Minutes

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Location of Meeting: Room 447 State Capitol, Sacramento, California July 26, 2013

Present:

Member Ana Matosantos, Chairperson Director of the Department of Finance Member Richard Chivaro, Vice Chairperson Representative of the State Controller

Member Andre Rivera

Representative of the State Treasurer

Member Ken Alex

Director of the Office of Planning and Research

Member Sarah Olsen Public Member

Member Carmen Ramirez City Council Member Member Don Saylor County Supervisor

NOTE: The transcript for this hearing is attached. These minutes are designed to be read in conjunction with the transcript.

CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL

Chairperson Matosantos called the meeting to order at 10:04 a.m.

Executive Director Heather Halsey called the roll.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES

Item 1 April 19, 2013

Member Rivera made a motion to adopt the minutes. Member Ramirez noted that her name was misspelled. With a second by Member Saylor, the April 19, 2013 hearing minutes were adopted as corrected by a vote of 7-0.

Item 2 May 24, 2013

Member Rivera made a motion to adopt the minutes. With a second by Member Alex, the May 24, 2013 hearing minutes were adopted by a vote of 7-0.

PUBLIC COMMENT FOR MATTERS NOT ON THE AGENDA

The Chairperson asked if there was any public comment. There was no response.

CONSENT CALENDAR

If there are no objections to any of the following action items designated by an asterisk (*), the Executive Director will include each one on the Proposed Consent Calendar that will be presented at the hearing. The Commission will determine which items will remain on the Consent Calendar.

HEARINGS AND DECISIONS PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 7 (GOV. CODE, § 17551, 17557, and 17559) (action)

PARAMETERS AND GUIDELINES AND PARAMETERS AND GUIDELINES AMENDMENTS

Item 7* Teacher Credentialing, 03-TC-09

California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Sections 80556(a),(c),(f) and (j) and 80556.1(e) as added and amended by Register 86, No. 40; Register 94, No. 19

San Diego County Office of Education, Claimant

INFORMATIONAL HEARING PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 8 (action)

STATEWIDE COST ESTIMATE

Item 9* Behavioral Intervention Plans (BIPs), CSM-4464

California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Sections 3001 and 3052

Register 93, No. 17; Register 96, No. 8; Register 96, No. 32

Butte County Office of Education, San Diego Unified School District, San Joaquin County Office of Education, Claimants

Item 10* Public Contracts (K-14), 02-TC-35

Public Contract Code Sections 3300, 7104, 20103.5, 20104, 20104.2, 20104.50, and 22300

Statutes 1985, Chapter 1073; Statutes 1988, Chapter 1408; Statutes 1989, Chapter 330; Statutes 1990, Chapter 1414; Statutes 1992, Chapter 799; and Statutes 1994, Chapter 726.

Business and Professions Code Section 7028.15

Statutes 1990, Chapter 321

California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Sections 59504, 59505, 59506, and 59509; Register 1994, Number 6

Clovis Unified School District and Santa Monica Community College District, Claimants

Item 11* Discrimination Complaint Procedures, 02-TC-46

Education Code Sections 66010.2, 66010.7, and 87102, as amended by Statutes 1988, Chapter 973 and Statutes 1991, Chapter 1198;

California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Sections 53003, 53004, 53006, 53020, 53021, 53022, 53023, 53024, 53025, 53026, and 53034, as added or amended by Register 92, Number 17; Register 96, Number 23; and Register 2002, Number 35

(Consolidated With)

Government Code Section 11135, as added or amended by Statutes 1992, Chapter 913; Statutes 1994, Chapter 146; Statutes 2001, Chapter 708; Statutes 2002, Chapter 1102

California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Sections 59320, 59322, 59324, 59326, 59327, 59328, 59330, 59332, 59334, 59336, 59338, 59340, and 59342, as added or amended by Register 81, Number 16; Register 92, Number 17; Register 96, Number 23; Register 2001, Number 6; Register 2002, Number 13; and Register 2002, Number 35

Santa Monica Community College District, Los Rios Community College District, and West Kern Community College District, Claimants

Item 12* Charter Schools IV, 03-TC-03

Education Code Sections 1628, 42100(a), 47605, 47605.6

Statutes 2002, Chapter 1058

San Diego Unified School District, Claimant

Item 13* Local Agency Ethics (AB 1234), 07-TC-04

Government Code Sections 53232.2(b), 53232.3(a) and (b), 53235(f) and 53235.2(a)

Statutes 2005, Chapter 700

City of Newport Beach, Claimant

Member Rivera made a motion to adopt the consent calendar. With a second by Member Olsen, the consent calendar was adopted by a vote of 7-0.

HEARINGS AND DECISIONS PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 7 (GOV. CODE, § 17551, 17557, and 17559) (action)

Executive Director Heather Halsey swore in parties and witnesses participating in the hearing.

APPEAL OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DECISIONS PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, SECTION 1181(c)

Item 3 Appeal of Executive Director Decisions

There were no appeals to consider.

TEST CLAIMS

Item 4 General Health Care Services for Inmates, 07-TC-12

Penal Code Section 4011.10

Statutes 2005, Chapter 481 (SB 159) and Statutes 2006, Chapter 303 (SB 896)

Orange County Health Care Agency, Claimant

This item was postponed to the September 27, 2013 hearing, at the request of the claimant.

Item 5 Immunization Records - Pertussis, 11-TC-02

Health and Safety Code Sections 120325 and 120335

Statutes 2010, Chapter 434 (AB 354)

Twin Rivers Unified School District, Claimant

This test claim pertains to school district activities related to a new pertussis (whooping cough) immunization requirement for adolescent students.

Senior Commission Counsel Tyler Asmundson presented this item and recommended that the Commission adopt one of two options. Option A would completely deny the test claim, based on the plain language of Health and Safety Code section 120335(d) which contains a prohibition. Option B would partially approve the test claim for the activities associated with Health and Safety Code section 120335(d) based on an analysis of activities required to implement the prohibition consistent with the Constitutional requirement for compulsory k-12 education.

Parties were represented as follows: Arthur Palkowitz of the law offices of Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz, representing the claimants; Laurie Carney and Susan Geanacou, representing the Department of Finance.

Following discussion among the Commission members, staff, and parties, Member Saylor made a motion to adopt Option B partially approving the test claim. With a second by Member Ramirez, the motion to adopt Option B partially approving the test claim was adopted by a vote of 6-1, with Chairperson Matosantos in opposition.

REQUEST FOR MANDATE REDETERMINATION

Item 6 Sexually Violent Predators (CSM-4509), 12-MR-01

Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 6601 through 6605, and 6608 Statutes 1995, Chapter 762 (SB 1143); Statutes 1995, Chapter 763 (AB 888); Statutes 1996, Chapter 4 (AB 1496)

As Alleged to be Modified by: Proposition 83, General Election, November 7, 2006

California Department of Finance, Requestor

This redetermination request alleges that the state's liability under a previously determined test claim has been modified based on a subsequent change in law as defined in Government Code section 17570.

Commission Counsel Matt Jones presented this item and recommended that the Commission determine that the Department of Finance has made an adequate showing that the State's liability for the *Sexually Violent Predators* program may have been modified as a result of Proposition 83

and that the Commission direct staff to schedule a second hearing on the request.

Parties were represented as follows: Hasmik Yaghobyan, on behalf of County of Los Angeles; Craig Osaki, on behalf of the Los Angeles County Public Defender's Office; Jack Weedin, on behalf of the California Public Defenders Association; Timothy Barry, on behalf of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office, District Attorney's Office, and Public Defender's Office; Geoffrey Neill, on behalf of the California State Association of Counties; Michael Byrne and Susan Geanacou, representing Requester, the Department of Finance.

Following discussion among the Commission members, staff, parties, and a member of the public, Member Olsen made a motion to adopt the staff recommendation. With a second by Member Alex, the staff recommendation to grant the request for redetermination and to direct staff to schedule a second hearing on the merits of the request was adopted by a vote of 7-0.

RECONSIDERATION OF STATEMENT OF DECISION AND PARAMETERS AND GUIDELINES

Item 8 California Public Records Act, 02-TC-10 and 02-TC-51
Government Code Sections 6253, 6253.1, 6253.9, 6254.3, and 6255
Statutes 1992, Chapters 463 (AB 1040); Statutes 2000, Chapter 982
(AB 2799); and Statutes 2001, Chapter 355 (AB 1014)
California Special Districts Association, Requestor

This is a request for reconsideration filed by the California Special Districts Association (CSDA), pursuant to section 1188.4 of the Commission's regulations. CSDA contends that the statement of decision and parameters and guidelines, adopted April 19, 2013, for the *California Public Records Act* program contain an error of law with respect to the description of eligible claimants. The decision authorized reimbursement for cities, counties, and school districts, but did not address the issue of special districts.

Chief Legal Counsel Camille Shelton presented this item and recommended that the Commission adopt the corrected statement of decision and parameters and guidelines which correct the section on eligible claimants to provide that special district subject to the taxing restrictions of articles XIII A and XIII C, and the spending limits of article XIII B, of the California Constitution, whose costs for this program are paid from proceeds of taxes are eligible to claim reimbursement, and to clarify potential offsetting revenues for this program.

Parties were represented as follows: Dorothy Holzem, California Special Districts Association, representing Requester; Andy Nichols, on behalf of Nichols Consulting; Geoffrey Neill, on behalf of the California State Association of Counties.

Following discussion among the Commission members, staff, and parties, Member Chivaro made a motion to adopt the staff recommendation. There was no second on this motion¹. The staff recommendation to adopt the corrected statement of decision and parameters and guidelines which correct the section on eligible claimants and clarify potential offsetting revenues for this program was adopted by a vote of 7-0.

HEARINGS ON COUNTY APPLICATIONS FOR FINDINGS OF SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL DISTRESS PURSUANT TO WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE

¹ Robert's Rules of Order (11th ed.), p.37, ll. 12-15 states "If a motion is considered and adopted without having been seconded – even in a case where there was no reason for the chair to overlook this requirement – the absence of a second does not affect the validity of the motion's adoption."

SECTION 17000.6 AND CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, ARTICLE 6.5 (info/action)

Item 14 Assignment of County Application to Commission, a Hearing Panel of One or More Members of the Commission, or to a Hearing Officer Note: This item will only be taken up if an application is filed.

No applications were filed.

STAFF REPORTS

Item 15 Legislative Update (info)

Program Analyst Kerry Ortman presented this item.

Item 16 Chief Legal Counsel: New Filings, Recent Decisions, Litigation Calendar (info)

Chief Legal Counsel Camille Shelton presented this item.

Item 17 Executive Director: Workload, Report to Finance and Backlog Reduction Plan and Tentative Agenda Items for Next Meeting (info)

Executive Director Heather Halsey presented this item.

CLOSED EXECUTIVE SESSION PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE SECTIONS 11126 AND 11126.2 (action).

PENDING LITIGATION

To confer with and receive advice from legal counsel, for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the following matters pursuant to Government Code section 11126(e)(1):

- 1. State of California Department of Finance, State Water Resources Control Board, and California Regional Water Quality Board, San Diego Region v. Commission on State Mandates and County of San Diego, et al. (petition and cross-petition), Third District Court of Appeal, Case No. C070357 (Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2010-80000604) [Discharge of Stormwater Runoff, Order No. R9-207-000, 07-TC-09 California Regional Water Control Board, San Diego Region Order No. R9-2007-001, NPDES No. CAS0108758, Parts D.1.d.(7)-(8), D.1.g., D.3.a.(3), D.3.a.(5), D.5, E.2.f, E.2.g,F.1, F.2, F.3, I.1, I.2, I.5, J.3.a.(3)(c) iv-vii & x-xv, and L]
- California School Board Association (CSBA) v. State of California et al., Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG11554698 [2010-2011 Budget Trailer Bills, Mandates Process for K-12 Schools, Redetermination Process]
- 3. State of California Department of Finance, State Water Resources Control Board, and California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Los Angeles Region v. Commission on State Mandates and County of Los Angeles, et al (petition and cross-petition). Second District Court of Appeal, Case No. B237153 (Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BS130730)
 [Municipal Storm Water and Urban Runoff Discharges, 03-TC-04, 03-TC-19, 03-TC-20, and 03-TC-21, Los Angeles Regional Quality

Control Board Order No. 01-182, Permit CAS004001, Parts 4C2a., 4C2b, 4E & 4Fc3]

PERSONNEL

To confer on personnel matters pursuant to Government Code section 11126(a)(1):

The Commission adjourned into closed executive session pursuant to Government Code section 11126(e) to confer with and receive advice from legal counsel for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the pending litigation published in the notice and agenda; to confer and receive advice from legal counsel regarding potential litigation, and to confer on personnel matters pursuant to Government Code section 11126(a)(1).

REPORT FROM CLOSED EXECUTIVE SESSION

At 11:40 a.m., Chairperson Matosantos reconvened in open session, and reported that the Commission met in closed executive session pursuant to Government Code section 11126(e) to confer with and receive advice from legal counsel for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the pending litigation listed on the public notice and agenda, and potential litigation, and to confer on personnel matters pursuant to Government Code section 11126(a)(1).

ADJOURNMENT

Hearing no further business, Chairperson Matosantos adjourned the meeting at 11:41 a.m.

Heather Halsey

Executive Director

PUBLIC MEETING

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

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TIME: 10:00 a.m.

DATE: Friday, July 26, 2013

PLACE: State Capitol, Room 447

Sacramento, California

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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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Reported by:

Daniel P. Feldhaus California Certified Shorthand Reporter #6949 Registered Diplomate Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter

Daniel P. Feldhaus, C.S.R., Inc.

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COMMISSIONERS PRESENT

ANA MATOSANTOS
(Commission Chair)
Director
State Department of Finance

KEN ALEX
Director
Office of Planning & Research

RICHARD CHIVARO
Representative for JOHN CHIANG
State Controller

M. CARMEN RAMIREZ
Oxnard City Council Member

ANDRÉ RIVERA
Representative for BILL LOCKYER
State Treasurer

SARAH OLSEN Public Member

DON SAYLOR
Yolo County Supervisor
Local Agency Member

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COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT

HEATHER HALSEY
Executive Director
(Item 17)

JASON HONE
Assistant Executive Director

CAMILLE SHELTON
Chief Legal Counsel
(Items 8 and 16)

PARTICIPATING COMMISSION STAFF

continued

TYLER ASMUNDSON
Commission Counsel
(Item 5)

ERIC FELLER
Senior Commission Counsel

MATTHEW JONES
Commission Counsel
(Item 6)

KERRY ORTMAN
Program Analyst
(Item 15)

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PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 5:

For Claimant San Jose Unified School District:

ARTHUR PALKOWITZ Stutz, Artiano, Shinoff & Holtz 2488 Historic Decatur Road, Suite 200 San Diego, California 92106

For Department of Finance:

SUSAN GEANACOU Senior Staff Attorney Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, California 95814

LAURIE CARNEY
Department of Finance
915 L Street
Sacramento, California 95814

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PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 6:

For Requestor Department of Finance:

SUSAN GEANACOU Senior Staff Attorney Department of Finance

MICHAEL BYRNE
Department of Finance
915 L Street
Sacramento, California 95814

For County of Los Angeles:

HASMIK YAGHOBYAN
SB 90 Administration
County of Los Angeles Auditor Controller's Office
500 West Temple, Room 525
Los Angeles, California 90012

CRAIG OSAKI
Los Angeles Public Defender's Office
210 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, California 90012

For California Public Defenders Association:

JACK WEEDIN California Public Defenders Association 10324 Placer Lane Sacramento, California 95827

For San Diego County Sheriff, P.D., and D.A.:

TIMOTHY BARRY County of San Diego County Counsel's Office 1600 Pacific Highway, Room 355 San Diego, California 92101

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 6: continued

For California State Association of Counties:

GEOFFREY NEILL Senior Legislative Analyst Revenue & Taxation California State Association of Counties 1100 K Street, Suite 101 Sacramento, California 95814

Individually as Member of the Public

ALLAN BURDICK CSAC SB-90 Service 2001 P Street, Suite 200 Sacramento, California 95811

Appearing for Item 8

For California Special Districts Association:

DOROTHY HOLZEM
Legislative Representative
Advocacy & Public Affairs Department
California Special Districts Association
1112 I Street Suite 200
Sacramento, California 95814

ANDY NICHOLS Nichols Consulting

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	Commission on State Mandates – July 20, 2013
1	BE IT REMEMBERED that on Friday, July 26, 2013,
2	commencing at the hour of 10:04 a.m., thereof, at the
3	State Capitol, Room 447, Sacramento, California, before
4	me, DANIEL P. FELDHAUS, CSR #6949, RDR and CRR, the
5	following proceedings were held:
6	000
7	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: The meeting of the
8	Commission on State Mandates will come to order.
9	Will you please call the roll, Heather?
10	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Alex?
11	MEMBER ALEX: Here.
12	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Chivaro?
13	MEMBER CHIVARO: Here.
14	MS. HALSEY: Ms. Matosantos?
15	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Here.
16	MS. HALSEY: Ms. Olsen?
17	MEMBER OLSEN: Here.
18	MS. HALSEY: Ms. Ramirez?
19	MEMBER RAMIREZ: Here.
20	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Rivera?
21	MEMBER RIVERA: Here.
22	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Saylor?
23	MEMBER SAYLOR: Here.
24	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All right, we have a quorum.
25	Are there any objections or corrections to

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the minutes of April 19<sup>th</sup>?
 1
 2
                MEMBER RIVERA: And I'll move approval.
3
                MEMBER SAYLOR: Second.
 4
                MEMBER RAMIREZ: Excuse me, I see that my name
5
      is misspelled. Anyway, it's Carmen Ramirez.
 6
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: So we'll make that
7
      correction.
 8
                MEMBER RAMIREZ: Thank you.
9
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: And we have a motion and a
10
      second.
                Any objections or abstentions?
11
12
                (No response)
13
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All right, so all those in
      favor?
14
15
                I guess we should take an official vote.
16
                All those in favor, vote "aye."
17
                (A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
18
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All right, and I already
19
      called for abstentions, so we're good to go.
20
                So the next set of minutes, are there any
      objections to or corrections of the May 24<sup>th</sup>, 2013,
21
22
      minutes?
23
                MEMBER RIVERA: Move approval.
24
                MEMBER ALEX: Second.
25
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Any objections?
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	Commission on State Francisco Striy 20, 2015
1	(No response)
2	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All right, is it okay to
3	substitute the prior roll call and go with all "ayes"?
4	All right, we'll go with that.
5	So with the minutes having been approved, we
6	will take up public comment for matters not on the
7	agenda.
8	Please note that the Commission cannot take
9	action on items not on the agenda. However, it can
10	schedule issues raised by public for consideration at
11	future meetings.
12	Is there any public comment?
13	(No response)
14	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Hearing no further public
15	comment, we'll move to the next item, which is the
16	Consent Calendar.
17	MS. HALSEY: The Consent Calendar consists of
18	Items 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.
19	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Are there any objections to
20	the proposed Consent Calendar?
21	MEMBER RIVERA: Move adoption.
22	MEMBER OLSEN: Second.
23	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: So we have a motion and a
24	second.
25	All those in support, please say "aye."

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(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
 1
 2
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All those opposed, signify
3
     by saying "no."
 4
                (No response)
 5
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All right, all "ayes." The
     motion carries.
6
7
                MS. HALSEY: Moving on to the Article 7 portion
8
      of the meeting, will the parties and witnesses for
9
      Items 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 please rise?
10
                (The parties and witnesses stood to
11
                be sworn.)
12
                MS. HALSEY: Do you solemnly swear or affirm
13
      that the testimony which you are about to give is true
14
      and correct based on your personal knowledge,
15
      information, or belief?
16
                (Parties and witnesses responded
17
                affirmatively.)
18
                MS. HALSEY: Thank you.
19
                Item 3 is reserved for appeals of the Executive
20
      Director's decisions. There are no appeals to consider
      under Item 3.
21
22
                Item 4 is the test claim on General Health Care
23
      Services for Inmates. This item has been postponed to
      the September 27<sup>th</sup>, 2013, hearing at the request of the
24
25
      claimant.
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Senior Commission Counsel Tyler Asmundson will present Item 5, a test claim on *Immunization Records* - Pertussis.

MR. ASMUNDSON: Good morning.

This test claim requests reimbursement for costs incurred by school districts for activities pertaining to a new pertussis immunization requirement for adolescent students.

This item was originally heard by the Commission on May 24th, 2013. The Commission continued the hearing on the test claim to consider an alternative proposed statement of decision that contains legal analysis supporting a finding that Health and Safety Code section 120335(d) imposes a reimbursable state-mandated program.

Staff has prepared two proposed statements of decision. Both decisions recommend that the Commission deny Health and Safety Code section 120325, as amended by the 2010 test-claim statute, on the ground that the statute is a statement of legislative intent and does not impose any state-mandated activities on school districts.

In addition, both decisions find that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the regulations adopted by DPH to implement the test-claim statute impose a reimbursable state-mandated

program on school districts because the regulations were 1 2 not pled or identified in the test claim. 3 The analysis in the two proposed decisions 4 departs on the issue of whether Health and Safety Code 5 section 120335(d), as amended and repealed by the 2010 6 test-claim statute, imposes a reimbursable state-mandated 7 program. 8 Option A denies the test claim, finding that 9 Health and Safety Code section 120335(d) does not impose 10 any state-mandated activities on school districts. 11 Option B approves the test claim with respect 12 to Health and Safety Code section 120335(d) based on an 13 interpretation of the statute, in light of the people's 14 constitutional right to education and the statutory 15 scheme in which section 120335 is a part. 16 Staff recommends that the Commission adopt 17 Option B, approving the test claim with respect to Health 18 and Safety Code section 120335(d). 19 Will the parties and witnesses please state 20 your names for the record? 21 MR. PALKOWITZ: Good morning. Arthur Palkowitz 22 on behalf of the claimant, Twin Rivers Unified School 23 District. 24 MS. CARNEY: Laurie Carney on behalf of the 25 Department of Finance.

1 MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, Department of 2 Finance. 3 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Mr. Palkowitz, do you have 4 any comments? 5 MR. PALKOWITZ: Yes, thank you. 6 Good morning, everyone, and thank you for the 7 opportunity to address the Commission this morning. 8 As was mentioned, this test claim was continued 9 from the last hearing. At the last hearing, we had 10 evidence and testimony on the District activities as it 11 pertains to this mandate. As was discussed at that time, 12 the school districts are assigned the task of making sure 13 all students are fully immunized in an attempt to comply 14 with that. And the requirement under the Constitution 15 that they unconditionally submit all students into the 16 public education system, it is our contention that this 17 mandate creates a reimbursable mandate; and we request 18 that the activities that are listed in the regulations be 19 approved as reimbursable activities. 20 As mentioned in the revised final staff 21 analysis, the interpretation of the regulations may be 22 considered in determining what is required by the 23 statute. 24 This is supported by the Yamaha case, cited on 25 page 9.

It is our belief that those activities listed 1 2 in the regulation should be considered a reimbursable 3 mandate. And it's also the claimant's contentions that 4 the information was included in the test claim and was 5 pled properly; and that also just judicial notice could 6 be applied in an attempt to use the regulations in 7 support of the mandate and the test claim. 8 Based on that, we urge the Commission to adopt 9 Option B, that's stated in the revised staff analysis. 10 Thank you. 11 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Finance? 12 MS. CARNEY: Finance continues to support the 13 original statement of decision, Option A, which would 14 deny this test claim based on the fact that the statute 15 does not impose a state-mandated program on school 16 districts, and that the Commission does not have the 17 jurisdiction to consider or make findings on the 18 implementing regulations. 19 We would just note, if the Commission is 20 inclined to consider an alternative, we recommend that 21 it not adopt the alternative statement of decision, 22 Option B, as proposed today. 23 Some of the activities listed as imposing mandated activities on school districts include 24 25 activities that we don't believe are required by statute

1 or regulations. For example, conditionally admitting 2 students who have not been fully immunized against 3 pertussis is permissible but not required by Health and 4 Safety Code Section 120340, as well as section 6035 of 5 Title 17 regulations. 6 Thank you. 7 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Staff, can you speak to this issue about inclusion in the decision of things that 8 9 Finance does not believe are actually requirements under 10 the regulations and the statute? 11 MR. ASMUNDSON: If they could state in detail 12 what items they are talking about, I can respond. 13 MS. CARNEY: Certainly. 14 So I'm looking at the proposed statement of 15 decision, pages 25 and 26, where the analysis lists the 16 activities found to be mandated. And specifically, Item Number 2, and also briefly mentioned in Item 17 18 Number 3, discusses the activity of conditionally 19 admitting students that have not been fully immunized. 20 I would point out again, in regulation section 6035, 21 paragraph A, it says that students may be admitted 22 conditionally but does not require it. And again, 23 statute Health and Safety Code 120340, again, says that 24 students may be admitted conditionally but does not 25 require.

MR. ASMUNDSON: Okay, pages 25 and 26 of the statement of decision does list the activities that we believe are required to comply with 120335(d).

What we tried to do is determine exactly what a school would have to do to determine if they should admit a student or not. The code section cited by Finance does allow schools to conditionally admit students until they are fully immunized. And that's why we added those activities, because students have a constitutional right to go to school. And if they're not fully immunized at the time that they try to be admitted, they are allowed to be conditionally admitted until they're fully immunized.

MS. SHELTON: Can I also just clarify that the activities here, we did -- under rules of statutory construction, you can use regulations to interpret what the Legislature intended to mean when they adopted a program. And we took some of the language from the regulations that just strictly applied to the activity of the prohibition of not admitting a student who has not been fully immunized.

What is not allowed for reimbursement here would be those activities required by the regulations that impose duties of reporting and record-keeping.

Those are not merely tailored to the prohibition in

1	120335(d).
2	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Have we taken this similar
3	approach anywhere in the past, in terms of deciding that
4	something is required when the regulations are now a part
5	of the test claim?
6	MS. SHELTON: Yes, it's happened a couple of
7	times. It really depends on the interpretation of the
8	statutory scheme.
9	We did it in POBR II, the second one. I don't
10	remember offhand how that was written, but it was written
11	as a prohibition. And essentially, when you read the
12	surrounding statutes and the test-claim statute in light
13	of that, it did require them to do something. If they
14	didn't do something, it would have triggered a
15	constitutional problem. So it just depends on your
16	statutory interpretation.
17	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: And if you could remind me,
18	when the bill was going through the Legislature, what the
19	Legislature thought it was doing?
20	MS. SHELTON: Yes, in the Committee analysis,
21	they did believe that the statute itself did not create
22	the mandate; but that any regulations adopted would
23	create the mandate. Those regulations were adopted three
24	months before the test claim was filed.
25	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Are there any questions from

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1
     members, or any additional discussion on this issue?
2
                (No response)
3
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Seeing none, do we have a
4
     motion?
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                MEMBER SAYLOR: Move approval.
                MR. PALKOWITZ: May I -- I'm sorry, may I add
6
7
      something before the motion is heard?
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                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Sure.
9
                MR. PALKOWITZ: Thank you.
10
                I also want to remind the Commission, that
11
      there are previously approved mandates that involve
12
     immunization; and also the reporting in the past would be
13
     considered a downstream expense that would flow from
14
     these activities. And they have been approved in
15
     previous mandates.
16
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Finance, can you remind me
     of the treatment of the immunization mandates relative to
17
18
      the education block grant?
19
                MS. CARNEY: One more time, please?
20
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: The immunizations mandate
21
     relative to the education block grant that was adopted as
     an alternative to the mandate process in the Budget Act,
22
23
     I think, last year?
24
                MS. CARNEY: That is something I'm not prepared
25
      to speak to. I'm sorry.
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• /
CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Staff, do you, by chance,
know the answer to this question?
MS. HALSEY: I just know that currently
approved mandates for immunizations were rolled into
that; but I don't know in terms of funding or anything
how that was done.
MS. SHELTON: Maybe going back just one step,
if the Commission does adopt Option B, under the
Commission's regulations, the Commission has the
authority and the discretion to include activities that
are reasonably necessary to comply with the mandate.
Those activities have to be narrowly tailored to the
mandate.
So it is not correct to say that any downstream
activity triggered by the mandate would be held to be
reimbursable. The Commission has not gone that far.
It has to be narrowly tailored. So even if the
Commission were to adopt Option B, it is likely staff
would recommend that the Commission not adopt activities
to report and record.
CHAIR MATOSANTOS: And if I recall correctly
and correct me if I'm wrong the staff's initial
recommendation was to deny the claim.
MS. SHELTON: Yes.
CHAIR MATOSANTOS: It's a subsequent

1 determination that's not saying that the full test claim 2 is actually eligible, partly because it doesn't include 3 the specific regulatory requirements. It's really more 4 about those elements that staff sees as being linked to 5 the constitutional obligation for students to have access to a free education? 6 7 MS. SHELTON: Exactly. 8 MS. HALSEY: That's correct, combined with that 9 prohibition. 10 And I did want to point out that, though it's 11 true that Mr. Palkowitz says that these reporting 12 activities have been approved in prior test claims, the 13 regs were pled in those test claims. So that's the 14 distinction here. 15 MS. GEANACOU: If I may? Susan Geanacou, from 16 the Department of Finance. 17 If the Commission is motivated to adopt an 18 alternative, perhaps Alternative B, as Commission staff 19 proposes here, I just want to make sure that you're 20 comfortable with the legal analysis that underlies any 21 such option rather than voting out of equity, because the 22 Commission is not supposed to cure perceived inequities 23 by virtue of a mandate finding. 24 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Ms. Olsen? 25 MEMBER OLSEN: Can staff address this issue --

1 and I know you addressed it the last time we heard this, 2 too, but I just need to be refreshed on it -- the regs were out three months before this claim was filed? 3 4 MS. SHELTON: Yes. 5 MEMBER OLSEN: Does that affect how the courts would view this? 6 7 MS. SHELTON: Well, let me say this is a little 8 bit of a different scenario than what we've had in the 9 past. 10 In the past, when the Commission has approved 11 a prohibition, all you had was the statute. There was 12 nothing interpreting the statutory language. It was just 13 statutory language. 14 Here, on the other hand, you have the 15 prohibition, the acknowledgment by the Legislature that 16 they thought the mandate would come from the regulations. 17 Then the regulations were adopted and amended to 18 implement the Pertussis test-claim statute. And those 19 became effective, and put into Barclays three months 20 before the test claim was filed. So they were there; 21 everybody was on notice that they existed. 22 Those regulations were amended to update the 23 shots -- you know, the booster shot for pertussis, update 24 the form requirements for the physicians to fill out that 25 form, to note the Tdap vaccination, to update the

1 record-keeping and recording of that shot, and the notice 2 requirements to parents. So it was specifically tailored 3 to the prohibition. 4 And in that sense, yes, it's a little different 5 than what the Commission has done. But there are rules 6 of statutory construction, too. And when you look at 7 what the Legislature is saying and you look at the 8 statute in light of the whole scheme, then you have to 9 consider those other statutes, too, and interpret it that 10 way. 11 It's really a close call. 12 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: But if we go with Option A, 13 there is nothing to preclude another district or this 14 district to file a new test claim associated, right? 15 MS. SHELTON: No. They are beyond their 16 statute of limitations. 17 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: They're beyond the statute 18 of limitations. And all districts would be beyond the 19 statute of limitations? Okay. 20 MS. HALSEY: Yes, if it were not for that, then 21 I'm sure the claim would have been amended to add the 22 regs. 23 MEMBER ALEX: And let me observe, you know, 24 without knowing the answer to this, that it's an odd 25 concept that a statute would -- that the Legislature

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1
     would say that the statute does not create a mandate and
2
     the regs do. Because, generally, the regs must be
     consistent with the statute. So if there's a mandate
3
4
     here, it at least strikes me that the mandate comes from
5
     the statute, not from the regs.
6
                MEMBER SAYLOR: I move Option B.
7
                MEMBER RAMIREZ: Second.
8
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All those in support of the
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     motion, "aye"?
10
                (A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
11
               CHAIR MATOSANTOS: I'm opposed, so no.
               But motion carries.
12
13
               MS. HALSEY: Moving on to Item 6, Commission
14
     Counsel Matt Jones will present Item 6, a request for
15
     mandate redetermination on Sexually Violent Predators.
16
               MR. JONES: Good morning.
17
                This redetermination request alleges that the
18
     State's liability under a previously determined test
19
     claim has been modified based on a subsequent change in
20
     law as defined in Government Code section 17570.
21
               A subsequent change in law is defined in the
22
     code to mean a change in law that requires a finding that
23
     an incurred cost is a cost mandated by the state under
24
     17514, or is not a cost mandated by the State pursuant to
25
     section 17556.
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Proposition 83, adopted by the voters in the November 2006 general election, amended and reenacted several sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code that are part of the Sexually Violent Predators program, and expressly requires some of the same activities previously approved by the Commission as imposing costs mandated by the State.

The requester now alleges that Proposition 83 constitutes a subsequent change in law, and that local government claimants no longer incur state-mandated costs pursuant to Government Code section 17556(f).

The mandate-redetermination process under section 17570 calls for a two-step hearing.

At this first step, the only issue before the Commission is whether the requester has made an adequate showing that the State's liability under Article XIII B, section 6, may have been modified based on a subsequent change in law.

If the Commission determines that the requester has made this showing, then pursuant to section 17570, the Commission shall notice the request for a second hearing to determine if a new test-claim decision shall be adopted to supersede the previously adopted test-claim decision; and what, if any, effect the subsequent change in law has on the test-claim statutes as approved in the

prior claim.
Staff recommends that the Commission determine
that the Department of Finance has made the adequate
showing that the State's liability for the Sexually
Violent Predators program may have been modified as a
result of Proposition 83; and further recommends that the
Commission direct staff to schedule a second hearing on
the request.
Will the parties and witnesses please state
your names for the record?
MS. YAGHOBYAN: Hasmik Yaghobyan on behalf of
County of Los Angeles.
MR. OSAKI: Craig Osaki with the Los Angeles
County Public Defender's office.
MR. WEEDIN: Jack Weedin, deputy public
defender for L.A. County, but representing California
Public Defenders Association, or CPDA.
MR. BYRNE: Michael Byrne, Department of
Finance.
MR. BARRY: Timothy Barry, Office of County
Counsel, on behalf of the Sheriff, D.A., and P.D. in
San Diego County.
MR. NEILL: I'm Geoffrey Neill with the
California State Association of Counties.
MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, Department of

1	Finance.
2	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Finance?
3	MS. GEANACOU: Yes. Thank you.
4	We're situated a little differently than
5	sometimes we are. Here, we're the requester. Thank you
6	for considering our request this morning.
7	This is Finance's request for a new test-claim
8	decision on the Sexually Violent Predators mandate.
9	The Commission on State Mandates adopted this
10	statement of decision, establishing this mandate in 1998.
11	In 2006, voters approved Proposition 83.
12	The statutes comprising the Sexually Violent
13	Predators mandates were all either expressly included in
14	Proposition 83 or are necessary to implement it.
15	Government Code section 17556(f) says, "The
16	Commission shall find no costs mandated by the State if
17	the statute or executive order imposes duties that are
18	necessary to implement or are expressly included in a
19	ballot measure approved by the voters in the statewide or
20	local election."
21	Four years after the voters adopted
22	Proposition 83 in 2010, the Legislature enacted a process
23	which we are utilizing now to allow for a new test-claim
24	decision following a subsequent change in law affecting
25	the State liability for mandate reimbursement.

1 Here, that subsequent change in law is Proposition 83, which was approved by the voters. Based 2 3 on that voters' approval of Proposition 83, Finance 4 asserts in its request for a new test-claim decision that 5 the Sexually Violent Predators mandate is no longer 6 reimbursable in its entirety based on Government Code 7 section 17556(f). 8 Finance has considered the comments filed in 9 response to our request. These have been addressed by 10 the staff in the final staff analysis. 11 We believe we have made the adequate showing 12 necessary to proceed to a second hearing on our request 13 for a new test-claim decision. Accordingly, we request 14 the Commission members adopt the staff analysis 15 recommending this next step on the merits of our request. 16 Thank you. CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Whoever is first on the 17 18 public comment. 19 MS. YAGHOBYAN: Good morning. Thank you. 20 Well, as we showed it in our comments filed 21 with the Commission, we disagree with the Department of 22 Finance's contention that Prop. 83 changed the SVP law. 23 We don't believe that the Proposition 83 has changed SVP 24 law, because just the recitation or the repetition of the 25 code section in the proposition doesn't mean a change in

law.

And secondly, with the Commission's comment that because the Department of Finance waited six and a half years after the passage of Prop. 83 to come forward and initiate this redetermination process, there was no mechanism to do that.

But like I said, we respectfully disagree with the Commission staff's analysis because there were mechanisms, at least in 2010, as you mentioned and still, the Department of Finance didn't come forward or didn't initiate any redetermination process.

Because in the case of the claimants, local agencies after enactment of a statute, we only have twelve months from the date of enactment or incurring of a cost to file a test claim with the Commission on State Mandates in order to get reimbursement. And also, when we file our test claim, we specifically have to file the changes, the new sections of a code, or Penal Code or the statute. That is, we only have to plead those new changes. We can't just say because the entire code section was repeated in the statute, therefore, everything is reimbursable.

So we believe that the same terminology should be applied to the Department of Finance also, even though we don't think they have any standing, and also because

1	their action has been barred because they stayed too
2	long.
3	And secondly, the Proposition 83 law is the
4	mirror image of SB 1128 which was passed two months
5	before Proposition 83 was put on the ballot.
6	So, therefore, we disagree with the
7	Commission's findings; and we don't think this was a
8	change in law to trigger the redetermination process.
9	And also even if it does, we can't go back and change the
10	sentencing of the offenders who were sentenced prior to
11	the Prop. 83.
12	If we do that, we are going to be overriding
13	the judge's sentencing decision, which we can't do that.
14	Therefore, we don't think that this statement of decision
15	should be adopted.
16	Thank you.
17	MR. OSAKI: Good morning, Members of the
18	Commission. I'm the deputy in charge of the SVP Branch
19	in L.A. County.
20	I have personally handled cases pre-Prop. 83
21	and post-Prop. 83. And I'm in a position to explain to
22	the Commission what effect, if any, the proposition had
23	before and after the passage of Prop. 83.
24	And specifically, I'd like to address the eight
25	mandated activities that were approved for reimbursement

1 back in 1998, because the question is whether or not they 2 were affected by the passage of Prop. 83. 3 With respect to the eight activities -- if the 4 Commission will note, they're numbered 1 through 8. 5 With respect to Items 1 through 3, we are just 6 simply dealing with who is in charge of prosecuting the 7 case, who is in charge of filing the case and reading the 8 material. Both pre- and post-Prop. 83, the prosecutors 9 or the District Attorney's office in our county were 10 responsible for that. There was absolutely no change. 11 With respect to Activities 4 through 7 --12 which is really the bulk of the SVP program -- we're 13 talking about the attendance and preparation at the 14 probable-cause hearings, at the trials, and at the 15 subsequent hearings as well, and also the retention of 16 experts and other professionals. Those activities still 17 existed both pre- and post-Prop. 83. 18 And finally, with respect to Activity 8 19 regarding transportation, that was not addressed by the 20 Department of Finance, so I won't address that. 21 But as the Commission can see, there really was 22 no impact, especially as to these mandated activities. 23 And I'm here to raise my concern over an 24 interpretation of a statute indicating a change in the 25 law, or a subsequent change in the law to include a

1 passage -- a subsequent passage of an initiative that 2 really didn't change the mandated activities. 3 So thank you very much. 4 MR. WEEDIN: To quote a verse from a song by 5 The Who -- maybe some of you were around when the song 6 came out -- is: What was parking on the left is now 7 parking on the right. In other words, it's our position 8 that Prop. 83 did not initiate a subsequent change in the 9 law as envisioned by the Government Code section. 10 There are a couple cases cited in our 11 materials, Hubbard and Lukas -- one is pre-Prop. 83 and 12 one post-Prop. 83 -- that compares the purpose, effect, 13 and focus of the Sexually Violent Predator Act. 14 And the Supreme Court of our State's conclusion 15 was: It's the same. It's identical. 16 The representative, Hasmik, from LA County 17 touched on it initially. In August of 2006, before the 18 passage of Proposition 83, the Legislature passed 19 SB 1128, which made sustentative changes to the SVP Act 20 that Proposition 83 sought to do, including the primary 21 one, create from a two-year term of commitment, to an 22 indeterminate commitment. So that was legislatively 23 enacted prior to Prop. 83. 24 Prop. 83 only amended seven of the 22 25 provisions in the SVP Act. The key sections, as

1 Mr. Osaki said, providing counsel, experts, hearings, 2 trials, the mandated reimbursable activities under 3 Welfare and Institutions Code 6602 and 6603 remain 4 unchanged. 5 Staff, in their analysis, deems this to be irrelevant. I beg to differ. I think subsequent change 6 7 of law means more than putting a comma in a proposition. It means that there has to be something substantive in 8 9 the mandated reimbursable activity. 10 The other area in our letters that I would 11 like to touch on is the concepts of misrepresentation, 12 estoppel, and unclean hands by the Legislative Analyst's 13 Office and the Department of Finance, which synergizes 14 the effect that there is no substantive change by 15 Proposition 83. 16 First of all, the voters materials in 17 Proposition 83 failed to mention any possibility of 18 redetermination; instead, it said there would be -- it 19 could be a cost saving to states and local governments. 20 If the test claim is undone, there would not be a cost 21 saving. 22 Also, the proponents of Prop. 83 failed to 23 inform -- or tried to inform the electorate of the 24 changes that SB 1128 made to their proposition. 25 September of 2005, the LAO and DOF issued a letter under

Elections Code section 9005, stating no less than four 1 2 times that, notwithstanding Prop. 83, the local 3 government costs would be reimbursed in full, including 4 those changes made by Prop. 83 to the SVP program. 5 that letter was issued by the director of DOF and the 6 director of LAO. And interesting enough, the DOF 7 initiated the current redetermination request. 8 Staff minimizes this by saying initially that 9 there was no mechanism for redetermination present in 10 2005-2006. That's not true. Government Code 17570 was 11 enacted in 1986 and amended in 1990, which was in effect 12 at the time of Proposition 83. 13 And under the code at that time, the LAO had 14 the power to reinitiate. 15 And the final staff analysis said, "Well, that 16 doesn't matter because it's different parties." Well, 17 I beg to differ. That begs the question, and who can 18 request a redetermination is inconsequential. 19 was, redetermination was legally possible in 2005 and 20 2006. 21 And the LAO, who had the power to initiate 22 redetermination, once again, was one of the signatories 23 in that September 2005 letter. 24 And also in the California School Board 25 Association decision, Government Code 17556(f), which was

1	enacted in 2005, gave the Legislature the power to grant
2	redeterminations, albeit a different party than the
3	current Government Code section; part of the
4	redetermination was still there.
5	In conclusion, there's a lot at issue here,
6	including the integrity and transparency of state
7	government, as well as the viability to prosecute and
8	defend cases brought into the Sexually Violent Predator
9	Act, an issue that's really important to the electorate.
10	CPDA respectfully requests the Commission to
11	deny the Department of Finance request, finding there
12	wasn't a subsequent change in the law.
13	Thank you.
14	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: For subsequent folks who
15	have public comment on this issue, can you just make sure
16	that you don't repeat other folks?
17	So we've heard clearly on the issue that folks
18	coming under public comment think that the mandated
19	activities were there beforehand.
20	We've heard on this issue about, you know, that
21	Finance, based on what was said and the voter pamphlet in
22	2006, does that have an effect on the issue before us.
23	And so I just want to make sure we don't get
24	repetition in subsequent witnesses, please.
25	Go ahead.

MR. BARRY: Good morning, Madam Chair, Members, Commissioners. My name is Timothy Barry. I'm a Senior Deputy County Counsel with the County of San Diego. I'm here on behalf of the San Diego Office of Public Defenders, the San Diego District Attorney's office, and the San Diego County Sheriff.

As has been discussed previously, and again I won't repeat myself, but the statute requires a subsequent change in the law. There has not been a subsequent change in the substance of the law as it pertains to the mandates. The only change that has occurred is as to the form of the law.

As staff had mentioned, the focus of Jessica's Law was to make changes in the Penal Code to increase criminal penalties, to increase the scope of who was included in the "sexually violent predator" definition.

And arguably, the changes that were made to the Welfare and Institutions Code sections that contain the mandated activities were only required in order to comply with Article IV, Section 9 of the Constitution, which requires that where any amendment is made to a statute, the entire statute has to be considered to be amended and reenacted.

So in order for the language that is contained in the Welfare and Institutions Code sections that contain the mandates to be updated to conform to the

other provisions in the Penal Code, it was required that the entire text of these provisions be included in Jessica's Law.

Arguably, that's the only reason that they were included, and that there was no intent by the Legislature or the proponents of Jessica's Law to include or to change the fact that the State would be obligated to pay for those obligations.

The summary, I've put forth the summary in our papers that we filed with the Commission. It appears at pages 204 through 207. I'm not going to go through those, but I've detailed each of the different code sections that contain the mandated activities and whether or not there were changes; and if there were changes, whether, in fact, they had any effect on the mandated activities. And I would submit to you that they don't.

The only way that the staff findings can get to where they are with respect to the definition of "subsequent change in the law" is through the application of the exception contained in 17556(f).

And where I specifically have a problem with the language is, as amended in 2005, the Legislature added language that said, "This subdivision applies, regardless of whether the statute or executive order was enacted or adopted before or after the date on which the

ballot measure was approved by the voters." 1 2 Now, the California School Board case, which 3 is referenced in the papers, dealt with whether or not 4 the reasonably-within-the-scope language, or 5 necessary-to-implement language. And it expressly excluded from its consideration, a determination of the 6 7 validity of the last sentence of 17556(f). And I think 8 ultimately, that may be where this case is going. 9 I can understand that if there is a proposition 10 or an initiative that is enacted and that there is 11 subsequent legislation that is enacted to implement that, 12 or regulations that are enacted to implement that, or if 13 there is existing legislation and there is a proposition 14 or initiative passed by the voters that changes the scope 15 of what the mandates were, then those would not necessarily be reimbursable. 16 17 But what we have here is a situation where your 18 Commission previously found that the Constitution 19 required that these activities be reimbursed by the 20 State. So you've made a constitutional finding that 21 under Article XIII B, section 6, that these activities 22 are required to be reimbursed. 23 The substance of those activities has not 24 changed. The Legislature, through the last sentence of

17556(f), is now attempting to usurp the Commission's

25

authority by saying it doesn't matter when this 1 2 proposition or initiative was enacted; and, therefore, 3 we can dictate to you that this is no longer a 4 constitutionally mandated activity. 5 So I know that's not -- it's probably beyond 6 the scope of what this hearing is today. But, again, I 7 wanted to reiterate the comments of the other witnesses, 8 that there has been no change in the substance of the 9 law. The mandated activities remain the same both before 10 and after the adoption of Jessica's Law. And the only 11 way you get to this exception, is through the application 12 of 17556(f); specifically, the language as amended by 13 2005. CHAIR MATOSANTOS: The CSAC witness. 14 15 MR. NEILL: Good morning. Geoffrey Neill with 16 the California State Association of Counties. 17 I first want to point out, the Constitution is 18 unequivocal. If the Legislature or State agency mandates 19 a program, as they have in this case, they established 20 the program, then the State must provide funds to 21 reimburse. That's the only test for reimbursement, is 22 whether the Legislature or a State agency established a 23 program. 24 There are four exceptions, none of which anyone 25 is arguing are relevant in this case. The program

remains as established by the Legislature. There is no exception for, if later in the Constitution, for later, if the voters happened to include some of the sections that are included in the program, adding a comma here or there, or changing one element of the program, that that later gets the State out of its burden from under the onus of reimbursing locals for these programs.

As you heard, of the 14 sections or subsections that established -- that form the basis for the original statement of decision, only three were actually amended by Prop. 83. And those were largely technical.

But the Department of Finance goes on to argue that the rest of the Sexually Violent Predator Program, the reimbursable parts, are necessary to implement.

However, the only effect of the voters' actions were to enhance penalties. And to do this, you need to identify who is a sexually violent predator under the program.

CHAIR MATOSANTOS: If I may, I find that really misleading, given the fact that Proposition 83 substantially changed the process through which folks were to identify who were SVPs and substantially increase the number of people who had to be evaluated as SVPs to kind of -- the fact that, you know -- in some ways, I feel like your testimony suggests that Proposition 83 hardly made any changes, and that the law, before it

1 passed, was very similar. And I would think that the caseload in L.A. County substantially increased following 2 3 Jessica's Law, given the fact that the number of people 4 in state hospitals considered SVPs substantially 5 increased. 6 MR. NEILL: Well, in fact, there was the 7 Sexually Violent Predators Program that was found to be, 8 by the statement of decision. But two months before 9 voters enacted Proposition 83, it was --10 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: I'm quite familiar with 1128. 11 12 MR. NEILL: I know that you are -- which is 13 substantially similar to the ballot measure. So it was 14 established by the Legislature. And then the changes in 15 Prop. 83 were, compared to 1128, significantly more minor 16 than they would have been if 1128 had not been passed by 17 the Legislature. 18 So the fact that Prop. 83 did not make all of 19 the changes that it appeared to make based on, you know, 20 the line that it's in Proposition 83 itself. 21 In any case, I think that what was necessary to 22 implement was far less than the legislative scheme that 23 still exists. There were many less onerous ways of 24 implementing Prop. 83 than the current process. 25 don't think that the current legislative -- legislatively

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1	enacted the current statutory process is necessary to
2	implement Prop. 83, because it requires necessity. And
3	as I said, many less onerous schemes were available to
4	the Legislature to implement Prop. 83.
5	Instead, what stands is what was already
6	enacted beforehand. That doesn't make it less onerous
7	than other possibilities, it only makes it what happened
8	to exist before.
9	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: So part of your issue, on
10	the issue you're speaking to now, really is about Step 2,
11	which isn't before us today. Okay.
12	Staff, could you address some of the issues
13	that have been raised by the witnesses?
14	MR. JONES: We have one more witness. I'm
15	sorry.
16	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Oh, sorry. Do we have one
17	more witness?
18	I think we're good.
19	MR. JONES: Okay, fair enough.
20	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Yes, I thought we had; but
21	thanks for double-checking.
22	MR. JONES: Thank you. Good morning.
23	Yes, I'd love to respond to as many of those as
24	the members have questions about.
25	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Just for me, the pieces that

I'd be interested in just having you remind us of is this question of when the statutory authority for the Commission came in, relative to reviewing whether a prior claim had been affected by subsequent, as well as reminding us of the constitutional reimbursement requirements, or lack thereof, associated with voter-approved...

MR. JONES: Certainly, yes.

Well, first, as an aside, you're correct in noting that "necessary to implement," with respect to the activities of Sections, I believe, 6602, 6603, I think it's Activities 4, 5, and 7, that's not before the Commission today.

The only issue before the Commission today, as I said at the outset, is whether the State's liability may have been modified based on a subsequent change in law. And the subsequent change in law, which has been the subject of substantial testimony this morning, is defined in the statute. We're not talking about a subsequent change in the test-claim statutes themselves. Whether the test-claim statutes themselves were amended with a comma or with more than that, matters very little with respect to the definition of "subsequent change in law" in the Government Code.

A "subsequent change in law" in the Government

1 Code is defined as a change that requires a finding that 2 a test-claim statute either -- or that a statute either 3 does impose state-mandated costs under 17514, or does not 4 impose state-mandated costs under 17556. 5 And 17556(f), as we all know, prevents the Commission -- it states that, "The Commission shall not 6 7 find costs mandated by the State for a voter-enacted 8 ballot measure." 9 So the subsequent change in law in this case 10 has very little to do with the substantive changes to the 11 test-claim statutes or -- and for that matter, SB 1128 12 is going to be irrelevant for the same reason. 13 very little to do with the substantive changes to the 14 test-claim statutes; it has to do with the changes that 15 have happened in the mandates scheme, if you like; 16 something that affects how the mandate is viewed under section 17556 and whether the mandate is constitutionally 17 18 reimbursable after that. 19 But to speak to, in particular, the issue that 20 you asked about. Section 17570 was amended to include a 21 redetermination process in 2010. 22 I think Camille might know what the statute 23 said as of 2005. 24 MS. SHELTON: It was added in 2010. 25 history of this goes way back. But originally, the

Department of Finance or the State could bring a cost-savings claim to the Commission. That process was repealed. And for many years, there was no process to allow that type of a request at all.

Immediately before the enactment of the redetermination statute in 2010, there is a statutory process and a regulatory process that allows for a quick reconsideration for an error of law. But that must be done within a quick 30-day, and it has nothing to do with any changes in the law, it's just that the Commission made a mistake. So this is a new statutory process as of 2010.

MR. JONES: To the extent that my analysis states that there was no mechanism or process to redetermine a test claim or to reconsider a test claim prior to 2010, all of the reconsiderations of test claims that I've been able to locate -- and, obviously, there are persons here today who have been with the Commission quite a bit longer -- were based on a legislative directive. The Legislature directed the Commission to reconsider a particular test claim. And I wouldn't consider that to be a mechanism or process that exists in law. That's something that the Legislature proactively requested from the Commission.

And, moreover, each of those, I think, would

be considered a separation-of-powers violation after 1 2 CSBA, the 2009 case, where I think three or four 3 reconsiderations were struck down on separation-of-powers 4 principles. 5 So I think it's fair to say and I think it's 6 true to say, that there was no mechanism or process for a 7 redetermination or reconsideration of a test claim prior 8 to 2010. And for that reason, the six years of waiting, 9 I suppose, that many of the claimants and many of the 10 interested parties are accusing the Department of Finance 11 of, I don't see how you can say that the Department of 12 Finance was sitting on its hands for six years, when 13 their procedure that we're doing today, the procedure 14 that we're dealing with, didn't exist until 2010. 15 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Any questions from Members? 16 MEMBER SAYLOR: Matt, that's actually the -- if I could? 17 18 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Yes. 19 MEMBER SAYLOR: Matt, that's the question that 20 I'm puzzling with, is at what point do we -- are there 21 other issues out there that go back in time, that at any 22 point in time Finance could bring forward as a 23 redetermination? And it does seem to me to be a 24 substantial passage of time to this point. 25 MR. JONES: Yes, sir. Well, you're right, that

1 it's been, you could say, two and a half, three years. 2 In this case, I don't remember exactly, I think 3 the 2010 statute was in October of 2010 or something like that. 5 So you could say that, yes, it's been a few years that Finance waited to file this particular claim. 6 7 But the claimants benefit from that because -- or excuse me, not this claim, but this redetermination request, 8 9 But the claimants all benefit from that 10 because the redetermination request, if you were to grant 11 it, only goes back one fiscal year. 12 The claimants have argued -- or at least 13 implied -- that the statute of limitations should go both 14 ways; and that whatever subsequent change in law, you 15 know, that triggers the authority, the ability to bring 16 a redetermination request, maybe that Finance or the 17 Controller should only have, you know, 12 months or one 18 fiscal year to bring that claim. 19 But that's simply not the way the law is 20 written. And even if it were, it still benefits the 21 claimants, the longer Finance waits to bring these 22 redetermination requests. 23 So, yes, it's very possible that we could see 24 some pretty old laws being redetermined, some pretty old 25 test claims being redetermined, but they're only going to

go back one fiscal year. 1 2 MS. SHELTON: And can I clarify, too? The redetermination process works both ways. 3 4 It doesn't work just for the State. It also works for the claimant community. It was written not to provide a 5 6 statute of limitations based on a subsequent change in 7 the law. Instead, they limited the period of 8 reimbursement of the effect of a new-test claim decision. 9 And it works equally both ways. 10 MEMBER SAYLOR: The second question. Some of 11 the witnesses referred to documents that were provided 12 to the voters at the time they were considering 13 Proposition 83, and documents that stated something about 14 the status of the local government costs. 15 What does that -- that would be for the merits 16 of the discussion that we have probably in the future. 17 But what weight does that have in determining whether we 18 should redetermine the case of a mandate and mandated 19 costs? 20 MR. JONES: Yes, sir. Well, there are a few 21 issues there. 22 One is that, yes, there was some evidence 23 submitted into the record that at the time that 24 Proposition 83 was being considered by the voters, being 25 put before the voters, there was some analysis from the

1 LAO, I think, sent to -- from the LAO and the Department 2 of Finance, sent to then Attorney General Bill Lockyer, 3 that suggested that there would be no fiscal impact on local government. And as I stated in the staff analysis, 5 that at the time was true because, again, there was no 6 mechanism for reconsidering a test claim absent 7 legislative directive to do so. 8 So to the extent that the interested parties 9 and claimants are now asking the Commission to apply a 10 promissory estoppel -- not a promissory estoppel -- but 11 equitable estoppel or an "unclean hands" defense or any 12 of those equitable defenses that have been raised, none 13 of those really apply unless there has been some kind of 14 misrepresentation at the outset, which there hasn't here. 15 The other issue that you suggest, which is... 16 I'm sorry, I lost my train of thought for a 17 moment. 18 Forgive me. Reframe your question one more 19 time, and I think I'll get there. 20 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: And just one more piece on 21 this. When the letter that goes to the Attorney Generals 22 is what goes to -- and is available to people when 23 they're gathering signatures, it's not what goes to the 24 voter in the voter pamphlet. The voter pamphlet is just 25 written by LAO; right? I'm just making sure we got that

1 right, in terms of who saw what, when. 2 MR. JONES: I apologize. I remember where I 3 was going now. 4 The other piece I was going to speak to was, to 5 the extent that the intent of the voters may have not 6 been cognizant of any fiscal impact on local government, 7 the intent of the voters I don't believe has any place in 8 the Commission's consideration of what the Constitution 9 now requires. 10 One of the commenters -- and I'm sorry, there 11 were too many of you, I lost track of whom it was. MEMBER SAYLOR: I'd like to have that one 12 13 quoted and framed someplace. MR. JONES: Well, I think it's true, one of the 14 15 commenters stated that the Constitution is unequivocal 16 with respect to what is reimbursable. And I think that's 17 true. 18 And here, we have decades of precedent that say 19 that only state-mandated programs are reimbursable. And 20 here, we have a program that has now clearly been adopted 21 by the voters. 22 Whether or not it was their intent to effect 23 mandate reimbursement, it was their intent to adopt the program and to stiffen penalties for the program, and to, 24 25 you know, broaden the scope of the program.

1	And whatever effect that has on mandate
2	redetermination I don't think is relevant.
3	MEMBER SAYLOR: One more question, if I could.
4	MS. SHELTON: There is one point on that that
5	is pretty key, and it's just the plain language of
6	Proposition 83. When the whole purpose of mandates and
7	the thought of mandates is that the State, in its
8	discretion and its policy-making decisions, are enforcing
9	school districts or local agencies to perform an
10	activity, here you've got an initiative adopted by the
11	voters. And the plain language of that initiative
12	prohibits the Legislature from repealing this program
13	unless, by a two-thirds majority vote, a supermajority
14	vote.
15	So it's taking away the full discretion of the
16	Legislature when you do adopt the same thing as an
17	initiative. So it is a substantive change.
18	MEMBER SAYLOR: If I could ask one further
19	question. This 2010 action that establishes this
20	redetermination process, was it silent on retroactively
21	applying those provisions to
22	MS. SHELTON: Yes, there is no statute of
23	limitations at all. So you could go back
24	MEMBER SAYLOR: Well, and it also was silent on
25	retroactively addressing prior actions?

MS. SHELTON: The intent is that it does
retroactively address current mandated programs or
programs that the Commission has denied in the past.
That's the whole intent.
MEMBER SAYLOR: Prior to the adoption of the
measure itself?
MS. SHELTON: Right, yes.
I will say that the whole redetermination
statutory process is being challenged in a separate
lawsuit by the California School Boards Association case.
That case has not been briefed yet. It has not been set
for trial.
The Commission is required by the Constitution
to presume those statutes are constitutional and to
follow the law. And we don't have an injunction or a
stay from following that process.
CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Any other questions?
MR. BURDICK: Madam Chair?
CHAIR MATOSANTOS: I'm sorry, we have another
question, I think.
No? Oh, we're good.
All right, go ahead.
MR. BURDICK: Madam Chair, I wasn't sworn in,
and I just wanted to make a comment. It seemed like
there was a little confusion. I know that

CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Hold on a second. 1 2 Somebody was not sworn in. 3 MR. BURDICK: Do I need to get sworn in, or... 4 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Yes. 5 MS. HALSEY: Please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the 6 7 testimony you are about to give is true and correct based 8 on your personal knowledge, information, and belief? 9 MR. BURDICK: I do. 10 My name is Allan Burdick, and today I'm just 11 here as a member of the public. 12 And I just wanted to kind of clear -- because 13 there was a lot of discussion about the determination process. And I think that Commissioner Chivaro was the 14 15 only one here before they were actually involved in the 16 process. I know you were Department of Finance at the 17 time, but it was in the mandate issues prior to 18 October 2010, when the redetermination process was passed 19 in a trailer bill which was opposed by local government. 20 But prior to that, we have had a lot of cases, 21 and several have gone to court, about where the 22 Legislature stepped in and directed the Commission to do 23 something. And the prior executive director, a couple 24 back, her position was that we were created by the 25 Legislature, therefore, if the Legislature tells us to do

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1	something, then we have to do it.
2	And so the Legislature would come in and say,
3	"Please rehear your decision, relook at this." And then
4	very often it would go to court.
5	The locals always said that's not the case,
6	but that was the position that the Commission Executive
7	Director, at least, was taking in prior years.
8	We had a lawsuit and we call it the AB 138
9	lawsuit which at that time which the courts came
10	in, or the final decision, I believe it was in April of
11	2010
12	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: I think counsel has spoken
13	to the separation-of-powers issue, and I think counsel
14	has also spoken to the litigation regarding this process;
15	and counsel has also advised us that we have to follow
16	the law.
17	So is there any other piece that you need to
18	chat with us about that's not on the agenda?
19	MR. BURDICK: No, I do not. Thank you very
20	much.
21	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Okay, thank you very much.
22	Any other questions, comments?
23	(No response)
24	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All right, do I have a
25	motion?

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                MEMBER OLSEN: So moved, the staff
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     recommendation.
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                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Do we have a second?
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                MEMBER ALEX: Second.
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                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All members in support, vote
      "aye."
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7
                (A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
8
                MEMBER SAYLOR: I say "aye" as well, but I
9
     regret having to say "aye." It's just simply, this is
10
     our structure that we must act on, the redetermination
11
     request appears appropriate given the legal framework
12
     that we're dealing with. It's not right, but it is
13
     legally required.
14
                MEMBER RAMIREZ: I'll agree with that.
15
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Any opposed?
16
                (No response)
17
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All right, the motion
18
     carries.
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                MS. HALSEY: Item 7 was on the Consent
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     Calendar.
                Item 8 is next.
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                Chief Legal Counsel Camille Shelton will
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     present Item 8, a request for reconsideration of
24
     statement of decision and parameters and guidelines
25
      on the California Public Records Act.
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MS. SHELTON: Good morning. This is the second hearing on a request for reconsideration filed by the California Special Districts Association on the California Public Records Act program.

The Association contends that the decision and the parameters and guidelines contain an error of law with respect to the description of eligible claimants which omits special districts required to comply with the CPRA. The Association also contends that all special districts, including those that receive revenues solely from fees, are legible to claim reimbursement under Article XIII B, section 6.

Staff finds that the description of eligible claimants in the parameters and guidelines for this program is incorrect, as a matter of law, except for certain provisions relating only to school districts, the activities mandated by the CPRA apply equally to all levels of government including special districts, and the test-claim statement of decision did acknowledge that fact.

Not all special districts, however, are eligible to claim reimbursement under the Constitution as asserted by the Association. As the courts have determined, only those local agencies that are subject to the tax-and-spend limitations of the California

1	Constitution and whose costs for the program are paid
2	from proceeds of taxes are eligible to claim
3	reimbursement under Article XIII B, section 6. Thus,
4	special districts that receive their revenue from fees or
5	pay for this program with fee revenue are not entitled to
6	reimbursement under Article XIII B, section 6.
7	Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the
8	corrected statement of decision and parameters and
9	guidelines which correct the section on eligible
10	claimants and clarify potential offsetting revenues for
11	this program.
12	Five affirmative votes are required to correct
13	the statement of decision and parameters and guidelines.
14	Will the parties please state your names for
15	the record?
16	MS. HOLZEM: Good morning. Dorothy Holzem with
17	the California Special Districts Association.
18	MR. NICHOLS: Andy Nichols, Nichols Consulting.
19	MR. NEILL: And Geoffrey Neill with the
20	California State Association of Counties.
21	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Ms. Holzem?
22	MS. HOLZEM: Thank you.
23	Let me start by thanking the Commission for
24	granting reconsideration on this item, and also that we
25	do appreciate the Commission's or the staff's effort
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to rectify the omission of special districts from 1 2 eligible claimants. 3 Unfortunately, though, we must express our 4 serious concerns with the staff recommendation that would 5 only provide for non-enterprise special districts to be able to claim reimbursement for the specified activities. 6 7 In addition, we believe the Court's decision 8 in the County of Fresno v State of California is 9 inappropriately applied here to the question. And this is for two reasons as outlined in our July $1^{\rm st}$ letter to 10 11 the Commission. 12 First, it's the characteristics of the 13 Hazardous Waste Abatement mandate in the case of Fresno, 14 when you compare it to the Public Records Act 15 requirements. 16

And second, the staffs analysis gives really no consideration to the historical context of the 1991 decision in light of the three major changes to local tax-and-revenue authority.

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As you heard, the staff recommendation really from a 30,000-foot level concludes that if an agency has fee authority, they can use those fees directly to cover the costs of a state-mandated program. But I urge you to consider how that can really be the case when you look at the differences between the Fresno state-mandated program

and, again, the Public Records Act mandates before you.

First, the *Hazardous Material Abatement* program
in the Fresno case included express fee authority. The
local agency was expressly authorized to levy a new fee

5 to cover the direct costs of mitigating the hazardous

6 waste for the ratepayers in that area.

Contrasting that, the Public Records Act only allows for a fee specific to the duplication of records. There is no direct fee authority for any of the other listed mandated activities that have previously been deemed a reimbursable mandate.

Even earlier this year, the California Supreme Court further limited the ability for local agencies to charge a fee for duplication of records. And I have to state that that cost duplication doesn't include staff time, it doesn't include the process of duplicating. It's purely for the copies made.

And the second point I need to make, distinguishing the Fresno County Hazardous Waste mandate from the Public Records mandates, is who is the beneficiary of the Act. In the Hazardous Waste mandate, it is the residents. It is the people within the jurisdiction who have a direct benefit conferred upon them. And so it's rightly so that they should have a new fee levied. However, when the Public Records Act was

considered, all members of the public benefit from having access to records of a local legislative body, regardless if they're a ratepayer, regardless if they're in that district, that city, that county, that state. It's really a benefit for all.

And so what ends up happening if you're going to apply the staff recommendation is that that enterprise district will be subsidizing -- the ratepayers in that enterprise district will be subsidizing the cost for all the other members of the public, changing the definition really, I think, from a fee to a tax, when you look at who is receiving the benefit and who is paying for that service.

And it's also important to note the broad application of the Fresno decision that the staff analysis mentions in the cases of the RDA of San Marcos, City of San Marcos versus the Commission on State Mandates.

The San Marcos case expressly describes the Fresno County case as the Supreme Court upholding the facial constitutionality of Government Code section 17556(d), which disallows state subventions of funds where the local government is expressly authorized to collect service charges or fees in connection with the mandate program.

Again, we don't have that direct fee authority for the Public Records Act.

And also as I mentioned in our July 1st letter, and I will briefly summarize, is the lens at which we are looking at this mandate has changed completely. And I think most notably because of the passage of Prop. 218, and how locals may levy or seek new fee or revenue for their services.

Prior to the passage of 218, Article XIII B was interpreted to say that, yes, if a public agency has the authority to levy a fee, then they should not be owed reimbursement for services. But since the passage of Prop. 218, it's now clear that both enterprise and non-enterprise districts are limited in their ability based on voter approval for new property -- for both property owners or voter approval before moving forward.

In addition, all special districts, enterprise and non-enterprise, are authorized to levy special taxes if approved by the voters that are subject to the tax-and-spend limitations of Article XIII A and B of the Constitution.

In other words, no special district is categorically exempt from the tax-and-spend limitations and, therefore, they should not be exempt from the protections under Article XIII, Section 6 for mandate

1	reimbursement.
2	I'll close by saying, you know, a major part of
3	the Court's reasoning in the Fresno County case was the
4	fact that Article XIII B was meant to prevent a situation
5	where the states' shift of responsibility to local
6	governments creates a situation where the local
7	government is ill-equipped to handle the new costs by
8	those programs.
9	And I would say that nothing has changed. And,
10	if anything, that's more true today because of Prop. 218
11	and the other restrictions on local fee authority.
12	So with that, I'll close and urge the
13	Commission to respectfully consider rejecting the staff
14	recommendation.
15	Thank you.
16	MR. NEILL: Good morning or early afternoon.
17	Geoffrey Neill with CSAC.
18	We have comments that I'm told didn't quite
19	make it into your binder. So I'll distribute them, but
20	you don't have to read them right away because I'll
21	summarize them for you nicely.
22	(Distribution of CSAC comments)
23	MR. NEILL: Now, for the commissioners and any
24	members of the public that have a hard time sleeping, as
25	Dorothy noted, the County of Fresno case is not directly

applicable. The Commission -- the staff analysis urges 1 2 a -- it seems the broadest possible use of that to say 3 that any district that has fee authority who doesn't have 4 tax-and-spend authority isn't eligible for reimbursement. 5 But the courts themselves have told us the scope of the 6 Fresno case, and that scope is where a government is 7 authorized to collect service charges or fees in 8 connection with a mandated program. 9 The courts themselves in San Marcos said that it is not broad; it is that narrow. And that's clearly 10 not the case in this instance. 11 12 But I want to spend more time on the fact 13 that -- the point of the Fresno case -- of course, it 14 said that the County of Fresno, you know, wasn't eligible 15 because of that. But the reasoning that it used is 16 instructive, I think, for us in this case -- or for you. 17 Because the reasoning was -- because the Constitution 18 isn't clear, the plain language of the Constitution does 19 not say, "Only if you have tax-and-spend authority." 20 The Court inferred that based on the historical context of Section 6. 21 But the historical context did not end 22 23 in 1991, which is when the Fresno case came down. The 24 historical context of Section 6 continues. And it 25 continues as my colleague said, with Proposition 218.

1 And so while Proposition 13, as the Fresno case noted, 2 limited taxes, and then Section 6 comes in and says, 3 "According to the Court, because you can't use taxes, 4 those of you that have used taxes now get reimbursed by 5 the State for mandates," Proposition 218 came in just a 6 few years after the court case and said any fees, 7 charges, assessments, those are all limited now, in 8 various ways, depending on what they are; but all of 9 them are limited. There is no local agency where the 10 governing board can, just on their own, without any 11 restriction by either the property owners or the voters, 12 can implement these kinds of charges. So that's a major 13 thing. 14 And, in fact, we have a reenactment which, of 15 course, came up in the last instance before this 16 Commission, we have a reenactment of Section 6 after 17 Proposition 218. 18 So the historical context of Section 6 in 19 Article XIII B has changed considerably from only, as the 20 staff analysis notes, because of tax restriction, it was 21 reenacted after there were also restrictions on fees, 22 charges, and assessments. 23 So we think that while the Court couldn't 24 deliberate on that because it was five years before 25 Proposition 218 passed, the Court, in that 1991 court

1	decision, said the reason is because of the historical
2	context. So there's new historical context.
3	So not only do we have Prop. 218 in 1986,
4	we have Proposition 1A, which is when Section 6 was
5	reenacted by the voters. And then just a couple of years
6	ago, we have Proposition 26. Of course, Proposition 26,
7	for the first time, defined "taxes" specifically.
8	And among other things, what it says is that
9	the fee it's only a fee if it is in direct proportion
10	to the benefit conferred on the fee payer; otherwise,
11	it's a tax.
12	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Isn't it also very clear
13	about the fact that administrative costs can be covered
14	by a fee? Because it seems to me that one of the logical
15	extensions of your argument would substantially narrow
16	the use of fees beyond how it has been interpreted and
17	how it's been used.
18	MR. NEILL: And perhaps we await those court
19	cases.
20	Yes, but I think that I think that
21	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: It is clear that it can be
22	used for administrative costs, where
23	MR. NEILL: Yes, it's absolutely true, it can
24	be used for administrative costs.
25	For state mandates, can fees be used can

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1	general fees be used to pay for state mandates where a
2	specific benefit is conferred on somebody outside of the
3	fee payers, though?
4	In this case, you know, conceivably
5	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Do the fee payers benefit
6	from open government?
7	MR. NEILL: Are they the only ones that benefit
8	from open government? Because they do, but they're not
9	the only ones; and, in fact, they may not be the
10	requester. And I think it's instructive that there is
11	fee authority in the Public Records Act, but that it is
12	severely constrained. So the Legislature has
13	acknowledged that this is a program that requires
14	additional you might say fee authority, and they
15	specifically declined to extend that fee authority to
16	these new mandated programs.
17	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Any questions from members?
18	Comments?
19	(No response)
20	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Are we prepared to make a
21	motion to move staff recommendation?
22	MEMBER CHIVARO: I'll move staff
23	recommendation.
24	MEMBER ALEX: We've got another speaker.
25	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: I thought we were skipping

I didn't realize we just changed -- I thought we 1 2 skipped you, not changed the order. 3 My apologies. Go ahead. 4 MR. NICHOLS: I wanted home-team advantage and 5 go last. 6 Thank you. Andy Nichols, Nichols Consulting. 7 Actually, I, too, have a handout. It is just a 8 one-pager. In fact, the information that I do have to 9 distribute is from the Commission on State Mandates' 10 Web site. So I think a number of folks in the room are 11 familiar with much of the information I'm handing out 12 here. 13 But you'll note on the heading of this 14 document, as it comes to you, I have identified 15 post-1991 -- and, obviously, I'm pointing to that data as a result of the County of Fresno v. California that's 16 17 what's been mentioned throughout here. And it identifies 18 special district programs -- I've listed them on the 19 left-hand side for you -- that do not contain any 20 reference to tax-and-spend provisions of XIII A, XIII B. 21 As you'll notice, 15 of those are the adopted 22 parameters and guidelines; 23 include changes, amendments 23 to the parameters and guidelines. And I've also listed 24 the dates, with the exception of the Mandate 25 Reimbursement Process I, which was amended 12 times, and

Mandate Reimbursement Process I and II, which was amended last time this Commission got together.

I think what is relevant in many of these cases, the only instance that special districts are limited to file reimbursement claims is they may not be eligible because the service they provide is ineligible. In other words, if you do not have a sworn peace officer, you would not be eligible for Cancer Presumption of Peace Officers; and, obviously, with the Firefighter programs, the same criteria would hold. And that is the only time there is a limitation under eligible claimants for special districts.

I am in agreement -- I obviously am supporting what CSDA has asked, which is the rejection of the limitation here for XIII A, XIII B. We're looking at the possibility of eliminating 2,700 special districts from the opportunity to file reimbursement claims when, in the past, this Commission has not had an issue with that.

Additionally, since one of the areas that provides reimbursement is the fact that when the State decides to shift costs, that burden is sent to local government. Those 2,700 special districts will have to bear the costs, as will their ratepayers.

As Ms. Holzem stated earlier, there is no opportunity to limit costs in that situation where the

Legislature can go ahead and make that shift without concern.

With that in mind and just quickly closing
here, I would like to see the Commission on State
Mandates -- as they did at their last meeting, when local
agencies are eligible to file claim, as they are under
Mandate Reimbursement Process I and II on those amended
parameters and guidelines, all special districts should
be eligible to file for California Public Records Act.

Thank you very much.

MS. SHELTON: A couple of things.

First, this is not a new issue. It's not a new analysis. It's consistent with what the Commission has adopted in the past, and on several occasions, when we've had test claims filed by certain special districts that were not eligible to claim reimbursement, one notably a couple of years ago on a Local Agency Ethics claim, where it was denied the sanitation district because they were fully fee-based.

Two, when you're looking at the plain language of the Constitution, yes, there's been subsequent amendments to the Constitution; and, now, special districts have restrictions on fee authority. They added Article XIII C and XIII D to impose those restrictions; but at no time did they amend Article XIII B to change

what the purpose of Article XIII B was. And that is a spending limit. And Section 6 was designed to help local government from paying for a state-mandated programs from their restricted tax revenues that are subject to the spending limit. There is no spending limit for fees at all. And, in fact, the plain-language definition in Article XIII B, section 8, defines "proceeds of taxes" to not include fees.

entity for expenditure of their fees. And, in fact, all of our P's & G's say that at any point in time that you use fee revenue to pay for the mandated program, you have to identify that and deduct that from the claim. You are not an eligible claimant if you use fee authority. And that's been consistent throughout all of these P's & G's that have been brought forth before the Commission. All of these test claims were filed by a city and county. All the P's & G's say that they are entitled to the reimbursement only for the eligible local agencies. The State Controller has the authority to reduce any claim filed by a special district that is not subject to the tax-and-spend provisions of the Constitution.

And, therefore, we recommend that the Commission adopt the staff analysis.

CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Thank you.

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And we had the motion and a second.
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2
                Does that hold?
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                MR. NICHOLS: Actually, may I respond to
4
     Legal's comments?
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: I think the issues have been
5
     discussed.
6
                MR. NICHOLS: Okay.
7
8
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Are there -- do we have any
9
     additional questions from Commissioners?
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                MEMBER OLSEN: I'm actually interested in
11
     hearing his response.
12
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All right, go ahead.
13
                MR. NICHOLS: Regarding the previous claims
      that involve special districts, I believe one was local
14
15
     agency formation commissions, LAFCo. The other was, as
16
     mentioned before, the ethics, AB 1234, which special
     districts were identified. I think in those two
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18
     instances -- I may be wrong -- but I believe those fell
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     off the radar. And I think if you look at Item Number 13
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     on your Consent Calendar regarding Local Agency Ethics,
21
     you'll notice that there were zero filings for that
22
     program, despite the fact that there could be potentially
23
     over
24
     700 eligible claimants.
25
                Similarly, with the LAFCo claim, even though
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1 there would have been conceivably over 600 claimants, 2 less than 25 filed. And both of those had multiple-year 3 opportunities to recover costs. 4 So I would say that both of those flew under the radar as far as the California Special -- I don't 5 6 mean to speak for them -- but as far as California 7 Special Districts Association is concerned. 8 Once again, this is the first time in the 9 claimant language that has shown up, this tax-and-spend 10 of XIII A, XIII B. 11 Thank you. 12 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Staff? 13 MS. HALSEY: I just did want to clarify one 14 thing. I think Mr. Nichols misspoke when he said he 15 pulled this, he got this off of our web site. I think 16 what he means is, he compiled it off of data he might have gleaned from our web site. We don't have a document 17 18 like this. 19 MR. NICHOLS: I apologize. That is correct. 20 MS. SHELTON: Just to mention, at any time the 21 State Controller has the authority and control on their 22 own to reduce any reimbursement claim. And, again, the 23 plain language of all parameters and guidelines say 24 "eligible local claimant," and do require an 25 identification of fee authority. So it's nothing new.

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      This is not a new analysis. I have written it many
 2
      times.
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                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: So we have a motion and a
4
      second.
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                All those in support, please say "aye."
                (A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
 6
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Anyone opposed?
7
 8
                (No response)
9
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: No?
10
                The motion carries.
11
                Thank you.
                MS. HALSEY: Items 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 were
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13
      on the Consent Calendar.
                Item 14 is reserved for County applications for
14
15
      a finding of significant financial distress or 1033
16
      applications. No SB 1033 applications have been filed.
17
                Item 15, Commission staff member Kerry Ortman
18
     will present Item 15, the Legislative Update.
19
                MS. ORTMAN: Good morning.
20
                The following bills related to the mandates
21
     process were introduced this year.
22
                AB 392 requires the Controller to determine the
23
     most cost effective allocation method if $1,000 or less
24
      is appropriated for a program. The bill was enrolled and
      sent to the Governor on July 10<sup>th</sup>, 2013.
25
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AB 1292 would make a technical, non-substantive 1 2 change to Government Code section 17560(b). This is a spot bill. And as of July 10th, 2013, the bill has not 3 been referred to a committee nor has it been amended. 4 5 Staff will continue to monitor this legislation. The Budget Act of 2013 was signed on June 27th, 6 7 The Commission's budget, as adopted, includes a 8 baseline augmentation over prior year to fund two 9 additional positions: an attorney III and a senior legal 10 analyst. These two new positions will hasten the 11 reduction of the Commission's backlog and facilitate 12 timely hearing of current and future matters. 13 Mandates originally proposed for suspension in 14 the Governor's budget included nine new programs. 15 the time, five of those did not yet have a statewide cost estimate. The Legislature did not, in the end, suspend 16 17 any of the mandates that did not yet have an SCE. 18 There was considerable public and media 19 interest in the proposed suspension of the California 20 Public Records Act reimbursable mandate. Ultimately, the 21 Legislature passed a budget that did not suspend this 22 mandate. On July 3rd, 2013, the Senate unanimously 23 24 approved the constitutional amendment intended to include

the reimbursable mandated activities associated with the

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1	California Public Records Act in the State Constitution.
2	If passed by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly, the
3	amendment will be included in the June 2014 election.
4	Finally, Budget Trailer Bill SB 71 was signed
5	on June 27 th , 2013. This trailer bill amended several
6	code sections with the stated intent of relieving local
7	entities of the duty to perform reimbursable activities
8	as determined by the Commission on State Mandates or
9	other authorized entity.
10	Included in the following state mandated local
11	programs: Deaf Teletype Equipment, Adult Felony
12	Restitution, Pocket Masks, Domestic Violence Information,
13	and the Victims Statements - Minors.
14	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Any questions about the leg.
15	update?
16	(No response)
17	CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All right, thank you.
18	MS. HALSEY: Thank you, Kerry.
19	Item 16, Chief Legal Counsel Camille Shelton
20	will present the Chief Legal Counsel's report.
21	MS. SHELTON: Thank you.
22	Since our last hearing, there have been no new
23	filings, no new decisions.
24	Wednesday, on the case of Department of Finance
25	and State Water Resources Control Board versus the

1 Commission on State Mandates on Stormwater Permit, that 2 case was heard before the Second District Court of 3 They have 90 days to issue their decision. 4 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Any questions on that 5 report? 6 (No response) 7 MS. HALSEY: Item 17 is Executive Director's 8 report; and that's our Report on Workload, and also our 9 Report to Finance and Backlog Reduction Plan for 2013, 10 as well as the tentative agenda items for the next 11 meeting. 12 The written report to Finance contains an 13 summary of work completed in 2012-13 and a summary of 14 pending matters, including items filed in the 2012-13 15 fiscal year. 16 For the 2012-13 fiscal year, the Commission had 17 only 10.5 staff positions; and posing an additional 18 challenge, staff in three of these positions, including 19 half of our Commission's attorneys, just began work with 20 the Commission this fiscal year. 21 Nonetheless, the Commission completed 11 test 22 claims, 12 parameters and guidelines, including four 23 with RRMs, eight statewide cost estimates, and three 24 parameters and guidelines amendments, and 42 incorrect 25 reduction claims.

As of July 1st, 2013, the Commission has a pending caseload of 26 test claims, four parameters and guidelines, 12 statewide cost estimates, twelve proposed parameters and guidelines amendments, two requests for mandate redetermination, and 87 incorrect reduction claims.

The report to Finance lays out a plan for hearing. All test claims filed through 2012-13, except for the ten *Stormwater* test claims that are pending outcome of litigation, and also all of the pending P's & G's, SCEs, PGAs, and mandate redetermination requests within the 2013-2014 fiscal year.

And the plan also includes hearing several IRCs in this fiscal year as well.

It's anticipated that upon resolution of the Stormwater cases, it should take about another year to complete those ten test claims. But the actual time required to complete those claims may be affected by many variables that are discussed at length in the plan.

Also, the plan continues to promote the continued informal resolution of IRCs with the SCO and claimants by strategically hearing those claims with the most cost-cutting issues first, and then facilitating meetings with the parties. And you'll see, some of those claims are coming forward shortly. I think we have some

in the next hearing.

And in the event that is effective, we may be able to resolve these more quickly. But in the event that it doesn't work that way, we have to hear each one of them. It may take up to two years to hear all those IRCs that we have pending.

At the end of the report, I have tentative agenda items for September and December meetings.

If you represent a party in these matters, please review the claim and comments on file. Some of the claims are old and maybe they don't have the comments you would want them to have. So this is the time to update those.

The comments are all posted on the Web site, so you can go take a look. And please submit any additional comments and documentation you wish to add for consideration in the staff analysis as soon as possible and before issuance of the draft, so we can consider them. This will speed the Commission's process and enable all the pending matters to receive a timely hearing.

And also be aware that the draft staff analysis generally issues between the middle to end of the month prior to the hearing date. So you can sort of -- especially I know we have a lot of newer people to the

1 mandates process, but that's sort of the time you can 2 expect your draft to review and comment on it. 3 Failing to review and comment within a 4 three-week period is not in itself good cause for 5 extensions of time and postponements of hearings. So please consider that time-line and schedule it into 6 7 our workload. 8 And does anyone have any questions? 9 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Should we assume Item 4 gets 10 added to the September and December? 11 MS. HALSEY: Yes, it is postponed to the 12 September hearing. 13 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: Great. 14 Any questions on the report? 15 (No response) CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All right, thank you. 16 17 MS. HALSEY: Thank you. 18 CHAIR MATOSANTOS: So the Commission is going to meet in closed executive session pursuant to 19 20 Government Code section 11126, to confer with and receive 21 advice from legal counsel for consideration and action, 22 as necessary and appropriate, upon the pending litigation 23 listed in the published notice and agenda; and to confer 24 with and receive advice from legal counsel regarding 25 potential litigation. The Commission will also confer

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     on personnel matters pursuant to the same code section.
2
     And we'll reconvene in open session in approximately
3
     15 minutes.
4
                (The Commission met in closed session
5
                from 11:32 a.m. to 11:40 a.m.)
6
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: The Commission met in closed
7
     executive session pursuant to Government Code section
8
     11126 to confer with and receive advice from legal
9
     counsel for consideration and action, as necessary and
10
     appropriate, upon the pending litigation listed on the
11
     published notice and agenda; and to confer with and
12
     receive advice from legal counsel regarding potential
13
     litigation; and pursuant to Government Code section
14
     11126(a) to confer on personnel matters.
15
                With no further business to discuss, I will
16
     entertain a motion to adjourn.
17
                MEMBER OLSEN: So moved.
18
                MEMBER SAYLOR: Second.
19
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All those in favor, say
20
      "aye."
21
                (A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
22
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: All those opposed, say "no."
23
                (No response)
24
                CHAIR MATOSANTOS: The meeting is adjourned.
25
                (The meeting concluded at 11:41 a.m.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify:

That the foregoing proceedings were duly reported by me at the time and place herein specified; and

That the proceedings were reported by me, a duly certified shorthand reporter and a disinterested person, and was thereafter transcribed into typewriting by computer-aided transcription.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand on the $22^{\rm nd}$ of August 2012.

Daniel P. Feldhaus California CSR #6949

Registered Diplomate Reporter Certified Realtime Reporter