MINUTES

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

State Capitol, Room 126 Sacramento, California May 27, 2004

Present: Chairperson James Tilton

Representative of the Director of the Department of Finance

Member William Sherwood

Representative of the State Treasurer

Member Walter Barnes

Representative of the State Controller

Member Jan Boel

Acting Director of the Office of Planning and Research

Absent: Member John Lazar

City Council Member

Vacant: Local Elected Official

Public Member

CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL

Chairperson Tilton called the meeting to order at 9:33 a.m.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES

Item 1 March 25, 2004

Chairperson Tilton made an amendment to his comments for item 7. Member Barnes made a motion to approve the minutes as amended. With a second by Member Boel, the minutes were unanimously adopted.

APPEAL OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DECISIONS PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, SECTION 1181, SUBDIVISION (c)

Item 2 Staff Report

No appeals were filed.

PROPOSED CONSENT CALENDAR

INFORMATIONAL HEARING PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 8 (action)

ADOPTION OF PROPOSED PARAMETERS AND GUIDELINES

Item 11 Differential Pay and Reemployment, 99-TC-02

Palmdale School District, Claimant

Education Code Sections 44977 and 44978.1

Statutes 1998, Chapter 30 (SB 1019)

ADOPTION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PARAMETERS AND GUIDELINES

Item 14 School District of Choice: Transfers and Appeals

State Controller's Office, Requestor, 02-PGA-05

Education Code Sections 48209.1, 48209.7, 48209.10, 48209.13, and 48209.14

Statutes 1993, Chapter 160 (AB 19) Statutes 1994, Chapter 1262 (AB 2768)

ADOPTION OF PROPOSED STATEWIDE COST ESTIMATE

Item 16 Grand Jury Proceedings, 98-TC-27

Penal Code Sections 914, 933, 933.05, and 938.4

Statutes 1996, Chapter 1170 (SB 11457) Statutes 1997, Chapter 443 (AB 829) Statutes 1998, Chapter 230 (AB 1907)

Member Barnes moved for adoption of the consent calendar, which consisted of items 11, 14, and 16. With a second by Member Sherwood, the consent calendar was unanimously adopted.

HEARINGS AND DECISIONS, PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 7 (action)

Paula Higashi, Executive Director, swore the parties and witnesses participating in the hearing of agenda items 5, 6, 9, and 10.

TEST CLAIMS AND PROPOSED STATEMENTS OF DECISION

Item 5 Cancer Presumption for Law Enforcement and Firefighters, 01-TC-19

CSAC-EIA and County of Tehama, Co-Claimants

Labor Code Section 3212.1

Statutes 1999, Chapter 595 (AB 539)

Statutes 2000, Chapter 887 (SB 1820)

Camille Shelton, Senior Commission Counsel, presented this item. She noted that the test claim involved Labor Code section 3212.1, which provides an evidentiary presumption in workers' compensation cases for specified law enforcement officers and firefighters that develop cancer during the course of employment. In such cases, the employee must show that he or she was exposed to a known carcinogen during employment. However, if an employer decides to dispute the claim, the burden of proof then shifts to the employer to prove that the carcinogen was not reasonably linked to the cancer, and thus, the cancer was not an industrial injury.

Ms. Shelton stated that the test claim was filed by the County of Tehama and the California State Association of Counties – Excess Insurance Authority. She explained that the California State Association of Counties – Excess Insurance Authority was a joint powers authority established by contracting counties for insurance and risk management purposes. She explained that it does not employ peace officers and would not be a party to a workers' compensation claim filed by a peace officer against a local agency employer. It also does not have the authority to raise tax revenue and is not bound by the spending limitations of article XIII B. Therefore, staff recommended that the Commission deny the test claim and make the following findings:

1. The California State Association of Counties – Excess Insurance Authority does not have standing and is not a proper claimant for this test claim.

2. Labor Code section 3212.1, as amended by the test claim legislation, is not subject to article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution because it does not mandate a new program or higher level of service on local agencies.

Parties were represented as follows: Juliana Gmur, on behalf of the claimants; Gina Dean, with the California State Association of Counties – Excess Insurance Authority; Allan Burdick, with the California State Association of Counties; and Jaci Nitschke, with the Department of Finance.

Ms. Gmur asserted that *Cancer Presumption for Law Enforcement and Firefighters* was not new because it was a revision of an existing program. She explained that the original claim involved only firefighters and was determined to be a mandate in 1985 by the Board of Control. The law was subsequently amended to add peace officers and a second test claim was determined to be a mandate in 1992. She contended that before the Commission now was another change in the same statute, which should also be determined to be a mandate. Specifically, the statute added leukemia and shifted the burden of proof to the employer.

Ms. Gmur quoted the statute, arguing that the inclusion of the word "shall" in the first sentence created a mandatory presumption that the cancer arose out of and in the course of employment. She disagreed with staff's position, noting that staff focused only on the second sentence, which states that the presumption is disputable and may be controverted. Ms. Gmur also believed that staff's reliance on the *City of Merced* case was misplaced.

Another issue raised by Ms. Gmur related to the California State Association of Counties – Excess Insurance Authority's standing. She argued that according to the plain language of Government Code section 17520, a joint powers agency or entity is a special district that can file claims. She explained that unlike a redevelopment agency, a joint powers authority is created by contract and uses the monies that counties acquired as proceeds of taxes. She stated that though counties assigned the administration of the funds to the joint powers authority, the character of the funds was not altered.

Ms. Dean stated that the California State Association of Counties – Excess Insurance Authority was formed in 1979 by a group of California counties that came together for the common need and purpose of insurance and risk management. She indicated that 53 of the 58 counties participated in one or more of the insurance pools, which were funded on an actuarial basis, based on each county's own historical losses. Ms. Dean contended that when counties received reimbursement, they then reimbursed the pool. She concluded that this burden could be eased if the pool could file claims on its own behalf.

Ms. Gmur submitted that since this joint powers authority used the proceeds of taxes, the *San Marcos* case did not apply.

Ms. Shelton noted that prior Commission decisions were not precedential and that case law clearly shows that it is not arbitrary for a quasi-judicial agency to not rely on older decisions if it is found that the law supports the conclusions in the current case. Here, she maintained that the Supreme Court decision in the *Department of Finance* case clearly states that an entity needs to be either legally compelled by the state or practically compelled to comply with the statute for reimbursement to be required.

Regarding the presumption language contained in the statute, Ms. Shelton indicated that it does not impose any activities on the employer. Rather, it was the second sentence that creates activities within the discretion of the local agency if it decides to dispute a claim. She

maintained that the state was not forcing local agencies to engage in litigation. She also noted that staff quoted the *City of Merced* case because the Supreme Court affirmed this finding in that case.

There was some discussion between Member Sherwood and Ms. Shelton about the Supreme Court's definition of the substantial penalty.

With regard to the California State Association of Counties – Excess Insurance Authority's standing issue, Ms. Shelton stated that there were two reasons for staff's position that it was not an eligible claimant in this case. First, the authority was not directly affected by the test claim legislation because it is not a party to the litigation in a workers' compensation case and it does not employ peace officers. A Supreme Court ruling in the *Kinlaw* case states that a party must be directly affected by the legislation.

Secondly, staff believed that the redevelopment agency case referenced in the analysis applies because the court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling and interpretation of article XIII B, section 6 in the *County of San Diego* case. The court explained that section 6 represents a recognition that articles XIII A and B together severely restrict the taxing and spending powers of local agencies. Ms. Shelton explained that the purpose of the section is to preclude the state from shifting financial responsibility for governmental functions to local agencies. She also indicated that the 3rd District Court of Appeals ruled that redevelopment agencies had no independent powers of taxation, and that there were admissions from the California State Association of Counties – Excess Insurance Authority in the record that they did not have an independent power to tax and were not subject to the spending limitations.

Ms. Gmur reiterated her earlier arguments.

Member Boel commented that it was not unusual for different associations to have a pooling arrangement. She asked what made the California State Association of Counties unique that they should be considered a claimant in this case. Ms. Gmur responded that Government Code section 17520 provides the statutory authority.

Ms. Shelton clarified that multiple courts and jurisdictions have made clear that only entities that have standing are those that have the ability to tax taxpayers directly and are subject to spending limitations. She restated that there were admissions in the record that the California State Association of Counties – Excess Insurance Authority does not have that capability. Ms. Shelton added that there was also testimony in the record that joining the authority was a voluntary decision on the part of the counties.

Ms. Nitschke supported the staff analysis based on the *Department of Finance* case.

On the standing issue, Mr. Burdick submitted that the California State Association of Counties – Excess Insurance Authority was a special district under law that reports to the State Controller. Further, to point out the cost impact on some local agencies, he provided some background information on the history of the test claim legislation and the two existing mandate determinations.

Member Barnes made a motion to adopt the staff recommendation. With a second by Member Boel, the motion carried unanimously.

Item 6 Proposed Statement of Decision: Cancer Presumption for Law Enforcement and Firefighters, 01-TC-19, as described above in Item 5.

Camille Shelton, Senior Commission Counsel, presented this item. She indicated that the sole issue before the Commission was whether the proposed Statement of Decision accurately reflects the Commission's decision. She noted that minor changes to reflect the vote count would be included in the final decision that would be issued. Unless the parties objected, staff recommended that the Commission adopt the proposed Statement of Decision.

Allan Burdick, on behalf of the California State Association of Counties, pointed out that the proposed decision did not include any of the discussions or comments made at the hearing. Although he did not expect any changes to be made on this particular item, he noted as a general matter that having a decision prepared prior to any discussion seemed a little troublesome.

Member Sherwood stated that Mr. Burdick's comments were warranted and that it caused a little concern for him as well. He added that nothing was really said that affected this proposed decision but acknowledged that the possibility was there that changes might be necessary.

Ms. Shelton responded that the Commission's regulations do not require that the proposed Statement of Decision be issued for comment, and that the Commission had discretion to adopt the proposal or wait until the next hearing. She noted that for this particular item, she would not change the recommendation because new evidence was not presented.

Member Sherwood submitted that this was something that should be monitored because there could be occurrences where the vote on a proposed decision would have to be delayed in order to incorporate additional information.

Ms. Shelton stated that staff would recommend the Commission not adopt a decision at the same hearing if evidence were presented that needed to be incorporated into the final decision.

Member Barnes commented that there had been cases where the proposed Statement of Decision was still adopted when a change was made, but with the expectation that the changes would be reflected in the final decision. He encouraged the claimants to inform staff and offer suggestions if they felt that something more should be incorporated into the final decision.

Chairperson Tilton added that the Commission should be more aware that its decisions accurately reflect the Commission's action. Ms. Higashi assured the Commission that staff's intent was to always accurately reflect the Commission's action.

Member Boel made a motion to adopt the proposed Statement of Decision. With a second by Member Sherwood, the motion carried unanimously.

Item 7 Algebra Instruction, 00-TC-14 Sweetwater Union High School District, Claimant Education Code Section 51224.5 Statutes 2000, Chapter 1024 (SB 1354)

Item 8 Proposed Statement of Decision: Algebra Instruction, 00-TC-14, as described above in Item 7.

Items 7 and 8 were postponed by the claimant.

Item 9 The Stull Act, 98-TC-25

Denair Unified School District, Claimant

Education Code Sections 44660 – 44665 (formerly Ed. Code, §§ 13485 – 13400)

13490)

Statutes 1975, Chapter 1216 (SB 777)

Statutes 1983, Chapter 498 (SB 813)

Statutes 1986, Chapter 393 (AB 3878)

Statutes 1995, Chapter 392 (AB 729)

Statutes 1999, Chapter 4 (ABX1 1)

Item 10 Proposed Statement of Decision: The Stull Act, 98-TC-25, as described above in Item 9.

Camille Shelton, Senior Commission Counsel, presented these items. She indicated that the Stull Act was originally enacted in 1971 to establish a uniform system of evaluation and assessment of the performance of certificated personnel within each school district. The Stull Act was amended by the test claim legislation, which was enacted between 1975 and 1999. The claimant alleged that these amendments constituted a reimbursable state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution.

Staff found that the test claim legislation constitutes a partial reimbursable state-mandated program for the reasons provided in the staff analysis.

Parties were represented as follows: David Scribner, on behalf of the claimant; and Barbara Taylor, with the Department of Finance.

Mr. Scribner and Ms. Taylor supported the staff analysis.

Ms. Shelton noted that a request for additional briefing on issues was sent out but responses were not received. She stated that staff found several mandated educational programs and used the court's opinion in the *Department of Finance* case to show the programs that were local discretionary programs. However, she indicated that more of the mandated educational programs still had to be identified and encouraged the parties' participation during the parameters and guidelines phase.

Member Sherwood made a motion to adopt the staff recommendation for item 9. With a second by Member Barnes, the motion carried unanimously.

Item 10 was adoption of the proposed Statement of Decision. Member Barnes made a motion to adopt the proposed Statement of Decision, which was seconded by Member Boel. The motion carried unanimously.

INFORMATIONAL HEARING PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 8 (action)

ADOPTION OF PROPOSED PARAMETERS AND GUIDELINES

Item 12 Law Enforcement Agency Notifications, 01-PGA-11 (CSM-4505)
Clovis Unified School District, Requestor
Education Code Section 48902, Subdivision (c)
Statutes 1989, Chapter 1117 (SB 1275)

ADOPTION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PARAMETERS AND GUIDELINES

Item 13 Pupil Residence Verification and Appeals, 01-PGA-08 (CSM-96-348-01)

Clovis Unified School District, Requestor Education Code Sections 48204.5 and 48204.6 Revenue and Taxation Code Section 97.3 Statutes 1995, Chapter 309 (AB 687)

Item 14 School District of Choice: Transfers and Appeals

Clovis Unified School District, Requestor, 01-PGA-12

Education Code Sections 48209.1, 48209.7, 48209.10, 48209.13, and 48209.14

Statutes 1993, Chapter 160 (AB 19) Statutes 1994, Chapter 1262 (AB 2768)

Items 12, 13, and 14 (01-PGA-12 only) were withdrawn by the claimant.

ADOPTION OF PROPOSED STATEWIDE COST ESTIMATES

Item 15 Immunization Records: Hepatitis B, 98-TC-05

Los Angeles County Office of Education, Claimant

Education Code Section 48216

Health and Safety Code Sections 120325, 120335, 120340, and 120375

Statutes 1978, Chapter 325 (AB 2260); Statutes 1979, Chapter 435 (AB 805);

Statutes 1982, Chapter 472 (SB 818); Statutes 1991, Chapter 984 (SB 407);

Statutes 1992, Chapter 13 (AB 2798); Statutes 1994, Chapter 1172 (AB 2971)

Statutes 1995, Chapters 219 and 415 (AB 382 and SB 1360)

Statutes 1996, Chapter 1023 (SB 1497)

Statutes 1997, Chapters 855 and 882 (SB 727 and AB 381)

California Code of Regulations, Title 17, Sections 6020, 6035,

6040, 6055, 6065, 6070, and 6075

Nancy Patton, Assistant Executive Director, presented this item. She explained that the test claim legislation for this mandate added mumps, rubella, and hepatitis B to the list of diseases an entering student must be immunized against prior to first admission into a school. Hepatitis B immunizations were also required for students entering the seventh grade. She also stated that the legislation amended statutes requiring the Department of Health Services to amend regulations relating to the monitoring, record keeping, reporting, and parent notification requirements for pupil immunizations.

Ms. Patton indicated that reimbursement for this program was based on uniform cost allowances and that staff reviewed actual reimbursement claims to develop the proposed statewide cost estimate. For fiscal years 1997-1998 through 2002-2003, she explained that the estimates were based on 2,694 unaudited actual reimbursement claims, and for fiscal years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, the estimates were developed using projected enrollment figures for kindergarteners and seventh graders and multiplying them by the uniform cost allowance adopted by the Commission and adjusted by the Implicit Price Deflator.

The proposed statewide cost estimate included eight fiscal years for a total of \$29,629,000, averaging to \$3,703,600 in annual costs to the state. Staff recommended that the Commission adopt the proposed statewide cost estimate.

Parties were represented as follows: Dr. Carol Berg, with the Education Mandated Cost Network; and Nelson Cayago, with the Department of Finance.

Dr. Berg pointed out that the \$29 million estimate represented eight full years of reimbursement. She urged the Commission to support the staff recommendation.

Mr. Cayago stated that the proposed statewide cost estimate was consistent with the actions of the Commission. However, he noted that the Department of Finance's concerns related to the underlying basis for the cost estimate because it should be based on audited rather than unaudited reimbursement claims. Thus, he felt that the proposed statewide cost estimate was overstated.

Ms. Patton responded that the estimate was based on the adopted uniform cost allowances. She explained that staff's analysis assumed that the cost would exceed the estimate if amended or late claims are filed and that costs could be less if the State Controller audited the program and determined that the claims were excessive or unreasonable.

Member Sherwood asked staff to respond to the issue of the claims being unaudited. Ms. Patton stated that the Commission had to complete the test claim process within a statutory timeline, and thus, the statewide cost estimate was based on the best data available.

Chairperson Tilton asked if it was fair to describe the basis of the estimate as a budget methodology. Ms. Patton affirmed.

Ms. Higashi explained that the proposed statewide cost estimate was based on the actual claims currently on file with the State Controller's Office and on pupil enrollment figures that were multiplied by the adopted uniform cost allowances. She also explained that unless an amendment to the parameters and guidelines is filed and adopted by the Commission, no changes can be made to the uniform allowances.

Chairperson Tilton recognized that the variable was enrollment figures. Dr. Berg noted that only the number of pupils would be audited.

Member Sherwood made a motion to adopt the proposed statewide cost estimate. With a second by Member Boel, the motion carried unanimously.

STAFF REPORT

Item 17 Conduct of Hearings on County Applications for Findings of Significant Financial Distress, Welfare. & Institutions Code Section 17000.6 and Cal. Code Regs., Title 2, Chapter 2.5, Article 6.5 (info/action)

Nancy Patton, Assistant Executive Director, presented this item. She stated that the County of Butte notified the Commission of its intent to file an SB 1033 application on or about September 1, 2004. She explained that an SB 1033 application would require the Commission to review county applications for findings of significant financial distress. Within 90 days of receipt, the Commission is required to review the applications, which include program and financial reports; conduct at least two public hearings on the matter; and determine if the applicant county is facing significant financial distress.

Ms. Patton stated that county applications are complex because they include budgets; budget forecasts; descriptions of county efforts to constrain expenditures; and information on flexibility, spending and resources, debt and cash flow, and unmet budget needs. The Commission's regulations authorize the Commission to assign this application to a hearing panel consisting of

one or more Commission members acting on behalf of the Commission, or to a hearing officer for hearing and preparation of a preliminary decision. However, if an assignment is not made, then the application will be set for hearing before the Commission itself.

Ms. Patton noted that in 1999, the Commission spent \$70,000 to contract with the Department of Finance to provide the budget and program analysis for a previous Butte County application. The amount did not include the cost for Commission staff time spent in processing the application and reviewing the Department of Finance's analysis. If Finance staff is available for this assignment, staff proposes to continue this practice.

Also, Ms. Patton indicated that the Commission's budget contained no funding for the SB 1033 program, but if a county application is filed, the Commission is authorized to request augmentation of its budget to fund the cost of completing the application. However, she noted that the Commission did not have adequate staffing to complete both test claim work and SB 1033 applications.

Before the Commission were options for how the future Butte County application will be heard and determined. Ms. Patton outlined them as follows:

Option 1: Hearing before the Commission. All Commission members would travel to Oroville for one hearing. Salary, travel, and per diem costs would be provided for public members, and state agency members would file travel expense claims with their respective agencies. The Commission would also contract with the Department of Finance for review of the application.

Option 2: Hearing Panel. A limited number of Commission members would travel to Oroville. Costs will vary depending on which members are on the panel. The Commission would contract with the Department of Finance for review of the application and preparation of an analysis.

Option 3: OAH Hearing Officer. The Office of Administrative Hearings could provide a hearing officer to review the application, conduct the hearing, consider the evidence, and prepare a proposed Statement of Decision that would be presented to the Commission members for a determination.

Option 4: Expert Hearing Officer. A person with expertise in county fiscal program matters would be appointed to be the hearing officer and to present findings and a recommended Statement of Decision to the Commission. This option may require an exemption from the Department of Finance. The necessity of contracting with the Department of Finance would be assessed.

Staff recommended that the Commission adopt Option 4.

Member Barnes asked questions about the timeline and the process for the previous application filed by Butte County in 1999. Acknowledging the sensitivity of the issue, he raised for discussion the idea of having the hearing before the Commission.

Member Sherwood noted several points. First, he stated that the process is a very significant undertaking for the members and for staff. Secondly, he indicated that the Commission's job is to make a finding about significant financial distress and the Board of Supervisors determines whether they will actually implement any cuts. Thirdly, he noted that those affected are people

on general assistance. Thus, he felt that as difficult as it may be, it would be important to be there for the meeting.

After further discussion amongst the members, Chairperson Tilton and Member Barnes concurred with Member Sherwood that the application should be heard and determined by the full Commission.

Ms. Higashi suggested that a short break be taken.

[As this time, a short recess was taken.]

HEARINGS AND DECISIONS, PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 7 (action)

Ms. Higashi swore the parties and witnesses participating in the hearing of agenda items 3 and 4.

TEST CLAIM AND PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION

Item 3 Distracted Drivers, 01-TC-12

City of Newport Beach, Claimant Vehicle Code Section 2407.5

Statutes 2001, Chapter 710 (AB 770)

Eric Feller, Commission Counsel, presented this item. He stated that the test claim legislation requires traffic collision reports prepared by the California Highway Patrol or any other peace officer to include information as to whether a cellular telephone or other driver distraction or inattention was a known or suspected associated factor in the cause of the collision. The statute requires that the information be collected and transmitted to the California Highway Patrol from January to July 2002.

Staff found that the test claim statute does not impose a reimbursable state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution and Government Code section 17514. Mr. Feller explained that state law does not require local agency peace officers, except county coroners, to prepare traffic collision reports. Therefore, they were not mandated by the state to include in a traffic collision report any information about the use of a cellular telephone or other distraction.

Mr. Feller indicated that the test claim was subject to article XIII B, section 6 with respect to county coroners by requiring them to include in the report required by Vehicle Code section 20011 information as to whether a cellular telephone or other driver distraction or inattention was a known or suspected associated factor to the cause of the traffic collision that results in death, and to collect and transmit the information to the California Highway Patrol. However, he stated that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding of costs mandated by the state on county coroners.

Therefore, staff recommended that the Commission adopt the staff analysis, which denies the test claim.

Parties were represented as follows: Pam Stone, Glen Everroad, and Sergeant Dale Johnson, on behalf of the City of Newport Beach; Captain Scott Howland, with the California Highway Patrol; and Elliott Mandell, with the Department of Finance.

Ms. Stone indicated that the period of compliance was from January through December 2002. After noting her points of agreement with staff's analysis, she disagreed with staff's conclusion

that the test claim statute did not constitute a reimbursable mandate. She stated the claimant's belief that there is an underlying common law constitutional obligation to enforce the law, which also includes enforcement of the Vehicle Code and completion of the resulting traffic collision reports.

Ms. Stone argued that nowhere could a mandate be found that a peace officer shall investigate all of any particular type of crime or prepare traffic collision reports for every collision occurring in its jurisdiction. Thus, she disagreed with staff's position that it is a discretionary local decision to prepare accident reports since there is no specific underlying statutory requirement, especially since the information provided by the reports were used by the California Highway Patrol for data. She notes that staff's citations to case law does not consider whether the statutory requirements constitute a reimbursable program. Therefore, she stated the claimant's belief that the incremental increase in completing the report as to the inclusion of known or suspected driver distractions should be reimbursable. She was also concerned that the logical extension of staff's analysis is that without any specific underlying statutory requirement, there was no obligation for local governments to do anything.

Sergeant Johnson noted that police departments responded to traffic collisions as a result of a call for service. He stated that the primary reason for responding to traffic collisions was to enforce the law by conducting investigations to determine what provisions of the Vehicle Code were violated. He felt that it was inaccurate to suggest that police departments were not mandated to conduct investigations and that they do so only at their own discretion. Further, he asserted that there was a mandate and an obligation both to the community and to the legislative process for local police agencies to complete the standard collision investigation forms.

Member Sherwood asked Sergeant Johnson if he had ever seen a case where a call for service had been turned down. Sergeant Johnson responded that it was the policy of the City of Newport Beach not to respond to collisions on private property because the Vehicle Code could not be enforced.

Mr. Feller stated that staff did not make a finding as to the general common law duty to enforce the law. He explained that this program related to vehicle collision reports, and staff's reading of all the state statutes and cases in the area indicated that it was not a duty mandated by the state. He added that Vehicle Code section 20008 imposes a duty on the driver to report accidents to the California Highway Patrol, or if it was an unincorporated area, to the local police, and the police had the duty to forward the reports to the California Highway Patrol. He reiterated that there was no duty on the police themselves to prepare accident reports.

In addition, Mr. Feller disagreed with the claimant's argument that there would be nothing to report to the California Highway Patrol pursuant to Vehicle Code section 2407 or 2408. He referenced the staff analysis to address the issue and added that there would be sufficient data for the California Highway Patrol to meet its other requirements under the Vehicle Code to statistically compile accident information.

Mr. Mandell agreed with staff that there was no reimbursable mandate here. However, if the Commission were to determine otherwise, he pointed out that the period of reimbursement should only be for a six-month period beginning January 1, 2002. He explained that even though the statute sunsetted January 1, 2003, it was clear that the California Highway Patrol only had to collect information up through July 1, 2002.

Captain Howland commented that when Vehicle Code section 2407 became effective, it did not require any additional reports or any change in reporting for law enforcement agencies to the California Highway Patrol. He added that it enabled the California Highway Patrol to complete the report that was mandated on them.

Mr. Everroad submitted that the City of Newport Beach was only seeking reimbursement for the incremental increase statutorily required by the Legislature to investigate, record, and report to the California Highway Patrol those accidents that involved a driver distraction. He added that the costs associated with this test claim were not significant as it was for a limited period of time. He urged the Commission to find a mandate in this case.

Ms. Stone reiterated her earlier concern about staff's position that there was no mandate, and that the activity was voluntary because there was no statutory requirement for the underlying traffic collision report.

Member Barnes expressed concern about what local governments were obligated to do. Mr. Feller maintained that state law did not mandate anything, but suggested that the obligation may be pursuant to local ordinance.

There was some discussion between Member Barnes and Captain Howland about responding to vehicle collisions and the corresponding report. Captain Howland clarified that the required information was already being gathered prior to passage of the legislation. He also explained that the legislation only changed how the information was being requested, but not what was being reported.

Chairperson Tilton summarized his understanding of staff's recommendation, which Mr. Feller confirmed.

Member Barnes stated that after all the discussion, he agreed with the staff recommendation. However, he restated that he was troubled by the legal justification.

Paul Starkey, Chief Legal Counsel, explained that staff's position was based upon a statutory analysis combined with the *Department of Finance* case. He stated that this was not about the generalized duty or moral duty of officers to respond to situations. Rather, staff looked at the statute to determine whether there was a requirement imposed by the state. From the plain meaning of the statute, local peace officers were not mandated to do anything.

Member Barnes noted that he did not see a particular conclusion that there was no obligation or duty to respond to traffic collisions.

Member Boel made a motion to adopt the staff recommendation. With a second by Member Sherwood, the motion carried unanimously.

Item 4 Proposed Statement of Decision: Distracted Drivers, 01-TC-12, as described above in Item 3.

Eric Feller, Commission Counsel, presented this item. He indicated that unless the parties objected, staff recommended that the Commission adopt the proposed Statement of Decision, which accurately reflects the decision on the test claim. Staff requested that the Commission allow staff to make minor changes to reflect the errata sheet, hearing testimony, and vote count before issuing the final Statement of Decision.

Ms. Stone reiterated the comments made by Mr. Burdick in item 6. She noted that there was extensive discussion regarding the concept of duty that was not reflected in the proposed decision. She commented that this implied that the Commission made decisions prior to hearing any testimony.

Chairperson Tilton and Member Sherwood responded that they were conscious of the concern and assured her that the Commission does not automatically adopt the staff recommendation.

Ms. Stone requested that the Statement of Decision reflect that the basis of the decision was that there was no statute requiring police officers to prepare a traffic collision report.

Mr. Feller stated that Ms. Stone's request was appropriate with modified wording. Ms. Higashi added that the decision could be modified as requested because it was consistent with staff's request that the Commission allow staff to make changes to reflect hearing testimony. However, she noted that staff would need to wait until the hearing transcript was received to issue the final decision.

Chairperson Tilton instructed staff to make the requested modification.

Member Barnes reiterated his earlier point that claimants should inform staff and offer suggestions if they feel that something more should be incorporated into the final decision.

Mr. Starkey noted for the record that decisions should only be read as an interpretation of the test claim statute and what was before the Commission, not anything broader.

Member Boel made a motion to adopt the proposed Statement of Decision and to authorize staff to update the decision to reflect the vote, the witnesses, and any hearing testimony not previously in the record. With a second by Member Sherwood, the motion carried unanimously.

Member Sherwood noted that the work currently being provided by Commission staff was excellent.

STAFF REPORTS

Item 18 Chief Legal Counsel's Report (info)
Recent Decisions, Litigation Calendar

Mr. Starkey reported that there was nothing further to add with regard to litigation updates. He also introduced the summer law clerks: Micah Martin, Todd Ratshin, and William Tunick.

Item 19 Executive Director's Report (info/action)
Budget, Workload, Assembly Special Committee on State Mandates,
Legislation, Next Hearing

Nancy Patton, Assistant Executive Director, noted that the Governor's Office had requested all boards and commissions to prepare bill analyses and recommend positions on pending legislation. She indicated that during previous administrations, the Governor's Office did not make this request, nor did the Commission routinely prepare analyses or recommend positions on pending legislation.

Ms. Patton explained that there may be a very short turnaround time of three to five days to submit a completed bill analysis in the event one was requested by the Governor's Office. Thus, staff recommended that the Commission authorize the Executive Director to submit bill analyses with positions on bills that impact the Commission's statutory authority and workload. She

noted that each bill analysis would include the following statement: "This analysis was prepared by Commission staff. It has not been reviewed by the Commission members, and it is not intended to reflect the position of any individual member or of the Commission itself." Ms. Patton added that this process would not preclude the Commission from voting to take positions on bills as staff would continue to present bills to the Commission for action.

Member Boel expressed support for staff's recommendation. She noted that it was necessary in order to continue the high quality of staff work being received. Chairperson Tilton and Member Sherwood agreed.

Member Sherwood made a motion to authorize the Executive Director to take legislative positions and to report them to the Governor's Office. With a second by Member Boel, the motion carried unanimously.

Ms. Higashi noted the following:

- Assembly Special Committee on State Mandates. The committee will resume hearings in about a week. There are a number of proposals before it.
- Legislation. Legislation updates are available on the Commission's website.
- Next Agenda. Staff is still in the process of finalizing the items.

Member Sherwood pointed out a typographical error regarding the State Controller's Report to the Director of Finance.

Ms. Higashi and Ms. Patton responded to questions from Member Boel and Member Barnes about the process and timeframes for the future Butte County application.

PUBLIC COMMENT

A short presentation was made in honor of Vice Chairperson, William Sherwood, who is retiring. He was presented with a resolution by Chairperson Tilton and tokens of appreciation by Dr. Carol Berg, on behalf of the Education Mandated Cost Network; and Mr. Allan Burdick, on behalf of the California State Association of Counties. Member Sherwood thanked his fellow members, as well as the Commission staff.

CLOSED EXECUTIVE SESSION PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE SECTIONS 11126 and 17526.

Mr. Starkey indicated that there would be no closed session meeting.

ADJOURNMENT

Hearing no further business, Chairperson Tilton adjourned the meeting at 12:46 p.m.

PAULA HIGASH

Executive Director

RECEIVED

JUN 17 2004

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES PUBLIC HEARING

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

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ORIGINAL

TIME: 9:33 a.m.

DATE: Thursday, May 27, 2004

PLACE: Commission on State Mandates

State Capitol, Room 126 Sacramento, California

--000--

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

--000--

Reported By:

JANETTE V. VINE CSR #3978

APPEARANCES

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT

JAMES TILTON
(Commission Chair)
Representative for DONNA ARDUIN
Director
Department of Finance

WILLIAM SHERWOOD

(Commission Vice Chair)

Representative for PHILIP ANGELIDES

State Treasurer

WALTER BARNES
Representative for STEVE WESTLY
State Controller

JAN BOEL
Acting Director
State Office of Planning and Research

COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT

PAULA HIGASHI Executive Director

PAUL M. STARKEY Chief Legal Counsel

CAMILLE SHELTON
Senior Commission Counsel

ERIC FELLER
Commission Counsel

NANCY PATTON
Assistant Executive Director

--000--

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 3:

For City of Newport Beach:

PAMELA A. STONE Maximus 4320 Auburn Boulevard, Suite 2000 Sacramento, CA 95841

DALE JOHNSON (Sergeant)
City of Newport Police Department
870 Santa Barbara Drive
Newport Beach, CA 92660

GLEN EVERROAD City of Newport 3300 Newport Boulevard Newport Beach, CA 92658

For the California Highway Patrol:

SCOTT HOWLAND (Captain)
Special Representative to the Legislature
California Highway Patrol

For the Department of Finance:

ELLIOTT MANDELL Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, CA 95814

Appearing Re Item 5:

For California State Association of Counties:

ALLAN BURDICK California State Association of Counties 4320 Auburn Boulevard, Suite 2000 Sacramento, CA 95841

For CSAC-EIA:

GINA C. DEAN CSAC Excess Insurance Authority 3017 Gold Canal Drive, Suite 300 Rancho Cordova, CA 95670

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 5: continued

For County of Tehama and CSAC-EIA:

JULIANA F. GMUR, Esq.
Maximus
4320 Auburn Boulevard, Suite 2000
Sacramento, CA 95841

For the Department of Finance:

JACI MARIE MITSCHKE Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, CA 95814

Appearing Re Item 9:

For Denair Unified School District:

DAVID E. SCRIBNER Schools Mandate Group One Capitol Mall, Suite 200 Sacramento, CA 95814

For the Department of Finance:

BARBARA TAYLOR Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, CA 95814

Appearing Re Item 15:

For Education Mandated Cost Network and Los Angeles County Office of Education:

CAROL A. BERG, Ph.D. School Services California, Inc. 1121 L Street, Suite 1060 Sacramento, CA 95814

For Department of Finance:

NELSON CAYAGO Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, CA 95814

ERRATA SHEET

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
11	24	CHANGE "SITE" TO "CITE"
24	10	DELETE "CITY OF"
26	18	CHANGE "SHERWOOD" TO "SHELTON"
120	25	CHANGE "STATUTE" TO "LAN"
121	1	CHANGE "LAW" TO "STATUTE"
121		CHANGE DAV 10 SIXTOIL
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1	BE IT REMEMBERED that on Thursday, May 27, 2004,
2	commencing at the hour of 9:33 a.m., thereof, at the
3	State Capitol, Room 126, Sacramento, California, before
4	me, JANETTE V. VINE, CSR #3978, the following proceedings
5	were held:
6	000
7	CHAIR TILTON: Get your attention. Let's get
8	started with the Commission on State Mandates meeting.
9	It's 9:30.
10	We'll see if we can get through the agenda in a
11	reasonable time today.
12	Paula, could you call the roll call, please?
13	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
14	MEMBER BARNES: Here.
15	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
16	MEMBER BOEL: Here.
17	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar is going to be absent
18	today.
19	Mr. Sherwood?
20	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Here.
21	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
22	CHAIR TILTON: Here.
23	MS. HIGASHI: The first item on today's agenda is
24	adoption of the minutes from the previous meeting. It's
25	Item 1.

1 CHAIR TILTON: Oh, I had one minor amendment. Page 9. 2 Middle of the page it quotes me there in terms of 3 when we were discussing whether this Mandate was funded 4 5 or not, and if I make the change, it says, "I was trying to find out if Department of Finance could verify this 6 7 point, " instead of, "I didn't expect Finance's budget to 8 cover the Mandate." MS. HIGASHI: We will make that correction. 9 CHAIR TILTON: With that, then, I'm okay with the 10 11 minutes. 12 MEMBER BARNES: Move for approval. 13 MEMBER BOEL: Second. 14 CHAIR TILTON: We have a motion and a second. 15 there is no objections, we'll approve the minutes as amended. 16 17 MS. HIGASHI: Next, we have the proposed consent calendar. 18 19 CHAIR TILTON: Is there any discussion on the 20 consent calendar? Does anyone want to pull anything off? MS. HIGASHI: Let me just read the consent 21 calendar. 22 Consent calendar consists of Item 11, Differential 23 24 Pay and Reemployment Parameters and Guidelines, and Item 14, School District of Choice: Transfers and 25

1	Appeals Limited to the State Controller's Office request,
2	and Item 16, Statewide Cost Estimate for Grand Jury
3	Proceedings.
4	CHAIR TILTON: Are there any objections or
5	comments on the consent calendar?
6	Do I have a motion?
7	MEMBER BARNES: Move approval.
8	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Second.
9	CHAIR TILTON: The motion is seconded. Any
10	further discussion?
11	(No audible response was heard.)
12	CHAIR TILTON: All those in favor of the Consent
13	Calendar signal by saying "aye."
14	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
15	CHAIR TILTON: Opposed?
16	(No audible response was heard.)
17	CHAIR TILTON: Motion carries.
18	MS. HIGASHI: At this time, we would normally go
19	to the hearing portion of our meeting, and we have three
20	test claims set for hearing today.
21	The first item that would be heard is Item 3.
22	Because of some airline problems in Orange County, we are
23	going to move that item up in the agenda and take it up
24	later today.
25	So we would begin with Item 5, 6 and 9 and 10.

At this time, I'd like to have all of the 1 witnesses and parties for Items 5, 6, 9 and 10 please 2 stand. 3 (Several people stood up.) 4 MS. HIGASHI: Please raise your hand. 5 Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony 6 7 which you're about to give is true and correct based upon your personal knowledge, information or belief? 8 (A chorus of "I do's" was heard.) 9 10 MS. HIGASHI: Thank you. 11 Item 5 is the test claim on Cancer Presumption for Law Enforcement and Firefighters. This item will be 12 presented by Senior Commission Counsel, Camille Shelton. 13 14 MS. SHELTON: Good morning. This test claim involves Labor Code section 15 16 3212.1, which provides an evidentiary presumption in 17 workers' compensation cases for specified law enforcement 18 officers and firefighters that develop cancer during the 19 course of employment. 20 In such cases, the employee need only show that he or she was exposed to a known carcinogen during 21

If the employer makes the decision to dispute the claim, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that the carcinogen is not reasonably linked to the

employment.

22

23

24

25

cancer and therefore, the cancer is not an industrial injury.

2.0

The test claim was filed by the County of Tehama and the California State Association of Counties-Excess Insurance Authority.

The CSAC-Excess Insurance Authority is a joint powers authority established by contracting counties for insurance and risk management purposes. CSAC-Excess Insurance Authority does not employ peace officers and is not a party to a workers' compensation claim filed by a peace officer against a local agency employer.

In addition, CSAC-Excess Insurance Authority does not have the authority to raise tax revenue and is not bound by the spending limitations of article XIII B.

Staff recommends that the Commission deny this test claim and make the following findings:

One: That CSAC-Excess Insurance Authority does not have standing and is not a proper claimant for this test claim;

And two: That the Labor Code section 3212.1, as amended by the test claim legislation, is not subject to article XIII B, section 6 of California Constitution because it does not mandate a new program or higher level of service on local agencies.

Will the parties and witnesses please state your

1	names for the record.
2	MS. GMUR: Good morning, Mr. Chairman,
3	Commissioners.
4	Juliana Gmur on behalf of the County of Tehama and
5	CSAC-EIA.
6	MS. DEAN: Gina Dean, CSAC-Excess Insurance
7	Authority.
8	MR. BURDICK: I'm Allan Burdick on behalf of the
9	California State Association of Counties.
10	MS. NITSCHKE: Jaci Nitschke, Department of
11	Finance.
12	CHAIR TILTON: Okay. Of the witnesses, who would
13	like to begin?
14	MS. GMUR: I would like to begin. Thank you very
15	much.
16	The cancer presumption for law enforcement and
17	firefighters test claim is not a new test claim. It is a
18	revision of an existing claim based on an old claim.
19	The original claim in 1982 came before the Board
20	of Control. At that time, Labor Code section 3212.1
21	involved firefighters only and was a new addition to the
22	law. It was found to be a mandate in 1985.
23	Why? Because of the language within the statute
24	that says there shall be a presumption. There was an
25	amendment, and law enforcement was added. So a second

test claim came forward before this Commission in 1989 to address the changes of the addition of peace officers.

It was also found to be a mandate in 1992.

1.3

Today, a new change in the statute comes before you. What has happened to the statute since then is leukemia has been specifically added. But more importantly, it removes the requirement that an employee prove the cancer was reasonably related to a carcinogen. It's part of AOE/COE, which I'll discuss later, and it limits the employer's defenses.

Commission staff recommends a finding that this be deemed not a mandate. What I'd like to do is walk through very slowly so we can explain to you how this really is a mandate.

Let's look at a workers' compensation case. In a workers' compensation case, an employee is injured on the job, they file. The employer responds and defends, and ultimately, the conflict is resolved.

The key issues for the employee is that there was an injury, and it is what they call AOE/COE; that it arose out of employment or was in the course of employment. For obvious injuries, like somebody lifting a box or somebody having some equipment fall over on them, the injury is obvious and the fact that it happened on the job is obvious. So these are very small hurdles.

In the case of cancer, however, proving the connection, the AOE/COE portion is very difficult. And it is subject to a lawsuit. And as a result, the Legislature made the change in the law shifting the burden of proof, basically saying to the employee, You may not know what carcinogens you've been exposed to. You may not know about whether the cancer is reasonably related. So what we'll do is instead of having you prove that element, we'll have your employer disprove it.

So now let's look at the language in the statute itself. I quote, "The cancer so developing or manifesting itself in these cases shall be presumed to arise out of and in the course of employment."

So there is a presumption that the AOE/COE portion of the employee's proof is then removed from them, and it uses the mandatory language of "shall." This language was recognized by the Board of Control and by this Commission in the prior two test claims.

Commission staff focus on the next sentence.

Let's look at that. I quote, "This presumption is disputable and may be controverted by evidence,"

et cetera. Sets forth how the defense may be brought forward.

Commission staff site the City of Merced. The City of Merced is a 1984 case, and the issue, basically,

boils down to if something is voluntary, it's not a mandate.

If we look at the facts briefly in the City of Merced, the City of Merced wanted to acquire, purchase some land. They did so by eminent domain. In so doing, they had to pay a cost that they were not anticipating; a cost they would not have had to pay if they had used another mechanism besides eminent domain.

The court found that because they could have avoided the statute that held the mandate, then there was no mandate.

What we're looking at here, and the way that I've explained it in the past, because it's kind of an esoteric legal issue, is I always imagine two paths going forward. City of Merced chose the path to the right, and as such, they stumbled over a rock. They stumble over that mandate rock. If they could have taken the path to the left, they could have avoided the rock entirely. And so that, in essence, is what City of Merced stands for.

In this case, when we're looking at that, the opening sentence says, "Shall." It's the second sentence that is says, "May." So there shall be a presumption.

There may be a defense.

For the employer, there is no way to avoid the "shall" portion of that statute. It can't do something

1.8

else to stop the presumption from happening.

1.8

The second test claim that was brought forward for the addition of the peace officers, there was similar language in that statute at the time. That was 1992, and City of Merced is a 1984 case. So City of Merced was on the books and well-known law at the time that this Commission looked at this same language.

I'll quote the language that existed when this Commission made its decision in '92.

"This presumption is disputable and may be controverted by other evidence, but unless so controverted, the Appeals Board is bound to find in accordance with it."

Very similar language to that which I quoted before, "This presumption is disputable and may be controverted by evidence."

At the time, this Commission did not apply City of Merced. And the reason is because City of Merced does not speak to whether this is a mandate. It speaks to whether defense costs are activities within the mandate. That's where the "may" language comes in.

So this matter is -- this is a mandate; it's been found to be a mandate by the Board of Control, by this Commission in the past. The areas of law that have been adjusted by the recent changes do not affect this basic

language that has existed since this law came into its existence. And therefore, the mandate should be found.

Before I move on to the other issue, are there any questions?

Thank you. And on we go.

The first issue is CSAC-EIA's standing. And I apologize, "standing" is another one of those fun but esoteric areas of the law.

Let's first look to the plain language of the statute. We're going to shift gears out of the Labor Code and move into Government Code now. We're looking at Section 17520, which states that "A joint powers agency or entity is a special district that can file claims."

Now, as the staff has pointed out, a redevelopment agency is also listed as a special district that can file claims. It's included in statute by name, but it's been excluded by Pate's Law.

So the question, then, is does the reasoning in the case Redevelopment Agency of San Marcos exclude joint powers authorities? We know it excludes a redevelopment agency, but does that same reasoning apply here today?

Let's look. Let's look at what a redevelopment agency is. They are created by ordinance; they have appointed board members; they serve for particular terms; they have very limited powers.

A joint powers authority, however, is created by contract. The counties get together; they contract. Any powers that they have, they can assign to this agency. It is basically an administrative function. They have flexible memberships because it's done by contract. And the powers are delegated to them by their membership.

2.0

San Marcos stands for the proposition that article XIII B, section 6 addresses reimbursement of tax revenues, or the language that's used in the case is the proceeds of taxes.

Redevelopment agencies have a different funding source than joint powers authorities. Redevelopment agencies use a tax increment financing. And this is found to be not the proceeds of taxes.

But the joint powers authority uses the monies from the counties themselves. I think we will all agree that the counties can bring the test claims. The question is can the JPA, who acts on behalf of the county, bring a test claim for them.

The counties acquire their money as proceeds of taxes. They assign the administration of these funds to the JPA. The assignment does not change the character of the funds itself. They remain the proceeds of taxes.

I'm going to turn this over to Ms. Gina Dean of CSAC-EIA, who can explain to you the real-world operation

of a JPA and why it should be considered a proper party.

MS. DEAN: Good morning.

1.1

The CSAC-Excess Insurance Authority was formed in 1979 by a group of California counties that came together for the common need and purpose of insurance and risk management purposes.

Currently, there is 53 of the 58 counties that participate in one or more of our insurance pools.

We have two workers' compensation programs. The first program that I'm going to talk about is an excess program, and what that means is we will reimburse the county for claims that they have to make payments on above a specified self-insured retention.

We have a large pool of money to do that, and we fund that pool by having an actuarial analysis based on our historic losses, the county's historic losses, and then each county contributes their proportional share.

If we over-collect and don't use all of that money, we return that to them. If we don't collect enough, then they contribute more.

For cancer claims in our excess pool, the county pays those claim payments and then they seek reimbursement from the EIA. In the situation with the state mandated cost claim, they submit the claim, they receive reimbursement from the state. Then they are

required to reimburse the CSAC-EIA pool for any funds that we have expended as well.

Since the CSAC-EIA is not currently eligible to file the claim on the pool's behalf, we have to go through this administrative process. And from a logistical and practical standpoint, it just seems to make more sense that the pool could make their own claim to be reimbursed for those funds.

The second worker's compensation program that I wanted to talk with you about is our primary workers' comp program.

There are 18 counties in the state that participate in this pool. We make all of the claim payments on their behalf. It's funded the same way, on an actuarial basis, based on each county's own historical losses. And we essentially are holding those funds to make those payments on their behalf.

Currently, since the CSAC-EIA is not eligible to file a claim for reimbursement, the county does that.

They receive the reimbursement, and then they reimburse the pool; even though they haven't directly made the workers' comp payments.

In conclusion, to the extent that we can ease the burden of the counties to make the administrative filing, and do it on the pool's own behalf, we think it would

1 have a positive impact on the counties to not only reduce their administrative time and costs, but also be able to 2 replenish the pool, which would ultimately reduce the 3 funding requirements on the counties. 4 Are there any questions? Thank you. 5 MS. GMUR: So in conclusion, a joint powers 6 7 authority is unlike a redevelopment agency. It does not 8 have a tax increment financing. It does use the proceeds of taxes. 9 In that case, City of San Marcos does not apply. 10 11 If it does not apply, the Commission must look to the plain language of the statute, which includes joint 12 13 powers agencies or entities as proper parties to file test claims. 14 15 Any questions? 16 CHAIR TILTON: Members? 17 MEMBER BARNES: I'd be curious to have the staff 18 respond to the two issues. 19 MS. SHELTON: Would you like me to take them in 20 any particular order? MEMBER BARNES: The first one that she talked 2.1 22 about. 23 MS. SHELTON: On the substantive merits of the claim? 24

First, the claimants are relying on two prior

25

Commission decisions. Let me first state that prior

Commission decisions are not precedential. You're not

bound by those decisions. They were adopted in the '80's

and the early '90's.

They dealt with a cancer presumption initially given to fire fighters and then given to peace officers.

And this test claim was subsequent amendments expanding that presumption and changing the burden of proof.

The case law is clear that it's not arbitrary or capricious for -- in a quasi-judicial agency to not rely on older decisions if they find that the law supports their conclusion in the current case.

Here, we have a recent Supreme Court decision on the Department of Finance case that clearly says you either need to be legally compelled by the state or practically compelled to comply with the statute in order for reimbursement to be required.

If you look on Page 11 of the staff analysis, there is the quote of the statute in question, and the claimants are relying on the first sentence, and the first sentence says, "The cancer developing or manifesting itself in these cases shall be presumed to arise out of or in the course of employment."

That is a presumption given to the employee. That first sentence doesn't have anything to do or impose any

activities on the employer. It's the second sentence which says, "This presumption is disputable and may be controverted," and those are the activities that are within the discretion of the local agency to decide whether or not they want to dispute the claim. They don't have to dispute the claim; they can settle if they want to.

The point is the state is not forcing them to engage in litigation and defend that case.

So we are not really relying on the City of Merced. We certainly have quoted the City of Merced because the Supreme Court affirmed that finding in the City of Merced case.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Camille, are you relying on the Department of Finance case --

MS. SHELTON: Yes.

2.4

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: -- here also, am I right?

MS. SHERWOOD: And the case -- the analysis relies on the Department of Finance, and the Department of Finance is quoting from the City of Merced case.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: And then that brings you back to the substantial penalty possibility that it was held out in the Supreme Court decision?

MS. SHELTON: Right. And how the Supreme Court defines the substantial penalty was that you needed

severe and certain Draconian consequences.

And here, you know, there may be a situation where their insurance premiums are going to go up, but there is no evidence that that has occurred, and there is no evidence of any severe or certain consequences attaching to this.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: And that's an issue that becomes a difficult issue for members, at times, in trying to define Draconian and is somewhat subjective; although, I guess the decision did make it clear to substantial Draconian-type action.

MS. SHELTON: And the court did say it is not just a loss of funding for an entity. So for the county's purposes, you know, maybe increased premiums and, therefore, a loss of, maybe, funding that they have received, that alone is not certain and severe or Draconian.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: It's an important issue, obviously, because since this has occurred, we've seen it come up in many of the analysis that we've seen just since the decision was made.

MS. SHELTON: Right. And before that time, I'll just say that there was a question about the City of Merced case. It originally dealt with the old SB90 Revenue and Taxation Code sections. And so there was a

question among all parties whether or not it was still valid.

2.

And here we have a 2003 Supreme Court decision affirming the decision as valid under article XIII B, section 6.

Just moving to the second issue, there are two important factors for our recommendation on the fact that we believe that CSAC-EIA does not have standing as an eligible claimant here.

One very important fact is that they are not directly affected by this legislation. They may be indirectly affected, certainly, by the payment of the insurance proceeds, but they are not directly affected. They are not a party to the litigation in the workers' comp case. They do not employ peace officers. So they are not directly affected by this legislation.

And we have a Supreme Court ruling in the Kinlaw case saying you have to be a direct party directly affected by the legislation in order to have standing.

Secondly, we have the redevelopment agency case which staff believes strongly applies here for a couple of reasons. And I'll read from the court's holding in the redevelopment agency case. The court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling and interpretation of article XIII B, section 6 in the County of San Diego

case.

2.0

In there, they said the Supreme Court explained that section 6 represents a recognition that together articles XIII A and XIII B severely restrict the taxing and spending powers of local agencies. The purpose of the this section is to preclude the State from shifting financial responsibility for governmental functions to local agencies, which are ill-equipped to undertake increased financial responsibilities because they are subject to the taxing and spending limitations under articles XIII A and XIII B. And here the 3rd District Court of Appeals ruled that redevelopment agencies have no independent powers of taxation.

And in our record, we have admissions from CSAC-EIA that they do not have an independent power to tax and are not subject to the spending limitations.

And, therefore, the ruling and the court's interpretation of article XIII B, section 6 is the law, and the Commission is required to follow that.

CHAIR TILTON: Go ahead.

MS. GMUR: Juliana Gmur again.

In looking at the case, the Department of Finance, the most recent case, because I've already established that City of Merced was the law in 1984, and this Commission made its decision in 1992 that there was still

a mandate.

2.1

So the emphasis is now on the Department of
Finance case, most recent case. That case did not change
City of Merced; in fact, it upheld City of Merced. And
the question is, properly stated, legal compulsion.

In this case, we really don't have something that's on the borderline. The borderline cases are those cases that were brought up in Department of Finance.

When there is not a law out there that tells you what to do, but there is a moral or social responsibility, is that enough compulsion so that it's really not voluntary when the gun is to your head and nobody's making you do it, so to speak, there is no statute on the books.

That's when you start getting the wobblers. That's the cases that are hard to decide. When is something really and truly voluntary?

In this case, we actually don't have to go that far because the statute itself uses the "shall" language to create the presumption.

Now, the focus is on the second sentence, the sentence that uses the word "may," with regard to the defense costs. But again, that is the activities under the mandate; not the existence of the mandate itself. The opening sentence creates a mandate; it adjusts the burden of proof, just as it did in 1982, just as it did

in 1992. It adjusts that burden of proof.

It is something that the employer must apply. It is like a gift to the employee in the legal setting, in that the employer, a cancer claim is filed and the employer's hands are tied. The presumption moves in favor of the employee. That is something that the employee does not have to prove. As we said, the employee has to prove two things, injury and AOE/COE.

Proving that you have cancer is not going to be difficult. Proving how the cancer rose out of your work would be; except in this case, you don't have to. That's all you have to prove is injury; not difficult. And you have a very easy win. It adjusts the burden of proof in favor of the employee.

There is a cost involved when the burden of proof shifts and somebody wins automatically upon proof of injury without having to jump that AOE/COE hurdle, which any workers' compensation attorney can tell you can be quite difficult depending upon the case. And in the case of cancer, nearly impossible.

So it was a social policy decision to make that shift. And that is a "shall" mandate.

Now, the "may" part comes into the question of once the mandate is found, are the defense costs voluntary or not. And there is the question. There is

where Department of Finance, there's where City of Merced comes into play.

But as to the establishment of the initial mandate, those cases do not come into play.

Finally on the second issue, the San Marcos case talks about redevelopment agencies. So we must look at the language of the case as well as the facts. Are redevelopment agencies like joint powers associations? They are not. True, JPA's do not tax. They don't. They are a mere association. They are established by contract.

A group of counties get together, they say, We have to do blank. We need to track child inoculations.

And instead of one county doing it, why don't the five of us get together by contract, somebody can chip in the administration funds. Somebody can buy the computer.

And we will do this together, because it's better for all of us to have it that way. It's going to save us money; it's going to be easier to do.

And at the end of the project, they, by agreement, just simply dissolve the JPA. It ceases to exist. They don't want it to exist; it doesn't exist. If they want to change how it works or what it does, they do so simply by agreement. It's a mere association of the counties.

The character of the money remains the counties.

The counties can tax. They do work with the proceeds of taxes.

Because you hand it to a group of counties to act on your behalf does not change the character of the money. Reliance on San Marcos is not going to be supportive.

MEMBER BOEL: I have a question about the -whether this issue about whether or not CSAC is a proper
claimant.

It's not unusual for associations of all different kinds, associations of the League of Cities, or different types of associations, to have some kind of insurance arrangements where they have a pooling arrangement.

So what makes CSAC unique that you should be considered in this case the claimant; whereas many of these other associations, would not? Or else maybe you're saying that a lot of associations should be considered.

MS. GMUR: Actually, we're back to the Government Code, which is, because San Marcos really doesn't apply, where we must remain.

Government code 17520 specifically includes joint power agencies and entities as special districts that can file test claims. So they have the statutory authority to proceed while others do not.

MEMBER BOEL: I'd like to have a comment from Camille about that.

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MS. SHELTON: Let me try to clarify some rules of interpretation and maybe that might help.

In Government Code section 17500, the Legislature has interpreted the Constitution. The court, when they are interpreting article XII B, section 6, will look how the Legislature has interpreted and give it great weight. But they are not required to rely on it.

Here, we do have a statute, but since the statute has been enacted, we have subsequent case law and interpretations by the Supreme Court, which we are required to follow, and the Courts of Appeal, which we're also required to follow. And it has been made very clear from multiple jurisdictions and multiple courts that the only entities that have standing in these cases are those that have the ability to tax directly to the taxpayer, and are subject to the spending limitations. And here, we have admissions in the record that they do not have that capability.

We also have, you know, testimony in the record that this was a voluntary decision on the part of the counties to join this association to, you know, cover workers' compensation in this particular manner. There is no requirement that they are there. And they can

1 certainly have other methods of paying for their workers' compensation claims and covering their insurance 2 necessities. 3 MEMBER BOEL: Thank you. 5 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Mr. Chair, could I hear from Department of Finance? Because I know early on in 6 7 reading the material that evidently they concluded that the legislation may create a reimbursable state-mandated 8 9 And then on April 14th, they filed comments basically reversing that position. 10 11 I'd just like to here the thinking behind that. 12 CHAIR TILTON: Sure. Department of Finance? MS. NITSCHKE: We support the staff analysis at 13 this time. 14 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: You did at the time? 15 MS. NITSCHKE: At this point, we do. We support 16 17 the staff analysis. 18 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Okay. But originally, there 19 was some indication you didn't. MS. NITSCHKE: There was new information provided 2.0 in the draft staff analysis. And we now support --21 22 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: And that information was 23 what? MS. NITSCHKE: Well, there is information provided 24

that this case information that was presented, and we

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were able to change our analysis at that point and support the staff analysis.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Was it somewhat based on the recent Supreme Court decision, Department of Finance case?

MS. NITSCHKE: Yes.

MR. BURDICK: Chairman, and other members of the Commission, Allan Burdick on behalf of the California State Association of Counties.

And just a couple of brief comments. First, on the standing issue, the CSAC-Excess Insurance Authority is a special district under law. They do report to the State Controller as a special district.

CSAC, as an example, is an association of counties and does not fall under those provisions and reports. So there is a difference between the association and the authority.

The authority is clearly, under law, a special district, and it's one of the special districts that reports to the State Controller, and they conclude that in their special district reports. And so there is a distinction between those, and I wanted to make sure it was clear. Sometimes we're referring to the authority as an association. It is an authority, which is really a joint powers authority, which clearly is a special

district under law.

I wanted to just kind of see if I could put this in a little more perspective for the lay persons, and getting away a little bit from the legal analysis. I know we need to consider that, but I think we need to look at the law.

I was one that happened to be involved with all the legislation that created both of the original cancer presumptions, and I also participated in the original test claim with the City of Sacramento and all of the involvement in the parameters and guidelines and discussion on that.

So let me just kind of let the folks know the current situation is is that there are two existing reimbursable state mandated programs; one, for police officers, one for fire fighters.

They are identical except they are based on separate statutes. Other than that, the situations and the process and the claiming and so forth is all the same.

In those particular cases, what happens is that when a local agency incurs costs for a workers' compensation cancer case related to a police officer or firefighter, depending on which case and which claim, in that particular case, the costs are shared equally

between the state and the local government.

The decision, originally, of the Board of Control on the firefighter claim, subsequently on the police officer claim, by this Commission, made a determination they were going to continue to say that, in this case, it increased the likelihood that a case would be found against the local agency because of the establishment of the presumption, and therefore, there was a sharing of, a 50-50 sharing of costs.

In this particular case, what happens is that along came legislation and changed the ground rules and made it much more difficult for local agencies to be able to prevail. So what local agencies are doing in this case, what their preference was, originally, was to seek an amendment to the parameters and guidelines of those two existing test claims, but were instructed, no, they needed to file a test claim because it was on a statute and could not do that. Even though there is no change, otherwise, in the elements of what is being sought for reimbursement.

What local agencies are really looking for is saying, Well, we had a 50/50 sharing. You've made things a little more difficult. Now it seems like we should change that sharing. Maybe it should be 55/45, maybe it should be 60/40, or whatever, but clearly what you've

done is you've established, by adding -- placing the burden of proof on the employer and shifting it from the employee, you've made it more difficult for the employer to prevail in these cases.

And as was pointed out by Ms. Gmur, that is because you're dealing with a cumulative injury, an injury that takes place over a period of time, very difficult to determine one way or the other as to was that related to the job or not.

And so they have to kind of go back and show that at some point, the way the law is written, there was some exposure to a carcinogen that's on the international list of known carcinogens.

And in this case, in the past, the burden of proof, the presumption was there, but the employee had the burden of proof to prove that. This shifted it to the employer. So that's all we're really looking at.

The change has shifted the ground rules. It's just like from your standpoint, if you went from a regular majority to a super majority, obviously, it makes it more difficult to get a super majority, much more on this Commission, than a majority, and that's all that we really did.

And so all local agency is really looking at is saying, Okay, let's go back to those two existing test

claims, not change any language relative to reimbursable components or anything else. The only thing you look at is should local agencies be getting more than 50 percent, because now they have a new burden. And I think clearly, the Workers' Comp Appeals Board, the Department of Industrial Relations, any attorney that deals in this area would tell you that there will be more cases found in favor of the employee now that we have this change in law.

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So that's kind of a simple lay person's description of what we're looking for. And, you know, instead of getting involved with all of this discussion on legal issues, as clearly as Ms. Gmur is pointing out, the issues in most cases being raised were there before. There is some discussion about the Department of Finance and the cost.

And one of the things I may point out is a number of public agencies are self-insured. And so when they incur a cost for one of these cases, they could incur the full cost. And in a small agency -- and this also extends to volunteers. You could have a volunteer firefighter in a small local government agency, or anyplace else, they could have a case that was now found in this particular case, because the county wasn't able to establish with a burden of proof on it, win that case,

and they could incur literally hundreds of thousands or possibly even a million dollars because they would be involved in paying for all of the legal costs in those particular cases, they would be involved in paying for any death benefits, any ongoing benefits to the dependents and so forth.

So there can be a substantial cost impact on some local agencies that are involved in this. Whether that cost is incurred initially at one time because they are self-insured, or in an insurance case, those costs are really spread amongst a lot of people, but they are still incurring -- local agencies, collectively, are still incurring that same dollar amount. So somebody might say, Well, your premium didn't go. But in the CSAC-Excess Insurance case, their members, if they have 40 members, and the case is a million dollars, those 40 members are going to share that cost. So there is still a million-dollar hit on those 40 agencies. Obviously, it's only 1/40th, not the full amount if they were solely self-insured. But there is still a hit on those agencies on a county-wide basis.

So anyway, I'd be happy to answer any questions.

As I say, I've been involved in this from the beginning of the legislation when Senator Art Torres introduced it a long time ago, and all the way through the process, and

1	the test claims that have participated since that time.
2	Thank you.
3	CHAIR TILTON: Any other comments or questions?
4	MEMBER BARNES: I move the staff recommendation.
5	MEMBER BOEL: I'll second that.
6	CHAIR TILTON: I have a motion and a second to
7	accept staff's recommendation.
8	Paula, do you want to call the roll?
9	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
10	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
11	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
12	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
13	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sherwood?
14	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Aye.
15	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
16	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
17	MS. HIGASHI: Thank you.
18	MEMBER BARNES: Thank you, very much.
19	MS. HIGASHI: Item 6 will also be presented by
20	Ms. Shelton.
21	MS. SHELTON: Item 6 is the Proposed Statement of
22	Decision on the test claim that you just heard.
23	The sole issue before the Commission is whether
24	the Proposed Statement of Decision accurately reflects
25	your decision today. Unless the parties object, staff
21222324	MS. SHELTON: Item 6 is the Proposed Statement of Decision on the test claim that you just heard. The sole issue before the Commission is whether the Proposed Statement of Decision accurately reflects

recommends that the Commission adopt the Proposed Statement of Decision beginning on page 2.

And any minor changes to reflect the vote count will be included on the final decision that will be issued.

CHAIR TILTON: Any questions or comments?

MR. BURDICK: Well, Mr. Chairman and members, I guess in order to be consistent, I should make a comment, because I raised the same comment with the Assembly Special Committee on State Mandates, and that is, that in the current process with the Commission is they have a draft statement of their decision and they adopt it.

But in that particular case, this statement does not include any of the discussions or comments that were necessarily made here today.

Now, I'm not sure there were a lot of things that were said in the last half-hour, or whatever, discussion that needed to be in there, but it seems to me there is a concern when you're adopting something that does not include the comments or discussions or the kind of opinions that were related here today.

Now, I know that, as example, Member Sherwood raised the issue relative to the Department of Finance.

I don't know if there was any comments or changes that may need to be in there, but I just think as a general

matter, very often, having a decision that is prepared before the discussion seems to me to be, you know -- is one that is a little troublesome in a sense that it says, This is to reflect our discussion and our decision, when essentially, you're taking something and adopting something that was prepared before you.

I don't necessarily expect you to make any changes today. I just wanted to be consistent. I did make those comments to the Assembly Special Committee on State Mandates.

Thank you very much.

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VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I think some of those comments are warranted, and it's a little bit of concern to me, also.

Now, I don't know if today we said anything that really changes anything that wasn't already put in print, but it seems like the possibility might be there on occasion for something like that to occur.

I guess -- I don't know what the -- what we're doing right now is relatively a new process, also. I think what? We've been doing it for several meetings.

MS. SHELTON: Right. Under the Commission's regulations, there is no requirement that we send the Proposed Statement of Decision out for comment at all.

In the past, what we did was just include it in

the binders and that was issued ten days before the hearing. It's certainly within your discretion, and you have the choice of adopting this today or waiting until the next hearing in a couple of months.

For this particular claim, I would not have changed any of the language in this proposed decision because there is nothing -- there is no new evidence or no -- there aren't any different legal arguments that were presented orally today that are not already in the written comments.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I'd have a tendency to agree with you, but I also think that it's something that needs to be monitored as we go down the road; that there may be occurrences where we need to put off the vote on this particular issue because of something that occurred during that meeting possibly.

MS. SHELTON: We have decided that if new -- you know, sitting here, if we hear evidence that really needs to be in the decision, or the Commission does not adopt the staff recommendation on any particular issue, we would recommend that you not adopt the proposed decision on the same date.

We would certainly need a chance to go back and either add testimony or a new legal argument to support whatever the Commission's decision is.

CHAIR TILTON: Walter?

MEMBER BARNES: Yeah, I guess to a certain extent my presumption is that if there is something new put on the table that you don't have reflected in here, we're voting on this in terms of its wording as well as augmentation that needs to be done to reflect any new things that have taken place here.

MS. SHELTON: That's correct.

MEMBER BARNES: And I know in some cases, we have changed the actual recommended decision in some cases, you know, to either add something or delete something or to refine something, and we've still adopted the same proposed decision, you know, with the expectation that those changes will be reflected in here.

So I would guess to a certain extent, if you feel that there is a need to have something more placed in this, I would encourage you to send the staff, you know, some suggestions so that they can incorporate that within there.

MR. BURDICK: Yeah, I just think the comments are that with the process of adopting it right afterwards, really don't -- there is not time, in a sense, to reflect and look at that and say, Is there something that we want to add in there?

And I think there have been cases in the past, as

I commented, I don't think this one probably is one that does meet that, but I think there has been some in the past that where some of the comments were not in there.

And I think even in some of the court decisions, there was some references to the staff decision may not have reflected some of the comments. But I don't want to get into that because then we'll open Pandora's Box.

CHAIR TILTON: Thank you for your comments.

I think it's a good comment that we as a Commission need to be aware of, that if we do believe that this does not reflect the action, that we should caution ourselves to take steps to back off at least one meeting.

So I think it's a good caution. I appreciate you bringing up the point.

MS. HIGASHI: I'd just like to assure the

Commission that that was always our intent. And that's

why we have changed the agenda where we have moved the

Proposed Statement of Decision immediately following

instead of having it in a separate portion of the agenda.

But also, this a change that we implemented one year ago when our budget was cut and we were reduced to bimonthly hearings. And that was in an effort to speed along decision-making; otherwise, that would be an additional two months added to the decision-making

1	process.
2	So in those cases where staff feels it's
3	warranted, we have we would obviously recommend that
4	the decision be postponed to the next meeting.
5	CHAIR TILTON: That's good, Paula. Thank you.
6	MS. BOEL: I move that we adopt the staff the
7	Proposed Statement of Decision.
8	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Second.
9	CHAIR TILTON: Motion to second. Call the roll,
10	Paula.
11	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
12	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
13	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sherwood?
14	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Aye.
15	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
16	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
17	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
18	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
19	MS. HIGASHI: Thank you.
20	CHAIR TILTON: Motion carries.
21	MS. GMUR: Thank you, Commission.
22	CHAIR TILTON: Thank you for your testimony.
23	MS. HIGASHI: Item 7 and 8 have been postponed.
24	They will be heard at the July hearing at the request of
25	the claimants.

1	And this brings us to Item 9, The Stull Act, which
2	will also be presented by Senior Commission Counsel,
3	Camille Shelton.
4	(A discussion was held off the record.)
5	MS. SHELTON: Item 9 involves the test claim on
6	The Stull Act.
7	The Stull Act was originally enacted in 1971 to
8	establish a uniform system of evaluation and assessment
9	of the performance of certificated personnel within each
10	school district.
11	The test claim legislation, enacted between 1975
12	and 1999 amended The Stull Act. The claimant alleges
13	that the amendments constitute a reimbursable
14	state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII
15	B, section 6 of the California Constitution.
16	For the reasons provided in the analysis, staff
17	finds that the test claim legislation constitutes a
18	partial reimbursable state-mandated program.
19	Will the parties and their representatives please
20	state your names for the record?
21	MR. SCRIBNER: Good morning. David Scribner for
22	the claimant.
23	MS. TAYLOR: Barbara Taylor, Department of
24	Finance.

Mr. Scribner.

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CHAIR TILTON:

MR. SCRIBNER: Good morning. Thank you. 1 Good news. I can spare everyone my standard 2 rambling diatribe against staff analysis this morning. 3 know, Walter, I'm sorry. 4 We support the staff's analysis as drafted, and 5 6 would urge your adoption of the analysis and the 7 Statement of Decision as currently drafted. CHAIR TILTON: Department of Finance? MS. TAYLOR: We also support the staff's analysis. 9 10 MEMBER BOEL: Surprise. We are stunned. 11 CHAIR TILTON: Do you have a concern, Bill? MEMBER BARNES: Since this is your last meeting, 12 I'd offer you the opportunity to --13 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I'm in shock. 14 15 Do we need to have any comments from staff? MS. SHELTON: No. I did just want to say that 16 17 there is, you know, we did send out a request for additional briefing on issues, and we didn't get any 18 19 responses. 20 And so if the Commission does agree with this 21 recommendation, I think there is more work that needs to 22 be done to identify all of the mandated educational 23 programs. We did go through and found several that we found 24

were mandated and used the court's opinion in the

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1	Department of Finance case to show the programs that were
2	local discretionary programs. But I don't know, at this
3	point, if that's an exhaustive list and would encourage
4	the parties to participate in the P&G's to be more
5	specific.
6	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I think you brought that up
7	in your write-up and the offsets addressing it in the
8	P&G's.
9	MS. SHELTON: We did. It is in there.
10	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Well, I would move for
11	approval of this particular item, then, with staff's
12	recommendation.
13	MEMBER BARNES: I'll second.
14	CHAIR TILTON: Motion to second. Call the roll.
15	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sherwood?
16	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Aye.
17	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
18	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
19	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
20	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
21	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
22	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
23	Motion carries.
24	MS. HIGASHI: And then can we have a motion for
25	Item 10, which is the Proposed Statement of Decision?

1	MEMBER BARNES: I move the staff recommendation.
2	MEMBER BOEL: I second it.
3	CHAIR TILTON: Motion seconded.
4	Call the roll.
5	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
6	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
7	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
8	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
9	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sherwood?
10	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Aye.
11	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
12	CHAIR TILTON: Aye. Thank you very much.
13	MR. SCRIBNER: You're welcome. Thank you.
14	MS. HIGASHI: I'd just like to ask, are the
15	parties or the witnesses for Item 3 here yet?
16	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Not yet. The flight
17	arrives in five minutes.
18	MS. HIGASHI: All right. Then we'll move to a
19	different item at this time.
20	We'll move to the second binder. And we'll go to
21	Item 15.
22	This item will be presented by Assistant Executive
23	Director Nancy Patton.
24	MS. PATTON: Good morning.
25	The test claim legislation for Immunization

Records: Hepatitis B added mumps, rubella and hepatitis B to the list of diseases an entering student must be immunized against prior to first admission into a school. Hepatitis B immunizations were also required for students entering the 7th grade.

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In addition, the test claim legislation amended statutes that required the Department of Health Services to amend regulations relating to the monitoring, record keeping, reporting and parent notification requirements relative to the enforcement of the pupil immunization requirements.

Reimbursement for this program is based on the uniform cost allowances. Staff reviewed actual reimbursement claims to develop the proposed statewide cost estimate.

The estimate for fiscal years 1997/98 through 2002/03 is based on 2,694 unaudited actual reimbursement claims. The cost for fiscal years 2003/04 and 2004/05 were estimated by multiplying projected enrollment figures for kindergartners and 7th graders by the uniform cost allowance adopted by the Commission and adjusted by the Implicit Price Deflator.

The proposed statewide cost estimate includes eight fiscal years for a total of \$29,629,000.00. This averages to \$3,703,600.00 in annual costs to the state.

Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the 1 proposed statewide cost estimate. 2 Will the parties and representatives please state 3 their names for the record? 5 Dr. Carol Berg, Education Mandated Cost Network. 6 7 MR. CAYAGO: Nelson Cayago, Department of Finance. CHAIR TILTON: Dr. Berg, if you'd like to start. 8 DR. BERG: Yes, good morning. 9 I am appearing before you this morning a little 10 crabby. And the reason I'm crabby is because the 11 12 Department of Finance waited until yesterday to pull from the Consent Calendar this item which we have spent three 13 years trying to get resolution on. 14 15 And so with all due respect, I'm sure that the 16 overall dollar amount is what caused their hearts to stop one more time. And we all have that concern. 17 That is 18 not the issue before you today. But I would point out that part of the problem 19 that we're facing is the length of time that this process 20 21 is taking. And if you'll look at the number of years 22 that that 29 million dollars represents, it's eight full years of reimbursement. 23

So I'd like to put that in the context of, again, getting to a unit-cost rate, which we struggled with for

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three full years, with not full cooperation, I'm sorry to report, from the Department of Finance in reaching a solution.

And this Commission finally did approve the methodology. And I urge you today to please support the staff recommendation.

CHAIR TILTON: Department of Finance?

MR. CAYAGO: Finance concurs with the proposed statewide costs -- the proposed statewide cost estimate is consistent with the actions by the Commission.

However, we just want to note for the record our concerns with the underlying basis for the statewide cost estimate. We feel that the costs should be based on audited claims rather than unaudited claims. And that some of the activities identified were very similar, and so not all of them would have to be performed.

As a result, we feel that the statewide cost estimate overstates the appropriate amount of the valid costs.

CHAIR TILTON: Comment from staff?

MS. PATTON: Well, we based the statewide cost estimate on the adopted uniform cost allowance. We assumed in our analysis that the cost could exceed the statewide cost estimate if amended or late claims are filed. And we also assumed that the costs could be less

if the State Controller audited this program and determined that the claims were excessive or unreasonable.

MEMBER BOEL: What happens in that case? If the state --

MS. PATTON: Well, you have a statewide cost estimate. If the Legislature appropriates that money in the budget and the claims are subsequently reduced, then all of that money would not be appropriated

CHAIR TILTON: Go ahead.

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VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Would you address the issue of the audited -- of the claims not being audited? I know the answer, but I'd like to see it put on record.

MS. PATTON: We're basing our statewide cost estimate on the data that we have available. We have a statutory timeline to meet to complete the test claim process.

And so we have tried other ways to develop a statewide cost estimate in the past, surveying the claimants. We usually get less than 15 percent response. And so this is the best data that we have when we're, at the time, we're developing the statewide cost estimate.

CHAIR TILTON: Is it fair for me to describe that this is basically a budget methodology; that you're estimating potential cost?

MS. PATTON: 1 Yes. CHAIR TILTON: And then when the claims come in 3 and are audited by the Controller, that the actual 4 expenditures would be controlled at that point? 5 MS. PATTON: Yes. MS. HIGASHI: Let me clarify then. 6 7 DR. BERG: No. What needs to be understood is that 8 MS. HIGASHI: this statewide cost estimate is based on the actual 10 claims that are currently on file with the State 11 Controller's Office on the date that we got the printout. 12 What they are based upon are the pupil enrollment 13 figures that were then multiplied by the uniform cost 14 allowances that were in the adopted parameters and 15 quidelines. 16 And when Dr. Berg talks about that three-year 17 process of coming up with the uniform allowance, that's 1.8 what she's talking about. So based on the underlying documentation that the 19 2.0 claims are based upon, no changes really can be made to 21 that uniform allowance at this point in time, unless and 22 until an amendment is filed, and an amendment is adopted 23 to change those numbers.

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CHAIR TILTON: So the variable is the enrollment,

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not the --

1	DR. BERG: Exactly. The only thing that would be
2	audited is the number of pupils.
3	CHAIR TILTON: Any other questions of the members?
4	MS. HIGASHI: And the mathematics.
5	CHAIR TILTON: Yes. Do I have a motion or
6	reaction to
7	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I move for approval.
8	MEMBER BOEL: I second.
9	CHAIR TILTON: The motion and the second to
10	approve staff recommendation.
11	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
12	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
13	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sherwood?
14	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Aye.
15	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
16	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
17	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
18	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
19	DR. BERG: Thank you very much.
20	MS. HIGASHI: This brings us now to Item 17. This
21	item will also be presented by Ms. Patton.
22	MS. PATTON: The County of Butte has notified the
23	Commission on State Mandates of its intent to file an
24	SB 1033 application on or about September 1, 2004.
25	SB 1033 requires the Commission to review county

applications for findings of significant financial distress. The Commission is required to review county applications that include program and financial reports, conduct at least two public hearings on the matter and determine if applicant county is facing significant financial distress within 90 days of receiving the application.

County applications are complex because they include budgets, budget forecasts, descriptions of county efforts to constrain expenditures, information on flexibility and spending and resources, debt and cash flow, and unmet budget needs.

Commission regulations authorize the Commission to assign this application to a hearing panel consisting of one or more members of the Commission, which shall act on behalf of the Commission, or to a hearing officer for hearing and preparation of a preliminary decision.

If assignment is not made, then the application will be set for hearing before the Commission itself.

In 1999, the Commission spent \$70,000.00 to contract the Department of Finance to provide the budget and program analysis for Butte County's previous application. This amount did not include the cost for time Commission staff spent in processing the application and reviewing the Department of Finance's draft staff

analysis.

Staff proposes to continue this practice if Finance staff are available for this assignment.

The Commission's budget contains no funding for current year or budget year for the SB 1033 program. If a county application is filed, the Commission is authorized to request augmentation of its budget to fund the cost of completing the application.

Once the Commission decides how it wishes to hear the Butte application, a section 27.00 request under the Budget Act can be prepared to request the funding from Department of Finance.

Since the last application was completed in 1999, the Commission staff has been reduced by approximately 40 percent. There is currently a backlog of test claims on file with the Commission that must also be completed within statutory time frames. The Commission does not have adequate staffing to complete test claim work and SB 1033 applications.

Before you today are options for determining how you will hear and determine the Butte County application that will be filed later this year.

Option 1: Hearing before the Commission. All Commission members would travel to Oroville for one hearing. There would be salary and travel per diem costs

for public members that travel to the hearing. The public member and the two locally elected officials.

State agency members could file travel claims with their own agencies for costs. And we would have costs to contract with the Department of Finance for review of the application.

Option 2: Hearing Panel. A limited number of Commission members would travel to Oroville for this hearing. Depending on who is on the panel, the costs will vary. And we would also have costs to contract with Department of Finance for preparation of the application and staff analysis.

Hearing Officer: You could assign the application to the Office of Administrative Hearings to provide a hearing officer to review the application, conduct the hearing, consider the evidence and prepare a proposed statement of decision that would then be presented to you for determination.

And finally, Hearing Officer: Appoint a person with expertise in county fiscal program matters to be the hearing officer and present findings and any recommended Statement of Decision to the Commission. Implementation of this option may require an exemption from Department of Finance. And depending on the expertise of the hearing officer, we would have to assess whether it would

1 still be necessary to contract with Department of Finance 2 for review of the application and preparation of the 3 staff analysis. 4 Staff recommends that the chairperson assign the 5 Butte SB 1033 application to a hearing officer with expertise in county budgets and programs. 6 7 CHAIR TILTON: You have raised the question about whether Finance would be required to review that finding. 8 9 Have you had any dialog with them about their 10 willingness to do that? 11 MS. PATTON: Not yet. 12 CHAIR TILTON: Walter? 13 MEMBER BARNES: I had a couple of questions. 14 I was a little confused about the timeline with 15 regard to Butte County. I read the attachment, which 16 basically, I guess, gave Butte County an exemption to reduce its general fund costs from, I think it was, 17 18 December of '99, December 28th of '99, through another 19 three years, which would have been December 28th of, I 20 quess, 2002. 21 So have they gotten an extension of that? 22 They are just now deciding they MS. PATTON: No. 23 are going to reapply. 24 MEMBER BARNES: And they are reapplying on a

prospective basis?

25

1	MS. PATTON: Correct.
2	MEMBER BARNES: Does anyone know whether or not
3	they returned their general fund benefits to the higher
4	level?
5	MS. PATTON: I don't know for sure. Haven't had
6	that dialog with them.
7	MEMBER BARNES: And in the 1999 process, did the
8	full Commission actually go up and do the hearing?
9	MS. PATTON: Yes.
10	MEMBER BARNES: And I guess one of the questions,
11	I heard that there were two hearings?
12	MS. PATTON: SB 1033 requires a minimum of two
13	hearings, and one of the hearings has to be held in the
14	applicant county. Then so you go up and you hear
15	their evidence, and then you have a final hearing here in
16	Sacramento where you make your final determination.
17	MEMBER BARNES: Which I assume would be a regular
18	meeting.
19	MS. PATTON: It can be.
20	MS. HIGASHI: It can be a regular meeting.
21	Sometimes because of scheduling issues and timeline
22	issues, it ends up being a special meeting solely for
23	that purpose.
24	MEMBER BARNES: This is a fairly sensitive issue
25	because you're dealing with, you know, the potential to

cut benefits to people.

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And I understand the desire to try to deal with reduced staff in terms of contracting out the review and the analysis and that kind of stuff.

But I raise the question of is this important enough, you know, from the sensitivity of it to have the Commission itself, you know, hold the hearing as opposed to a hearing officer? And I bring that up just as a discussion item for us. I'm not necessarily advocating for it.

But I think there is certainly some emotional, if not, you know, even moral reasons for us to at least be there and hear what people have to say.

MEMBER BOEL: I have a clarification.

If we have the hearing officer go up, then does the second hearing come back to us?

MS. PATTON: Right. They would present a Proposed Statement of Decision to the full Commission.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Might I add, as you know, this will be my last meeting, but I was here through the meetings; I think we've probably have seven, eight cases. And I think you're right, Walter.

First of all, it's a very significant undertaking for the Board and for the staff. And that has to be recognized. But it is in the law.

Secondly, you know, our job is to find a significant financial distress. It's really up to the Board of Supervisors to determine whether or not they want to take the next step and actually implement the cuts.

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And then, thirdly, of course, we're looking at a group of people that are on general assistance. And I think it's an extremely sensitive and important issue to these people, because even though the cuts in dollars is small, it's a significant percentage of what these individuals have to live on.

So I think it's a type of issue that when we looked at this, in prior years, understanding, also, I think, that our budget was in better shape and we had a larger staff, and I think Department of Finance was able to provide assistance, that we felt it was very important for us to go to these meetings and actually listen to the various input from the -- from both sides of the particular issue.

There will be a tremendous amount of financial data. And I think that's what we have to zero in on, is that financial data, because we're looking at the finances of local government. But you almost have to be there to listen to the principals involved, and also listen to the individuals that come from the community

that are going to be affected by this.

So my thinking would be to, as difficult as it might be, I think the importance of the issue is to be there for the meeting. I think, quite frankly, if you turn it over to a hearing officer, you're going to have to have a meeting anyway; a follow-up meeting with the Commission.

The meetings do take -- normally, they take all day. They seem -- I remember we went to Los Angeles. That was an all day. Almost went into the next day.

So it's a lengthy proceeding. And it's interesting to say the least. That's my viewpoint on it.

MEMBER BARNES: I guess the only other thing I would offer is that my impression is that the Department of Finance has done the review, you know, by tradition, and I would offer up that the State Controller also has an audit program, which does audits very much like this.

We've done reviews of LAFCO proposals involving the creation of new cities and special districts and that kind of thing, which revolves around a top/bottom look at income as well as potential expenditures as well.

So we have that expertise and would be interested in offering ourselves as an alternative as well, the Controller's Office would.

CHAIR TILTON: Is that based on reimbursement or

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just --

MEMBER BARNES: It's always based on reimbursement.

MS. HIGASHI: The Department of Finance is also based on reimbursement, might I add.

MEMBER BARNES: I guess that raises another question here, which is to the extent that there is travel costs associated with having the Commission go to, I assume this hearing would be in Oroville, that that, too, can be reimbursed through the section 27.00 process as well.

I'm not adverse to having a hearing officer, you know, take over the responsibility of taking the hearing, but I do kind of share Bill's comments that in some ways, this is a really, you know, personal life issue, I think, for many of the people that are going to be affected.

And I'm not sure that we do it proper justice to wait until everything's all done to not hear it personally.

I mean, obviously, they can come to this meeting here in Sacramento and talk, but that's a fairly large inconvenience for many of them to do so.

MEMBER BOEL: I'd practically like to ask Paula or Nancy how difficult this would be for the staff to handle? I mean, we've got a backlog still of what? A 120 cases.

So does this mean -- how many more cases are going to be delayed? I mean, if we ask you, if we say to staff that we will go up to Butte County, how difficult will that be for you?

MS. HIGASHI: We would still need to contract with an outside organization to do the program and fiscal review.

We are currently not staffed up and budgeted to do any of that, nor to do any of the copying and just all of the work associated with the hearing.

We're talking about -- was it three volumes, four volumes? Huge documents that are included in the record, because it will be all the fiscal data for the past three years, plus projections of revenue for the next couple of years as well.

If it's the full Commission, the only staff would be basically Paul and I would need to be there at that hearing. Other staff would not absolutely have to be there.

If it were a hearing officer that was an ALJ, none of us would have to go. If it were to be a hearing officer with the expertise, that would lift the burden off of us from a staff perspective, because it would be someone with that knowledge that we wouldn't have to spend time tutoring. And frankly, we were thinking of

someone like former Commission member Al Beltrami as the type of person we were thinking of, who is a retired county official that would have a handle on all the issues that would be before the body and who's actually sat on SB 1033 hearing panels before.

2.2

We are faced with incredible pressure right now to deal with the test claim backlog. We have very limited staff. There are proposals that are pending that are part of the May revision that would place the Commission in a position of having to complete and determine all of the local agency test claims within two years.

We still have more test claims filed by school districts, and we have statutory timelines for all of those test claims under current law of 12 to 18 months; yet we have not been fully funded in order to address that backlog and to process those claims under those time lines.

So it's a competing burden on us, and the Commission needs to help us to decide. If the Commission wants to do it, then we would, you know, obviously do what we have to do to make it happen.

CHAIR TILTON: Well, let me make a suggestion, because I think we're clouding what is the bigger issue, which is your workload with this. And what I'm hearing here is that this has an impact, but really it's the cost

to bring someone in who can analyze the books and that's an additional cost we're going to have anyway.

2.0

I would suggest that we kind of table the issue of workload that's coming down, give us an opportunity to talk with my other hat on to deal with that issue. And I'm sympathetic to the issue of the members that we ought to take this seriously, and I think we shouldn't hear things secondhand or read things.

I think we need to go up and do both of these hearings as a Board. At least that's my sense, personally, as well as I'm hearing the rest of the members. And I know from staff's point of view, you're trying to find ways to minimize your workload, but it seems to me from what I'm hearing, this is some relief, but it's not going to help the bigger issue.

MS. HIGASHI: No. Because Paul and I -
CHAIR TILTON: If can make the bigger issue go

away, I'd be arguing on behalf of --

MS. HIGASHI: Paul and I and Nancy will still be reading everything else that we have to do as well, as well all of you.

CHAIR TILTON: Right.

MS. HIGASHI: Because we have an October -- we have a September hearing for test claims, regular business, but, Nancy, SB 1033 would be October.

MS. PATTON: Right.

2.4

MS. HIGASHI: If Butte follows the schedule they have given us.

CHAIR TILTON: Walter?

MEMBER BARNES: Yes. I would agree with you. I think we want to do no harm at all to the normal business of the Commission.

And it just seems to me that, you know, the idea of contracting out for the review and also contracting out for somebody who would actually massage the review, and, you know, hear and take the testimony and stuff which we hear at a meeting and merge it together and actually take the responsibility off of the staff to actually write the recommendations and the analysis for us, I think is the way to go.

Basically, it's almost like having a mini-Executive Director and staff specifically for this for a temporary period of time that frees you up so that you can continue to do what you do, and, you know, basically, gives us the information we need to hear this.

So I mean, that's kind of the way I think we should be kind of thinking about. Obviously, if you're interested in this when put your other hat on, I'm sure the Controller's Officer would love to sit down and talk to you about it.

1	MS. HIGASHI: We'll proceed accordingly.
2	CHAIR TILTON: Okay. Do you need a motion on
3	that?
4	MS. HIGASHI: No, because if you don't make the
5	assignment, then it means it's the full Commission.
6	I would like to suggest we take a short break and
7	then come back and hopefully, we'll have our other
8	witnesses.
9	CHAIR TILTON: Okay. Get back by 11:00 o'clock.
10	(Whereupon a recess was taken.)
11	CHAIR TILTON: Thank you for the break.
12	Paula, do we need the people from number 3, can
13	we go back there?
14	MS. HIGASHI: Yes, we're at Item 3 now.
15	And before we begin, I'd like to administer the
16	oath for witnesses.
17	Would you please raise your right hands?
18	Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony
19	that you're about to give is true and correct based upon
20	your personal knowledge, information, or belief?
21	(A chorus of "I do's" was heard.)
22	MS. HIGASHI: Thank you.
23	Item 3 is the test claim on distracted drivers.
24	This item will be presented by Commission Counsel
25	Eric Feller.

MR. FELLER: Good morning.

2.2

The test claim statute requires traffic collision reports prepared by the CHP or any other peace officer to include information as to whether a cellular telephone or other driver distraction or inattention is a known or suspected associated factor in the cause of the collision. The statute requires that the information be collected and transmitted to the CHP from January to July 2002.

As stated in the analysis, staff finds that the test claim statute does not impose a reimbursable state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution and Government Code Section 17514.

State law does not require local agency peace officers, except county coroners, to prepare traffic collision reports, so they are not mandated by the state to include in a traffic collision report information about the use of a cellular telephone or other distraction.

The test claim is subject to article XIII B, section 6 with respect to county coroners by requiring them to include in the report required by Vehicle Code section 20011 information as to whether a cellular telephone or other driver distraction or inattention is a

1 known or suspected associated factor to the cause of the traffic collision that results in death, and to collect and transmit the information to CHP. 3 4 However, without evidence in the record regarding 5 increased costs as a result of the test claim statute, 6 the record does not support a finding of costs mandated by the state on county coroners. 7 You'll note that I distributed a blue errata sheet 8 9 to page 13, but it does not change the analysis or the 10 conclusion on this item. 11 Therefore, staff recommends that the Commission 12 deny the test claim. 13 Would the parties and witnesses please state their names for the record? 14 1.5 MS. STONE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of 16 Commission. Pam Stone on behalf of the City of 17 Newport Beach. 1.8 MR. EVERROAD: Glen Everroad with the City of 19 Newport Beach. SGT. JOHNSON: Sergeant Dale Johnson, City of 20 21 Newport Beach. 22 CAPT. HOWLAND: Captain Scott Howland with the 23 California Highway Patrol. 24 MR. MANDELL: Elliott Mandell, Department of 25 Finance.

CHAIR TILTON: Who would like to start?

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MS. STONE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission.

First of all, we would like to express our appreciation for delaying this hearing, given the problems that Sgt. Johnson had with Southwest Airlines this morning. And we appreciate being able to have this matter heard today rather than being placed over.

First of all, we would like to reiterate with staff that we have no dispute that the test claim statute reports -- test claim statute requires that any traffic collision report prepared by the CHP or any other peace officer for a period of one year only, and that was from January 1 of 2002 through December 31st of 2002, because the statute automatically expired as of January 1, 2003.

And that such collision report include information as to whether a cellular telephone or other driver distraction or inattention was a known or suspected factor in the causation of that traffic collision.

We will agree that property damage-only reports are voluntary except for the fact that one who was involved in such an accident must make a report to DMV if there is property damage in excess of \$750.00.

And we also agree, and there is no disagreement, I believe, the cities and counties are required by the

California Constitution to maintain a police force or a sheriff's department. These are clear unambiguous issues.

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What is in disagreement is whether this particular statute constitutes a reimbursable mandate.

The basic issue I think we can get into is that I think we all agree that there is no specific legislation which requires an accident report to be prepared by a peace officer or sheriff, except in one circumstances I'll discuss in a minute; however, the difference is that the claimant believes that there is an underlying common law constitutional obligation to enforce the law, which also includes the enforcement of the Vehicle Code, which results in traffic collision reports.

The Commission on State Mandates believes that this type of activity is purely voluntary and thus is not reimbursable.

The Commission takes a look at the fact that,
whereas -- the fact that peace officer are not required
to make a traffic collision report. Sort of axiomatic,
when I was taking my masters in public administration,
that nowhere will you find a mandate, for example, that a
peace officer investigate all of any particular type of
crime or prepare traffic collision reports for every
collision which occurs within its jurisdiction.

And that's for a simple reason. To have some sort of a statute like that would obviously mandate a specific level of police force within a given jurisdiction. You would have to be able to project how many of this type of incident you would be having during a particular given period of time.

You would also have to figure out how many other calls for service there would be, and have additional room in the event that there was some sort of a public safety emergency. So, in fact, there were studies that were done that would demonstrate that you could have somebody on every corner, and theoretically, you would not have adequate police staff.

So there are real issues with regard to any sort of a mandate with regard to total staffing so that you could have an adequate peace officers.

So it shouldn't be a surprise that there is nothing that requires all traffic collisions, for example, to result in a report by the police department.

Now, the Commission points out that the peace officers are required to take a collision report under Vehicle Code Section 20003 by an individual. But an individual only has to give out six things in any kind of a report of an accident. And that's his or her name, their current residence address, the name and current

residence address of any occupant that's injured in the accident. The registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving. The name and current residence address of the owner of the car to the person struck or to the driver or occupant of any vehicle they collide with. And that information shall be given to any traffic officer or peace officer at the scene.

1.1

If there is no one at the scene, then 20004 requires that individual to report the accident to the nearest CHP or police department.

That is a far cry from the type of information that you will note that is required by the CHP to be completed in a traffic collision report. And obviously, if that were the only type of information needed, the entire guidebook by the CHP to appropriately complete a traffic collision report would not be necessary. You would just wait until somebody had an accident and they come down and tell you that somebody was injured or died. And you would not have the information requisite to be able to do any investigation.

You will note, for example, that this type of information doesn't even require one to provide the site of the accident. So, I mean, the accident could have been anywhere. Or what day. There is no requirement that the date, the time or the location be specified.

We would like to point out that Vehicle Code
Section 20017 does require police departments to report
pesticides spills.

The Commission on State Mandates emphasizes that this information that's supposed to be reported by the individual in an accident is to be forwarded to the jurisdiction with jurisdiction over the investigation of the accident. So, therefore, what are you going to do? Wait for somebody to refer it to you and then tell yourself to go investigate? It's putting another step in there that really doesn't happen in the real world.

Commission on State Mandates claims it is a discretionary local decision to prepare accident reports. Yet, the information provided in these accident reports is used by the CHP for data. There is a plethora of data collected and reported by the CHP at the back of your materials showing the types of accidents, number of fatalities and injuries as a result of the data which is collected from these accident reports.

Additionally, these accident reports serve as an assistance to the recollection of the officers when testifying in matters pertaining to the enforcement of the Vehicle Code. Because without that, the officer might not remember or recall what happened when there is an infraction or criminal matter which occurs at a

substantially later time, because the officer will have had intervening duties.

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So without that accident report, query as to the efficaciousness of having any type of proceeding for enforcement of violations of the Vehicle Code.

Now, also, the Legislature, we believe, assumed that law enforcement investigates traffic collisions and files reports, because, otherwise, there would not have been this requirement that the information with regard to whether or not a driver was talking on a cell phone, applying mascara, reading the Wall Street Journal, I don't know, having breakfast, would need to be reported to the CHP in order to obtain the information as to whether or not there should be laws pertaining to self-utilization.

So I believe that the Legislature did not think that the activity of compiling, preparing traffic collision reports is purely voluntary.

Now, the claimant found an Attorney General opinion that states, and I quote, "The obligation to investigate vehicular accidents resulting in injury/death is not a voluntary act, but rather is an obligation imposed by virtue of the office created. It is the obligation of police departments and sheriff's departments to investigate and arrest those who have

committed crimes or public offenses within their respective jurisdictions."

And the Commission staff claims that opinions of the Attorney General are advisory, not mandatory, and we will concur; although, probably the Attorney General would not necessarily.

However, the Commission on State Mandates has gone off and found a plethora of cases dealing with the exercise of discretion for the purposes of third-party liability to demonstrate that there is no obligation whatsoever to take those reports.

The purpose of the liability cases, and their discussion, deals with the issue of discretionary immunity and whether or not there is an obligation by a statute to perform a duty in any particular manner.

And the cases are uniform that, yes, local law enforcement has the obligation to investigate crime and to enforce the laws; maybe not with respect to a particular individual or a particular individual in a given manner, but yes, it does have that obligation.

So the Commission is taking the fact that there is discretionary immunity, and going one step further, and saying that this is voluntary. However, the staff in its plethora of case law does include the case of Leger versus Stockton Unified School District, which is a 1988

Cal. App. case, Cal. App. 3rd case, which states that it is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.

None of these cases considered, for the purpose of a public program, whether or not traffic collisions and accident reports must be investigated and reported for the purposes of whether or not they constituted a reimbursable program. That is a new issue before your Commission. And we assert that those cases are not analogous because the purpose, therefore, was not analogous.

Additionally, if there were no accident reports, there would be no statistics forwarded to the CHP to discharge its mandatory duty to prepare a report of these accidents. Thus, the CHP would be completely without data from any organizations save and except for itself.

And as you will see in the back, I mean, it goes on for pages, starting around 570, something, 540 something, it goes on for 30 pages with regard to how many people died on what type of road and what jurisdiction. This type of information would not exist.

I think we really need to take a look at the logical consequence of the rationale behind the Commission and the logical consequence of the rationale behind the claimant.

The logical rationale behind the claimant is if you have a traffic collision report involving injury or death during that one-year period, the increment that it took to complete the information and find out whether a driver was eating, drinking, smoking, playing with animals, disciplining children, talking on the phone, that small increment of time for that very brief period would be reimbursable.

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If you take a look at the logical extension of the Commission's analysis, that's where we have something that's really interesting. If a traffic accident report is not mandatory, it's purely voluntary because there is nothing that says you have to do it, then, obviously, with regard to the enforcement of traffic laws, nothing says you have to do this specifically, it says you shall enforce all laws. Well, therefore, you really don't have to investigate traffic accidents.

And then from there on, the logical conclusion is that by and large, the enforcement of the Vehicle Code is voluntary. So whereas, you're required to have a police department, along the analysis of the Commission of State Mandates, that police department does haven't to do anything. It can just sit there, and so you have accidents and it's very nice.

We're concerned that the logical extension of this

analysis by the Commission would have that, unless there is a specific underlying statutory requirement, that there really is no obligation to do anything.

And therefore, we respectfully disagree with the conclusion of Commission's staff. Thank you.

MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Chairman, I just want to make one clarifying comment to place in the record is that during Ms. Stone's testimony, she referred to the staff analysis as being the Commission's analysis or the Commission's conclusions, and I just wanted to remind everyone that it's the final staff analysis.

CHAIR TILTON: I appreciate it, Paula.

SGT. JOHNSON: Hi. My name is Dale Johnson. I'm a sergeant with the City of Newport Beach. I'm currently assigned as a supervisor for our traffic division. As part of my duties, I directly supervise our traffic investigators, our accident investigators, as well as our motor officers that are responsible for, in our city, for taking traffic collision reports and doing Vehicle Code enforcement.

I think I've been asked to come and discuss today some of the practical matters that the decision in the staff report referred to in terms of our view on our obligation to take traffic accident collision reports as well as enforce the Vehicle Code in general.

I think the first thing to point out when we're talking about the police department, our response to traffic collisions, is that almost all the time, those come as a result of a call for service; meaning that a citizen, someone in the community, calls us with either a property collision or a collision involving injury or, unfortunately, sometimes death, and requests the police department come out and assist them.

I think it's rather obvious that the police department is in no position at that time to refuse to provide a service of that nature to our citizens. In fact, that's the reason we exist.

When we respond to a call for service, particularly specifically a traffic collision, we do so for many different reasons. One of them has to do with public safety concerns. Obviously, vehicles which are crashed in the roadway, sometimes multiple vehicles, sometimes objects, those create a danger not just to the unfortunate people who have just been involved in the collision, but other traffic as it tries to move around it.

There are traffic delays associated with traffic collisions that have to be dealt with, that have to be addressed by the responding officer.

There are injuries that occur. There is an

assessment of those injuries that have to be made by the officers on the scene. They then have to allocate additional assets from their departments, whether it be fire, medics. Sometimes engineers. Sometimes people to come out and pick up traffic lights and poles that have been knocked over.

There are a variety of things that we have to do, chief among them assisting the motorists, that this is a very traumatic event for them, and they look to local law enforcement to assist them with this highly unusual point in their lives.

But from the police department's standpoint, our primary reason for responding to traffic collisions, aside from the public safety concerns, is to enforce the law. We are there to conduct an investigation, as with all other criminal investigations, to determine what provisions of the Vehicle Code have been violated and to take appropriate action, whether it be citations or a summons, or whether it be a physical arrest of that person for the violation of that law.

To suggest that that is not a mandated function of a local police agency to conduct criminal investigations, I think it's rather clear that it is. Again, that is the reason we exist.

While we are on scene at a traffic collision,

there are other laws outside of the infractions relating to the specific driving which we also investigate.

Primary among those, most would be aware, would be driving under the influence of alcohol. We assess the possible impairment of the drivers involved.

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There are also other crimes, whether they be driving under the influence of drugs; whether they be violations of driver's licenses, insurance obligations; and then finally, the actual Vehicle Code violations which may have led to the accident itself.

These are all things that we have to do in order to serve our communities. And we do believe that we are mandated to do that; certainly by our community, but we believe by statute, also. That is, again, the function of law enforcement is to conduct criminal investigations and to see to the public safety of the community we serve.

Once again, to suggest that we are not mandated to do that and we have an option or we do so only at our own discretion, I think, from a realistic standpoint, is inaccurate.

There are other mechanisms built into the traffic collision format, I think, that speak to this obligation and explain that it is. The California Highway Patrol, most agencies that the California Highway Patrol provides

the standard collision investigation form, the CHP 555 form. And on it is a great deal of information, as was discussed earlier, outside of the five minor pieces of information that legislatively have been discussed.

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That form is a very technical form, in fact. It requires our officers to attend a minimum of 40 hours of POST-certifiable training in order to learn how to fill out the document. There are a lot of codes, there are a lot of symbols. There is even, unfortunately, some math that has to be done, and it gets rather technical.

Lay people, meaning people involved in those collisions, would have no ability to accurately complete that form without the assistance of local law enforcement or the CHP. They would not be able to submit the form as required by the CHP and to meet the provisions of 2000 -- I'm sorry, 20009, subsection A, or 20002, subsection A2, without the assistance of the police department to fill out that particular form.

SWITRS, which is the clearing house that collects the data for those forms, is very specific as to the format that the forms must be completed. In fact, we receive regularly returns from SWITRS telling us that we have to -- that we made an error in the format, and it's returned for a correction.

So to expect the public to be able to meet with

the provisions of the Vehicle Code in their reporting responsibilities, without specific direction and assistance from the police department or CHP or local sheriff's departments, is unrealistic; they would be unable to meet those provisions.

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So on one hand, you require reporting of traffic collisions in a certain format, in a certain manner, a very technical manner, and on the other hand, suggest that that is only done at the discretion of the police department. And again, that's a point we would disagree with.

The California Highway Patrol would not be a resource for this type of report either in terms of taking the reported information to the California Highway Patrol and asking them to complete the form, because as previously stated, the CHP would refer them back to the jurisdiction with which the collision occurred; meaning that, in my case, the City of Newport Beach and the local police agency.

After having reviewed the staff report, it is my opinion as a 20-year member of the law enforcement community, and someone considered an expert in traffic-related fields, that there is a mandate and an obligation both to the community and to the legislative process for local police agencies to complete the forms.

Decisions as to whether or not the additional mandate 1 concerning distracted drivers falls under the purview of 2 reimbursement, I will leave to those of you who are much 3 more educated in that area than I am. 5 Thank you very much. 6 CHAIR TILTON: Thank you. 7 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Chair. Lieutenant -- am I right? 8 SGT. JOHNSON: No, it's Sergeant. 9 10 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Sergeant. SGT. JOHNSON: Sergeant Johnson, yes. 11 12 MS. STONE: I'm sorry. I gave him a promotion. VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Lieutenant here. 13 14 My nephew works for the city police department 15 here in Sacramento, and he just became a sergeant 16 yesterday. 17 SGT. JOHNSON: Congratulations. VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: So he's very pleased to be 18 So good for you. 19 one. 20 You know, this moral obligation versus legal, 21 constitutional; I'm wondering in your experience, 20 22 years I think you indicated, do you feel that -- have you 23 ever seen a case where a call came in and your agency 24 turned down the request to come to the accident scene or

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to be involved?

I'm just wondering if that's occurred; if you're aware of that situation.

SGT. JOHNSON: It is the policy of the City of
Newport Beach, and many different cities and
jurisdictions have different policies, I can speak to
that which I'm most familiar, which is the City of
Newport Beach, we do not respond to collisions on private
property. Which, again, speaks to the reasons why we
respond to collisions.

The only -- there is only a few exceptions in the Vehicle Code that allow Vehicle Code enforcement on private property. That would be driving under the influence, reckless driving, and a couple of other violations that can occur off of state highways.

We would not respond to collisions on private property because we cannot enforce the Vehicle Code there. Again, that speaks to the reason why we respond to collisions to begin with, is to investigate that collision and to determine from a criminal standpoint who is responsible for it.

We, being the City of Newport Beach, respond to every collision, whether it be property damage, minor collision, minor property damage or not.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: And would you feel that that's a policy, and this may be a tough question to ask,

but that's driven by a constitutional issue? Or it's a moral obligation? Or a legal obligation, do you feel on your part?

SGT. JOHNSON: My personal belief would be that it's both. I think that particularly within the City of Newport Beach, our constituents, our community, have a high expectation of the service that we provide.

I understand fully that that service differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, particularly when manpower is used. I also believe that from a moral standpoint that, you know, "To protect and serve," means that when people are in need of the police department, particularly for the information we talked about earlier, public safety issues which occur certainly at every collision, vehicles in the roadway, injury assessment, that there is a moral obligation that we took, without being overly dramatic about it, we took an oath to respond and to assist people who are in those positions when they need us.

And I believe that is a moral obligation as well as a legal one.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Thank you.

CHAIR TILTON: Get staff response to the issues brought up.

MR. FELLER: Sure. Regarding the general common

law duty to enforce the law, staff doesn't make a finding on that. That's not what this is about.

This is about vehicle collision reports. Just accident reports.

And our reading of all the state statutes and cases in this area indicates that it's not a mandatory duty that comes from the state. It may be pursuant to a local ordinance or a local policy to provide these kind of reports, but we could not find a mandate in law that the state imposes.

The Vehicle Code 20003 -- excuse me, 20008, imposes a duty on the driver to report accidents to the CHP, or if they are in an unincorporated area, to the local police, and the duty's on the police to forward those reports to the CHP. But we could not find a duty on the police themselves to prepare accident reports.

So that is why the staff's position is as it is.

This is something that the Legislature easily could have done. Ms. Stone noted that the Vehicle Code 20017 requires them to notify the CHP regarding pesticide spills. They could have easily done that the same way with regard to accident reports, but they have not.

With regard to the argument that there would be nothing to report to the CHP pursuant to Vehicle Code

2407 or 2408, we disagree with that on the page 13 of the analysis. We feel things that would be reported would be mostly -- and that's at the top of the page -- CHP reports, driver reports, pursuant to Vehicle Code 20008, as well as coroner reports pursuant to Vehicle Code 20011, and reports that peace officers in their discretion or the discretion of the local agency, voluntarily report.

So there would be data there for the CHP to meet its other requirements under the Vehicle Code to statistically compile accident information.

CHAIR TILTON: Can we hear from the Department of Finance, then?

MR. MANDELL: Yes. Elliott Mandell, Department of Finance.

I want to say that we agree that we don't believe that Chapter 710 establishes a reimbursable mandate, and agree with the comments of your staff on that.

But we'd like to make one point that comes from the testimony of the claimant, and it's the issue that we don't believe that if a reimbursable mandate is found, that it would be for a year period.

It's true that the statute was enacted on January 1, 2002, and it's true that it would, according to that same statute, be sunsetted on January 1, 2003.

However, the statute makes it clear that the CHP is supposed to collect the information up through July 1, 2002. That's a six-month period.

It does not seem reasonable to us that a local agency would need to comply, would feel it needs to comply beyond the July 1 timeframe.

So, again, we don't support that there is a reasonable mandate here, but should one be identified by the Commission, we believe that there is a six-month limit on the activity.

CHAIR TILTON: CHP?

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CAPT. HOWLAND: Scott Howland with the California Highway Patrol.

I just wanted to add a couple things. Under 2407.5, it specified one data element to be provided, and that was distracted driving, referred to cell phones, and if you look at a traffic collision report, it's coded as "Inattention." That field existed on the CHP 555 prior to this section being enacted.

As a matter of fact, several years before this section, what was required, or what we asked, I should say, on the back of a 555 to be submitted was any driver that was inattentive and was found at fault or contributing to an accident, that box be checked, and then an explanation of the inattention be written; such

as eating, cell phone, et cetera.

In December of 2000, we requested that agencies use codes rather than a description so that as we put our data into our computer, that it would become meaningful; so that there is consistency within what data we were gathering and what data that we were able to output and provide in our research.

So when 2407.5 became effective, it didn't require any additional reports and didn't require any change in reporting for law enforcement agencies to us. And it enabled us to complete the report that we were mandated to report.

CHAIR TILTON: Any comments from members? Or would someone else like to talk?

MR. EVERROAD: Yes, thank you, Chairman Tilton.

Glenn Everroad, City of Newport Beach. I also would like to thank you for allowing us the time to bring our expert witness in to offer some reality in terms of what happens in local government in the investigation and response to traffic collisions.

I would restate what Ms. Stone has stated, that this is not a test claim seeking recovery of costs for investigating traffic collision reports. We do that; we've assumed that responsibility. We'll continue to do so.

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We're only speaking reimbursement for that incremental increase that was statutorily required by the Legislature and the test claim legislation to investigate, record and report to the CHP those incidents that have a drivers distraction.

There are not significant costs associated with this test claim. This is a very limited period of time. We're not arguing that whether or not the legislation imposes huge costs on local government; it does not. But we believe that it's the intent of XIII B to provide a mechanism for local government to recover the costs that are statutorily imposed by the Legislature. We're only exercising our rights afforded us by XIII B.

Staff's analysis admonishes the Commission that it shall not use XIII B as an equitable remedy to cure the perceived unfairness resulting from political decisions on funding priorities. Our test claim doesn't seek a cure for any unfairness. Our test claim merely seeks what article XIII B was intended to provide, reimbursements for the costs that local government realizes when the Legislature directs us to act on their behalf.

Staff would have you find that cities aren't responsible for investigating traffic collisions and cites 20008 as the basis for their position. 20008 does

not require local government to report accidents. The reporting requirement is that of the drivers. But it does in 20008 state that if the agency which receives a report is not responsible for investigating the accident, it shall immediately forward the report to the law enforcement agency which is responsible for investigating the accident. Staff would have us believe that that responsibility does not exist in any agency. Where, then, would we refer that report?

So if the underlying requirement does not exist to investigate an accident, how could we ever satisfy 20008's requirement to refer it to the appropriate agency.

I think the Sgt. Johnson's testimony this morning suggests that we do have a responsibility, and because the city has not found a specific statutory requirement to investigate this, and to infer that the Legislature didn't intend for local government to investigate traffic collisions, because had they intended that to occur, they would have included it in the test claim legislation, doesn't recognize the requirements of 20008 to forward it to someone.

So we would argue that we think we do have a responsibility and we think that the Commission is in the position of recognizing reality in the context of the

test claim legislation, and we would urge you to find that there is a mandate in the test claim legislation.

Thank you.

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MS. STONE: Mr. Chairman, just one more minor thing.

The test claim legislation is mandatory; that when you do the traffic collision report, you shall report whether or not the driver was distracted. That is clear. That in and of itself is a mandate.

What your staff is saying is because there is no statutory requirement for the underlying traffic collision report, there is no mandate because that activity is voluntary.

I am concerned that this particular type of analysis will be applied to a greater extent. For example, if you have a new program that requires a given department to do "X," but there is no requirement to have that department, then is that particular legislation totally voluntary as well if you don't have the underlying requirement?

And that is what I'm concerned with here. There may be no requirement to fill out a traffic collision report, but when you do, this particular activity is mandated.

How far back are we going to have to go to find an

underlying requirement before any of the legislative add-ons constitute a mandate?

And with that I submit it. Thank you.

CHAIR TILTON: Walter?

MEMBER BARNES: I guess I'm a little troubled by the write-up and how its being characterized.

Is it your belief, Eric, that you're concluding that they have no obligation to investigate traffic accidents?

MR. FELLER: That is what the research on the law indicates to us. And granted, we looked at -- there aren't any Mandates cases on the duties of law enforcement, but we looked at tort cases on the duty of law enforcement, as Ms. Stone noted, and those seem to indicate that there was not a duty to investigate traffic accidents.

And that's where we found the source of that conclusion. That's from the State Supreme Court in the Williams case. In fact, if you look on Page 473,

Justice Mosk dissented in that case. And Justice Mosk wrote the Attorney General opinion on which the claimants rely to find that duty.

Justice Mosk was in the dissent on this case. The court didn't accept his assessment of officer duties. It goes from 473 to 474. The Supreme Court basically

disagreed with him and found that there was, in this case, not a duty to investigate.

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This is an analysis that we take from the City of Merced and the Department of Finance cases, where Ms. Stone's correct, where if the underlying program is voluntary, then there is no mandate. And because we couldn't find a duty in law for peace officers, except for coroners, to prepare vehicle accident reports, that that was the basis for the conclusion that the underlying program was voluntary.

MEMBER BARNES: I guess my impression is that, maybe I'm -- well, my impression is that, in effect, they do have an obligation.

I mean, it seems like they are responsible for enforcing, you know, violations of law, including Vehicle Code at the local level.

So how do we get from that kind of general obligation on them to a specific decision that says they have no obligation to respond to or to, you know, do any kind of investigation?

And I'm not necessarily disagreeing with the conclusion that there may not be a mandate related to the specific information that's being asked for here, but I guess it seems to me that they have an obligation to respond, number 1, and as a continual part of their

obligation as a law enforcement officer, to take whatever information is available related to a violation of law, which then, basically, if that is correct, seems like it only becomes a question of how much information and what is that information, and what format it is.

I mean, I guess, you know, to a certain extent, I guess I'm questioning this underlying assumption that there is, in fact, no obligation on them. Are you saying that if there are automobile accidents, that they have no obligation to respond?

MR. FELLER: We couldn't find one in the law. I will say that.

And so if there were an obligation, it could be pursuant to local ordinance. And this is only with regards to local agencies. I'm going to defer to the CHP on their duties of law.

But in many cases, I would assume the CHP would be the party that the report would be forwarded to, would be responsible for investigating the accident, but we could not find a duty in law for vehicle collision reports or to investigate traffic accidents.

MEMBER BOEL: And I would think, practically, I mean, maybe Newport Beach, it's a very nice community, and maybe that's something that they do have an obligation to do from their community's point of view,

but there is very many communities in our state that,
with resources tight, they might not respond to a vehicle
accident report because of other more pressing duties.

I mean, downtown parts of L.A. or something, you know. I know when we've called sometimes about a little accident even in our neighborhood in El Dorado Hills, it doesn't always get responded to because of other pressing duties.

MEMBER BARNES: And I guess what that says is that there is a presumption that, you know, there is a wide range of enforcement activities that are out there, and that you have to make a decision about which ones you're going to take care of, because you obviously can't deal with everything. And, in fact, I kind of get the sense that you're saying that as well; that you only, in fact, respond to those where there is a specific request on the table. Or that you happen upon in the course of your normal obligation.

SGT. JOHNSON: We, at times, I think going to the point of your question there, there is also what's referred to as counter reports where people will come to the police station usually as a result of a collision that had not been reported to the police department, and later, their insurance carriers would refuse to provide recovery for their costs absent a police report. And we

will then take what's called a counter report, one which is not investigated at the scene.

An important difference between a counter report and a regular traffic collision report, although they are done on the same form, is that there is no finding of fault. There is no finding of which party is most at fault, and there is no enforcement done to these type of collisions.

And as you indicated, Ma'am, we also do have to prioritize at times the use of our resources. And again, the City of Newport Beach is the only one which I would consider myself very familiar, but we will respond; it might be an hour later; it might be more than that depending on what activities are going on in the city at the same time.

But we do respond and have an obligation, we believe, to investigate every traffic collision.

The insurance component is one which wasn't raised before. The insurance industry depends heavily upon the reports taken by the various law enforcement agencies in order to do their due diligence in determining fault and how they settle their claims. That's another area upon which the public certainly feels that the police department has an obligation; otherwise, who is the determiner of fault.

MEMBER BARNES: I have another question.

Captain, I'd like to ask you, with regard to the reporting that goes on, are there any cities, you know, or counties that do not report?

CAPT. HOWLAND: As far as the requirements of 20008, I believe all cities and counties report. I think there is a varying degree of service that they provide, though, that was hinted upon here.

Some departments have a policy, like the CHP, that we will respond to all traffic collisions regardless whether it's property damage, injury or fatal accident. There is some jurisdictions due to staffing and other issues such as, I believe, the City of Los Angeles that decide we're not going to respond to property-damage only reports because they don't have the resources to respond to those. Not to say they don't occasionally, but that's a decision they make.

And there are departments that, at times, because of workload and other things going on, are unable to respond to some of those accidents. So as far as statute, there is no specific statute that says an agency shall respond to all of those accidents, but 20008 is clear that the reports they do receive regarding injuries and fatals have to be reported. We receive those reports.

Property-damage only collisions are not required to be reported to us, but many jurisdictions do report those to us. As a matter of fact, we encourage them to report them to us because that gives us a broader data in order to do analysis, and so we get a big picture of all accidents as opposed to just certain categories.

MR. MANDELL: And if I may -- I was going to say, Elliott Mandell, Department of Finance.

If I may, I just want to make a point that irrespective of the potential broader application of the Commission staff analysis and review, that the Department

irrespective of the potential broader application of the Commission staff analysis and review, that the Department of Finance review was at the more narrowed scope of this particular test claim.

And on the basis of that more narrowed scope, we determined that there was not reimbursable state mandate. So I wanted to reiterate that point.

MEMBER BARNES: By narrower, what do you mean?

MR. MANDELL: You're getting into issues with

regard to the Commission on State Mandate staff findings

about the broad responsibilities of a local enforcement

agency.

And we believe that that's not necessarily an area that needs to go to be able to determine that this particular requirement from Chapter 710 does not in and of itself require a reimbursement of costs by the state

for requirements of that chapter; irrespective of that 1 2 broader question. Okay. Getting back to the 3 MEMBER BARNES: reporting, the other question is are there police 4 departments or counties that just don't respond at all? 5 That don't provide you with information? 7 CAPT. HOWLAND: None that I'm aware of. 8 MEMBER BARNES: Okay. So you get what you get, in effect. 9 Correct. 10 CAPT. HOWLAND: MEMBER BARNES: You use data. 11 12 Is there some benefit to the local agencies 13 themselves, the police officers and sheriff's offices, by the collection of that data? 14 15 CAPT. HOWLAND: Oh, most definitely. regularly publish specific reports that provide overviews 16 17 by jurisdiction, and also on a statewide issue, of that 18 And then we also have the ability to analyze 19 specific data and respond to specific requests. 20 So if they wanted to see if there was a trend in 21 driver age, or a trend in certain primary collision factors within their jurisdiction, we have the ability to 22 run that and do a report to give an idea of how many 23

MEMBER BARNES: And Sergeant, I saw you kind of

accidents are in certain categories.

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nodding your head. Would you generally agree with that?

SGT. JOHNSON: There are certainly benefits on the local level to our ability to analyze our own traffic trends within our city; specifically, so that we can target enforcement to intersections of high accidents.

If we're seeing that speed is a primarily collision factor on a specific roadway, we're able to target enforcement and take steps to try to impact that driving.

So there are benefits to the local level for the data that we're able to determine from our own investigations, yes, sir.

MEMBER BARNES: Thank you.

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My last question has to do with the specific information that the Legislature wanted you to gather.

It was unclear to me whether or not the information you gathered required a modification of the normal form, or whether it was gathered outside of the normal form.

CAPT. HOWLAND: The information was gathered on the normal form. On page 2 of the CHP 555, there is a column that talks about other associated factors.

In there, there is a multiple of other associated factors. As a matter of fact, those -- let me pull out a report here -- those factors include the option to

include a specific Vehicle Code section, vision 1 2 obscurement, inattention, which would be the category this specific issue falls under, stop-and-go traffic, 3 entering and leaving a ramp, previous collision, 4 5 unfamiliar with road, defective vehicle, uninvolved vehicle, other or non-apparent run-away vehicle. 6 7 And so when gathering the specific data for this 8 section, inattention is a single box that would be 9 checked, and then after that box, it would be an

We broke the categories down into cellular phone, electronic equipment, radio/CD, smoking, eating, children, animals, personal hygiene, reading and other.

MS. STONE: I believe you'll find that information bulletin at page 129 of your record.

MEMBER BARNES: Which?

inattention category.

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MS. STONE: Page 129. The cover memo is at page 128. And the form itself, in sort of small print, is on page 131.

MEMBER BARNES: So in other words, this information bulletin was the thing that was used to gather the specific information that you need.

CAPT. HOWLAND: Actually, this information bulletin was sent out prior to the enactment of the statute. It was sent out in December of 2000.

And what it did was it helped to standardize and simplify the collection of data. Obviously, there are inattention categories that don't fall within these codes and those investigating collisions on this form can still write in something that doesn't fall in those categories, but as far as narrowing it down and figuring out what categories we're looking for, and that gave us the ability as we analyzed the data to be able to get an exact number that fell under cell phone, because some people refer to them as cell phones or wireless phones, or, you know, there is a large number, and that way we were standardized.

It also made it easier for our data-entry folks, when they actually enter the data, because the process that we go through in order to take this data and make it meaningful is the agencies that investigate the collision send us a physical copy of the report itself.

We then have data-entry people who then enter the data we need into our computer, and then we're able to analyze and make it meaningful.

MR. MANDELL: I think it's also important to note that the simplification was not just for the CHP, but for the local agencies, too. They could take less effort to fill out the form.

MEMBER BARNES: And I guess what I'm trying to get

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to is the information that you gathered to respond to the Legislature's request for information was from a form that had been amended to provide that information, in effect, before the legislation was passed?

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CAPT. HOWLAND: Correct. Actually, the collision report itself didn't require amending. We just changed how we requested the information prior to that, so when the code actually was implemented, we didn't have to request any change in reporting from anybody.

CHAIR TILTON: Eric, can I make two comments just to have you confirm my sense of your position or recommendation is two things; one is that the requirement to actually fill out an incident report is a discretion at the local level? And second, it sounds like that the requirement to report to CHP is also discretionary, but if you do report, here's the format for that reporting?

So those are the two points that you're trying to bring to our attention?

MR. FELLER: That's correct.

MEMBER BARNES: I guess after listening to all of this, I have to agree with the recommendation that this probably is not a mandate. But I'm a little troubled by the legal justification associated with it, because it seems to come from an area that says there is no obligation to investigate or look at or whatever, when,

in fact, it seems to me, and maybe they are the same thing, so I'm probably asking you, Paul, to weigh in on this, but it seems to me that what we're concluding is that, in fact, there is discretion on the part of the local agencies to decide which things they do investigate, which things they do not, and that, in effect, there is some discretionary decision-making that goes on to decide how extensive these things get into. Which seems to be, to my lay brain -- that's lay brain, not lame brain -- that there is a little bit of a difference in terms of our basis.

So do you have any help for us?

MR. STARKEY: Well, I think the staff decision is correct, and the staff decision is based upon a statutory analysis combined with the Department of Finance case.

And the Department of Finance case indicates, as Eric has said, is that you look to the nature of the underlying activity and to the participation of the underlying activity.

So with respect to the statute at issue, it is -- there is discretion in the mandate sense about whether or not that report has to be prepared. And what's critical, I think, and helpful for the staff recommendation and the decision, is that we have shown the Commission, and ultimately the court if it were

challenged, that in one case, the Legislature has shown that it's quite able to say that it is requiring a local entity to do something, on page 10 where the language of the coroner, just looking at the language of that statute, its plain meaning, it imposes -- it says, "The coroner shall prepare the writing."

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So in that case, we drew the conclusion that that would be the one instance where we could find where the Legislature had said that there would be a requirement to make a writing. That wasn't the case with the other statute.

So the analysis, as Eric, again, mentioned, this is not about the generalized duty or the moral duty of officers to respond to situations, and we all know that and appreciate that. What we do in our analysis is to look at the test claim statute and analyze that to say to the Commission, Here is what the Legislature required at this point in time, or did not require.

And just to kind of stand back, this test claim legislation, when you look at the history that was put out in the analysis and in the background materials, the Legislature, in fact, this is one of those types of bills where they're saying, We think there is a problem with accidents happening. We think that it has something to do with cell phones. We think we eventually want to act

in that direction.

So they put out this language that they wanted to have this information collected. But from the plain meaning of that statute, they did not say the local peace officers shall collect this information. They said,

Based upon the current situation, when this report is being done, you shall do this. And it's a huge difference in the mandate world.

In the world of the lay person, please rest assured that Commission staff spent a great amount of time going over this. We greatly appreciated the representation by Ms. Stone by providing information, and the Highway Patrol providing information, looking at how this program works; looking at the manual and saying what is, for Mandates purposes, required.

So suffice to say, we looked at all of it, and the way we do the Mandates analysis, we think the analysis is correct. And it doesn't hinge on the finding about the duty or no duty for investigating in general. We don't look at a generalized duty. We look at the specific test claim statute and say, Is there a requirement imposed by the state? And here we didn't find it. And I believe the analysis is there, and Eric, I think, pointed it out.

MS. STONE: Mr. Chairman, what the claimant is most concerned about is -- I mean, obviously, there is an

issue that, you know, is this incremental increase sufficient to rise to the level of a reimbursable mandate? I think that's what the Department of Finance and CHP are saying is that, you know, the block is there; it doesn't take more than a couple seconds; it's negligible at best.

But what the claimant is most concerned about is starting down this slippery slope of unless there is a specific statutory requirement that something be performed, any requirement imposed upon that is not a mandate. And that there is no -- the whole concept of government does not necessarily rest upon statute, but rests upon the Constitution and authorizing legislation.

And it will not often state that one is to do a specific task. It may say you can't do a specific task in a certain way. But oftentimes, there is no specific legislation directing something. Does it mean, then, that any requirement imposed upon that, which is a mandatory requirement, then is optional because there is no statutory foundation absent the Constitution and/or authorization given to local government? I mean, that is the concern here.

And I'm concerned, also, that this may not necessarily be the case with which that particular issue should be reached, if it can be done on an alternate

basis. And I think that's what Member Barnes was 1 2 stating. 3 MEMBER BARNES: I guess in rereading, you know, some of the parts of this thing, I quess I have to say 4 that I think you've taken it -- you've narrowed it down 5 with regard to the findings that deal with, basically, 6 7 the preparation of the report itself. 8 In going back through this, I guess I don't see a 9 particular conclusion that, in fact, there is no obligation or duty or whatever to deal with accidents as 10 a whole. Or collisions or whatever as a whole. 11 So I guess that was kind of the underlying premise 12 13 that I was a little worried about. But in rereading the specific recommendations, I quess I think that it's 14 probably okay the way it is. 15 CHAIR TILTON: Any other discussion or questions? 16 MEMBER BOEL: I'd like to make a motion that we 17 move to approve the staff recommendation. 18 19 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I'll second that. 20 CHAIR TILTON: Got a motion and a second. Call 21 the roll please, Paula. 22 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes? 23 MEMBER BARNES: Aye. MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel? 24 25 MEMBER BOEL: Aye.

MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sherwood? 1 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: 2 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton? 3 CHAIR TILTON: 4 Aye. MS. HIGASHI: Item 4. 5 6 MR. FELLER: This regards the Statement of 7 Decision. Unless the parties object, staff recommends that 8 9 the Commission adopt the Proposed Statement of Decision, beginning on page 2, which accurately reflects the 10 decision on the test claim. 11 Staff also requests that the Commission allow 12 13 minor changes be made to the SOD, including the errata on page 13, as well as reflecting the hearing testimony and 14 vote count that will be included in the final statement 15 16 of decision. 17 MS. STONE: On behalf of the claimant, I would 18 like to reiterate those comments made by Mr. Burdick this 19 morning on the cancer presumption; that it does cause 20 claimants some concern when the Proposed Statement of 21 Decision is prepared and submitted to your Commission 22 prior to the time that there has been any hearing whatsoever, or evidence proffered, either by the 23 24 claimants, state agency or Department of Finance.

Furthermore, we've had an extensive discussion

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this morning with regard to the concept of duty and the underpinnings which seem to arise from this particular Mandate. And to have a Statement of Decision prepared in advance of the hearing would seem to imply that the ultimate decision has been made before any presentation of evidence or testimony at the hearing, which is extremely problematic to claimants, given the fact that I would say probably in excess of 90 percent of the situations, the staff analysis is what is adopted by your Commission. And generally, any modifications to your Statement of Decisions are with regard to typographical errors only.

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And I think there is nothing within the Statement of Decision to reflect the underlying concern that this does not directly address the underlying responsibility of police departments to enforce the law.

And if your Commission is specifically not making any determination that your Statement of Decision does not reach the issue of whether or not there is an underlying obligation to enforce the law, then I would request that the Statement of Decision so reflect.

CHAIR TILTON: Ms. Stone, you may not have been here when we had this discussion this morning, and what we were talking about is that what we have asked staff to do is prepare the Record of Decision.

MS. STONE: I was here for that discussion.

CHAIR TILTON: Okay. So I think the issue for us now, as a board member, is that if we believe that there is anything that's been discussed or testimony that would require changes to this, then that's the time for us to consider that. And so it's not an automatic that we just accept it as is; it's just more procedural if we can approve it and it's informed, and the issues have been raised already, and there aren't any new issues, then that's why we're doing that. Rather than having a delay of two months.

So we're very conscious of the issue to make sure that this is not just a pro forma and doesn't indicate that the Commission is automatically accepting staff's recommendation when they propose both items.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Mr. Chair, Ma'am, I would like to indicate that there is no absolutely no way that this statement effects my decision-making through the process.

MS. STONE: This is the impression that is given, I mean, when one has a Statement of Decision issued contemporaneously with a staff analysis.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I guess an option would be to have two different, to have a yes and a no, or some other option here before us. But when this comes before

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us, we look at the case, at least I look at the case. 1 MS. STONE: No, I know you do, Mr. Sherwood. 2 3 the issue is the overall impression. I understand. And I think VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: earlier I expressed some concern about this process of 5 6 putting the two together and that we have to be extremely 7 careful as we proceed with our decision-making on step A and B. 9 I think that's up to us as Commission members to make sure that we understand the importance of decisions 10 we're making here, and I think we've all expressed that 11 12 we are concerned and aware of your concerns, frankly. MS. STONE: And it is for that reason that I would 13 14 have requested that the Statement of Decision reflect the 15 very narrow fact that you are basing your decision on the 16 fact that there is no statute which requires that peace 17 officers prepare a traffic collision report. 18 19 from what the discussion is. 20

And I mean, that is the basically the crux of it And the Statement of Decision is a little bit more vague than that.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Let's hear from staff.

CHAIR TILTON: Sure. Eric?

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That would be within your discretion. MR. FELLER: My recommendation would be that it's based on no requirement in statute, rather than no requirement in

law.

CHAIR TILTON: That's an amendment you think would be appropriate, Ms. Stone's request?

MR. FELLER: I think that would be appropriate.

MS. HIGASHI: It seems to be consistent with what Mr. Feller's, his recommendation indicated that the decision would be updated to reflect the testimony here today. And that was certainly a significant part of the testimony that was heard and the discussion. So it could easily be reflected.

We would need to wait until the transcript is issued, and once that is issued, then the Statement of Decision would be completed. It would be up to the Commission as to whether or not the motion, if you wanted to add conditions to the motions such that we would prepare it as a revised proposed SOD, send it out to the parties, ask for comment. If we don't hear back from anyone within ten days or something, then it's issued. Including the members, obviously. That would be another way of doing it.

But my only concern is that since Mr. Sherwood is not at our next meeting.

CHAIR TILTON: Well, I think Ms. Stone has basically summarized my conclusion in terms of the rationale for my motion or my vote on this. And so I

believe it's appropriate for us, at least from my point of view, to instruct staff to make that modification.

And whatever process you want to put in place to make sure that finding gets described that way. I think I'd rather do that than come back and put it over. But I do agree with the comment Ms. Stone made in terms of that point.

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MS. STONE: Then my suggestion, as a procedural matter, might be that the Commission staff prepare a Statement of Decision reflecting the narrow basis upon which this particular claim was denied, and provide us with a copy, and if we have no objections, it would just go in. And that were we to have objections, then we would request that it be set on the July hearing; otherwise; it would just go through. If that would be suitable as a procedure for your Commission.

CHAIR TILTON: Fine with me. Do any of the other members have a problem with that?

MEMBER BARNES: Yeah. I mean, to a certain extent I think that, you know, the proposed decision is reflective of the discussion that we've had and the conclusion that we've made. To the extent that you need to, you know, technically, change that, I think there is the opportunity to do that.

And I would suggest that we do what we've said in

the previous one, which is that if you have some suggestions, get them into the Commission staff. And, obviously, I would encourage you to read it and take a look at it and see how that can be incorporated.

MR. STARKEY: I just want to say something for the record in case this turns into a dispute down the road.

The reason that -- the Commission's findings are contained in the conclusion, and I concur with Mr. Barnes; I think it is all here. And I think you can only read this decision to be an interpretation of what was before the Commission and the test claim statute, and not read the Commission's decision for something broader than that.

But I want to point out that, in responding to the arguments of the claimants, they are the ones that brought up a generalized duty that therefore made -- that because of some generalized duty, that we had to read the statute differently.

So it's -- to say that we would limit it to say that only the statute is not correct because by virtue of the way the case was presented and pled and rebuttal presented, we were forced to look at all of California law to find out if there was any law in statute, case authority, the Constitution, anything that the state was imposing a mandate.

So I just wanted to state that now in case this becomes a dispute later on.

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MEMBER BARNES: I mean, I guess I would also say that, you know, in looking at it, you know, we would all probably suggest word-smithing associated with this, you know, if we were so inclined. But by and large, it seems to me that the document and the resulting final recommendations incorporate, you know, the rationale and the decision correctly.

So again, to the extent that you feel that there is something that needs to be in here, I would encourage you to let the staff know, and we'll see what we can do.

CHAIR TILTON: Seeing no one else wants to discuss that, a motion?

Did you make a motion already? Did I miss it?

MEMBER BOEL: I'm not sure what the motion is

right now. Is the motion that we redo this? That the staff has to redo this?

MEMBER BARNES: No.

MS. HIGASHI: Eric made a recommendation which I believe is the motion, and it's basically that staff is authorized to update the decision to reflect the vote, the witnesses, and any hearing testimony that was not previously in the record.

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MEMBER BOEL: That's fine. I so move.

1	CHAIR TILTON: I have a motion.
2	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Second.
3	CHAIR TILTON: And a second. Call for the roll.
4	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
5	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
6	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
7	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
8	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sherwood?
9	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Aye.
10	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
11	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
12	MS. HIGASHI: Thank you.
13	MS. STONE: Thank you very much.
14	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Can I just make one more
15	comment, Mr. Chair?
16	CHAIR TILTON: Sure.
17	VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: This is something Pam said,
18	you said about us voting 90 percent, I think, with the
19	staff.
20	I think we need to note, though, that often staff
21	does vote or not vote, but recommend in favor.
22	MS. STONE: No, no, I understand that. I guess
23	the concern is that, oftentimes, it doesn't matter what
24	the testimony is; that whatever your staff recommends,
25	good, bad or indifferent with regard to any particular

party, that the Commission just walks along behind it.

And that's one of my concerns. You know, because you do have -- both state agencies and claimants have the right to present evidence.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I think over the years that I've seen -- I know, Pam, you've been involved for several years.

MS. STONE: Way too long. Way too long, Mr. Sherwood.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I think I might go along with you on that, Pam. In my case; not yours.

MS. HIGASHI: We have --

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: It seems to me that over the years, working and seeing the staff's work, that quite frankly, the work that's being provided right now is excellent.

And I think the work provided by your staff and other staffs has been awfully good also over the years. I've seen it come and go. And I think on occasion, the Board has, through the years, voted against staff possibly more often in some years, prior years.

So it's a cycle. And I think a part of it depends upon the quality of the work that's being done by the staff and by the claimants. So it does come and go, I think.

I think in recent times, my experience has been is 1 that you're right; I think the Board has had a tendency 2 to vote along with staff. Which may be the relationship 3 to the quality of work that's being received from either 5 I just want to point that out. 6 MS. STONE: No, no, I understand. I've been doing 7 this on and off for 20 years. VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Twenty? Very good. 9 Congratulations. I think I'm nuts. 10 MS. STONE: CHAIR TILTON: Thank you for your testimony, Pam. 11 12 MS. HIGASHI: We have a couple more items, and 13 then we have public comment, and then we will need a 14 quick closed session. 15 So Item 18 is Mr. Starkey's. 16 MR. STARKEY: For the public report for the 17 litigation, there is nothing further to add at this time. 18 There will be updates for the next Commission hearing. 19 I did want to take the opportunity, though, to introduce to the Commission our summer law clerks. And 20 21 gentleman, if you would stand. 22 Micah Martin, to the right, is returning with us 23 for the summer. He is a second-year student at McGeorge. 24 Todd Ratshin, in the middle, has joined us for a special

project for a month for the summer to help us out.

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also second year at McGeorge doing great work. And
William Tunick has just joined us for the summer from
UC Davis. And then he will leave us and move on to the
Attorney General's office where he's already accepted an
offer, unfortunately.

But I want to commend them for their work so far and to introduce them to Commission.

CHAIR TILTON: Right. Nice meeting you. Thanks for the help.

MS. HIGASHI: Item 19 is my report. And there is, embedded in this report, is one item that requires your discussion and consideration. That's on Page 2, and I've asked Assistant Executive Director Nancy Patton to present this item since she is most familiar with the issues.

MS. PATTON: The Governor's office has requested that all boards and commissions prepare bill analysis and recommend positions on pending legislation.

During previous administrations, the Governor's office did not make this request, nor did the Commission routinely prepare analysis and recommend positions on pending legislation.

When the Governor's office requests a bill analysis, we may have a very short turnaround time of three to five days, it could be shorter than that, to

submit a completed bill analysis. Because of these short timelines, staff recommends that the Commission authorize the Executive Director to submit bill analysis with positions on bills that impact the Commission's statutory authority and workload. Each bill analysis will include the following statement: "This analysis was prepared by Commission staff. It has not been reviewed by the Commission members, and it is not intended to reflect the position of any individual member or the Commission itself."

This process would not preclude the Commission from voting to take positions on bills; staff would continue to present bills to the Commission for their action.

MEMBER BOEL: Well, coming from Governor's office, and this is the kind of thing my department, the Office of Planning and Research does all the time, and really, before this mandate came out, I was coming to Paula and Nancy to say, I think you should get involved in taking positions on legislation much more actively, because there has been a lot of legislation that affects the Mandates Commission.

And I was concerned because I would watch them on the hearings -- in fact, Paula has done an excellent job in the hearings, I want to commend you, I think she's

done outstanding work -- but it seems like I was saying,
"Help, we need to be out there giving our position." And
we wouldn't have a meeting for six weeks.

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So I really would urge us to give them the authority to do this. I think it's very much needed to continue the high quality of staff work we've been getting.

CHAIR TILTON: My reaction, I think it is very important, especially, Paula, in terms of the processes of the mandates. You folks are the experts. And I think in many ways, there's a conflict of interest for us as board members taking positions on legislation, on the policy issues, because our own agencies are doing those kinds of issues.

So I think this is a good compromise, that with that disclaimer, we can always object and have a different opinion when we need to. But I think it's important for the staff to be involved in the processes of mandates in all those discussions. So I think this is a good recommendation.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I feel the same way.

CHAIR TILTON: Do we have a motion, then, to authorize the Executive Director to do the legislative positions and report those to the Governor's office?

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VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: So moved.

MEMBER BOEL: I second. 1 CHAIR TILTON: All in favor, say "aye." 2 (A chorus of "ayes" was heard.) 3 CHAIR TILTON: Opposed? 4 (No audible response was heard.) 5 CHAIR TILTON: Motion passes. 6 7 MS. HIGASHI: Thank you. MS. PATTON: Thank you. 8 9 MS. HIGASHI: I have just a couple minor updates. 10 One is that the Assembly Special Committee on State 11 Mandates will resume its hearings beginning a week from 12 Monday. So we'll find out at that time what they intend to do. 13 And they have a number of proposals before them, 14 and they'll start discussing the testimony, as well as 15 the written submittals they've received. 16 17 I've given you copies of the documentation that 18 I've provided to the Committee at their last hearing. 19 And I've also given you copies of pending test claims. 20 Nancy has provided an update on legislation which is 21 already out of date, but if you go to the Commission's 2.2 website, all of the bills that we have been following are all noted there and you can go directly to them, Leg. 23 24 Info Updates.

We also have a very brief list of agenda items for

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the July hearing. We are still in the process of finalizing some of the analyses, and some of them may drop off, and others may take their places. So we'll keep you updated on that as soon as I have a closer perspective on that agenda.

Are there any other questions?

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VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I'll just make a couple,
Paula. It's a minor item, but on page 3, under State
Controller's Report to the Director of Finance, I think
there is a typo there under -- and the reason I mention
it is because we're talking about a million seven. I
think the million dollars two hundred four thousand, it's
the third line down, talking about additional funds in
the amount of 1.7 million -- billion. And you have one
billion seven hundred million for local agencies; six
hundred eighty-two million for schools. I think the one
billion seven should be one billion two hundred four.

MS. HIGASHI: Oh, okay.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Which will cross over, then, to the one seven three one.

MS. HIGASHI: I guess that's why I don't work at Finance.

MEMBER BOEL: What's a billion here.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Things like that jump out at me for some reason.

MS. HIGASHI: And we did proof it, I thought. 1 2 MEMBER BOEL: I would have one other question on 3 dates and agenda items. We talked earlier today about the Butte County 4 having a special hearing up there. Do we have any idea 5 what kind of timeframe that would be in? 6 Is that within 7 the next quarter? MS. HIGASHI: It would be October. 8 9 MS. PATTON: If they file the end of August, beginning of September, which is what they are 10 indicating, we would have to hold the first hearing 11 12 within 60 days of them filing applications so that would be sometime in October. 13 14 MEMBER BOEL: So it would not be the same. MS. HIGASHI: So we would have the July hearing, 15 then we would have a September hearing. 16 MEMBER BARNES: Can I just clarify? We'd have to 17 have it in 60 days, even though the analysis is not done 18 19 or anything like that? 20 MS. PATTON: No. The analysis has to be done before we have the hearing within 60 days. 21 22 MEMBER BARNES: But my understanding is that the 23 analysis does not have to be performed until there is money to pay for it. 24

Correct.

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MS. PATTON:

The 90-day time line is

tolled until we have the funding.

MEMBER BARNES: That's what I wanted to make sure.

MS. PATTON: But now that you've indicated your preference, we can go forward and request the funding.

MEMBER BARNES: Okay.

MS. HIGASHI: We have one other -- I should say, we should move on to public comment, unless there are questions.

(No audible response was heard.)

CHAIR TILTON: I'm going to stand up for this, Bill.

And we have a Resolution for Mr. Sherwood. And I want to comment two things: One, I've been serving on the Commission here just a few -- seems like a lifetime, but it's been about three or four meetings, but I've known Bill for over twenty years. Worked with him back in 1980 with the Treasurer's Office. And always have known Bill, as I've seen here, as both professional, the highest esteem in terms of public servants, Bill, and has a reputation around government for one of those folks who does the public work in high value and high esteem.

And we're going to miss you in your retirement,
and maybe we'll keep our hooks in you somehow. But I
have a resolution to read you from the Commission. And I
think this reflects all of our esteem in terms of your

good work of 34 years, I think, you said.

"Whereas, Bill Sherwood, Director of Investments and Deputy State Treasurer, has distinguished himself as a Member of the Commission on State Mandates, representing the State Treasurers Tom Hayes, Kathleen Brown, Matt Fong, and Phil Angelides, from December 1990 through June 30th, 2004." That's a long time.

"Whereas, as the longest tenured Commission member, Bill Sherwood has participated in 113 meetings and hearings of the Commission on State Mandates;

"Whereas, he has advised and influenced the

Commission in determining test claims, including Special

Education, Investment Reports, County Treasury Oversight

Committees, Peace Officer's Bill of Rights, ERAF, Three

Strikes, Animal Adoption, School Site Councils,

Expulsions, Sexually Violent Predators, High School Exit

Exam, Medically Indigent Adults, Open Meetings and

Graduation Requirements, Incorrect Reduction Claims,

pursuant to article XIII B, section 6 of the California

Constitution and section 17551 of the Government Code;

"Whereas, he is the only member to participate in hearing and determining the Applications for Findings of Significant Financial Distress," as we've talked about today, "filed by the Counties of Sacramento, Alameda, Lassen, Los Angeles, Shasta, Solano and Butte; and,

"Now, therefore, be it resolved upon his retirement, the Members and Staff of the Commission on State Mandates are honoring Bill Sherwood in appreciation of his 34 years of outstanding dedication, leadership and service to the State of California.

"Done this day, May 27th, 2004."
Thank you, Bill.

(Chorus of applause.)

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Well, just quickly, I'll make a few comments.

I got into this position because Fred Buenrostro was over at the State Treasurer's office, and Fred called me up one morning and said, Bill, I sit on this little obscure Commission. And I'd like you to, and he gave me about ten minutes' notice, I'd like you to come over and sit in for me because I can't make it today.

So I didn't think anything about it. I said,

Fine. That's great. So I jumped over here, and I found

out that this was really one involved, difficult

Commission to deal with because of the type of

information we're dealing with and the requests being

made.

And after that one meeting, somehow, Fred decided to leave us and go to the State Controller's Office, and it became my job. And as Treasurers came along, I can

honestly -- I should honestly say, I kind of made an effort to kind of move away from the Commission, and it never quite worked out that way.

But I've been so fortunate to have worked for three great Treasurers. I've worked for seven over the years. And they are all very good people. But as a Commissioner on this Board, with Phil Angelides and Tom Hayes and Kathleen Brown, and with Matt Fong, I was just always able to do and work the way I wanted to, and they treated this whole Commission with integrity. And I'm just very lucky to have worked with those people.

And it's been a very educational and rewarding experience for me. I've learned so much by being involved in working with local governments, and the people that have come forward, I have a lot of respect for what you do, and I think it's an extremely important Commission. And I think the job itself that you do out there is so worthwhile and so needed, and I just compliment you on the efforts you make to come before us.

And, of course, the Commissioners, I look back to
Joann Steinmeier, and Al Beltrami, John Lazar; these
people volunteer their time. I sit here because I work
at the Treasurer's Office, but I also get paid by the
Treasurer. These people that are here, public members,
do a tremendous job, and I respect them very much. Over

the years, Joann, educational background. Al, I think, came from Cal, and he had a tremendous background. And John, an elected official from down in Turlock.

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So it's just been a tremendous experience for me.

And I'd just like to close by saying how much I respect
the job that this staff does. They are understaffed,
underfunded; they are looking at 100 some odd cases right
now, 120 some odd.

And I just respect how you keep your nose to the grindstone; keep knocking out the work. Good job. Good work. And I think it speaks so well to state service and the type of people that we have here working for us. So it's just been a pleasure, Paula, Paul, Camille, Nancy; everyone. Just what a great job you do, and keep up the good work.

And I got to believe that down the road, there will be some light at the end of the tunnel, and I think we're, as a state, moving in the right direction, and we're going to be in a much better situation.

So stay with it, because you're not quite as old as I am. You need to stay with it before you can retire probably.

Thank you very much.

(Chorus of applause.)

CHAIR TILTON: I guess we'll now move into closed

session.

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MS. HIGASHI: We have two other comments.

DR. BERG: With your indulgence, Carol Berg, Education Mandated Cost Network.

We can't let you get away, Mr. Sherwood, without expressing our gratitude to you. Very few people on this Commission have persevered through the 20-year Special Education --

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I remember that well.

DR. BERG: Right. And you've been there through all of it. The great loss, really and truly, for the whole process is the loss of the institutional memory that you will take with you. And we appreciate so much the fact that you've done your homework; it's obvious that you have done that. And that is a huge responsibility for somebody who also has a day job.

So we, on behalf of the Education folks, we represent over 800 of the thousand school districts, we have a little token here for you to put on a wall or in a box, depending on what you do with all the treasurers.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: We'll put it on a wall.

DR. BERG: And this says, "We present to you,

Mr. Sherwood, in appreciate for your faithful service and

dedication to the work of the Commission on State

Mandates," which is no longer an obscure, small

Commission, "with gratitude for your service." 1 We thank you. 2 Thank you. 3 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: (Chorus of applause.) 4 Thank you VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Okay. Great. 5 6 very much. 7 MR. BURDICK: Mr. Chairman and members, Allan Burdick on behalf of a group called the 8 9 City/County, or the CSAC League of Cities Advisory Committee on State Mandates. 10 11 And with me today I have our co-chairs, 12 Leonard Kaye, from the County of Los Angeles, who is our county chair, and Glenn Everroad, who chairs on behalf of 13 14 the cities from the City of Newport Beach. 15 And we would like to join in, and I think the first thing I'll do is ask Leonard to make a couple 16 17 comments relative to the work with Commissioner Sherwood. 18 MR. KAYE: Yes. Thank you. 19 It's a real pleasure to be here today and to wish 20 you the very, very best. And to let you know over the 21 years, as I appeared before you, while we did have our 22 slight disagreements, you did offer some very deep and 23 reflective thought as to what we were trying to do. 24 And I just want to wish you the very best and

appreciate your long and very dedicated service.

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And it

was encouraging to all of us, I think, in the field to, because we never quite knew what questions you would ask, you sort of kept us on our toes, and to let you know, by the way, if you want to stop by in Los Angeles County, you're always welcome.

And, you know, to wish you the best. Thank you.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Thank you very much. It's
been great working with you, also.

MR. EVERROAD: Member Sherwood, we'd like to also thank you from the city's perspective. You not only, as Leonard indicated, are obviously familiar with the process and have prepared whenever you've presented yourself here on the Commission, you've also offered us a great deal of insight about your understanding when you actually reached the decision.

It was helpful for us in preparation of our claims to know where you were coming from. I'd like to thank you for that as well. And restate the best wishes for you in your future.

VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Thank you very much.

MR. BURDICK: And Bill, if I may be so bold, we had the opportunity, obviously, to work with you from day one. I remember when Fred left and you showed up and have been ever since.

And as Vice-Chairman of the Commission, I think I

echo the comments of everybody else that while we didn't always agree with your vote, and a couple times today, possibly, but on the other hand, we knew that you came, you were well prepared, you asked very penetrating questions.

It's great to see somebody -- we were very pleased when you were able to represent, when you came back in after, I think it was originally, I think that was Tom Hayes, if my recollection is right, and then came on, and changed stripes, and we had different partisan members who were elected to that particular office, but it didn't seem to make any difference; they continued to allow you to come.

So what I'd like to do is because I'm recovering from a hip injury, is I'd like to have Glenn Everroad take this up to you as a token of our appreciation from the Joint CSAC League of Cities Advisory Committee on State Mandates in our appreciation for your dedication and hard work all these years.

It is a bittersweet day; one of those days that -we know the reason you're leaving is you're going on to
retire and have wonderful times. On the other hand,
we're going to miss you.

I did comment to Leonard that his Investment
Report Incorrect Reduction Claim has not yet been

And now as you leave state service, that maybe 1 2 Leonard should look to seeing if he couldn't enter into a 3 relationship to have you come on and help defend that. VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Be careful here. 4 MR. BURDICK: My quess is Paula will not schedule 5 that within the next year. 6 Thank you very much. 7 8 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Thank you very much. 9 (Chorus of applause.) 10 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Chair, Mr. Starkey wishes to make a comment. 11 12 MR. STARKEY: Just for closed session -- actually, before we do that, I just want to say Bill, thank you. 13 It's been a pleasure. 14 I'm somewhat nervous because Bill is the last 15 remaining member of the Commission who hired me, I think, 16 17 August or July. 18 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I feel really good about that decision. 19 20 MR. STARKEY: Thank you. Thank you. 21 But on that, for closed session, things are sort of on hold, so we can suspend with that, and I can 22 provide anything in writing as decisions develop. 23 24 So if the members have no questions, we can

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suspend with that.

1	CHAIR TILTON: Great. We're done with our
2	business?
3	MS. HIGASHI: We can go to lunch.
4	CHAIR TILTON: With that, the Commission on State
5	Mandates is adjourned.
6	Thank you for your testimony.
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8	(The proceedings concluded at 12:46 p.m.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were reported by me at the time and place therein named; that the proceedings were reported by me, a duly certified shorthand reporter and a disinterested person, and was thereafter transcribed into typewriting by computer.

I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for any of the parties to said proceedings, nor in any way interested in the outcome of the cause named in said matter.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 16th day of June 2004.

Janette V. Vine
Janette V. Vine, CSR #3978