MINUTES

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

State Capitol, Room 447 Sacramento, California March 24, 2011

Present: Member Pedro Reyes, Chairperson

Representative of the Director of the Department of Finance

Member Richard Chivaro, Vice Chairperson Representative of the State Controller

Member Francisco Lujano

Representative of the State Treasurer

Member Ken Alex

Director of the Office of Planning and Research

Member J. Steven Worthley

County Supervisor Member Sarah Olsen Public Member Member Paul Glaab City Council Member

CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL

Chairperson Reyes called the meeting to order at 9:35 a.m. Executive Director Drew Bohan called the roll. Member Lujano was absent from the meeting room.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS

Item 1 Staff Report

Mr. Bohan stated that the annual election of officers is the first order of business for the first meeting of the year. Chairperson Reyes asked for nominations for chairperson.

Member Alex nominated the Director of Finance. Member Chivaro seconded. Director of Finance Ana Matosantos was elected chairperson by a vote of 6-0.

Chairperson Reyes asked for nominations for vice-chairperson and then nominated the State Controller. With a second by Member Glaab, the State Controller John Chiang was elected vice-chairperson by a vote of 6-0.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES

Item 2 December 2, 2010

Mr. Bohan noted a blue handout with corrections to the December 2, 2011 minutes. With a motion for approval by Member Chivaro and a second by Member Glaab, the December 2, 2010 hearing minutes were adopted, as corrected, by a vote of 6-0.

(Member Lujano entered the meeting room.)

CONSENT CALENDAR

INFORMATIONAL HEARING PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 8 (action)

PROPOSED STATEWIDE COST ESTIMATES

Item 11* Local Government Employment Relations, 01-TC-30

Government Code Sections 3502.5 and 3508.5

Statutes 2000, Chapter 901 (SB 739)

California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Sections 32132, 32135, 32140, 32149, 32150, 32160, 32168, 32170, 32175, 32176, 32180, 32190, 32205, 32206, 32207, 32209, 32210, 32212, 32310, 32315, 32375, 32455, 32620, 32644,

32649, 32680, 32980, 60010, 60030, 60050, 60070

City of Sacramento and County of Sacramento, Claimants

Item 12* Local Agency Formation Commissions, 02-TC-23

Government Code Section 56425, Subdivision (i)(1) (formerly Subdivision (h)(1))

Statutes 2000, Chapter 761 (AB 2838)

Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District, Claimant

Item 13* Cal Grants, 02-TC-28

Education Code Section 69432.9, Subdivision (b)(3)(C)

Statutes 2000, Chapter 403 (SB 1644)

California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Sections 30007, 30023,

Subdivisions (a) and (d), and 30026

Long Beach Community College District, Claimant

ADOPTION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONS

Item 15* Final Regulations to Amend Conflict of Interest Code California Code of Regulations, Title 2, Chapter 2.5., Article 9, Section 1189.10 and Appendix.

Member Worthley made a motion to adopt items 11, 12, 13, and 15 on the consent calendar. With a second by Member Olsen, the consent calendar was adopted by a vote of 7-0.

APPEAL OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DECISIONS PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, SECTION 1181, SUBDIVISION (c)

Item 3 Staff Report (if necessary)

There were no appeals to consider.

HEARING AND DECISIONS ON TEST CLAIMS, PARAMETERS AND GUIDELINES, INCORRECT REDUCTION CLAIMS, AND STATEMENTS OF DECISION, PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 7 (Gov. Code, §§ 17551 and 17559) (action)

Drew Bohan, Executive Director, swore in parties and witnesses participating in the hearing.

A. TEST CLAIMS

Item 4 Discrimination Complaint Procedures, 02-TC-46, 02-TC-25 and 02-TC-31

Education Code Sections 212, 212.5, 213, 214, 221.5, 221.7, 66010.2, 66010.7, 66016, 66030, 66251, 66252, 66261, 66261.5, 66262, 66262.5, 66263, 66264, 66270, 66271.7, 66281.5, 66290, 66291, 66292, 66292.3, 72011, 72012, 72013, 72014, 87101, and 87102 Statutes 1976, Chapter 1010; Statutes 1981, Chapter 470 (AB 1726); Statutes 1982, Chapter 1117 (AB 3133); Statutes 1983, Chapter 143 (AB 1949); Statutes 1984, Chapter 1371 (SB 2252); Statutes 1988, Chapters 973 (AB 1725); Statutes 1990, Chapter 1372 (SB 1854); Statutes 1991, Chapter 1198 (AB 617); Statutes 1998, Chapter 914 (SB 1999); Statutes 1999, Chapter 587 (AB 537); and Statutes 2002, Chapter 1169 (SB 2028) California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Sections 53001, 53002, 53003, 53004, 53005, 53006, 53020, 53021, 53022, 53023, 53024, 53025, 53026, 53033, 53034, and 54220

"Student Equity: Guidelines for Developing a Plan" Fall 2002, The Academic Senate for California Community Colleges (Appendix 1: Chancellor's Office "Student Equity Plan Review Procedures and Instructions"), (Appendix 3: Chancellor's Office "Student Equity: Regulations and Guidelines," Revised May 14, 1997, Adopted by the Academic Senate Fall 2002)

(Consolidated With)

Government Code Sections 11135, 11136, 11137, 11138, and 11139 Statutes 1977, Chapter 972(AB 803); Statutes 1992, Chapter 913 (AB 1077); Statutes 1994, Chapter 146 (AB 3601); Statutes 1999, Chapter 591 (AB 1670); Statutes 2001, Chapter 708 (AB 303); Statutes 2002, Chapter 300 (AB 3035); Statutes 2002, Chapter 1102 (SB 105) California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Sections 59300, 59303, 59304, 59310, 59311, 59320, 59322, 59324, 59326, 59327, 59328, 59329, 59330, 59332, 59334, 59336, 59338, 59339, 59340, 59342, 59350, 59351, 59352, 59354, 59356, 59358, 59360, and 59362 Register 96, number 23; Register 2001, number 6; Register 2002, number 13; and Register 2002, number 35; Los Rios, Santa Monica and West Kerns Community College Districts, Claimants

Kenny Louie, Commission Counsel, presented this item. Mr. Louie stated that *Discrimination Complaint Procedures* addresses state anti-discrimination laws as they apply to community college districts in the areas of employment, provision of programs and activities to students, and procedures that are used to deal with allegations of discrimination.

Mr. Louie pointed out that the primary areas in dispute are whether or not the regulations setting forth the minimum conditions entitle districts to state aid for state-mandated activities. Staff finds that they do not. The other issue, according to Mr. Louie, is whether the statutes and regulations in the areas of employment, student equity, and discrimination complaint procedures impose federal mandated activities. Staff finds that some of the statutes and regulations do impose federal mandates.

The parties were represented as follows: Keith Petersen representing the test claimants and Susan Geanacou representing the Department of Finance.

Mr. Petersen stated that this test claim pulled two items from the *Minimum Conditions for State Aid* test claim which is currently scheduled for hearing in May. Some of the legal issues in this claim will have an effect on some of the legal issues in that claim as well.

Mr. Petersen stated that, in his March 1, 2011 response to the draft staff analysis, he raised the following five issues: (1) test claimants would like to abandon a portion of the reimbursement period as a result of the *Connerly* case; (2) disagreement with the standard of review that the staff uses; (3) disagreement with portions of the federal mandate analysis; (4) disagreement with all of the minimum conditions analysis; and (5) disagreement with some of the findings regarding the programs. He only intended to address objections one, four, and five at this hearing.

Mr. Petersen stated that the issue of the abandonment of a portion of the test claim is a procedural issue. He said that the reason the claimants want to abandon the two-month period is because the *Connerly* case changed the *Equal Employment Opportunity* program from the affirmative action program. Based on the date the test claim was filed, the change occurs two months after the start. Since this is covering seven or eight years, Mr. Petersen said it would be less confusing for the claimants and much easier to write parameters and guidelines if the claimants give up that two-month period of the old law and start with the new law.

Ms. Shelton stated that Commission regulations only allow for an abandonment of statutes that have been pled. And the claimant does not want to withdraw any of those statutes because they are relevant after the period of reimbursement. Therefore, after a discussion, staff decided to go forward with the claim as it stands. If this or any other claimant chooses to abandon that period of reimbursement and the Commission adopts the staff recommendation to partially approve this test claim, then those eligible claimants simply do not have to seek reimbursement on a reimbursement claim with the Controller's Office.

Mr. Petersen agreed that was for the best and said that he was not formally abandoning the pre-Connerly reimbursement period. Chairperson Reyes asked if a motion was needed. Ms. Shelton said no because there was no request to sever or abandon.

Mr. Petersen stated his disagreement with the findings that some of the statutes or regulations are reimbursable activities. He found most of the activities were analyzed consistently with Commission procedure but took issue with one particular item referenced in his March 1, 2011 letter.

Mr. Bohan clarified that the Commission members did not have a paper version of Mr. Petersen's comments because they were issued flash drives instead.

Member Worthley stated that, going forward, if someone wanted to reference a specific document, he or she should bring copies for the Commission members. Both Member Worthley and Member Olsen stated that the new system is preferable since it uses less paper.

Mr. Petersen said that the issue on the *Discrimination Complaint Procedures* Program is that there is essentially a two-step complaint process. One is an informal complaint process handled mostly by the college district; that is someone complaining that they were improperly discriminated against. The other is a formal State Chancellor's Office appeal process.

Mr. Petersen stated that the claimants disagree with the finding that the appeal process on the Chancellor's Office level does not impose any activities. The staff analysis says, however, there is no language in those sections that requires community college districts to engage in any activity and that is what is pertinent. Mr. Petersen agreed with the analysis that there are no words that say that when an appeal is filed, the district as a party to the appeal must respond. Nor does it say when the chancellor calls or sends a brief to the college, the college must respond.

However, it seemed essential that the appeal process, which is a complaint against the district, involve the district. The regulations indicate that the Chancellor's Office is indeed involving the district. And an appeal should involve all the essential parties in a complaint that is filed against the community college district.

Mr. Petersen likened this case to another commission claim, *Pupil Discipline Records*. In that case, the plain law stated that the district that received the transfer student must request discipline records on the student from the district that sent the transfer student. The law did not say that the district that sent the student had to send the records; but the purpose of the mandate would not have been implemented unless the sending district sent the records to the receiving district.

Mr. Petersen reiterated that the community college district is not the one who starts the appeal, but rather, is the party against which the complaint is filed by an individual. Therefore, the community college district has to be a party to the appeal and participate.

Commission regulations regarding parameters and guidelines require that a description of specific costs and types of costs that are reimbursable, including one-time costs and ongoing costs, and a description of the most reasonable methods of complying with the mandate be included. Mr. Petersen emphasized "The most reasonable methods of complying with the mandate are those methods not specified in the statute or executive order, but that are necessary to carry out the mandate program."

Mr. Petersen concluded that, if not as a matter of exact words and statute but, as a matter of the most reasonable and necessary method, a community college needs to respond to those appeals and, therefore, it should be a reimbursable activity.

Susan Geanacou, Department of Finance, stated that Finance agrees with the Commission's final staff analysis.

Member Olsen clarified that, on *Pupil Discipline Records*, the Commission said this issue could be addressed in the parameters and guidelines phase.

Ms. Shelton stated that she had not reviewed *Pupil Discipline Records* in preparation for this hearing nor had she heard the argument made. She said that the issue before the Commission is whether or not there is a mandate as a matter of law. She said the first step is to find out if the regulation does mandate an activity on school districts. If the Commission finds that it does mandate an activity, then, at the parameters and guidelines phase, other additional activities can be included that are reasonably necessary to comply with the mandated activity. Based on the plain language of the regulation, there is no mandated activity imposed on the district.

Member Worthley asked if it would be possible to apply the provision of practical compulsion to this situation. Ms. Shelton replied that there must be evidence of practical compulsion in the record and, in this case, there is not. She believes Mr. Petersen was making a legal compulsion not a practical compulsion argument. Mr. Petersen stated that he did not know if parties were legally compelled to participate in formal administrative adjudications. Ms. Shelton believes that, in the case of *Pupil Discipline Records*, there was some procedure laid out and that a mandate in that language could be found.

Mr. Louie stated that the plain language of the law does not require these activities and an argument has not been set forth that they are practically compelled. There is no evidence that they were practically compelled to engage in the activities. Mr. Petersen stated that he agreed to an extent but the parameters and guidelines regulation specifically says it does not have to be stated in the statutes or regulations.

Mr. Louie pointed out that that language is a parameters and guidelines issue. Here, the Commission is making a mandates finding and plain language does not mandate these activities.

Member Worthley asked if it is possible that this might be addressed again as another issue in the parameters and guidelines. Ms. Shelton pointed out that since the recommendation is for the Commission to deny the regulation that would not be possible.

Ms. Shelton further reminded Commission members that the decision to be made at the current stage in the process was one of law. However, at the parameters and guidelines stage, the Commission members could exercise their discretion.

Member Worthley commented that this matter has previously come before the Commission, and will probably come again in the future. It would be good to come up with some sort of way to deal with it. He agrees with counsel that the failure to say "Thou shalt" is almost an omission by default. He stated that everybody intends that people will respond. He believes that the Legislature is not inclined to want to fix the issue because it means that they do not have to pay for something. He stated that he would like to look at the issue because he sees it as a practical compulsion issue.

Member Chivaro asked if the commission was ready for a motion. Chairperson Reyes answered in the affirmative and asked if there was any further discussion. Mr. Petersen asked, if the Commission adopts the staff position, would it then foreclose it from becoming an issue at the parameters and guidelines stage. Ms. Shelton answered that if the Commission adopts the regulation then the statute would not even be discussed during parameters and guidelines.

Member Chivaro made a motion to adopt the staff recommendation with a second from Member Lujano. Ms. Geanacou asked if the motion was on the entire analysis or the issue on which Mr. Petersen just testified. Chairperson Reyes stated that the motion could be held until Mr. Petersen finishes and Finance has an opportunity to comment.

Mr. Petersen continued with the threshold issue of whether compliance with the 20 programs known as *Minimum Conditions* is required for state funding. The provisions of the subchapter sections 51000 through 51207 are the 20 different programs. Two of them, as part of this test claim, are adopted under the authority of Education Code 70901, and comprise the rules and regulations fixing and affirming the minimum conditions, satisfaction of which entitles a district maintaining community colleges to receive state aid for the support of its community colleges.

Mr. Petersen stated that the claimant's position is that the language, since it is a regulation, has the same force as a statute, by itself is legally compelling, and that staff's subsequent analysis of the *Kern* case and the *POBOR* case to discuss practical compulsion is not required.

Mr. Petersen read from the analysis that, "The Chancellor's Office and the claimants both describe the language as providing that most of the regulations pled by the claimants establish minimum conditions for the receipt of state aid." He stated that it appears the Chancellor's Office intended that it be coercive and compulsory. Also in the analysis, Commission staff spent several paragraphs describing what the language does not exclude which led to the *Kern* analysis.

The *Kern* case dealt with school districts who establish school site councils, informal small groups that meet on particular issues. Some are funded by federal agencies, others by state categorical money. After several years of being in operation, a state law was passed requiring that those groups write and post agendas. The test claim was filed to get reimbursement for the agendas.

The subsequent litigation said that since the district voluntarily decided to operate those committees, any subsequent mandate downstream was not reimbursable. That is the essence of the *Kern* analysis. For *Kern* to work, there would have to be a precursor program and a downstream program.

The 20 programs, Mr. Petersen argued, putatively are downstream, but they are not downstream of any other program. Section 51000 is not a program, but rather a coercive requirement compelling implementation of the 20 programs at the risk of losing state aid. Therefore, the facts of *Kern* do not fit. Title 5, section 51000, is not a precursor program voluntarily established by the college districts. That leads to the *POBOR* analysis, which requires proof of coercion, proof of severe penalty.

Mr. Petersen explained that the *POBOR* case had to do with school districts and colleges requesting reimbursement for training and other costs for peace officers. The court decided that employing peace officers at school districts and colleges was a discretionary act, and there was no coercion to do so. That is not the case here. Every college is being coerced to comply with those programs.

Mr. Petersen again referred to his March 1, 2011 letter for the *Minimum Conditions* penalty review by the Chancellor's Office and the Board of Governors. The regulations require the Chancellor's Office to review the community college districts every seven years to see if they are complying with this coercion; or if they are notified otherwise, the Board of Governors has jurisdiction over alleged non-compliance. He cited an example of alleged non-compliance in the hiring of the chancellor at San Mateo Community College. The chancellor's staff recommended a penalty of \$500,000 for violating one or two sections of the *Equal Employment Opportunity* program, which coincidentally is the subject of this test claim.

The Board of Governors had three choices: agree with what the district did, discuss a remediation plan, or penalize. In this case, they did not penalize. The staff analysis indicates that is proof that section 51000 is not coercive. And it indicates there is no evidence in the record that there is a severe penalty to back up the coercion.

Mr. Petersen alleged that Section 51000 is sufficient and legally compelling. But for there to be evidence in the record of severe loss of funding, it appears there would have to be extreme malfeasance by community college personnel. They would have to intentionally ignore the requirements of those 20 programs.

Mr. Petersen suggested that it is unlikely there is ever going to be that sort of evidence because community college district officers are professional public servants who do not behave in that manner. He then asked that the Commission staff reconsider their treatment of this legal issue, with directions that *Kern* is not applicable and POBOR is not applicable, factually.

Mr. Louie responded that *Kern* specifically states that these activities are conditions and there is no legal requirement to engage in these activities. Nor is there practical compulsion or evidence that there are certain severe penalties.

Member Worthley stated that there was still the possibility of a penalty. There is the authority to impose such draconian measures.

Mr. Louie rebutted that there is no evidence of what the certainty or severity of those consequences would be.

Member Worthley reiterated that he believes the issue is not whether there is a factual situation, but rather, is there a legal ability to impose these measures on the local agency. Mr. Louie explained that there was actual evidence of consequences in each of the cases from the federal mandate analysis used in the draft staff analysis. For example, double taxation of state

businesses or termination of the state unemployment insurance program were certain consequences.

Mr. Petersen stated that, regarding practical compulsion, he believes the Commission's position is rather disingenuous. For federal mandates, the Commission often finds that there is practical compulsion for schools, cities and counties to implement federal mandates that threaten fund loss or future program loss or threaten potential litigation. However, none of those actually occur, rather they are threats. For that reason, Mr. Petersen believes the Commission is applying a different standard to require that the chancellor of the various community college districts actually impose certain consequences. He continues to allege that section 51000 is legally compelling and sufficient on its own.

Ms. Shelton clarified that there is not a lot of case law to help with this situation. She pointed to two federal mandates where either the plain language said "there shall be..." or actual litigation was occurring. Those were the key differences in statutes used in the staff recommendation.

Member Glaab, understanding the Commission's duty to adjudicate cases, suggested that this claim be brought back to the next hearing to allow staff and the claimant to work out some issues.

Susan Geanacou, Department of Finance, stated that Finance supports the staff analysis and Mr. Louie's comments about the lack of certainty regarding any adverse or severe consequences. Ms. Geanacou pointed out the key distinction in the analysis between entitlement to receive state aid versus the actual receipt of aid.

Mr. Petersen questioned the substantive legal difference between "being entitled to" and "receiving" state aid. Ms. Shelton stated that under the rules of statutory construction, the Legislature chose to use those words and therefore, they must have meaning.

Mr. Petersen countered by saying that community colleges are entitled by their mere existence as community colleges. And, that entitlement is subject to an action, after the fact if they fail to comply. Mr. Louie stated that a failure to comply does not necessarily lead to a direct loss of funds.

Member Alex asked Ms. Shelton to clarify when does practical compulsion need to be raised and is it purely factual. Ms. Shelton responded that a decision has to be made as to whether or not there is a mandated program. Clearly the law says, based on the Constitution, that they must be mandated by the state. There has to be strict legal compulsion which is based on the plain language of the statute. The courts have suggested, although they have yet to find, a situation where the local government has been practically compelled by the circumstances. Under that situation, it must be shown that, despite the language or the silence of their discretionary triggering decision, the downstream requirements are practically compelled because there are certain and severe penalties imposed if they fail to comply. That is a first element of finding whether or not there is a reimbursable state mandated program. The practical compulsion is based on facts and evidence in the record, but ultimately, it is a question of law.

Member Alex asked that those facts would be in the record at this point and staff's finding was that there are no facts to give rise to a practical compulsion determination. Ms. Shelton confirmed that was correct.

With a motion by Member Chivaro to adopt the staff recommendation, and a second by Member Lujano, the staff recommendation to deny the test claim was adopted by a vote of 6-1, with Member Worthley voting no.

Item 5 Proposed Statement of Decision: *Discrimination Complaint Procedures*, 02-TC-46, 02-TC-25 and 02-TC-31 [See Item 4 above.]

Member Chivaro made a motion to adopt the proposed statement of decision. With a second by Member Alex, the statement of decision was adopted by a vote of 6-0 with Member Olsen abstaining.

Item 6 School Facilities Funding Requirements, 02-TC-30, 02-TC-43 and 09-TC-01 Education Code Sections 15271, 15272, 15274, 15276, 15278, 15280,

15282, 15284, 15301, 15302, 15303, 15320, 15321, 15322, 15323, 15324, 15325, 15326, 15327, 15336, 15340, 15341, 15342, 15343, 15346, 15347, 15349, 15349.1, 15350, 15351, 15352, 15354, 15355, 15359.2, 15359.3, 15380, 15381, 15384, 15390, 15391, 17006, 17008.3, 17009, 17009.5, 17014, 17015, 17016, 17017, 17017.2, 17017.5, 17017.6, 17017.7, 17017.9, 17018, 17018.5, 17018.7, 17019.3, 17019.5, 17020, 17021.3, 17022, 17022.7, 17024, 17025, 17029, 17029.5, 17030, 17030.5, 17031, 17032, 17032.3, 17032.5, 17036, 17038, 17040, 17040.1, 17040.2, 17040.3, 17040.6, 17040.7, 17040.8, 17041.1, 17041.2, 17041.8, 17042.7, 17042.9, 17047, 17047.5, 17049, 17056, 17059, 17059.1, 17061, 17062, 17063, 17064, 17065, 17066, 17070.33, 17070.50, 17070.51, 17070.60, 17070.63, 17070.70, 17070.71, 17070.75, 17070.77, 17070.80, 17070.90, 17070.95, 17070.97, 17070.98, 17071.10, 17071.25, 17071.30, 17071.33, 17071.35, 17071.40, 17071.46, 17071.75, 17072.10, 17072.12, 17072.13, 17072.20, 17072.33, 17072.35, 17073.10, 17074.10, 17074.15, 17074.16, 17074.20, 17074.25, 17074.26, 17074.30, 17074.50, 17074.52, 17074.54, 17074.56, 17075.10, 17075.15, 17076.10, 17076.11, 17077.10, 17077.30, 17077.35, 17077.40, 17077.42, 17077.45, 17078.18, 17078.20, 17078.22, 17078.24, 17078.25, 17088.3, 17088.5, 17088.7, 17089, 17089.2, 17090, 17092, 17096, 17110, 17111, 17150, 17180, 17183.5, 17193.5, 17194, 17199.1, 17199.4, 17210, 17210.1, 17211, 17212, 17212.5, 17213, 17213.1, 17213.2, 17251, 17315, 39003, 39120 and 100620 as added or amended by Statutes 1976, Chapter 557 (AB 3884); Statutes 1977, Chapter 242 (AB 645); Statutes 1978, Chapter 362 (SB 1917); Statutes 1982, Chapter 735 (AB 3598); Statutes 1990, Chapter 1602 (SB 2262); Statutes 1991, Chapter 1183 (AB 928), Statutes 1996, Chapter 277 (SB 1562); Statutes 1997, Chapters 513 (AB 553), 893 (SB 161), and 940 (SB 1105); Statutes 1998, Chapters 407 (SB 50), 485 (AB 2803), 691 (SB 1686), 741 (AB 89), 848 (AB 2696), 941 (AB 191), 957 (SB 2045), and 1076 (SB 2126); Statutes 1999, Chapters 133 (AB 1633), 709 (AB 1136), 858 (AB 695), 992 (AB 387) and 1002 (SB 162); Statutes 2000, Chapters 44 (AB 1908), 193 (AB 2586), 443 (AB 2644), 530 (AB 2408), 590 (SB 2066), and 753 (SB 1795); Statutes 2001, Chapters 132 (SB 1129), 159 (SB 662), 194 (AB 1558), 422 (AB 1478), 647 (AB 401), 725 (SB 575), 734 (AB 804) and 972 (); and Statutes, 2002, Chapters 33 (AB 16), 199 (AB 693), 935 (AB 14), 1075 (SB 21), and 1168 (AB 1818)

Health and Safety Code Sections 25358.1 and 25358.7.1 as added by Statutes 1999, Chapter 23 (SB 47)

Public Resources Code sections 21151.4 and 21151.8 as amended by Statutes 2003, Chapter 668 (SB 352); Statutes 2004, Chapter 689

(SB 945); Statutes 2007, Chapter 130 (AB 257): and, Statutes 2008, Chapter 148 (AB 2720)

California Code of Regulations, Title 2, Sections 1859.20, 1859.21, 1859.22, 1859.30, 1859.31, 1859.32, 1859.33, 1859.35, 1859.40, 1859.41, 1859.50, 1859.60, 1859.70, 1859.72, 1859.74.1, 1859.75, 1859.75.1, 1859.76, 1859.77.1, 1859.77.2, 1859.79, 1859.79.2, 1859.79.3, 1859.81, 1859.81.1, 1859.82, 1859.90, 1859.100, 1859.102, 1859.104, 1859.104.1, 1859.104.2, 1859.104.3, 1859.105, 1859.105.1, 1859.106, 1859.107, 1862.52, 1862.53, 1865.3, 1865.8, 1865.32.5, 1865.33, 1865.39, 1865.42, 1865.43, 1865.50, 1865.70 as added or amended by Registers 78-05, 79-34, 80-12, 80-26, 81-19, 84-51, 86-44, 98-49, 98-52, 99-11, 99-14, 99-29, 99-31, 99-41, 99-52, 2000-02, 2000-11, 2000-26, 2000-29, 2000-37, 2000-52, 2001-01, 2001-24, 2001-30, 2001-33, 2001-51, 2002-15, 2002-18, 2002-33, 2002-37, 2002-38, 2002-40, 2002-45, 2003-03, 2003-06, 2003-07, 2003-08, 2003-09, 2003-18, 2003-24

Substantial Progress and Expenditure Audit Guide of May 2003; School Facility Program Guidebook of January 2003; State Relocatable Classroom Program Handbook of January 2003; and The Lease-Purchase Applicant Handbook of April 1988 Clovis Unified School District, Claimant

Senior Commission Counsel Heather Halsey presented this item. Ms. Halsey stated that this test claim addresses the activities required of school districts as a condition of receipt of school facility funding pursuant to the test claim statutes and regulations. Staff found that the decisions to acquire a new school site, build a new school, undertake a school modernization project, add portable classrooms and accept state facility program funding, issue local bonds or participate in one of the other voluntary programs pled in this test claim are discretionary decisions; and that based on the analysis in *Kern* court decision, the downstream requirement to comply with *School Facilities Funding Requirements* is not reimbursable. Additionally, staff found there is no evidence in the record to support a finding of practical compulsion.

The claimant disagreed, asserting school districts are legally and practically compelled to build new schools and otherwise provide additional classrooms. Staff recommended that the Commission adopt the staff analysis to deny the test claim.

The parties were represented as follows: Art Palkowitz representing the test claimant and Donna Ferebee representing the Department of Finance.

Art Palkowitz stated that the claimant is requesting that the activities that relate to schools to receive funding, whether it be state funding or the issuance of local bonds, are a reimbursable mandate based on legal and practical compulsion.

Mr. Palkowitz said that public education is a statewide concern, but not one brought about by local agencies. Once a school decides to build a new facility, it must comply with numerous state agency requirements. For example, beginning with the California Department of Education (CDE), the school must have a site approval, final plans approval and then go through escrow. The school is required to comply with the Field Act as well as the Division of State Architects (DSA) regarding the construction of the school.

It is quite a task to build a school; a task that is required by the state. Therefore, the claimant believes there is a legal compulsion by the requirement that the state requires the school district to provide public education; and there is practical compulsion.

Mr. Palkowitz stated that once a facility is built, it is the property of the state. The district or local agency is only a trustee of that facility. Because of Proposition 13, they cannot levy taxes. This is a text book example of what the Legislature thought. They realized that the state was going to pass the financial burden to local agencies. However, shifting financial responsibility for carrying out government functions to local agencies is prohibited by Article XIII B and schools should be reimbursed for those activities.

Mr. Palkowitz submitted that the practical compulsion of not building a school is exactly what the courts considered severe consequences. Public education constitutes nearly 40 percent of the state's budget, a high priority. There is a draconian consequence if a school is not built.

In the analysis, staff detailed examples of options that may be done before it is decided to build a school facility. Mr. Palkowitz agreed that those are options a school must go through before making a decision to build. However, after these options are analyzed, it is clear that public education and providing education at the local level is an enhanced service to the public; a new activity and the basis for having reimbursable mandates. Mr. Palkowitz pointed out that the claimant does not dispute the decision regarding the hazardous waste and other items.

Donna Ferebee, Department of Finance, stated that Finance agreed with the final staff analysis that there is neither a legal nor a practical compulsion to construct or build a school.

With a motion by Member Olsen to adopt the staff recommendation, and a second by Member Chivaro, the staff recommendation to deny the test claim was adopted by a vote of 4-2, with Member Glaab and Member Worthley voting no and Chairperson Reyes abstaining.

> Item 7 Proposed Statement of Decision: School Facilities Funding Requirements, 02-TC-30, 02-TC-43 and 09-TC-01 [See Item 6 above.]

Member Olsen made a motion to adopt the proposed statement of decision. With a second by Member Chivaro, the statement of decision was adopted by a vote of 6-1, with Chairperson Reyes abstaining.

B. PARAMETERS AND GUIDELINES AND STATEMENT OF DECISION

Municipal Storm Water and Urban Runoff, 03-TC-04, 03-TC-20 Item 8 and 03-TC-21

Los Angeles Regional Quality Control Board Order No. 01-182

Permit CAS004001

Parts 4C2a., 4C2b, 4E & 4F5c3

Filed September 2, 2003, (03-TC-04) filed by the County of

Los Angeles

Filed September 30, 2003 (03-TC-20) by the Cities of Artesia,

Beverly Hills, Carson, Norwalk, Rancho Palos Verdes, and

Westlake Village

Filed September 30, 2003 (03-TC-21) by the Cities of Bellflower,

Commerce, Covina, Downey, Monterey Park, Signal Hill,

South Pasadena, Vernon

Senior Staff Counsel Eric Feller presented this item. Mr. Feller stated that the parameters and guidelines for the test claim are based on a permit issued by the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board. The Commission approved the test claim for placing and maintaining trash receptacles at transit stops for local agencies not subject to a trash TMDL (Total Maximum Daily Load). The primary issue in dispute is whether the installation activities in the parameters and guidelines are reasonably necessary to comply with the mandate. The LA Regional Water

Board and Department of Finance contend the activities go beyond the scope of the mandate, but the claimants contend that they are reasonably necessary to comply with the mandate.

Staff found that the activities in the parameters and guidelines are reasonably necessary to comply with the mandate. Staff also limited the installation activities to one time per transit stop, limited pickup to no more than three times per week, and deleted graffiti removal as a reimbursable activity.

The Department of Finance and State Controller's Office also asserted that the reasonable reimbursement methodology (RRM) should not be adopted but reimbursement should be based on actual costs. Staff found that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the RRM of \$6.74 for the ongoing maintenance activities, and that the RRM complies with the statutory requirements.

Staff recommended that the Commission adopt the staff analysis as its decision and the attached parameters and guidelines and RRM as modified by staff.

Parties were represented as follows: Leonard Kaye representing the county claimants; David Burhenn representing the city claimants; Jon Walker and Wendy Bui for the County of Los Angeles; Carla Shelton and Susan Geanacou for the Department of Finance; Jim Spano and Jay Lal for the State Controller's Office; and Allan Burdick for the California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities.

Leonard Kaye, Los Angeles County, thanked the Commission staff for their diligence and very finely crafted decision and analysis on this matter. Mr. Kaye agreed with the staff recommendation. He requested a clarifying change on the language which was previously submitted and he was prepared to answer any questions.

David Burhenn, representing the city claimants, echoed Mr. Kaye's appreciation for the hard work on this matter in terms of the municipal storm water area. He also agreed with the suggested changes. Mr. Burhenn urged the Commission members to approve the RRM.

Jon Walker, County of Los Angeles, concurred with the staff recommendation. Wendy Bui, County of Los Angeles, also agreed with the recommendation and stated she was involved with coming up with the costs for the county.

Jay Lal, State Controller's Office, stated that the Controller's Office had reservations about approving the RRM because: (1) it is based on a survey response of seven out of 85 cities/county reported expenditures that have not been validated; and (2) the respondents' survey developed by the cities and county resulted in greater costs for the eight cities/county sampled than the actual expenditures stated in the survey over the seven-year period.

Carla Shelton, Department of Finance, stated that the claimants addressed some concerns, however, Finance still believes some of the activities found to be reasonably necessary go beyond the scope of the mandate. Ms. Shelton specifically expressed concern with actual costs and one-time costs.

Mr. Feller explained that the one-time costs are for transit stops that are moved while the ongoing costs are for receptacle pads that go missing or become damaged beyond use.

Member Olsen asked if staff was satisfied with the claimant's proposed changes. Mr. Feller responded in the affirmative and that the staff recommendation included those clarifying changes.

Susan Geanacou, Department of Finance, asked if Commission staff had any feedback on the Controller's concerns raised about the RRM. Member Alex also questioned the survey issue and asked staff to comment.

Mr. Feller stated that staff has not had time to consider those concerns as they were just raised today. Member Chivaro asked for the difference between actual costs and the hourly rate. Mr. Kaye pointed to an analysis he had prepared in anticipation of those concerns. While a copy of the analysis was passed out, Mr. Kaye explained that, considering the unit cost for each claimant, using non-weighted average and average costs, and coming up with the variance by jurisdiction, he was able to illustrate accurate and reflective numbers.

Chairperson Reyes then questioned the small sample survey. Mr. Kaye said that while the number of respondents to the survey was small, the number of trash pickups represented between 50-70 percent of all pickups.

Camille Shelton stated that, when adopting an RRM, Commission staff must determine whether or not the proposal is representative of the eligible claimant pool. Staff believed that it was representative of both large and small agencies, even though it only had seven of the 85 claimants.

Jim Spano, State Controller's Office, commented that the costs have not been verified. He suggested that his office could go to the survey respondents, look at the data that was used in reporting the actual costs, and validate that those costs are true and correct. This could be done in about six months or less.

Mr. Kaye responded by reading into the record parts of Government Code sections 17558.5 (a) and 17561 (d)(2) as they pertained to initiation of an audit and audit application of an RRM. He added that the claimants are required to retain their documentation that supports reimbursement including the number of trash receptacles and the number of trash collections. He welcomed Mr. Spano to come down for a visit.

Mr. Spano responded that his suggestion was not an audit of a claim because a claim has yet to be filed. Rather, it was an opportunity to validate data used in developing an RRM.

Ms. Shelton clarified that when the statute was adopted, it was intended to allow the Commission to adopt an RRM without having an audit of the actual costs occur before a number was put into the parameters and guidelines. It was meant to balance simplicity and accuracy. She explained that if the Commission adopts the RRM of \$6.74, that number cannot be challenged by the Controller's Office. They could audit the number of trash pickups but could not change the RRM number.

Chairperson Reyes expressed concern about not seeing agreement from the fiscal state agencies regarding the proposed RRM of \$6.74.

Ms. Shelton explained that a request to amend the parameters and guidelines could be submitted if it turns out that this number is too high or too low. Chairperson Reyes then said the claimants are not required, however, to retain documentation so there would be no data to analyze. Ms. Shelton suggested that another option would be to adopt an actual cost requirement, get data in over a couple of years and then develop another RRM.

Mr. Feller stated that the claimants have been doing these trash pickups since 2002, and that this seems like the right case for an RRM.

Mr. Kaye concluded by saying that a ballpark figure of total costs to the state using this RRM would be to multiply between 12,000 to 14,000 pickups by \$6.74 and adding actual costs for the pad installations. He continued that this is a money saver for local governments. It has gotten much support from the cities as well as endorsement from the California State Association of Counties (CSAC).

With a motion by Member Worthley to adopt the staff recommendation, and a second by Member Olsen, the staff recommendation to adopt the parameters and guidelines and RRM was adopted by a vote 7-0.

Chairperson Reyes pointed out that everybody was pleased with Mr. Feller's analysis and with Ms. Halsey's and Mr. Louie's analyses. Member Worthley commented that he has read novels shorter than Mr. Louie's tome.

C. INCORRECT REDUCTION CLAIM

Item 9 *Mandate Reimbursement Process*, 01-4485-I-01

Public Resources Code Sections 40148, 40196.3, 42920-42928

Public Contract Code Sections 12167 and 12167.1

Statutes 1999, Chapter 764 (AB 75)

Statutes 1992, Chapter 1116 (AB 3521)

State Agency Model Integrated Waste Management Plan (February 2000)

Redwood City Elementary School District, Claimant

Item 10 Proposed Statement of Decision

See Item 9 Above

Chair Reyes stated that items 9 and 10 had been continued.

INFORMATIONAL HEARING PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 8 (action)

ADOPTION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONS

Item 14 Final Regulations to Implement Mandate Redetermination Process Pursuant to Government Code Section 17570, Subdivision (d) (Stats. 2010, Ch. 719, eff. October 19, 2010 (SB 856))
California Code of Regulations
Title 2, Chapter 2.5., New Article 10, Sections 1190-1190.05

Program Analyst Heidi Palchik and Senior Staff Counsel Heather Halsey presented this item. Ms. Palchik stated that the Commission adopted emergency regulations to implement the new mandate redetermination process pursuant to Government Code section 17570. At that time, the Commission also adopted an order to initiate permanent regulations while those emergency regulations were in effect. This item would implement the permanent regulations for the new mandate redetermination process.

Ms. Palchik discussed the comments submitted by the California School Boards Association (CSBA) that urged the Commission to resolve the ambiguity of Government Code section 17570, modify the regulations to add a definition of "*materiality*," and amend the regulations to say that the requester has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the change in law would change the underlying determination.

Staff responded to CSBA's comments but continues to recommend the language originally proposed. Therefore, staff recommends that the Commission adopt the regulations, finding that no alternative would be more effective in carrying out the purpose for which the regulations are proposed, or would be as effective as, and less burdensome to affected private persons than the proposed regulations, and adopt the proposed amendments to sections 1181.1 and 1181.2, and the addition of Article X, effective 30 days after filing with the California Secretary of State, and authorize staff to make any non-substantive, technical corrections requested by the Office of Administrative Law or Barclays Official California Code of Regulations prior to publication.

Parties were represented as follows: Deborah Caplan representing the California School Boards Association.

Ms. Caplan expressed appreciation for staff's comments to CSBA's letter which serve to highlight some of the questions and concerns that were initially raised. Ms. Caplan stated that the primary issue is about whether section 17570 is supposed to be used for any change in liability, meaning the amount that the state owes to the local governments; or is it only to be used for changes in liability, meaning the liability for the mandate determination: ultimately whether or not there is a mandate.

Ms. Caplan explained that under Government Code sections 17514 and 17556, the Commission finds whether or not a statute or executive order impose duties that are subject to reimbursement. The concern is the ambiguous language in the redetermination statute itself. CSBA contends the language should be read to mean a new test claim determination is appropriate whenever the underlying mandate determination is changed. If costs change or new activities are added or deleted, they should be subject only to a parameters and guidelines amendment.

Ms. Shelton agreed that this is a complicated area. She explained that when a test claim is filed, an analysis is done on each alleged mandated activity to determine whether that activity constitutes a new program or higher level of service, and whether that activity imposes costs mandated by the state. Often times, the Commission will partially approve a test claim for certain specific activities that meet the entire mandates analysis.

A parameters and guidelines amendment cannot conflict with the underlying decisions and cannot delete a state-mandated activity. In order to file a request for redetermination, the party has to show that there is a change in liability of the underlying mandate determination for that reimbursable state-mandated activity.

Ms. Shelton explained that the pleading is up to the test claimant who picks and chooses statutes and how to title the test claim. That is not within the control of the Commission. A test claim is a request for the reimbursement of several activities within several different articles and chapters of the code of regulations. Each one of those activities goes through the full-blown analysis of the elements that are required under the Constitution.

Ms. Halsey interjected that each activity is mandated individually. Often, an analysis will find that some activities are mandated while other activities are not. The law could change to affect one of those activities and not another activity.

Ms. Shelton continued that the activities listed in the statement of decision are those that are mandated by the plain language of the statute. The Commission does not exercise discretion on those activities because it is a question of law. However, those are not necessarily the same activities listed in the parameters and guidelines because there, the Commission has discretion to add more activities that are reasonably necessary to comply with the mandated activities.

It would not be appropriate for a request for redetermination to be filed to change one of those extra activities that the Commission found to be reasonably necessary because that is discretionary. That would be a parameters and guidelines amendment. It would only be appropriate to file a redetermination if the subsequent change in the law changes one of those activities that was, continues to be, or is no longer mandated by the statute.

Ms. Caplan verified that each statement of determination actually encompasses many substatements. So, a particular mandate would not accurately reflect the number of mandates found in that statement of decision.

Member Alex asked Ms. Caplan to concisely state her concern on behalf of CSBA. Ms. Caplan cited the difficulty in understanding how the proposed regulation would be applied and how the

mandate process truly works from an external perspective. If the intent of the statute and the regulations is to allow for a new test claim determination process to be commenced anytime one of those activities within any one of those dozens and dozens of mandates has changed in some way, either more or less expensive, then it is fundamentally problematic.

Member Worthley offered that the redetermination process would require a fundamental change to determine whether or not there still is a mandate.

Ms. Shelton stated that the proposed regulations require Commission staff to go through a completeness review when a request for redetermination is filed. Part of that review is to see if there is a subsequent change in law and allegation that the state's liability has changed. If staff determines that the filing is not a proper request for redetermination, but is a parameters and guidelines amendment, then staff will send it back to the requester. The requester can appeal that decision, so there are checks and balances along the way.

Ms. Shelton said that CSBA has filed a petition for writ of mandate to challenge the underlying statutes. The Commission is complying with the underlying statutes to initially adopt emergency regulations and now to make those emergency regulations permanent.

Allan Burdick, CSAC and California League of Cities, pointed out that they have been working closely with CSBA on this issue. However, this discussion is becoming a little problematic in terms of understanding what this regulation is doing because the language is not clear. Mr. Burdick suggested delaying this decision.

Ms. Halsey stated that delaying a decision would create a lapse in the Commission regulations. If a redetermination request were filed during that lapse, staff would only have the statute to use without any procedures. Ms. Shelton stated that it would create problems with whatever procedures were used during that lapse because they could be viewed as underground regulations.

Chairperson Reyes reviewed the rulemaking process to include CSBA's comments and staff's response to those comments. He cited the options of postponing a decision which would create that lapse in Commission regulations or adopting the staff recommendation notwithstanding CSBA's concerns. He asked if the regulations could be amended in the future to address some of the current issues being raised. Ms. Shelton stated that any party may request that the Commission start a new regulatory package.

Next, Ms. Caplan expressed concern with the two hearing process and staff's citation of the *NRDC* case which had a very different, two-phase process from the Commission's proposed process. Ms. Caplan explained that in the *NRDC* case, there had to be an evidentiary standard met. The Commission's proposal requires only a substantial possibility, not even a probability that the underlying statute liability has changed. So really, there is no difference between the second and the first hearing. There is no burden of proof on the requesters in the first hearing except to show that they are likely to get to the second hearing.

Member Olsen offered to move the regulatory package as it currently stands but wanted acknowledgment on the record that she found this two-hearing issue to be compelling.

With a motion by Member Olsen to adopt the staff recommendation, and a second by Member Chivaro, the staff recommendation to approve the proposed amendments to the regulations was adopted by a vote of 7-0.

STAFF REPORTS

Item 17 Legislative Update

Assistant Executive Director Nancy Patton presented this item. Ms. Patton explained three bills that affect the mandate process. AB 202, by Assembly Member Brownley, is a spot bill sponsored by the Assembly Education Committee. It is not clear what is planned for that bill at this point.

SB 64, by Senator Liu, is sponsored by the California Association of School Business Officials, California School Boards Association, and School Innovations and Advocacy. This bill proposes to revise the process for how school districts file test claims. Commission staff met with the sponsors' staff and the author's office to discuss the mandates process and how this bill would work. They are contemplating amendments, so an analysis will not be done yet because it could change.

SB 112, also by Senator Liu, is sponsored by the State Controller's Office. The bill would provide the State Controller with 30 additional days to issue claiming instructions. It would also clarify that when the Commission adopts amendments to the boilerplate language in parameters and guidelines and those amendments do not result in any increase or decrease in costs; it would limit the period of reimbursement and make it prospective only.

Item 18 Chief Legal Counsel: Recent Decisions, Litigation Calendar

Chief Legal Counsel Camille Shelton presented this item. Ms. Shelton stated that there were new filings. As mentioned earlier, CSBA filed a lawsuit challenging the redetermination statutes in addition to the budget trailer bills that were enacted for this last budget. CSBA is also challenging all of Government Code section 17500 with respect to the school districts.

The next case is a cross-petition filed by the County of Los Angeles and the cities involved in the water permit that was discussed earlier. They are challenging the activities that were denied by the Commission.

One case has been dismissed. The County of Santa Clara's IRC on *Handicapped and Disabled Students* is scheduled for the May hearing. There is also a demurrer filed by the state.

Ms. Shelton then highlighted some cases of interest. There is a published opinion issued by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in *CSBA vs. State*. That case deals with the deferral of mandates for school districts. The court found that the deferral was not appropriate and unconstitutional. But the remedy is provided in statute in section 17612, to allow the local government to file a declaratory relief action in Sacramento County Superior Court to enjoin the enforcement of that statute. That remedy is appropriate. The claimants in that case were trying to get the court to direct an appropriation, and the court did not do that.

The *California School Boards Association vs. Arnold Schwarzenegger* case challenges the bluepencil appropriation for *Handicapped and Disabled Students*. The petition alleged that there was a separation of powers violation with the Governor actually suspending the program. The court disagreed with that petition and denied it saying that the Governor was not exercising suspension authority but was properly exercising the blue-pencil authority.

Item 19 Executive Director's Report

Executive Director Drew Bohan presented his report. Mr. Bohan noted the formatting changes that were made to test claim analyses and other documents. Staff expanded the executive summaries and added a claims chart as a reference tool. He welcomed feedback from the Commission members.

Mr. Bohan then highlighted the backlog reduction plan. He explained that, as indicated in the September 15, 2011 report to the Director of Finance, the Commission would prepare a backlog reduction plan for incorrect reduction claims. Staff is proposing to look at the whole package because every minute staff shifts from test claims to focus on IRCs is a minute lost on test claim work. The Commission has approximately 15 test claims from 2002 with about 400 statutes and 500 regulations that are cited in these test claims. These claims were from before the statute was amended to narrow the claim time frame.

Staff's plan contemplates completing all 2002 claims by the end of this calendar year at best; and at worst, this next fiscal year. Then staff can move on and complete the 2003, 2004 and 2005 claims in calendar year 2012; and 2006, 2007, and 2008 claims by calendar year 2013.

Mr. Bohan also pointed out that the oldest IRC was completed today by being withdrawn. Staff is working diligently on the next oldest one and would proceed with the standard approach of dealing with the oldest things first. However, after meeting with the claimant community, staff got a suggestion to not necessarily take everything in order. There are times when, because those 2002 claims are largely education-related claims, staff should work on some local government claims as well.

Mr. Bohan stated that, out of the 163 IRCs that are pending, about 102 of them focus on just two programs. Staff has been working closely with Mr. Spano at the Controller's Office and the other claimants to see if they can resolve some of the issues that would address most or all of those IRCs together.

PUBLIC COMMENT

Richard Hamilton, Director of CSBA Education Legal Alliance, commented on pending litigation.

CLOSED EXECUTIVE SESSION PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE SECTIONS 11126 AND 11126.2 (action).

A. PENDING LITIGATION

To confer with and receive advice from legal counsel, for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the following matters pursuant to Government Code section 11126, subdivision (e)(1):

- State of California, Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates, Sacramento, Superior Court Case No. 34-2010-80000529 [Graduation Requirements, Parameters and Guidelines Amendments, Nov. 2008]
- 2. State of California Department of Finance, State Water Resources Control Board, and California Regional Water Quality Board, San Diego Region v. Commission on State Mandates and County of San Diego, et. al., Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2010-80000604 [Discharge of Stormwater Runoff, Order No. R9-207-000, 07-TC-09 California Regional Water Control Board, San Diego Region Order No. R9-2007-001, NPDES No. CAS0108758, Parts D.1.d.(7)-(8), D.1.g., D.3.a.(3), D.3.a.(5), D.5, E.2.f, E.2.g,F.1, F.2, F.3, I.1, I.2, I.5, J.3.a.(3)(c) iv-vii & x-xv, and L]
- 3. Cross Petition Filed: County of San Diego, and Cities of Carlsbad, Chula Vista, Coronado, Del Mar, El Cajon, Encinitas, Escondido, Imperial Beach, La Mesa, Lemon Grove, National City, Oceanside, Poway, San Diego, San Marcos, Santee, Solano Beach, and Vista v. Commission on State Mandates, State of California Department of Finance, State Water Resources Control

Board, and California Regional Water Control Board San Diego Region, Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2010-80000604 [[Discharge of Stormwater Runoff, Order No. R9-207-000, 07-TC-09 California Regional Water Control Board, San Diego Region Order No. R9-2007-001, NPDES No. CAS0108758, Parts D.1.d.(7)-(8), D.1.g., D.3.a.(3), D.3.a.(5), D.5, E.2.f, E.2.g,F.1, F.2, F.3, I.1, I.2, I.5, J.3.a.(3)(c) iv-vii & x-xv, and L]

- 4. State of California Department of Finance, State Water Resources Control Board, and California Regional Water Quality Board, Los Angeles Region v. Commission on State Mandates and County of Los Angeles, et. al., Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. BS130730 [Municipal Storm Water and Urban Runoff Discharges, 03-TC-04, 03-TC-19, 03-TC-20, and 03-TC-21, Los Angeles Regional Quality Control Board Order No. 01-182, Permit CAS004001, Parts 4C2a., 4C2b, 4E & 4Fc3]
- 5. California School Board Association (CSBA) v. State of California et. al., Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG11554698 [2010-2011 Budget Trailer Bills, Redetermination Process]
- 6. Cross Petition: County of Los Angeles and Cities of Bellflower, Carson, Commerce, Covina, Downey and Signal Hill v. Commission on State Mandates, State of California Department of Finance, State Water Resources Control Board, and California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Los Angeles Region, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BS130730 [Municipal Storm Water and Urban Runoff Discharges, 03-TC-04, 03-TC-19, 03-TC-20, and 03-TC-21, Los Angeles Regional Quality Control Board Order No. 01-182, Permit CAS004001, Parts 4C2a., 4C2b, 4E & 4Fc3]

To confer with and receive advice from legal counsel, for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the following matter pursuant to Government Code section 11126, subdivision (e)(2):

Based on existing facts and circumstances, there is a specific matter which presents a significant exposure to litigation against the Commission on State Mandates, its members and/or staff (Gov. Code, § 11126, subd. (e)(2)(B)(i).)

B. PERSONNEL

To confer on personnel matters pursuant to Government Code sections 11126, subdivision (a)(1).

• Personnel Subcommittee Report

Hearing no further comments, Chairperson Reyes adjourned into closed executive session pursuant to Government Code section 11126, subdivision (e), to confer with and receive advice from legal counsel for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the pending litigation published in the notice and agenda; to confer and receive advice from legal counsel regarding potential litigation.

REPORT FROM CLOSED EXECUTIVE SESSION

At 11:55 a.m., Chairperson Reyes reconvened in open session, and reported that the Commission met in closed executive session pursuant to Government Code section 11126, subdivision (e), to confer with and receive advice from legal counsel for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the pending litigation listed on the public notice and agenda, and potential litigation.

ADJOURNMENT

Hearing no further business, Chairperson Reyes adjourned the meeting at 11:56 am.

Drew Bohan

Executive Director

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COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

CERTIFIED COPY

PUBLIC HEARING

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

& · · · · ·

TIME: 9:30 a.m.

DATE: Thursday, March 24, 2011

PLACE: State Capitol, Room 447

Sacramento, California

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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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Reported by:

Daniel P. Feldhaus California Certified Shorthand Reporter #6949 Registered Diplomate Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter

Daniel P. Feldhaus, C.S.R., Inc.

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COMMISSIONERS PRESENT

PEDRO REYES
(Commission Chair)
Representative for ANA MATOSANTOS
Director, State Department of Finance

RICHARD CHIVARO
Representative for JOHN CHIANG
State Controller

KEN ALEX
Director
Office of Planning & Research

PAUL GLAAB
City Council Member
City of Laguna Niguel

FRANCISCO LUJANO
Representative for BILL LOCKYER
State Treasurer

SARAH OLSEN Public Member

J. STEVEN WORTHLEY
Supervisor and Chairman of the Board
County of Tulare

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COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT

DREW BOHAN
Executive Director
(Item 19)

ERIC FELLER
Senior Staff Counsel
(Items 8 and 9)

NANCY PATTON
Assistant Executive Director
(Item 17)

COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT

continued

HEATHER HALSEY Senior Staff Counsel (Items 6, 7, and 14)

> KENNY LOUIE Staff Counsel (Item 4 and 5)

HEIDI PALCHIK
Program Analyst
(Item 14)

CAMILLE SHELTON
Chief Legal Counsel
(Item 18)

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PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Items 4 & 5 (Discrimination Complaint Procedures)

For Claimants:

KEITH B. PETERSEN President SixTen and Associates 5252 Balboa Avenue, Suite 900 San Diego, California 92117

For Department of Finance:

SUSAN GEANACOU Senior Staff Attorney Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, California 95814

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Items 6 & 7 (School Facilities Funding Requirements):

For Claimant Clovis Unified School District:

ART PALKOWITZ Stutz, Artiano, Shinoff & Holtz 2488 Historic Decatur Road, Suite 200 San Diego, California 92106

For Department of Finance

DONNA FEREBEE
Staff Counsel III
Department of Finance
915 L Street
Sacramento, California 95814

Appearing Re Item 8 (Municipal Storm Water and Urban Runoff):

For County of Los Angeles:

LEONARD KAYE
County of Los Angeles
Department of Auditor-Controller
500 West Temple Street, Suite 603
Los Angeles, California 90012

JON WALKER
Los Angeles County

WENDY BUI Transit Manager County of Los Angeles Department of Public Works 900 S. Fremont Avenue Alhambra, California 91803

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 8 (Municipal Storm Water and Urban Runoff): continued

For City Claimants:

DAVID W. BURHENN Burhenn & Gest LLP 624 South Grande Ave., Suite 2200 Los Angeles, California 90017

For Department of Finance:

CARLA SHELTON
Department of Finance
915 L Street
Sacramento, California 95814

SUSAN GEANACOU Senior Staff Attorney Department of Finance

For State Controller's Office:

JAY LAL
Manager
Division of Accounting and Reporting
State Controller's Office
300 Capitol Mall, Suite 518
Sacramento, California 95814

JIM SPANO
Chief, Mandated Cost Audits Bureau
Division of Audits
State Controller's Office
300 Capitol Mall, Suite 518
Sacramento, California 95814

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 8 (Municipal Storm Water and Urban Runoff): continued

For California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities:

ALLAN BURDICK California State Association of Counties SB-90 Service 4320 Auburn Boulevard, Suite 2000 Sacramento, California 95841

Appearing Re Item 14 (Final Regulations to Implement Mandate Redetermination Process):

For School Boards Association:

DEBORAH B. CAPLAN
Olson Hagel & Fishburn
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1425
Sacramento, California 95814

Appearing Re Public Comment:

RICHARD HAMILTON
Director
CSBA Education Legal Alliance
3100 Beacon Boulevard
West Sacramento, California 95691

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Commission on State Mandates - March 24, 2011

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Commission on State Mandates - March 24, 2011

_	Commission on State Mandates – March 24, 2011
1	BE IT REMEMBERED that on Thursday, March 24,
2	2011, commencing at the hour of 9:35 a.m., thereof, at
3	the State Capitol, Room 447, Sacramento, California,
4	before me, DANIEL P. FELDHAUS, CSR #6949, RDR and CRR,
5	the following proceedings were held:
6	്രം••••জ
7	(The following proceeding commenced with
8	Mr. Lujano absent from the meeting room.)
9	CHAIR REYES: Okay, the meeting of the
10	Commission on State Mandates will come to order.
11	Drew, would you please call the roll?
12	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Alex?
13	MEMBER ALEX: Here.
14	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Chivaro?
15	MEMBER CHIVARO: Here.
16	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Glaab?
17	MEMBER GLAAB: Here.
18	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Lujano?
19	(No response)
20	MR. BOHAN: Ms. Olsen?
21	MEMBER OLSEN: Here.
22	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Worthley?
23	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Here.
24	MR. BOHAN: And Chair Reyes?
25	CHAIR REYES: Present.

1	Thank you
1	Thank you.
2	MR. BOHAN: The Chair of the Commission,
3	Mr. Reyes, will conduct the annual election of officers.
4	CHAIR REYES: Are there nominations for the
5	chairperson?
6	MEMBER ALEX: Yes, I would like to nominate
7	Pedro Reyes for Chair.
8	MEMBER CHIVARO: Second.
9	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
10	Are there other nominations?
11	MEMBER OLSEN: I think we need a clarification.
12	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Chair, we just need to clarify
13	that technically, the Director of Finance is the chair.
14	And you would serve in her capacity.
15	CHAIR REYES: Okay. So the nomination is for
16	the Director of Finance.
17	MEMBER ALEX: Okay, let me clarify the
18	nomination and make it for the Director of Finance.
19	MEMBER CHIVARO: I'll second the motion.
20	CHAIR REYES: Okay, without objection,
21	nominations are closed.
22	All those in favor of electing the Director of
23	Finance as chairperson, say "aye."
24	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
25	CHAIR REYES: Opposed?

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r	Commission on State Mandates – March 24, 2011
1	(No response)
2	CHAIR REYES: The ayes have it.
3	Thank you.
4	The Director of Finance, in this case myself,
5	as the delegate for now.
6	So thank you.
7	Are there nominations for vice-chairperson?
8	Is there a motion?
9	I nominate the State Controller's as vice-
10	chairperson.
11	MEMBER GLAAB: Second.
12	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
13	There's been a nomination and a second.
14	Are there other nominations?
15	(No response)
16	CHAIR REYES: All in favor of nominating the
17	vice-chair as the Controller, please say "aye."
18	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
19	CHAIR REYES: Oppose?
20	(No response)
21	CHAIR REYES: Great.
22	Congratulations.
23	MEMBER CHIVARO: Thank you.
24	CHAIR REYES: Okay, Drew?
25	MR. BOHAN: Okay, Mr. Chairman. Item 2 is

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	Commission on State Manuates – March 24, 2011
1	the minutes from the December 2^{nd} , 2010, meeting. And
2	they're before you.
3	And you'll notice there's a blue sheet. We put
4	out a couple colored sheets. The blue one is a very
. 5	minor correction to the minutes under Item 7.
6	CHAIR REYES: Are there any objections or
7	additional corrections to the minutes?
8	MEMBER CHIVARO: I'll move approval.
9	MEMBER GLAAB: Second.
10	CHAIR REYES: As amended?
11	MEMBER CHIVARO: As amended.
12	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
13	It's been moved and seconded.
14	All those in favor, say "aye."
15	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
16	CHAIR REYES: Opposed?
17	(No response)
18	CHAIR REYES: The "ayes" have it.
19	Thank you.
20	Drew?
21	MR. BOHAN: The next item is the Consent
22	Calendar.
23	(Mr. Lujano entered the meeting room.)
24	MR. BOHAN: And the consent items today are
25	Items 11, 12, 13, and 15.

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MEMBER WORTHLEY: Move approval of the consent
items.
MEMBER OLSEN: Second.
CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
All in favor, say "aye."
(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
CHAIR REYES: Opposed?
(No response)
CHAIR REYES: Thank you. The "ayes" have it.
MR. BOHAN: Item 3, Chairman, is the appeals of
the Executive Director decisions.
There aren't any for this hearing, so there
isn't anything for that item.
CHAIR REYES: Next item.
MR. BOHAN: The next matter is to swear in the
witnesses. So I'll address the folks in the audience and
anyone who would be speaking today.
Will the parties and witnesses for Items 4, 5,
6, 7, and 8, please rise?
(Several persons stood up.)
MR. BOHAN: Thank you.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the
testimony which you are about to give is true and
correct, based on your personal knowledge, information,
or belief?

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1	(A chorus of "I do's" was heard.)
2	MR. BOHAN: Thank you very much.
3	Mr. Chairman, Item 4 is going to be presented
4	by Commission Counsel Kenny Louie across the dais from
5	me, and it's entitled the Discrimination Complaint
6	Procedures test claim.
7	Kenny?
8	CHAIR REYES: I see the Department of Finance
9	moving forward.
10	We're on Item 4.
11	Proceed.
12	MR. LOUIE: Discrimination Complaint Procedures
13	addresses state anti-discrimination laws as they apply to
14	community-college districts in the areas of employment,
15	provision of programs and activities to students, and
16	procedures that are used to deal with allegations of
17	discrimination.
18	The areas in dispute primary areas in
19	dispute are whether or not the minimum conditions
20	which set forth the regulations setting forth the
21	minimum conditions entitle satisfaction which entitles
22	districts to state aid for state-mandated activities.
23	Staff has found that they do not.
24	The other issue is whether or not the statutes
25	and regulations in the areas of employment, student

1	equity, and discrimination-complaint procedures impose
2	federal mandated activities.
3	Staff has found that some of the regulations of
4	statutes do; however, some of them don't. And the ones
5	that do, the activities can be found on pages 246 to 260.
6	Will the parties and witnesses state their
7	names for the record, please?
8	MR. PETERSEN: Keith Petersen, representing the
9	test claimants.
10	MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, for the
11	Department of Finance.
12	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
13	Mr. Petersen?
14	MR. PETERSEN: Good morning.
15	This test claim, as filed, was separate in the
16	sense that it's a combination of the Discrimination
17	Complaint test claim, but it also pulls two items from
18	another claim called, "Minimum Conditions for State Aid."
19	The Minimum Conditions for State Aid test claim is
20	scheduled for hearing right now in May.
21	Some of the legal issues in this test claim
22	will have an effect on some of the legal issues in that
23	test claim. So those are bound together, which is why
24	I want to focus on a couple of the issues.
25	In my March 1 st response, I raised five

objections; and those are listed conveniently on the 1 bottom of page two. I'll try to avoid reading too much 2 of this back to you, but to focus on those, I'll have to 3 reference them. 4 The first issue is, test claimants would like 5 to abandon a portion of the reimbursable period, 6 two-month period as a result of the Connerly case. 7 Number two, there is a disagreement with the 8 standard of review the staff uses; and that standard is 9 whether you compare things to 1975 or whether you compare 10 the new law to the law immediately preceding. 11 The third is a disagreement with portions of 12 the federal mandate analysis. 13 Fourth, a disagreement with all of the 14 minimum-conditions analysis. And as I prefaced, that 15 is relevant to the next test claim that you'll hear next 16 time, if you're here. 17 And five, a disagreement with some of the 18 findings regarding the programs. 19 Lucky for you, I only want to respond to one, 20 four, and five today, okay. And what I'll do is take 21 some procedural things first. 22 If you look at page 33, at the very bottom, 23 this is the issue of the abandonment of a portion of the 24

test claim. It's a procedural issue. And I think with

25

some more information, it might be cleared up today.

At the bottom, it says, "The Commission must take jurisdiction over the pled test claim." I agree.

The next sentence says, "There is no process under the governing statutes of the Commission's regulation that provides for abandonment of a portion of a claim."

And I think that's where I'm confused because I have a copy of the regulation that says, in the first sentence, "A test claim or any portion of the test claim may be withdrawn by the claimants upon written application." So I think the confusion is probably in the next sentence.

"Thus, unless the claimants wish to withdraw portions of their test claim in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Commission must make a finding on the statutes and regulations pled."

The reason we want to abandon this two-month period is, the *Connerly* case is an issue that changed the Equal Employment Opportunity program from the affirmative action program. And based on the date the test claim was filed, the change occurs two months after the start. And since this is covering seven or eight years, I believe it would be less confusing for the claimants, much easier to write parameters and guidelines if the claimants just

1	give up that two-month period of the old law and we just
2	start with the new law.
3	So I guess my question is and it probably
4	has to be directed to counsel is, how was I defective
5	in requesting an abandonment of that portion?
6	CHAIR REYES: Ms. Shelton?
7	CAMILLE SHELTON: We did not consider your
8	letter as a request to withdraw because it was entitled
9	"Comments on the Draft Staff Analysis."
10	If you are wanting to withdraw those sections,
11	then under the Commission's regulations, we have to issue
12	your withdrawal to the entire class of claimants and
13	allow them 60 days in case somebody else wants to take it
14	over.
15	If that is the claimants' intent, the
16	Commission can still go forward if you sever those
17	portions of what he is trying to withdraw from today's
18	hearing.
19	I'm not sure if that's easily done. If you can
20	easily do that here, to sever those portions out.
21	MR. PETERSEN: I'm sorry, I thought I did that
22	in my March 1 letter. I have a sentence that says, "This
23	letter is notice that the test claimant has abandoned the
24	pre-Connerly reimbursement period."
25	CAMILLE CHELTON. Obox it would have to be

1	severed with respect to the statutes and chapters and
2	Ed. Code sections.
3	MR. PETERSEN: How about the Equal Employment
4	Opportunity program as it existed never mind.
5	CHAIR REYES: Yes, let's not go on a fishing
6	expedition. Let's figure out what we want to do with
7	that.
8	CAMILLE SHELTON: It did become difficult in
9	our office. We did kind of take a look at it, and it got
10	to be: Well, what is he actually trying to sever?
11	I mean, time-wise, it's easy pre-Connerly. But
12	he has pled some of those statutes and chapters, and they
13	continue.
14	So if you are
15	MR. PETERSEN: Right. It had to
16	CAMILLE SHELTON: It's very difficult to
17	separate those out.
18	I would need a very clear statement of what is
19	being withdrawn, and then we'd have to issue for comment
20	for 60 days to allow another claimant to take it back and
21	bring it back in if they want.
22	And then it could be dismissed if nobody steps
23	in the shoes of the claimant on those portions that are
24	withdrawn.
25	But for today, if that's the intent, the

1	Commission can still hear the claim, and then the
2	claimant can request that those portions be severed.
3	And I would recommend that if the Commission
4	if this proceeds this way, to bring back the Statement of
.5	Decision for next month so that we can clean it up in the
6	Statement of Decision. You can still come to a decision
7	today, but we would need to clean up the Statement of
8	Decision.
9	CHAIR REYES: Mr. Petersen?
10	MR. PETERSEN: Mr. Chair, my concern was this:
11	We have to do it before decision is adopted. I can't
12	abandon it after you've adopt the decision, so
13	CHAIR REYES: Right. And that's the thing that
14	counsel is alluding to.
15	CAMILLE SHELTON: Correct. And if you're
16	saying that your statement is a written you know,
17	consider your written request to withdraw, then we can
18	take it as a written request to withdraw. That would be
19	all right.
20	MR. PETERSEN: And then subject to the
21	technical cleanup?
22	CAMILLE SHELTON: Right. I would recommend
23	I mean, it would require a motion. I would recommend
24	that the Commission sever those portions that you are
25	withdrawing, hear the portions that remain. And then

1	we'd need to I would recommend that you you could
2	take a vote today, if you choose to do that. But we
3	would need to bring back the Statement of Decision on
4	Item 5 for next month so that we can clean it up and you
5	can review that again and then you can adopt.
6	CHAIR REYES: Before we take a motion, I want
7	to make sure Mr. Petersen is on board with that.
8	Does that satisfy your issue?
9	MR. PETERSEN: Yes. I just need some
10	acknowledgment that the requests that I have, provided
11	adequate notice of abandonment before your decision is
12	made. And then the next step, of course, is procedural.
13	CHAIR REYES: And you're providing notice, now?
14	Is that what I'm hearing?
15	MR. PETERSEN: I thought I had on March $1^{\rm st}$,
16	but
17	CHAIR REYES: I don't think you were in a place
18	to do so, given what I just heard.
19	CAMILLE SHELTON: Right. I'm not saying it was
20	defective. We've read your written letter as comments to
21	the draft staff analysis without specifically identifying
22	which sections you are withdrawing.
23	So I still need from you what are you
24	withdrawing.
25	If it's clear to our counsel here and he

understands it, then it's good to go.

MR. PETERSEN: Okay. If you're asking me to enumerate the Title 5 sections, right now I can't do that. In that sense, that's defective, I guess.

What we intend to abandon is eligibility for reimbursement for the two-month period, which is slightly different than abandoning the statutes and the sections because you need the statutes and the sections, as the staff did, to analyze the historical law.

So I think this is kind of an issue of first impression in the sense that I have before abandoned activities and code sections in other test claims, but I've never abandoned an eligibility period.

I guess the other alternative is not to do it and then just have everybody ignore the parameters and guidelines.

But I think, as you saw, there's 35 pages of activities. And to the extent I can slice out something that's happened two months ago -- seven years ago in a two-month period, I think it will benefit everybody involved.

So if it's possible for me to do that with another writing, I would like to do that.

CAMILLE SHELTON: Okay, the difficulty is this:
The regs only allow an abandonment of statutes that have

1	been pled. And I understand that the claimant doesn't
2	want to withdraw any of those statutes because they're
3	relevant after the period of reimbursement that you're
4	talking about. So we have discussed that in our office
5	and decided to go forward with the claim as it stands.
6	If the claimant chooses to abandon that period
7	of reimbursement and any other claimant also chooses to
8	abandon the period of reimbursement and the Commission
9	adopts the staff recommendation to partially approve this
10	test claim, then those eligible claimants simply don't
11	have to seek reimbursement on a reimbursement claim with
12	the Controller's office.
13	MR. PETERSEN: That's probably best. And if we
14	can get separate P's & G's for that period, we can all
15	just ignore it.
16	CAMILLE SHELTON: And that is easily done.
17	MR. PETERSEN: It will cost us a tree, but
18	there's a lot of trees falling on this one, anyway.
19	CHAIR REYES: Okay.
20	MR. PETERSEN: Okay, so I guess to make this
21	work, I am not formally abandoning the pre-Connerly
22	reimbursement period.
23	And thank you for your patience. I didn't
24	quite understand what was happening here.
25	Okay, looking back at page 2 again, I'm

1	responding to Item 5 on one particular activity
2	CHAIR REYES: Before you move there, do we need
3	to take a motion on that particular, or do we take
4	that
5	CAMILLE SHELTON: No, everything's fine, and
6	there's no request to sever, no request to abandon.
7	CHAIR REYES: Okay, thank you.
8	MR. PETERSEN: Okay, so going back to page 2,
9	quickly, just to remind you, I'm looking at Item 5 now,
10	disagreement with some of the findings, some of the
11	statutes or regulations are reimbursable activities.
12	There's a lot of that in there. But based on my
13	experience with the Commission process for 20 years, I
14	think those activities are analyzed consistent with the
15	Commission procedure.
16	I do have one issue I'd like to take today, and
17	that's on page 208.
18	I will also be referencing my March 1 letter.
19	I hope you have that in front of you. Page 14 of my
20	March 1 letter.
21	MR. BOHAN: Just to clarify, you don't have in
22	front of you the paper version of his comments. You
23	have them on a flash drive, so he's referring to a
24	document you don't have.
25	MR. PETERSEN: You're kidding?

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1	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Well, we were given it.
2	Mr. Chairman, we were given it, but it's on our flash
3	drive, but it's not on a hard copy.
4	Okay, going forward, that's an important kind
5	of concept, if somebody wants to reference something like
6	that, it might be well to bring copies for members of the
7	Commission so that we have it to look at. Because, I
8	mean, this is the way it's gone forward is really
9	preferable to the way we do things as far as
10	MEMBER OLSEN: As far as the tree issue.
11	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Yes, so they don't send boxes
12	of stuff to us, they send us an envelope, so
13	MR. PETERSEN: But we're not all reading flash
14	drives right now, are we
15	MEMBER WORTHLEY: No.
16	MR. PETERSEN: so I will have to read some
17	sentences to you.
18	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Yes, you will.
19	MR. PETERSEN: And I'll try to do that.
20	All right, the issue is, on the Discrimination
21	Complaints Program, looking at page 208, which is before
22	you, there is essentially a two-step complaint process.
23	One is an informal complaint process handled
24	mostly by the college district. Again, this is someone
25	complaining that they were improperly discriminated

against.

And then there's a formal chancellor's office, State Chancellor's office, appeal process, at the formal level. That's described in the large paragraph in the middle of the page that says, "If a complainant appeals the decision to the Chancellor, the process on the Chancellor's Office involves the Chancellor reviewing the district's decision, the materials that the decision was based upon, the complainant's appeal in order to determine if there's a reasonable cause... If reasonable cause is found, the Chancellor must investigate to determine if there's a probable cause. During the course of the investigation, attempts at informal resolution must be made."

This goes on and describes the process, the Chancellor contacting the district for acquiescence.

The situation here is -- and that's stated at the very bottom of the page -- "The claimants disagree with the finding that the appeal process on the Chancellor's office level does not impose any activities..."

On the next page, the staff analysis says, however, there is no language in those sections that requires community-college districts to engage in any activity -- and that's what's pertinent.

From their standpoint, I agree there are no words that say that when an appeal is filed, the district is a party to the appeal, it must respond to the appeal. Nor does it say when the chancellor calls the college, it's supposed to respond, or when the chancellor sends a brief to a college, it is supposed to respond.

It would seem essential that the appeal process, which is in a complaint against the district, involve the district. The regulations indicate that the chancellor's office is involving the district. And an appeal should involve all the essential parties in a complaint that is against the community-college district.

This reminds me a great deal of something that happened about two years ago on something called, "Pupil Discipline Records."

The plain law said, the district who gets the transfer student must contact the district who sent the transfer student and say, "Send me all your discipline records on this student. It's a public-safety issue."

The law did not say that the district who sent the student has to send the records; but the purpose of the mandate would not have been implemented unless the sending district sent the receiving district those records.

And I think the same situation is occurring

here; that is, there is a formal appeal process. The community-college district is the party against which the complaint is filed by an individual. The community-college district is not the one who starts the appeal, it's the person who is appealing, an employee or someone who went through the employment process. So it's not up to the community college to start the appeal. They have to be a party to it and participate.

The Commission regulations -- again, this is a procedural thing, and it's one of those catch-22's. I'm not sure if I don't mention it now, I can mention it as part of the parameters and guidelines process.

The parameters and guidelines regulations state that a description of specific costs and types of costs that are reimbursable, including one-time costs and ongoing costs, and a description of the most reasonable methods of complying with the mandate. And the quote is, "The most reasonable methods of complying with the mandate are those methods not specified in the statute or executive order, but that are necessary to carry out the mandate program."

And I'm asserting, if not as a matter of exact words and statute but as a matter of the most reasonable and necessary method, a community college needs to respond to those appeals and, therefore, it should be a

1	reimbursable activity.
2	And I don't know whether you want to vote on
3	that before we move on to the next issue or
4	CHAIR REYES: Does Finance have any comments on
5	this?
6	MS. GEANACOU: We don't have any specific
7	comments. We agree with the Commission's final staff
8	analysis on this issue, although I do recall the Pupil
9	Discipline Records issue.
10	CHAIR REYES: Commissioner Olsen?
11	MR. PETERSEN: Fondly or
12	MS. GEANACOU: I remember it.
13	MEMBER OLSEN: I just want a clarification.
14	I think on Pupil Discipline, what we did is, we said that
15	it could be dealt with in the P's & G's.
16	Is that correct?
17	MR. PETERSEN: That's my recollection.
18	CAMILLE SHELTON: I have not reviewed Pupil
19	Discipline in preparation for this hearing. I haven't
20	heard that argument made. As I recall, I don't know if
21	Mr. Louie has, and he can definitely respond.
22	Let me just say that the issue before the
23	Commission is whether or not there's a mandate as a
24	matter of law. So you have to find that this are we
25	in a reg or a statute? If this regulation does mandate

1	an activity on school districts. First, you have to find
2	that.
3	If you find that mandated activity, then, at
4	the parameters and guidelines phase, you can include
5	other additional activities that are reasonably necessary
6	to comply with that mandated activity.
7	And I think the recommendation here, by the
8	plain language of this regulation, there is no mandated
9	activity imposed on the district.
10	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Chairman?
11	CHAIR REYES: Yes?
12	MEMBER WORTHLEY: I have a question for
13	counsel.
14	Would it be possible to apply the provision of
15	practical compulsion in this situation?
16	CAMILLE SHELTON: Yes, you have to have
17	evidence in the record of that. And I don't think it
18	is Mr. Petersen, I'm not sure if you're making a
19	practical compulsion argument.
20	I think he's making a legal compulsion
21	argument.
22	MR. PETERSEN: Yes. I don't know whether
23	parties are legally compelled to participate in formal
24	administrative adjudications.
25	CAMILLE SHELTON: And you can correct me if I'm

-	
1	wrong, because I really have not looked at Pupil
2	Discipline in several years, but if I remember a little
3	bit, I do think there was some procedure laid out there,
4	correct?
5	And there were
6	MR. PETERSEN: In what sense?
7	CAMILLE SHELTON: Pardon me?
8	MR. PETERSEN: In what people had to do
9	things.
10	CAMILLE SHELTON: Right.
11	MR. PETERSEN: Yes.
12	CAMILLE SHELTON: And I think that you could
13	have found a mandate in that language where I believe,
14	here well, Mr. Louie can discuss the recommendation.
15	MR. LOUIE: I can only say "ditto" to what
16	counsel said.
17	I mean, essentially the plain language of the
18	law does not require these activities. Argument hasn't
19	been set forth that they are practically compelled.
20	There's no analysis within the analysis that they're
21	practically compelled. So we haven't we don't have
22	any evidence to suggest that they are practically
23	compelled to engage in these activities that are being
24	suggested, so
25	MR. PETERSEN: I agree with that, to some

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1	extent, if I may. Except the P's & G's regulation I
2	wrote you, specifically says it does not have to be
3	stated in the statutes or the regs.
4	MR. LOUIE: But that is a P's & G's issue,
5	though.
6	Here, we're making a mandates finding. So on
7	this level of the analysis, we're making a mandates
8	finding.
9	Plain language does not mandate these
10	activities.
11	MEMBER WORTHLEY: May I ask a question?
12	Is it possible that this might be addressed
13	again as another issue in the P's & G's?
14	CAMILLE SHELTON: The recommendation is for the
15	Commission to deny this regulation. So, no, it would not
16	come back.
17	CHAIR REYES: There's no mention in the
18	P's & G's.
19	CAMILLE SHELTON: You would need to make a
20	decision now.
21	And just to say that whatever decision you're
22	making today is a question of law when you know, and
23	it's based on the interpretation of the regulation and
24	the plain language and whatever history you have, and the
25	analysis that you have.

When you go to P's & G's, it's where you can exercise your discretion. You cannot exercise discretion at this level.

MEMBER WORTHLEY: My only comment is that this matter has come before us before, and probably come up again in the future. And it would be good to come up with some sort of way of dealing with it. Because I agree with counsel, the failure to say, "Thou shalt" is almost an omission by default. But I think everybody intends that, of course, people will respond. If you're being sued, you know, you don't have to -- you can have a default judgment taken against you. But practically, you'd better get in there and wage war or you're going to have defaults taken against you.

And this is a similar situation. If I'm being contacted by the Chancellor's office and said, "I'm going to make these findings," and I don't respond to it, then I'm stuck with the findings. I may not like the results. So that's a very practical thing. It's just -- you know, and the Legislature is not necessarily inclined to want to fix this because it means they don't have to pay for something. So I think we're almost rewarding bad behavior.

So I would like to look at this -- I mean, I realize it's kind of late, but I just see this as a

1	practical compulsion issue. I mean, that's how it feels
2	to me, but I'm one commissioner.
3	CHAIR REYES: Mr. Chivaro?
4	MEMBER CHIVARO: Are we ready for a motion?
5	CHAIR REYES: Yes.
6	Well, are there any other questions from
7	members?
8	(No response)
9	CHAIR REYES: Is there any other further
10	discussion?
11	Mr. Petersen, you're raising your hand.
12	MR. PETERSEN: Yes, again, I just want to my
13	understanding is that this is a procedural issue that you
14	can adopt the staff position on this. But that does not
15	foreclose it becoming an issue at the parameters and
16	guidelines stage.
17	Is that correct?
18	CHAIR REYES: That's not correct.
19	MEMBER OLSEN: That's not what I heard.
20	CAMILLE SHELTON: If the Commission adopts the
21	regulation, then the statute wouldn't even be discussed
22	during parameters and guidelines.
23	MR. PETERSEN: Except that the Commission
24	regulations allow activities that are not stated in
25	statute.

1	CAMILLE SHELTON: But that's after they find a
2	legal mandate. And that issue would be resolved today;
3	or if it was resolved when they issued the decision.
4	MR. PETERSEN: Perhaps I didn't state that very
5	well.
6	So it's my understanding that you can go ahead
7	and adopt the staff recommendation, but that doesn't
8	preclude me from discussing that this is a reasonable and
9	necessary activity for the parameters and guidelines?
10	CAMILLE SHELTON: If you can tag it to a
11	state-mandated activity, certainly they would need to
12	entertain those arguments.
13	MR. PETERSEN: And you're saying there's no
14	state-mandated activity for a formal appeal?
15	I see.
16	CHAIR REYES: Okay.
17	MR. PETERSEN: The thing you're saying I should
18	tag it to, you're saying, doesn't exist.
19	CHAIR REYES: At this time, on this mandate, it
20	does not.
21	MEMBER CHIVARO: I'm going to move the staff
22	recommendation.
23	CHAIR REYES: Okay, I have a motion.
24	Is there a second?
25	MEMBER LUJANO: I will second.

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1	CHAIR REYES: We have a second.
2	Thank you.
3	There's been a motion and there's a second.
4	Are you ready to take the question?
5	Drew, please call the roll.
6	Yes?
7	MR. LOUIE: I don't believe Keith has addressed
8	every issue that he has on this test claim.
9	MR. PETERSEN: No, there's one more.
10	CHAIR REYES: One more?
11	MR. PETERSEN: It's kind of big.
12	CHAIR REYES: Okay, let's see go ahead and
13	MR. PETERSEN: I was hoping to address the
14	issues one at a time, rather than okay.
15	MS. GEANACOU: Is this the motion on the entire
16	analysis or on the issue regarding the one he just
17	testified on?
18	The entire?
19	MEMBER CHIVARO: Affirmative. We can hold
20	that.
21	CHAIR REYES: We can hold that until go
22	ahead you finish your last, and then Finance, you want
23	to address that issue, too, I suspect.
24	MS. GEANACOU: The one he just addressed?
25	CHAIR REYES: Yes.

1	MS. GEANACOU: We do not have any specific
2	comments.
3	CHAIR REYES: You're done with that?
4	MS. GEANACOU: Yes, sir.
5	CHAIR REYES: And, Mr. Petersen?
6	MR. PETERSEN: Looking at page 2 again, that
7	leaves me with number four, which is the threshold issue,
8	of whether compliances with the minimum with the
9	20 programs that are called the "minimum conditions" are
10	required for state funding.
11	Thankfully, the code citation is rather short.
12	It's on the bottom of page 24.
13	Okay, I'll walk you through this.
14	The provisions of the subchapter sections 51000
15	through 51207, and the 51000 through the 51207 are the
16	20 different programs, of which two of them are part of
17	this test claim, are adopted under the authority of
18	Education Code 70901, and comprise the rules and
19	regulations fixing and affirming the minimum conditions,
20	satisfaction of which entitles a district maintaining
21	community colleges to receive state aid for the support
22	of its community colleges.
23	This is a threshold issue in this test claim
24	and it's a threshold issue in the next test claim.
25	Our position is that that language, since it's

a regulation, has the same force as a statute, by itself, is legally compelling, and that the staff's subsequent analysis of the *Kern* case and the *POBR* case to discuss practical compulsion is not required.

If you look on the page -- the top of page 25, you'll see after the quote, that, "The Chancellor's Office and the claimants both describe the language as providing that most of the regulations pled by the claimants establish minimum conditions for the receipt of state aid." It appears the chancellor's office intended that it be coercive and compulsory. That section alone, the staff spends several paragraphs describing what the language does not exclude -- well, the language doesn't exclude a lot of things. You don't have to add things it doesn't exclude. That takes them to the Kern analysis.

The Kern case, you'll probably remember, dealt with school districts who establish school site councils, informal small groups that meet on particular issues.

Some of them are funded by federal agencies. Some are funded by state categorical money.

After several years of being in operation, a law came out requiring that those groups write and post agendas, kind of a semi Open Meetings Act requirement. The test claim was filed to get reimbursement for the agendas.

The subsequent litigation said that since the 1 district voluntarily decided to operate those committees, 2 any subsequent mandate downstream was not reimbursable. 3 That's the essence of the Kern analysis. For Kern to 4 work, you'd have to have a precursor program and a 5 downstream program. 6 The 20 programs putatively are downstream, but 7 they're not downstream of any other program. 8 Section 51000 is not a program. Section 51000 9 is a coercive requirement compelling implementation of 10 the 20 programs at the risk of losing state aid. 11 Therefore, the facts of Kern don't fit. 12 And the reality of the code section -- of the 13 Title 5 code section don't fit. Title 5, 51000, is not a 14 precursor program voluntarily established by the college 15 districts. 16 That takes us to POBR. POBR -- you don't get 17 to POBR unless you buy into Kern. 18 POBR requires proof of coercion, proof of 19 severe penalty. 20 The POBR case, you might remember -- some of 21 you might remember, had to do with school districts and 22 colleges requesting reimbursement for training and other 23

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costs for peace officers. The Court decided that peace

officers -- employing peace officers at school districts

24

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and colleges but not cities was a discretionary act, and there was no coercion to do so.

The fact that most college districts and schools do not have peace officers as opposed to guards probably had some influence there -- factual influence.

That's not the case here. Every college is being coerced to comply with those programs.

So you can't get to the *POBR*, even, until you go through *Kern*.

I provided for the record in my response to

March 1st the only copy of the minimum conditions penalty
review by the Chancellor's Office and the Board of

Governors that I could find. And the regulations require
the Chancellor's Office every seven years to review the
community-college districts to see if they're complying
with this coercion; or if they are notified otherwise,
the Board of Governors have jurisdiction over alleged
noncompliance.

And the example I gave them was the alleged non-compliance in the hiring of the chancellor at San Mateo Community College about four or five years ago.

The chancellor's staff recommended a penalty of \$500,000 for violating one or two sections of the Equal Employment Opportunity program -- just coincidentally, the subject of this test claim. And the Board of

Governors had three choices: They can agree with what the district did, they can discuss a remediation plan, or they can penalize.

In this case, they did not penalize, and the staff analysis indicates that's further proof that there's no teeth in section 51000 in the coercion. And they indicate there's no evidence in the record that there's a severe penalty to back up the coercion.

Once again, I'm alleging you don't need to get to POBR. Section 51000 is sufficient and legally compelling. But for there to be evidence on the record of severe loss of funding, there would have to be extreme malfeasance by community-college personnel, it appears. They would have to intentionally ignore the requirements of those 20 programs.

And I would suggest to you that it's unlikely there's ever going to be that sort of evidence because community-college district officers are public servants, professionals. They don't behave in that manner.

So the evidence they say is lacking, I don't think is extant. I don't think it's possible. So that's a catch-22 there.

So what I'm asking for is for the Commission to ask the Commission staff to reconsider their treatment of this legal issue, with directions that *Kern* is not

applicable and POBR is not applicable, factually.

CHAIR REYES: Mr. Louie?

MR. LOUIE: So, the reason why Kern is applicable in this case is the language of 51000, which Mr. Petersen has referred to, is a condition. It states specifically that these activities within this chapter of regulations are conditions. As a result, is there a legal requirement to -- is there a legal requirement to engage in these activities to achieve whatever it's a condition of? No, there's no legal requirement here.

As a result, you then go to whether or not it's practically compelling. We have done the analysis here within the staff analysis whether we found practical compulsion.

We have not found evidence that there's certain severe penalties.

As Mr. Petersen has stated in the example that he's found, it was suggested that there would be fines — or something of that extent. However, the only thing that actually occurred was increased supervision, which community-college districts are subject to, anyway.

I mean, this was increased supervision.

However, we didn't find that it was certain and severe -or evidence of severe penalties. So that was the extent
of our analysis right here for this issue.

MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Chairman?

CHAIR REYES: Yes.

MEMBER WORTHLEY: One thing that strikes me about this is that we're saying that there's no evidence of a factual situation; but it doesn't take away from the fact that the \$500,000 claim, although it wasn't, in fact, charged, could have been charged.

In other words, when you think about it -- MR. PETERSEN: They have the power.

MEMBER WORTHLEY: Yes, they have the power to do these things.

Whether or not they've been exercised at this point in time is really of some bearing, I suppose. But if you have the authority and the ability to impose these draconian measures, the fact that they haven't exercised it to date doesn't mean it won't be sometime in the future. All you have to do is take a look at what's happening in certain communities in Southern California, and realize that people in high authority can do some very strange things that could have tremendous impact.

So I don't know why that really is -- if that would be the -- I mean, I don't know why the burden would be on the claimant here. If they can show that there is the authority to impose such draconian measures, that should be sufficient. You don't actually have to have a

case to show that it's actually occurred in the past.

MR. LOUIE: But we have a situation here where we have to deal with the certainty and severity of the consequences. Here, we don't have evidence of certainty or severity of what the consequences would be.

Now, the consequence -- I mean, it's a possible consequence. However, it could be a remote consequence.

These situations in which --

MEMBER WORTHLEY: Well, this goes back to the issue of practical compulsion. Because you can say that that's only possible. Well, probably it's less likely if people get them to respond. So in other words, they go through the steps of actually responding to measures from a procedural standpoint to protect themselves; and as a consequence, they don't suffer the severe consequences.

If they did nothing -- if it was a default situation, and they said, "Well, you're not required to compel to respond," then there's more of a likelihood that they're going to have some burdensome things that occur to them.

I just think that trying to find a factual situation, to me, is not really the issue. The issue is, is there a legal ability to impose this on the local agency? If there is, that should be the draconian measure that we have to deal with, that that possibility

exists.

MR. LOUIE: I would just disagree in terms of, we still don't -- it's just -- we still have to deal with the certainty of it. We don't have any certain evidence of whatever the consequences would be from the situation.

In every other case, this analysis was taken from federal mandate analysis. In each of those cases, there was actual evidence of consequences that would happen in those situations.

In one instance, the State would have to face -- the State would face double taxation of its businesses -- it would face it; or it would face the actual consequence of terminating its own unemployment insurance program. Here, we don't have a situation of any certainty of any consequences.

CHAIR REYES: Mr. Petersen?

MR. PETERSEN: Well, several thoughts on that.

In the Sacramento case he cited, none of those things happened.

MR. LOUIE: Because the --

MR. PETERSEN: And second, for *POBR* to work for the Commission staff, it appears that in addition to facing a fiscal firing squad, I've got to show that somebody got shot. I don't think that's necessary, and I don't think it's going to happen.

If you're still thinking practical compulsion,

I've often thought that the Commission position on that
as to state mandates is rather disingenuous. Because if
you compare this to how they treat federal mandates -and there's 20 or 30 pages of federal mandate discussion
in here -- they find, based on court cases, that there is
a practical compulsion for schools, cities, counties, in
various situations, to implement federal mandates that
threaten fund loss or future program loss; or second,
threaten potential litigation. That is sufficient for
them to find a federal mandate here. And the court cases
support that.

None of those things actually occurred. Those
people never got shot. It was the threat. And for that

None of those things actually occurred. Those people never got shot. It was the threat. And for that reason, I believe to apply a different standard to require that the chancellor of the various community-college districts, one of them actually has to get shot, exceeds the standard they apply to the federal analysis.

So, again, I think 51000 is legally compelling, sufficient on its own. Second, the facts in *Kern* don't match. And you can't get to POBR because you can't get the evidence they seem to think they need.

CHAIR REYES: I'll go to Ms. Shelton and then
I'll go to Commissioner -- oh, you're not?

Okay, Commissioner Glaab will go after

Ms. Shelton. 1 Go ahead, Ms. Shelton, respond to that and then 2 3 we'll go --CAMILLE SHELTON: Just to kind of clarify the discussion, these are interesting arguments and they are 5 good arguments. There's not a lot of case law to help 6 7 the situation. You have two federal mandate cases: One, in 8 the City of Sacramento case where the statute plainly 9 said as a consequence "there shall be double taxation if 10 you don't comply." 11 That's different than this case, where it gives 12 the authority to the chancellor to impose whatever 13 consequence the chancellor sees fit. That was the key 14 distinguishing factor, at least for me, when I was 15 reviewing this case. 16 In Hayes, you did have things actually occur. 17 Litigation was actually occurring. You had the language 18 saying you would lose all of your funding, you know, 19 directly, without the discretion there. Those are key 20 differences between those statutes and this one here. 21 And that's why we have the recommendation based on what 22 we have here. 23 CHAIR REYES: Commissioner Glaab? 24

25

MEMBER GLAAB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and

Members.

I certainly want to comply with our mandate here of adjudicating cases, but some of the issues that Mr. Petersen raises resonates with me.

And I'm just wondering -- I might be the only person up here -- but might it be worthwhile to bring it back to the next meeting and allow Mr. Petersen and staff to work some of these things out? Because I think there's a lot of back and forth here. And I think that that might prove of benefit. But, again, I'm just one commissioner.

Thank you.

CHAIR REYES: Finance, I have not given you a chance to comment.

MS. GEANACOU: That's okay.

Susan Geanacou for the Department of Finance.

Finance overall supports the final staff analysis on this issue. And in particular, we support Mr. Louie's comments just a few minutes ago about lack of certainty regarding any adverse or severe consequences.

And I think I also observed that the staff draws a distinction in the analysis between entitlement to receive state aid versus the actual receipt of aid.

I defer to staff on what they're observing, but I think that's a key distinction in the analysis as well.

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1	CHAIR REYES: Okay.
2	MR. PETERSEN: I would like to respond to that.
3	CHAIR REYES: Okay.
4	MR. PETERSEN: Does anybody see any substantive
5	legal difference in that statement, "being entitled to"
6	and "receiving it"?
7	CHAIR REYES: Ms. Shelton?
8	CAMILLE SHELTON: Just under the rules of
9	statutory construction, the Legislature chose to put that
10	word in there for a reason. And they could have just
11	said, "directly the receipt of state aid." They chose to
12	say, "entitlement to the receipt of state aid." So it
13	has to have meaning.
14	MR. PETERSEN: But we know they're entitled by
15	their mere existence as community colleges. And that
16	entitlement is subject to an action after the fact if
17	they fail to comply.
18	MR. LOUIE: It indicates that a failure to
19	comply doesn't necessarily lead to a direct loss of
20	funds.
21	MR. PETERSEN: No, it doesn't. That's
22	MR. LOUIE: That's what occurred in San Mateo.
23	MR. PETERSEN: That's what occurred, but it
24	doesn't say that.
25	MR. LOUIE: That's what entitlement if you

1	don't
2	MR. PETERSEN: Okay, we
3	MR. LOUIE: We disagree on the terms.
4	CHAIR REYES: There's clearly a disagreement on
5	that perspective, okay.
6	A few minutes ago, we actually had a motion and
7	a second.
8	I don't know if the maker of the motion wants
9	to rescind the motion and go with Commissioner Glaab, or
10	do you still stand by your motion?
11	MEMBER CHIVARO: I stand by the motion.
12	CHAIR REYES: And the second?
13	MEMBER LUJANO: Yes.
14	CHAIR REYES: So we have a motion and a second.
15	Are there additional comments or questions from
16	the board or from the public?
17	Yes, Mr. Alex?
18	MEMBER ALEX: I have a question.
19	I'm a little unclear on the first on issue
20	number five, in the order that you brought it up.
21	When does practical compulsion need to be
22	raised? And is that purely factual?
23	That's for counsel.
24	CHAIR REYES: Is that a question to
25	MEMBER ALEX: For counsel. For Ms. Shelton.

Is that on due process? MR. PETERSEN: 1 That's a question CHAIR REYES: Ms. Shelton. 2 to Ms. Shelton? 3 Yes. MEMBER ALEX: 4 CAMILLE SHELTON: Under mandates law, I'll let 5 Mr. Petersen just direct the answer with respect to his 6 7 claim. You have to find whether or not there is a 8 mandated program. And there are two ways that you can do 9 10 that. Clearly, the law says, based on the 11 Constitution, that they have to be mandated by the State. 12 There has to be strict legal compulsion. And that is 13 based on the plain language of the statute. 14 The courts have suggested, although they have 15 yet to find, a situation where the local government has 16 been practically compelled by the circumstances. 17 Under that situation, you have to show that 18 despite the language or the silence of their 19 discretionary triggering decision, that the downstream 20 requirements are practically compelled because there are 21 certain and severe penalties imposed if they fail to 22 That is a first element of finding whether or 23 not there's a reimbursable state-mandated program. 24 The practical compulsion is based on you have 25

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1	to have facts and evidence in the record, but ultimately,
2	it is a question of law.
3	MEMBER ALEX: But those facts would be in the
4	record at this point?
5	CAMILLE SHELTON: Right.
6	MEMBER ALEX: And your finding was that there
7	are no facts to give rise to a practical compulsion
8	determination?
9	CAMILLE SHELTON: That's correct.
10	MEMBER ALEX: Thank you.
11	CHAIR REYES: Okay, any further discussion?
12	(No response)
13	CHAIR REYES: Call the question, Mr. Bohan.
14	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Alex?
15	MEMBER ALEX: Aye.
16	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Chivaro?
17	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
18	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Glaab?
19	MEMBER GLAAB: Aye.
20	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Lujano?
21	MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.
22	MR. BOHAN: Ms. Olsen?
23	MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
24	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Worthley?
25	MEMBER WORTHLEY: No.

1	MR. BOHAN: And Chair Reyes?
2	CHAIR REYES: Aye.
3	The motion carries. Thank you.
4	Mr. Louie, do you want to take us through
5	Item 5, please?
6	MR. LOUIE: So, Item 5, the only issue before
7	the Commission is whether the proposed Statement of
8	Decision accurately reflects the Commission's decision on
9	the Discrimination Complaint Procedures test claim.
10	Staff will update the final Statement of
11	Decision reflecting the witnesses testifying and the vote
12	count in Item 4.
13	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
14	Are there any comments
15	MEMBER OLSEN: Mr. Chairman?
16	CHAIR REYES: Yes?
17	MEMBER OLSEN: I just want you to know that I
18	will have to abstain from this vote because my packet did
19	not include Item 5. I assumed that it was coming in
20	later mail, and it never came, so
21	CHAIR REYES: Our apologies for that.
22	MEMBER OLSEN: That's okay.
23	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Chairman, if I recall, we
24	wanted to bring this back actually because of the fact
25	that he's withdrawing a portion of that's not

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1	necessary today?
2	CAMILLE SHELTON: He is not withdrawing. He
3	decided not to withdraw. We would handle that during
4	P's & G's.
5	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Okay, very good. Thank you.
6	MEMBER CHIVARO: I'll move staff recommendation
7	for approval.
8	CHAIR REYES: Staff recommendation has been
9	moved.
10	Is there a second?
11	MEMBER ALEX: Second.
12	CHAIR REYES: Okay, it's been moved and
13	seconded.
14	Any additional discussion or comments?
15	(No response)
16	CHAIR REYES: Call the question.
17	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Alex?
18	MEMBER ALEX: Aye.
19	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Chivaro?
20	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
21	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Glaab?
22	MEMBER GLAAB: Aye.
23	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Lujano?
24	MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.
25	MR. BOHAN: Ms. Olsen

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1	MEMBER OLSEN: Abstaining.
2	MR. BOHAN: you're abstaining.
3	Mr. Worthley?
4	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Aye.
5	MR. BOHAN: And Mr. Reyes?
6	CHAIR REYES: Aye.
7	Thank you.
8	MR. PETERSEN: Thank you.
9	CHAIR REYES: Okay, we're on Item 6. And,
10	Senior Staff Counsel Heather Halsey will present this,
11	entitled the School Facilities Funding Requirements test
12	claim.
13	MS. HALSEY: Good morning.
14	This test claim addresses activities required
15	of school districts as a condition of receipt of school
16	facility funding pursuant to the test-claim statutes and
17	regulations.
18	The primary issue in this test claim is the
19	following: Staff finds that the decisions to acquire a
20	new school site, build a new school, undertake a school
21	modernization project, add portable classrooms and accept
22	state facility program funding, issue local bonds or
23	participate in one of the other voluntary programs put in
24	this test claim are discretionary decisions; and that
25	based on the analysis in Kern, the downstream requirement

1	to comply with School Facilities Funding Requirements is
2	not reimbursable.
3	Additionally, staff finds there is no evidence
4	in the record to support a finding of practical
5	compulsion.
6	Claimant disagrees, asserting school districts
7	are legally and practically compelled to build new
8	schools and otherwise provide additional classrooms.
9	Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the
10	staff analysis to deny the test claim.
11	Will the parties and witnesses please state
12	your name for the record?
13	MR. PALKOWITZ: Good morning. Art Palkowitz on
14	behalf of plaintiff I'm sorry, the claimant.
15	MS. FEREBEE: Donna Ferebee for the Department
16	of Finance.
17	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
18	Are there any questions from the members?
19	MEMBER CHIVARO: No.
20	CHAIR REYES: Please.
21	MR. PALKOWITZ: Thank you.
22	The claimant brought this test claim that was
23	filed back on June 23 rd , 2003.
24	And what the claimant is requesting is that the
25	activities that relate to schools to receive funding,

whether it be state funding or issue bonds, that those activities are a reimbursable mandate.

I would like to try to express to you in the next few minutes on why we believe there is legal and practical compulsion to find the mandate.

As stated in the analysis by staff on page 45, Article XIIIB of the California Constitution states, "The purpose is to preclude the State from shifting financial responsibility for carrying out government functions to local agencies which are ill-equipped to assume increased financial responsibilities because of the taxing and spending limitations."

What we have before us today is the following:

It is clear, as pointed out in the analysis, that public education is a statewide concern. That is not a concern that is brought about by local agencies. The courts have been clear on this.

What we have is that once a school decides to build a new facility, it must comply with numerous state-agency requirements. Those requirements start out with the CDE -- California Department of Education -- to have a site approval, to have final plans approved by them, to go through escrow.

They're required to comply with the Division of State Architects, DSA, regarding the construction of a

1 school. They're required to comply with the Field Act. 2 Building a school is guite a task; and it's a 3 task that is required by the State. 4 What is trying to be decided here today is, are 5 those requirements and activities a state mandate? 6 We believe there's a legal compulsion by the 7 requirement that the State require the school district 8 provide public education; and there's practical 9 compulsion. 10 I would like to go through those analyses and cover any questions you might have. 11 12 Once a school is built, it's the State that 13 owns the property. The school is only a trustee. 14 district or a local agency is building a school for the 15 State, yet it's the burden, because Prop. 13 doesn't 16 allow the local agency to levy taxes. 17 This is exactly what the Legislature had in 18 plan when they thought and realized that the government 19 of the State is going to pass these financial burdens to 20 the local agencies. 21 This is the perfect textbook example: You are 22 required to build schools. You must have public 23 education, but we can't pay for it. So down at the local 24 agency, it's going to be your responsibility. But once

you have that responsibility, we want you to comply with

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all the state laws that are related to it.

22.

This is exactly what it is, is a shifting of the burden to a local agency. That is prohibited by Article XIII, and schools should be reimbursed for those activities.

I submit that the practical compulsion of not building a school is what exactly the courts were looking at when they talked about severe consequences.

Public education consists of nearly 40 percent of the State's budget. This is a high priority. This is a draconian consequence if a school is not built.

Now, the staff analysis goes through a detailed example of options what may be done before you decide to build a school. And I agree, those are options a school must go through before making that decision. However, after these options are analyzed, I believe that the schools are taking these options into consideration before they're building, whether it be transferring students or creating a double session of kindergarten classes or moving boundary changes or multi-track or bussing or reopening closed schools. That is analysis that is gone through by the districts.

The districts are not opening schools before this analysis and then making a decision that is not complete and is also voluntary. It's a decision that is

done after all other alternatives have been looked at. 1 It is clear that the public education and 2 providing education at the local level is an enhanced 3 service to the public, it's a new activity, and what is 4 defined under the mandate law as a basis for having 5 reimbursable mandates. 6 The claimant doesn't have any dispute with the 7 decision regarding the hazardous waste and other items 8 I'm not discussing, as those, I agree, are not only 9 impacting local agencies, it also impacts the private 10 11 sector. However, we are adamant on our contention that 12 the funding requirements that affect schools is a 13 reimbursable mandate. 14 Thank you. 15 Thank you. CHAIR REYES: 16 Finance? 17 MS. FEREBEE: Yes. Donna Ferebee for the 18 Department of Finance. 19 The Department of Finance agrees with the final 20 staff analysis, that there is neither a legal, nor 21 practical compulsion to construct or build a school. 22 Thank you. 23 CHAIR REYES: Ms. Halsey, do you want to 24 respond to any of the issues raised by the claimant, or 25

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1	do you feel you've done so in your write-up already?
2	MS. HALSEY: No, not unless the members have
3	any particular questions.
4	CHAIR REYES: Do the members have any
5	questions?
6	(No response)
7	CHAIR REYES: Does anybody in the audience have
8	any comments?
9	(No response)
10	CHAIR REYES: Okay, Mrs. Olsen?
11	MEMBER OLSEN: I'll move the staff analysis on
12	this one.
13	MEMBER CHIVARO: Second.
14	CHAIR REYES: The staff analysis has been moved
15	and seconded.
16	Okay, all in favor, say aye or no, you take
17	the roll call. I'm sorry, I forget.
18	MR. BOHAN: Sure.
19	Mr. Alex?
20	MEMBER ALEX: Aye.
21	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Chivaro?
22	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
23	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Glaab?
24	MEMBER GLAAB: No.
25	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Lujano?

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1	MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.
2	MR. BOHAN: Ms. Olsen?
3	MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
4	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Worthley?
5	MEMBER WORTHLEY: No.
6	MR. BOHAN: And Mr. Reyes?
7	CHAIR REYES: What's the vote right now?
8	CAMILLE SHELTON: 4-2.
9	CHAIR REYES: 4-2, right? We need four, right?
10	I am going to abstain only because I'm very
11	biased, since I also chair the State Allocation Board.
12	And in all fairness, I just
13	Thank you.
14	The motion carries.
15	MR. BOHAN: That brings us to the next item,
16	which is Item 7, and Heather Halsey will introduce this
17	one as well.
18	MS. HALSEY: Staff recommends that the
19	Commission adopt the proposed Statement of Decision.
20	The sole issue before the Commission is whether the
21	proposed Statement of Decision accurately reflects the
22	decision of the Commission on Item 6.
23	Minor changes to reflect witnesses and vote
24	count will be included in the final Statement of
25	Decision.
	1

_		Commission on State Mandates – March 24, 2011
1		CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
2		MEMBER OLSEN: I'll move the Statement of
3	Decision.	
4		MEMBER CHIVARO: Second.
5		CHAIR REYES: Are there any comments from the
6	public?	
7		(No response)
8		CHAIR REYES: All in favor Drew?
9		MR. BOHAN: Mr. Alex?
10		MEMBER ALEX: Aye.
11		MR. BOHAN: Mr. Chivaro?
12		MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
13		MR. BOHAN: Mr. Glaab?
14		MEMBER GLAAB: Aye.
15		MR. BOHAN: Mr. Lujano?
16		MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.
17		MR. BOHAN: Ms. Olsen?
18		MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
19		MR. BOHAN: Mr. Worthley?
20		MEMBER WORTHLEY: Aye.
21		MR. BOHAN: And Mr. Reyes?
22		CHAIR REYES: I'll abstain.
23		MR. BOHAN: Abstain.
24		That brings us, Mr. Chairman, to the next item
25	on the ag	renda, which is Item 8.

1 And Senior Staff Counsel Eric Feller will 2 present this item. It's entitled Municipal Storm Water 3 and Urban Runoff, and it's the proposed parameters and 4 quidelines and Statement of Decision for this matter. 5 MR. FELLER: Good morning. 6 The parameters and quidelines for the test 7 claim are based on a permit issued by the Los Angeles 8 Regional Water Quality Control Board. 9 The Commission approved the test claim for 10 placing and maintaining trash receptacles at transit 11 stops and local agencies not subject to a trash TMDL. 12 The primary issue in dispute is whether the installation activities in the parameters and guidelines 13 14 are reasonably necessary to comply with the mandate. The 15 LA Regional Water Board and Department of Finance contend 16 the activities go beyond the scope of the mandate, but 17 the claimants contend that they are reasonably necessary 18 to comply with it. 19 Staff finds that the activities in the 20 parameters and guidelines are reasonably necessary to 21 comply with the mandate. Staff also limited activities to one time per 22 transit stop, limited pickup to no more than three times 23

per week, and deleted graffiti removal as a reimbursable

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activity.

The Department of Finance and State 1 Controller's Office also assert that the reasonable 2 reimbursement methodology should not be adopted but 3 reimbursement should be based on actual costs. 4 Staff finds that there is substantial evidence 5 in the record to support the reasonable reimbursement 6 methodology, or RRM, of \$6.74 for the ongoing maintenance 7 activities, and that the RRM complies with the statutory 8 9 requirements. Staff recommends that the Commission adopt this 10 analysis as its decision and the attached parameters and 11 quidelines and reasonable reimbursement methodology as 12 modified by staff, allowing for minor changes, including 13 reflecting the witnesses and vote count and the proposed 14 clarifying changes submitted by Claimant Los Angeles 15 County on green-colored paper that you should have before 16 you. 17 Will the parties and witnesses please state 18 your names for the record? 19 MR. KAYE: Leonard Kaye, County of Los Angeles. 20 MR. BURHENN: David Burhenn for the City 21 claimants. 22 Jon Walker, County of Los Angeles. MR. WALKER: 23 MS. BUI: Wendy Bui, County of Los Angeles. 24 Jay Lal, State Controller's Office. MR. LAL: 25

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1	CARLA SHELTON: Carla Shelton, Department of
2	Finance.
3	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
4	MS. GEANACOU: There are folks back here, if
5	you want this on the record.
6	CHAIR REYES: Okay. Yes, please.
7	MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, for the
8	Department of Finance.
9	MR. SPANO: Jim Spano, State Controller's
10	office.
11	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
12	Are there any questions from the members at
13	this point?
14	(No response)
15	CHAIR REYES: Mr. Kaye?
16	MR. KAYE: Good morning. It's a pleasure being
17	here, even though it's a rainy morning.
18	And we'd like to, first of all, thank staff for
19	their diligence and very finely crafted decision and
20	analysis on this matter. I think it reflects an awful
21	lot of work. And we also have been diligent in trying to
22	be responsive to State agency concerns.
23	What we have, I think, before you is a staff
24	recommendation that we heartily endorse and agree with.
25	We have requested a tiny, clarifying change on

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1	some of the language which Eric referred to; and that is
2	before you as well. And we're prepared to answer any
3	questions you, as commissioners, have for us this
4	morning.
5	Thank you.
6	MR. BURHENN: Good morning, Chair Reyes and
7	Members of the Commission. My name is David Burhenn. We
8	represent the City claimants on this test claim.
9	I would like to echo Mr. Kaye's appreciation
10	for the hard work on this pioneering matter in terms of
11	the municipal storm water area.
12	We also would like to note that we also agree
13	with the suggested change on your green sheet.
14	And finally, we also would like to urge the
15	Commission to approve the reasonable reimbursement
16	methodology, which has been, I think, crafted with a good
17	deal of care through the work largely led by Mr. Kaye
18	with his Excel spreadsheet. I should be kept away from
19	all numbers.
20	Thank you very much.
21	CHAIR REYES: Is that a reimbursable mandate
22	right there, because you broke that?
23	MR. WALKER: Thank you, Commissioners and
24	Chair.
25	On behalf of the County of Los Angeles, I'd

1	like to, again, thank staff as well, and just indicate
2	that we are pleased to be here and that we're pleased to
3	concur with the staff's recommendation.
4	MS. BUI: Hi. I'm Wendy Bui, also County of
5	Los Angeles. Thanks for having us here today.
6	I also, of course, agree with the
7	recommendations. And my involvement has been coming up
8	with the costs for the County.
9	So thank you.
10	MR. LAL: Chairperson, Commission Members, my
11	name is Jay Lal with the State Controller's Office.
12	Our office has reservations on approval of this
13	RRM for two reasons.
14	First, it is based on a survey response of
15	seven of 85 city/county-reported expenditures that have
16	not been validated.
17	Secondly, the respondents' survey developed by
18	the Cities and County, resulted in greater costs for the
19	eight cities/county sampled than what expenditures they
20	stated as actual on the survey over the seven-year
21	period.
22	CHAIR REYES: Finance?
23	CARLA SHELTON: Good morning. Carla Shelton,
24	Department of Finance.
25	We would like to recognize or acknowledge that

1	the claimants addressed some of our concerns noted in our
2	comments. However, we continue to believe that some of
3	the activities found to be reasonably necessary to carry
4	out the mandate go beyond the scope of the mandate.
5	CHAIR REYES: Okay, so you disagree with some
6	of the activities that are being costed out?
7	CARLA SHELTON: Right. Yes, such as on page
8	I want to say, I want to say, 14 wait, page 29, excuse
9	me were it says "for one-time costs," installation of
10	pads is okay.
11	But also where it says under B.4, under the
12	RRM, they also can claim the costs
13	CHAIR REYES: What page are you on again?
14	CARLA SHELTON: Oh, I'm sorry. Excuse me,
15	page 4. I apologize.
16	CHAIR REYES: Page 4.
17	I'm trying to read along with you.
18	CARLA SHELTON: I apologize.
19	MR. FELLER: Page 4 of the parameters and
20	guidelines, I believe that's the same as page 30 of the
21	analysis.
22	CHAIR REYES: Okay, great.
23	CARLA SHELTON: I apologize. Okay.
24	There's actual costs, one-time costs for
25	installing pads. But then also under "B," to maintain

the trash receptacles, the maintenance of installing pads also can be claimed under the reasonable reimbursement methodology rate.

So, again, the Commission has the authority to

So, again, the Commission has the authority to determine that these activities are reasonably necessary to implement the mandate. But we still feel like these activities go beyond the scope of the mandate.

CHAIR REYES: Mr. Feller?

MR. FELLER: I'd just like to point out that the one-time costs are for transit stops that are moved.

The ongoing costs are for receptacles pads that go missing or become damaged beyond use; and that all the activities in "B" are covered under the \$6.74 RRM, so there is no extra payment for those replacement or installations for missing trash receptacles. They're all covered through the RRM -- all the activities under B, ongoing activities for maintenance.

CHAIR REYES: Any questions from the Members?

MEMBER CHIVARO: Does Finance have a position
on the RRM?

CARLA SHELTON: Our position is that we don't have -- at this point, we don't have any -- we have concerns with the RRM because, again, it's based on those activities found to be reasonably necessary to carry out the mandate. So we will go on record noting that.

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1	CHAIR REYES: Ms. Olsen?
2	MEMBER OLSEN: Mr. Chairman, could I get some
3	clarification from staff?
4	On the green sheet, are you guys is staff
5	okay, they've evaluated this, and you're okay with the
6	change on the green sheet?
7	MR. FELLER: Correct. Yes, the recommendation
8	was the staff recommendation included those clarifying
9	changes.
10	MEMBER OLSEN: Thank you.
11	MS. GEANACOU: Can I ask a question?
12	CHAIR REYES: Yes. Finance, do you want to get
13	to the mike so we can go on record, please?
14	Thank you.
15	MS. GEANACOU: I have a loud voice.
16	I just wanted to hear whether Commission staff
17	had any feedback on the State Controller's Office
18	concerns raised about the proposed RRM and the costs that
19	underlie it. That may very well affect Finance's
20	position on it regarding the receptivity of the
21	Commission to have some doubts about its accuracy for
22	reimbursing the claimants.
23	MEMBER ALEX: I had the same question, which is
24	the survey issue raised and whether you have comments on
25	that survey.

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1	MR. FELLER: The concerns that I'm hearing
2	today were raised for the first time today, so staff
3	hasn't had time to really consider those.
4	CHAIR REYES: And that is, that you have seven
5	out of 85 surveys?
6	MR. FELLER: Yes.
7	CHAIR REYES: Okay.
8	MEMBER CHIVARO: And what's the difference
9	between the actual costs on those surveys and the hourly
10	rate that's been approved?
11	MR. KAYE: Okay, Commissioner Chivaro?
12	MEMBER CHIVARO: Yes?
13	MR. KAYE: I have prepared, in anticipating
14	that this issue would come up, I've prepared an analysis
15	with two schedules. I can distribute that now for
16	MEMBER CHIVARO: That would be helpful.
17	MR. KAYE: just to go along with the talking
18	points.
19	MEMBER CHIVARO: Okay, sure.
20	MR. LAL: Our analysis has, over the seven-year
21	period, it's a 14 percent increase over the actual costs.
22	CHAIR REYES: The City frowns on that number.
23	Do you want to articulate that frown?
24	MR. BURHENN: I haven't seen the analysis,
25	Chair Reyes. And, though, again, as I previously

indicated to the commissioners, I stay away from numbers. 1 MR. KAYE: Okay, you'll be getting your copy in 2 3 a minute. CHAIR REYES: I do have good news for the 4 The crazy staff person that was pushing for 5 reasonable reimbursement methodology no longer works in 6 the Assembly. So just -- that's good. No crazy ideas 7 8 will be forthcoming. MR. KAYE: Okay, as I say, this is -- was 9 prepared in anticipation that this issue would come up. 10 There is also the issue of equity between City and County 11 claimants and so forth. 12 So going to Schedule 1, you see that the unit 13 costs under column A, is the actual unit cost. This is 14 simply a result of the actual costs that were measured by 15 each claimant -- I'm sorry, do we have -- I guess our 16 friends and -- we're waiting to distribute the copy to 17 the State Controller and Finance. 18 Okay, so we have, under column A, the actual 19 unit cost for these claimants. And you will see that if 20 you do a straight, non-weighted average cost, considering 21 the unit cost for each claimant to weigh the same amount, 22 you come up with an average cost of \$8.60. That's 23

Then what I did was, I subtracted the average

column B.

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1	unit cost from their actual cost, and I came up with the
2	variance by jurisdiction. Some were over three were
3	over excuse me, four were over and three were under.
4	So the net difference, as you would expect, would be
5	zero.
6	Okay, next, I computed the number of pickups.
7	That goes to the issue of overall, what would be the cost
8	to the State? Because you just multiply the average unit
9	cost times the number of pickups. And what I did is,
10	I just multiplied it by the difference. So, for example,
11	Los Angeles County, using the straight average of
12	\$8.60 as an RRM would be gaining \$3,719.24 over
13	their actual cost.
14	Then what I did is, I did the same for each
15	respondent.
16	The bottom line would be that the State would
17	lose, using this methodology, \$13,398.39.
18	Okay, next, what I did was I illustrated what
19	it would be under the averaging method that I actually
20	used to compute the \$6.74.
21	What I did was, I took the same unit cost; but
22	this time, I weighted it, saying that we have, for
23	example, 2,513 pickups in Los Angeles County but only
24	39 pickups in the City of Azusa. So to weight them the
25	same, I think, would create a statistical anomaly. And

so what I did is, I came up with a weighted average of \$6.74.

And as you can imagine, this weighted average caused various dispersions about the mean on the unit-cost basis; but you can see from column E, that we had the percentage gains or losses come out pretty neutral.

So to answer the State Controller's Office's concerns, basically using the actual costs from our survey, translating that into a unit cost that's based on the weighted average, is exactly within \$28.95 what our actual costs would be.

CHAIR REYES: But how do we answer the question, that if these dollars work for the seven, what about the other folks who -- I mean, the sample survey is small in their perspective.

MR. KAYE: Well, it's small in terms of the number of claimants.

In terms of the number of pickups, you're looking at 4,000, 7,000, 8,000, 9,000. I would say that that's 50, 60 percent of all pickups.

Maybe Dave could indicate the number of cities that are entitled to reimbursement, and indicate whether, you know, they're large or small. But I expect, in terms of the number of pickups, that this is at least 50 or

60 or 70 percent of all pickups in the County of 1 Los Angeles, in the cities that are affected. 2 CHAIR REYES: Ms. Shelton, you were going for 3 the mike. 4 CAMILLE SHELTON: In the staff analysis, when 5 we've dealt with these before, we've tried to determine 6 whether the proposal is representative of the eligible 7 claimant pool. And in this case, based on the 8 information that we had, we did feel that it did 9 represent both large and small agencies, although it did 10 only have seven of the 85 or 88 claimants. 11 representative of both types of entities in that area, 12 13 LA area. Let me just -- if this helps, 17518.5 requires 14 that the Commission look at a couple of factors when 15 adopting an RRM. 16 Well, first, it is based on approximations of 17 local costs and it is not based -- it doesn't have to be 18 based on actual costs incurred. But you do need to find 19 that it is based on cost information provided by a sample 20 of eligible claimants, and that the approximation shall 21 consider the variation and costs among local agencies to 22 implement the manner in a cost-efficient manner. 23 CHAIR REYES: Yes, sir? 24 MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Chairman, I'm prepared to 25

1	move the staff recommendation as amended with the
2	clarification language.
3	MEMBER OLSEN: I'll second.
4	CHAIR REYES: We have a second.
5	Is there any additional comments or questions
6	from anybody?
7	Yes?
8	MR. SPANO: I'm Jim Spano. I'm the bureau
9	chief for the Division of State Controller's Office.
10	And just to address on Susan's and Jay's
11	concerns about the activities being audited right now,
12	from the audit perspective, we can actually look at the
13	survey, cities and counties, not to question the
14	methodology, but just to validate the underlying costs
15	used in developing the RRM as an alternative.
16	MR. KAYE: Okay, could I respond to that?
17	CHAIR REYES: Well, I want to make sure I
18	understand.
19	So what would you do then?
20	MR. SPANO: Basically, what I'm saying is that
21	Susan and Jay brought up that the cost has not been
22	verified.
23	The comment I'm making is that we can actually
24	go out to those seven those eight six, seven or
25	eight entities that were surveyed, and actually look at

1 the data that was used in reporting the actual costs to 2 validate that those costs are true and correct. 3 CHAIR REYES: And how long would that take you? 4 MR. SPANO: I would think that we can do it 5 within six months; and we'd try to get it done earlier, 6 if we can. 7 MR. KAYE: May I respond to that? 8 CHAIR REYES: Yes. 9 MR. KAYE: This is Leonard Kaye, County of 10 Los Angeles. 11 I'd like to read into the record -- again, we 12 didn't put this in the P's & G's, but I think Commission 13 staff, in anticipation of this issue coming up -- and I'd 14 like to read this into the record because it's very, very 15 pertinent to Jim Spano's concerns. 16 "The reasonable reimbursement methodology" --17 this is under the proposed parameters and guidelines, 18 section 7, Records Retention, B, Reasonable Reimbursement 19 Methodology: "Pursuant to Government Code section 20 17558.5(a), a reimbursement claim for actual costs filed 21 by a school district pursuant to this chapter is subject 22 to the initiation of an audit by the Controller no later 23 than three years after the claim," and so forth. 24 And I'll just skip. 25 "Pursuant to Government Code 17561(d)(2), the

Controller has the authority to audit application of a reasonable reimbursement methodology."

So built into the P's & G's are exactly what Jim Spano has just mentioned.

Not only that, but we must retain documentation which supports the reimbursement of the maintenance cost identified in section 4(b) -- that's the reasonable reimbursement methodology -- these parameters and guidelines during the period subject to audit, including documentation showing the number of trash receptacles in the jurisdiction and the number of trash collections of pickup. If an audit has been initiated by the Controller during the period subject to the audit, the record-retention period is extended until the ultimate resolution of any findings.

So I believe, Commissioners, you have put into concrete our liability for audit. And Mr. Spano is certainly welcome anytime to come down and visit us.

Thank you.

CHAIR REYES: Mr. Spano?

MR. SPANO: Yes, just from my perspective, we would not be auditing a claim. And I'm not sure -- I wouldn't consider this an audit of a claim. This is just an opportunity to validate costs that were incurred. So I'm not sure there's a distinction; but we're not -- you

know, 17558.5 talks about auditing a claim right now.

A claim has not been filed yet. This is actually auditing the validity of data being used in developing an RRM.

CHAIR REYES: Ms. Shelton?

CAMILLE SHELTON: Let me just kind of indicate a couple of things when this statute was adopted. I think -- and certainly Mr. Reyes can speak to this, too -- but my understanding of when the statute was adopted, was to allow the Commission to adopt an RRM without having an audit of the actual costs occur before a number was put into the parameters and guidelines.

It was supposed to balance simplicity with accuracy. It wasn't, you know, prepared or placed into statute for a perfection on actual cost. This RRM is based on actual costs.

Let me just clarify a couple of things, though, about the language that Mr. Kaye was mentioning in the P's & G's.

If the Commission adopts the RRM of \$6.74, that number cannot be then challenged by the Controller's office. All the State Controller's Office can do would be to audit maybe the number of times of pickup by the agency; but they can't change that number.

They can look for backup supporting

documentation to see if the number of times are actually the number of times, but they wouldn't be able to change or audit to that number.

CHAIR REYES: So here's what I'm struggling with: As we sat in this room and came up with this crazy notion of reasonable reimbursement methodology, it was a methodology that you are correct, that folks did not have to go out there and dot every "I" and cross every "T" and keep all the records in perpetuity because folks can come back and look at it. But the notion was that there would be an agreement by parties, though. And I'm not getting that notion of agreement right now.

What I'm hearing is, there is discomfort by Controller's -- there are fiscal state agencies that are saying, "I'm concerned that the sample is too small," when you came with that.

I'm concerned that we're agreeing on the \$6.74, that nobody has really taken a look at and said that, "It should be 7, it could be 5, it could be 6. It's in the ballpark."

If somebody had said, from one of the State agencies, "We know that the price ranges from 5 to 10 bucks, and 6.74 is reasonable," then this commissioner would be much more comfortable in saying, "Yeah, move forward, and we now have agreement."

Commission on State Mandates – March 24, 2011 But the goal was to minimize the going back and 1 And that's one issue I'm struggling with: 2 we now have proposed reimbursable methodology or costs 3 per unit of \$6.74. But the two parties to the State are 4 not quite there yet. They're not there yet on the sample 5 size even though it represents over 50 percent of the 6 pickups, and they're not quite there yet on the cost, the 7 8 potential range. Am I misunderstanding the issue? 9 CARLA SHELTON: No. 10 CHAIR REYES: Okay. But I do recognize that 11 the goal was not to be able to go back and look at -- if 12 we agree on \$6.74, that is the price that we go on in 13 perpetuity. And if Mr. Spano's group goes out there and 14 finds out they're actually doing it for \$3.25, we're out 15 16 \$3.50. 17 Go ahead.

CAMILLE SHELTON: There can always be a request to amend the P's & G's.

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So if the Commission decides to adopt this just based on actual costs and not adopt the RRM or to adopt the RRM, you can always change it later if there's a request coming before the Commission to change that amount.

CHAIR REYES: Who would initiate that request?

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1	CAMILLE SHELTON: Anybody but the Commission.
2	CHAIR REYES: All right. And then at that
3	point, though, there's really no data by the claimants to
4	retain to show that, in fact, it's this or this,
5	because we said you don't have to.
6	CAMILLE SHELTON: That would be correct.
7	So one option, you know, certainly would be to
8	adopt an actual cost requirement and get data in a couple
9	of years, you know, to develop another RRM, if that's
10	what the Commission decides to do. That's an option.
11	CHAIR REYES: Mr. Feller?
12	MR. FELLER: I just want to remind the
13	Commission, the claimants have been doing these pickups
14	since 2002, I believe. So I suppose if this isn't the
15	right case for an RRM, we just don't know what is,
16	really.
17	CHAIR REYES: Yes, that's what I'm struggling
18	with, too.
19	Mr. Alex?
20	MEMBER ALEX: Do you have a sense for this time
21	period, if it's \$5 versus \$10, how much money is at stake
22	here?
23	MR. FELLER: I just have to defer to the
24	claimant's evidence in the record and remind the
25	Commission that they're under oath.

MR. KAYE: Okay, well, you can get a ballpark figure by multiplying the total number of pickups, which maybe the entire universe would be 12,000, 14,000 pickups by \$6.74.

So you're not looking at a huge amount of money.

Now, that doesn't include the actual cost. I think with the actual cost for the installation of the pads and so forth, we did have some concerns expressed. But generally, I think the State Controller's Office and the State Department of Finance recognize now that we have to install pads and do things like that.

So this is a small amount of money. I think the risk to the State is very, very small. As Camille Shelton pointed out, the State Controller, whoever, can revisit this matter in a year or two, and so forth.

But we feel it's an important money-saver for local government because we won't be counting pennies and these minuscule amounts of funds; and also it should be much, much lower. I'm sure the State has much bigger things to audit than a few hundred thousand dollars in claims, although every penny is important.

We would urge you to adopt this. A huge number of folks, we've gotten a lot of the cities to support this.

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1	We've got the CSAC to endorse our activities,
2	and CSAC has been helpful in doing that.
3	We've got the League of Cities to participate.
4	They've endorsed this amount.
5	And we feel pretty strongly that many of the
6	actual cost figures can easily be documented if it came
7	to that because they're based upon hard, contemporaneous,
8	actual cost information.
9	So we have no issues with that.
10	CHAIR REYES: Okay, I think there was a motion
11	and a second.
12	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Yes.
13	CHAIR REYES: And there was a second.
14	So are there any further questions or comments?
15	(No response)
16	CHAIR REYES: Are you ready for the question?
17	Okay, Mr. Drew?
18	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Alex?
19	MEMBER ALEX: Aye.
20	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Chivaro?
21	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
22	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Glaab?
23	MEMBER GLAAB: Aye.
24	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Lujano?
25	MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.
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1	MR. BOHAN: Ms. Olsen?
2	MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
3	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Worthley?
4	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Aye.
5	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Reyes?
6	CHAIR REYES: Aye.
7	MR. KAYE: Thank you.
8	CHAIR REYES: And I'd like to point out that
9	everybody was very happy with Mr. Feller's analysis. I
10	was also happy with Ms. Halsey's and Mr. Louie's
11	analysis.
12	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I was
13	going to say, that Mr. Louie must feel badly. His was
14	a tome. I mean, I've read novels shorter than his
15	analysis.
16	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
17	Item 9 has been pulled.
18	Item 10 has been pulled.
19	Item 11 was consent, 12 was consent, 13 was
20	consent.
21	I think we're on Item 14.
22	MR. BOHAN: I think that's right.
23	And we're shuffling chairs and bodies here.
24	But Program Analyst Heidi Palchik will be
25	handling this item, along with Senior Staff Counsel

1	Heather Halsey. It's Item 14. It's adoption of proposed
2	amendments to our regulations. We're calling it the
3	Final Regulations to Implement Mandate Redetermination
4	Process.
5	Heidi?
6	CHAIR REYES: You can join us at the table if
7	you're going to be testifying.
8	Thank you.
9	MS. PALCHIK: Good morning.
10	On November 9 th , 2010, the Commission adopted
11	emergency regulations to implement the new mandate
12	redetermination process pursuant to Government Code
13	section 17570.
14	At that time, the Commission also adopted an
15	order to initiate permanent regulations while those
16	emergency regulations were in effect.
17	This Item 14 would implement the permanent
18	regulations for the new mandate redetermination process.
19	Commission staff issued this rulemaking on
20	November 19 th , 2010, with a 70-day comment period. And
21	during that time, the California School Boards
22	Association submitted comments urging the Commission to
23	resolve the ambiguity of Government Code section 17570,
24	modify the regulations to add a definition of
25	"materiality," and amend the regulations to say that

the requester has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the change in law 2 would change the underlying determination. 3 Staff responded to CSBA's comments but 4 continues to recommend the language originally proposed. 5 Pursuant to Government Code section 17527, the 6 adopted permanent regulations must be transmitted to the 7 Office of Administrative Law by May 23rd, 2011, or the 8 emergency language would be repealed by operation of law 9 the following day. 10 Therefore, staff recommends that the Commission 11 find that no alternative would be more effective in 12 carrying out the purpose for which the regulations are 13 proposed, or would be as effective as, and less 14 burdensome to affected private persons than the proposed 15 regulations, and adopt the proposed amendments to 16 sections 1181.1 and 1181.2, and the addition of 17 Article X, effective 30 days after filing with the 18 California Secretary of State, and authorize staff to 19 make any non-substantive, technical corrections requested 20 by the Office of Administrative Law or Barclays Official 21 California Code of Regulations prior to publication. 22 Will the parties please state your name for the 23

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MS. CAPLAN: Good morning. Deborah Caplan.

record?

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I'm with Olson, Hagel & Fishburn. I'm representing the School Boards Association this morning.

CHAIR REYES: Thank you.

MS. CAPLAN: Thank you.

I would like to express my appreciation for the comments provided by the staff in response to our earlier letter.

I think that the comments in the response serve to highlight some of the questions and concerns that we raised initially.

I would say the primary one is this issue about whether section 17570 is supposed to be used for any change in liability, meaning, the amount that the State owes to the local governments, or is it only to be used for changes in liability, meaning, the liability for the mandate determination: Ultimately, is there a mandate or is there no mandate?

And as I'm sure everybody knows, if the statute or executive order is what is submitted to the Commission for determination under 17514 and also 17556, to find out are there costs that are, by the statute or executive order, imposed that are subject to reimbursement under the Constitution.

Both of those decisions under 17514 and 17556 are essentially mandate or no mandate. In other words,

Commission on State Mandates - March 24, 2011 the Commission either finds that the statute or executive order imposes duties that are subject to reimbursement; 2 and if they do, then they decide which activities are 3 actually subject to reimbursement and how much those 4 are going to be reimbursed -- the amount of the 5 reimbursement. And under 17556, those are the exceptions 6 to finding the costs imposed by statute or executive 7 order. 8 So if the Commission finds that a statute or 9 executive order fits into those categories, then there 10 is no mandate. 11

So we have acknowledged, I think, in our comments, that the statute itself is somewhat ambiguous. And I think the ambiguity stems from two separate points in the statute.

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The first is that it says that a new test-claim determination can be made or can be entered whenever the State's liability is modified. And both of those words are used: "Liability" is "modified."

So the staff has said: Well, "modified" means any modification. So modification can be a change in the amount owed.

And I think that that is -- technically, that's probably correct. But if you look at it as the entire phrase, which is whether the liability under XIII B(6) is

modified, then I think that language can and should be read more narrowly to mean anytime the underlying mandate determination is changed, that's when a new test-claim determination is appropriate.

The staff does say that if a statute or executive order is changed to add activities, those are -- as I understand it -- and I stand to be corrected, if I'm misreading or misunderstanding it -- that new activities are subject to the new test-claim process, meaning, that a claimant files a new test claim under 17551, and it goes through that process.

If activities are added or deleted, they could also be subject to an amendment of the parameters and guidelines, because the parameters and guidelines outline which activities are subject to reimbursement.

So it seems to me that there is -- the second conflict in the statute is that -- what it says is that a change in law that requires a finding -- meaning, that there's a new test-claim determination is required -- is that a cost that is a cost mandated by the State as defined by 17514, or is not a cost mandated by the State pursuant to 17556, or a change in mandate law.

So the first two provisions, the reference to 17514 and the reference to 17556, I think, are pretty clear that they go to the underlying ultimate mandate

determination.

But the third phrase, "or a change in mandate law," possibly opens that up to mean any change in liability, meaning, the amount that the State owes going up or down. And I think that's where the staff comments are largely focused.

And if you look at page 4 of the staff's response, they give an example at the bottom of that page, where they say -- they give the example of a mandate that has multiple activities. And the State adopts a statute that provides fee authority to reimburse for the cost of one of the mandates -- one of the activities, I'm sorry, not the mandate -- but one of the activities. And then they say that this would be subject to the new test-claim determination.

And then farther down on that page, they say that either the addition or the deletion of activities within a mandated program could trigger a new test-claim determination.

I think that this is -- CSBA believes that this is fundamentally inconsistent with the finality that's supposed to attach to mandate decisions. So in other words, unless the underlying mandate is changed in such a way that -- or there's a change in mandate law such that the underlying mandate is going to either be

eliminated or a prior mandate that was denied is going to be granted, that's the point of a new test-claim determination.

Additions or deletions of activities within a mandate should either be a new test claim under 17551, or they should be a change in the parameters and guidelines. Because, as I understand it -- and, again, I could be corrected -- but, as I understand it, a change under 17556, whether it's fee authority or additional funding, if those are only partial, if they only go to part of the mandate, they affect the amount to be reimbursed, but they don't affect the underlying mandate itself.

The mandate -- for instance, if fee activity were given for one activity out of five, that would be an offset, but it wouldn't eliminate the underlying mandate. So I think that the -- and I understand that the statute creates some of this ambiguity. But I think what we've requested, is that the regulations take a narrow view of the ambiguity and resolve it in a more conservative way from the Commission's point of view, to say that only those determinations that affect the underlying mandate should be subject to the new test-claim determination process.

Changes to activities within a mandate that

	Commission on Sweet 11 and 11
1	don't go to the ultimate mandate should either be new
2	test claims under the regular process or they should be
3	changes amendments to the parameters and guidelines.
4	So I think that's a critical area of concern and
5	disagreement with the existing proposal.
6	The second area is the questions about the
7	burden of proof and the difference between the first
8	hearing and the second hearing.
9	CHAIR REYES: Can I stop you for a second?
10	MS. CAPLAN: Sure.
11	CHAIR REYES: Can I ask Ms. Shelton to address
12	the first issue? That way, we can follow it.
13	CAMILLE SHELTON: Thank you.
14	This is a complicated area. And I think, for
15	the most part, we agree with what CSBA is saying.
16	But I think we had a difficult time
17	understanding the comments. Because I think where the
18	breakdown of communication is occurring here is that CSBA
19	is talking about a decision, a prior decision on a whole
20	mandated program; but it doesn't work that way.
21	When a test claim is filed, there has to be
22	whole analysis on each mandated activity, so that there
23	is no one whole mandated program. You're analyzing
24	whether an activity that is mandated by the State does
25	impose a state-mandated program, whether that activity

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constitutes a new program or higher level of service, and whether that activity imposes costs mandated by the State.

So on many occasions, when we get a test claim in, the Commission only partially approves the test claim for certain specific state-mandated activities that meet all the mandate's analysis.

And when this bill was enacted, they enacted it -- not only the 17570 series, but also the change to 17557, which clarified when a P's & G's amendment could occur.

And you can only amend parameters and guidelines when the amendment does not conflict with the underlying decision. In other words, you can only amend the P's & G's when it won't delete a state-mandated activity. So that if it reduces the costs of a state-mandated activity, that would be valid under a P's & G's amendment.

That would not be valid under a request for redetermination. Because in order to file a request for redetermination, the party has to show that there is a change in liability of the underlying mandate determination for that reimbursable state-mandated activity.

Do you see what I'm saying?

MS. CAPLAN: Yes, except I guess -- I think
I understand, but I think I disagree on one point; and
that is, that when the test claim is filed, it's filed
as to the entire -- well, when you see the test claims
identified, they're identified by the statutes that
enacted them. They're not identified by each activity
within the statute.

So the test claim embraces -- often embraces --

So the test claim embraces -- often embraces -- more than one activity.

CAMILLE SHELTON: Correct.

But what happens is, the pleading is up to the test claimant. And oftentimes, a test claimant will not file every single statute under a -- when you're looking at the code, under an article or a chapter. They pick and choose.

And, for example, the one that we had earlier on Discrimination Complaint Procedures, that was from many different areas; and the claimant titled the test claim the way they wanted to title the test claim.

But you can't go to the regulations and say, "Oh, it's under this article." It was under very many, many articles.

So they choose how they file their test claim. That is not within the control of the Commission.

So it's not one mandated program. It's many

requests for reimbursement of several activities, within several different articles and chapters of the code and regulations.

MS. CAPLAN: Well, could I ask you for this clarification then?

CAMILLE SHELTON: Yes.

MS. CAPLAN: Are you saying that when you refer to an activity in here and a change in the activity affecting the State's liability, are you talking about an activity where the entire — the scope of the mandate is the activity? In other words, the activity is coextensive with the mandate as opposed to a mandate that includes multiple activities, and perhaps one of those activities — that the liability for one of those activities is affected?

those activities has gone through a full mandates analysis and that activity has been found to be state-mandated, a new program or a higher level of service, and it does impose costs mandated by the State, and the State subsequently enacts the statute which the State comes forward and says, "We want a redetermination because now we believe that one activity is no longer reimbursable," that would be the subject of a redetermination.

But it would have to conflict -- that statute would have to cause the creation -- or the Commission to come to a different conclusion with respect to that previously mandated activity.

You would have to allege that, for example, in that fee-authority example, that now, when you apply 17556, and a fee authority, subdivision (d), I think, to that activity, it is no longer reimbursable because now the State has enacted a fee-authority statute which is sufficient to cover the costs of the mandate, and intended to cover that mandated activity.

So we're using the word "mandate" loosely.

When it's not one whole program, you've got to focus -every analysis that we do here is focused on individual
activities. And each element has to apply to each
activity that is approved in the Statement of Decision.

MS. CAPLAN: But it's common -- I mean, I've read the statements of decision. It's common for one mandate determination, one statement of decision to include many activities that are subject to reimbursement.

CAMILLE SHELTON: That's correct. But each one of those activities has gone through the full-blown analysis of each element of what's required under the Constitution. Not the whole program. It's required to

do it activity by activity.

And the courts have --

MS. HALSEY: Each activity is mandated individually, and we often will have analysis where we'll find that some of the activities are mandated and other activities are not mandated. And their law could change to affect one of those activities and not another activity.

MS. CAPLAN: Well, I understand that.

But then it seems to me then, that the -so then what you're actually saying is that every -because -- the mandate determination, the statement of
decision, in many instances, sup- -- I don't know what
the right word is -- it encompasses so many different
activities.

And so what you're suggesting is, by the regulations, that anytime -- that only that activity would be separated out and it wouldn't affect the balance of the mandated activities; is that what -- I mean...

CAMILLE SHELTON: Well, let me just explain that the activities that are listed in the statement of decisions are those that are mandated by the plain language of the statute. The Commission does not exercise discretion on those activities. It's a question of law, okay.

So they're not necessarily the same activities 1 as those that are listed in the P's & G's. Because in 2 the P's & G's, the Commission has discretion to add more 3 activities that are reasonably necessary to comply with 4 the mandated activities. 5 It would not be appropriate for a request for 6 redetermination to be filed if somebody was trying to 7 change one of those extra activities that the Commission 8 found to be reasonably necessary because that's 9 discretionary. They do that for a P's & G's amendment. 10 It would only be appropriate to file a 11 redetermination if the subsequent change in the law 12 changes one of those activities that was -- or continues 13 to be, or maybe no longer is -- mandated by the statute. 14 Do you see what I'm saying? 15 MS. CAPLAN: Yes, except that then you're 16 saying that each statement of determination actually 17 encompasses, in most instances, many, many substatements 18 of decision. So if you were to refer to a particular 19 mandate, it would not accurately reflect the number of 20 mandates found in that statement of decision. 21 Correct. CAMILLE SHELTON: 22 MS. CAPLAN: Or statement of determination. 23 CAMILLE SHELTON: That's absolutely correct, 24 except a lot of times, the title of it does incorporate

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kind of the whole topic of what we're talking about. But you're absolutely right, each one is individual, each 2 activity goes through a full-blown analysis. 3 MS. CAPLAN: Well, I quess I would just say 4 that from the point of view of being on the outside of 5 this, to some extent, that doesn't appear to be the way 6 the mandate process really works because -- well, I'm 7 saying in the sense that the statewide estimate is for 8 all the activities found within the statement of 9 10 determination. CAMILLE SHELTON: That's correct; but it's 11 based on how test --12 MEMBER ALEX: Can I interrupt here? 13 Sure. CAMILLE SHELTON: 14 MEMBER ALEX: I'm sorry. This seems like a 15 staff discussion that probably is not appropriate for the 16 board hearing. 17 I wonder, either if you could have this 18 discussion, maybe we take a break or something, or if 19 you can state very crisply exactly what your concern is 20 as to why you want the change that you've discussed. 21 MS. CAPLAN: Thank you, and I apologize for 22 getting sidetracked. But I think you can see why 23 there's, I think, some difficulty in understanding how 24 this regulation would be applied and would actually work. 25

And what I'm hearing actually confirms, I think, the concerns, which is, the way that the mandates -- at least from -- again, externally, to the outside world -- you say, you know, people refer to the mandate reimbursement process mandate, or the Open Meetings Act mandate.

Now, within those mandates, there may be a number of reimbursable activities. And what I understand Ms. Shelton to be saying -- perhaps correctly -- is that each of those activities is technically considered a separate mandate. I don't think that's how we normally talk about them, but perhaps that's technically true.

When we talk about funding for them in the annual budget, it's not treated as separate activities; it's treated as the collection of activities under Open Meetings Act or the collection of activities mandated under MRP, whatever it is. That's the way we typically talk about them.

So if the intent of the statute and the regulations is to allow for a new test-claim determination process to be commenced anytime one of those activities within any one of those dozens and dozens of mandates has changed in some way -- either to become more expensive or less expensive -- what I hear is that the regulations allow for the commencement of a

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new test-claim determination. And I think that's fundamentally problematic, because -- well, because if each activity is considered its own mandate, then any change to the State's liability, whether it's up or down, is going to affect that mandate determination, quote, unquote, because it's considered a separate mandate.

MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Chair, that's not what I heard. Because I think the change would require a fundamental change to determine whether or not there is still a mandate or not.

If there's an up or down liability issue, that can be handled in the P's & G's. That's what I heard counsel saying, and I think that's how it works.

So you don't go back to the underlying question just because the cost went up or it went down. You don't go back to determine is there still a mandate or not a mandate; the mandate language hasn't changed.

So you don't go back and seek a redetermination of mandate. You'd go back and say, for a P's & G's request modification because of changed circumstances, not to the mandate itself but to the actual costs, up or down.

CAMILLE SHELTON: Can I -- I'm sorry. I was just going to say, the proposed regulations do require Commission staff to go through a completeness review when

a request for redetermination is filed.

Part of that completeness review would be to review the request to see if there is a subsequent change in the law and there's an allegation that the State's liability has changed.

If it really looks to staff that it really is not a proper request for redetermination but is a proper, maybe, P's & G's amendment, we'll send it back. So there's a checks-and-balances at the early stage to determine that.

If the parties don't like the Commission staff review or the decision on completeness, somebody can appeal the ED decision and take it to the Commission.

So there are checks and balances along the way.

You know, I will say that CSBA has filed a petition for writ of mandate to challenge the underlying statutes. We are complying with the underlying statutes to initially adopt the emergency regs and now to make those emergency regs permanent. That, the Commission doesn't have a choice about.

CHAIR REYES: Mr. Burdick, do you want to...

MR. BURDICK: Yes, Chairman Reyes and Members,
Allan Burdick. I provide staff both to CSAC and
California League of Cities advisory committee on state
mandates.

And I want point out that the League and CSAC attorneys have been working closely with the School Boards Association on this issue.

And I think that based on the discussion today, it sounds to me like -- I thought we had understood what was happening, but I'm not sure we do. And I don't know whether these have to be -- as emergency -- have to be adopted today or whether they could -- oh, do they?

Because this discussion is becoming a little problematic in terms of whether we have an understanding of what it's really doing.

I think we all acknowledge that the underlying statute was a problem. The language in that was not as clear as we wanted. We worked with the authors on that, and were unable to get the LAO to take some amendments we had requested.

So I guess if there isn't time, but I think that this sounds like -- this discussion is something where -- it's a little bit different than I think both CSAC and the League and their attorneys had discussed. I don't know. And so I just was going to see whether we could put it over, delay it; but it looks like from Camille's standpoint, maybe there was --

MS. HALSEY: There would be a lapse in the regulations. And if anybody were to file a

Commission on State Mandates - March 24, 2011 redetermination request, we'd have to just use the statutes and not have any procedures of the Commission's to deal with. We would just have to deal with it kind of haphazardly, which wouldn't be good. It would create problems with CAMILLE SHELTON: whatever procedure we use, because it could be seen as an underground regulation. CHAIR REYES: And you're saying, the statute is

CHAIR REYES: And you're saying, the statute is ambiguous?

I'm kidding.

MS. CAPLAN: CSBA --

MS. HALSEY: It doesn't say how you have to file what needs to be included in the filing, those kinds of things, and so...

CHAIR REYES: Okay, so it would be my understanding that you went through the process, comments were received, you responded to those comments; where appropriate, you reflected those comments.

And now, we have this regulation before us.

We have to either -- if we postpone for a month to give

you more time to go and discuss, we are then with a lapse
in regulations because the emergency regulations would
have lapsed; or we take the regulations, the staff
recommendation now, which is to adopt the regulations
proposed, that folks have concerns with that.

If we adopt these regulations, can they be amended in the future to try to address some of the issues that are being raised now?

CAMILLE SHELTON: Absolutely. Under the Commission's regulations now, any party may request that the Commission start a new regulatory package.

CHAIR REYES: Okay. I just wanted to make sure I understand what our options are.

You say you had a second issue that you wanted to raise; but I prefer that we don't go back and forth.

MS. CAPLAN: I understand.

CHAIR REYES: Okay.

MS. CAPLAN: I understand. And I did want to just -- just on one point, to finish it -- just to respond to Commissioner Worthley. The way, as I understand what you've indicated and the staff, if a mandate -- an Open Meetings Act, some broad mandate, what we talk about as a mandate, it consists of several different activities, and the State provides fee authority for one of those activities, and it's enough to cover the entire activity, then that's my understanding, is that that would be subject to the new test-claim determination.

But then that activity would be taken out of the rest of the mandate and not affect the underlying

State liability for the rest of the mandate. So you would actually be seeking a new test-claim determination for each -- for a particular activity within a mandate.

Just to be clear, I think that's what you were saying.

So I think that's -- whether that's problematic or not, I think that's what the understanding is.

The second point I wanted to get to is, the two hearings and the burden of proof -- and the Commission has -- the staff has indicated that the substantial evidence pretty much covers that.

I would disagree only to the extent that they cite the NRDC case. The NRDC case had a two-phase process, but the first phase, you had to produce scientific evidence to show that a particular species was endangered or not endangered.

If you made the prima facie showing -- and there was an evidentiary standard that you had to meet for that, then the second phase was, you got -- the NRDC would actually conduct a yearlong scientific exploration. So it was a very different process.

Because here, all you have to do is show a substantial possibility -- not even a probability -- that the underlying statute is -- liability has been changed, and then the second hearing is exactly the same thing, so there is no difference between the second hearing and the

And there's no burden of proof on the first hearing. 1 requester in the first hearing except to show that they 2 are likely to get to the second hearing. So that's not 3 really a substantive burden of proof. 4 The NRDC case itself talks about the burden of 5 proof or the evidentiary standard that's imposed on the 6 petitioner or on the requester is different from the 7 ultimate legal standard that the Commission's decisions 8 have to meet if they're reviewed in court. 9 substantial evidence. 10 So substantial evidence doesn't really tell you 11 what the burden is on the person who is actually bringing 12 the petition or the new test-claim determination request 13 in this case. 14 So, again, I understand the time concerns and 15 the time constraints; but we wanted to point out, I 16 think, that that's something that is lacking in the 17 current regulations and perhaps needs to be remedied. 18 CHAIR REYES: Okay. How does the Commission 19 wish to proceed? 20 Is there any other additional comments or 21 questions from anybody? 22 (No response) 23 CHAIR REYES: What is the will of the 24 Commission? Do we accept this staff recommendation of 25

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1	the regulations? Do we postpone and pray that the
2	statute is clear enough when we know it's not? Or hold
3	it off, or try to amend it here?
4	MEMBER OLSEN: Well, I would suggest that
5	I mean, I'm willing to move the regulatory package as it
6	now stands.
7	However, I do think that the Board's second
8	argument, second issue is a kind of compelling issue.
9	And I just would want that statement out there, that
10	I actually find that to be a compelling issue.
11	But I will move the regulatory packet so that
12	we're not in a gap.
13	MEMBER CHIVARO: I'll second.
14	CHAIR REYES: It's been moved and seconded.
15	Any additional comments?
16	(No response)
17	CHAIR REYES: Okay, Drew?
18	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Alex?
19	MEMBER ALEX: Aye.
20	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Chivaro?
21	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
22	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Glaab?
23	MEMBER GLAAB: Aye.
24	MR. BOHAN: Mr. Lujano?
25	MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.

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MR. BOHAN: Ms. Olsen?
MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
MR. BOHAN: Mr. Worthley?
MEMBER WORTHLEY: Aye.
MR. BOHAN: And Mr. Reyes?
CHAIR REYES: Aye.
Item 15 is consent.
Item 16 is County Applications for Findings of
Significant Financial Distress. There are none.
Item 17, staff report on legislation.
Nancy?
MS. PATTON: There are three bills that affect
the mandates process right now.
AB 202, by Assembly Member Brownley, is a spot
bill right now sponsored by the Assembly Education
Committee. So I don't really know what they have planned
for that bill at this point.
SB 64 by Senator Liu is sponsored by the
California Association of School Business Officials,
California School Boards Association, and School
Innovations and Advocacy.
And this bill proposes to revise the process
for how school districts file test claims. And we met
with the staff from the sponsors' and the author's office
and just talked to them about how it would work. And at

Commission on State Mandates - March 24, 2011 this point, they are going to go back, and they're 1 contemplating amendments. So I am not doing any analysis 2 on this yet because I think it's going to change. 3 And the final one is SB 112, also by Carol Liu. This bill is sponsored by the State Controller's Office. 5 It would do a couple of things. 6 It would provide the State Controller with 7 30 additional days to issue claiming instructions. And 8 it would clarify that when we adopt amendments to the 9 boilerplate language in P's & G's and those amendments do 10 not result in any increase or decrease in costs, it would 11 limit the period of reimbursement and make it prospective 12 only. So that when there's no cost involved and these 13 are just technical amendments, you couldn't go back and 14

And those are the three bills that are pending right now in the mandates process.

CHAIR REYES: Thank you.

re-file and open up the claiming period again.

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Ms. Shelton, Chief Counsel's Report?

CAMILLE SHELTON: Thank you.

Just a couple of new filings.

As I mentioned earlier, CSBA has filed a lawsuit challenging the redetermination statutes in addition to the budget trailer bills that were enacted for this last budget. They are also challenging actually

all of Government Code section 17500 with respect to the school districts.

The second case is a cross-petition filed by the County of Los Angeles and the cities on that water permit that we just discussed earlier. They are challenging the activities that were denied by the Commission.

One case has been dismissed. The County of Santa Clara, their IRC on Handicapped and Disabled Students. Their IRC is scheduled for the Commission's May hearing calendar.

There is a hearing scheduled for tomorrow on the cross-petition for the County of San Diego on their water permit. There is a demurrer filed by the State, and the Court will conduct a hearing on that issue tomorrow.

Just a couple of cases of interest that I wanted to highlight.

The first one, a published opinion issued by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in CSBA vs. State.

That case dealt with the deferral of mandates for school districts. And the Court found that the deferral was not appropriate and unconstitutional to do that. But the remedy is provided in statute in 17612, to allow the local government to go file a dec relief action in

Sacramento County Superior Court to enjoin the 1 2 enforcement of that statute. And that remedy is 3 appropriate. So the claimants in that case were trying to 4 get the Court to direct an appropriation, and the Court 5 6 did not do that. On the back, on page 4, another school --7 California School Boards Association vs. Arnold 8 Schwarzenegger, challenging the blue-pencil appropriation 9 for Handicapped and Disabled Students. And the 10 allegation there was that the Governor -- there was 11 a separation of powers violation with the Governor 12 actually suspending the program. The Court disagreed 13 with that petition and denied that petition, saying that 14 the Governor wasn't exercising suspension authority but 15 was exercising appropriately the blue-pencil authority, 16 and found that to be appropriate. 17 Those are two published decisions. 18 And that's all I've got. 19 CHAIR REYES: Thank you. 20 Drew, Executive? 21 MR. BOHAN: The Executive Director report is in 22 I just want to highlight one thing that's 23 vour binder. not in it and one thing that is. 24 The first is, you may have noticed, those of 25

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you that have been on the Commission for a little while, some changes to the test claims and some of the other documents. We've beefed up the executive summaries a bit and have added in a claims chart as a reference tool; and would welcome your feedback on whether those are good, bad, or indifferent. You, obviously, can call us anytime you want or we can talk after or if you want to talk during the session.

The second thing I want to highlight is the backlog reduction plan that we've been working on. Staff has a draft. And what this is, is in your September 15th report to the Director of Finance last year, in 2010, you indicated that you were going to prepare a backlog reduction plan for incorrect reduction claims. And staff got to talking about this and sketching it out a little bit; and it seemed to us that it made sense. wanted to propose this to you this morning to really look at the whole package. Because every minute we shift from test claims to focus on IRCs is a minute lost on our test-claim work. And literally staff, here, we're going to go to lunch together and we're going to go back to the office, and we're focusing on next meeting, which has a due date of a week from today, to make sure that all of our test claim IRC and P's & G's draft staff analyses are done, and folks from the outside can review them.

So we wanted to propose that to you. And if I don't hear any response, we'll assume that that's -- silence is agreement, and we'll package a plan to try to deal with the entire backlog that's identified in specific numbers in the report.

And just a quick highlight on it.

The test claims, most of you know this, but very briefly, we've got about 15. We've knocked off a couple today, so I'm not sure of the exact number, but about 15 test claims from 2002. These were when, before the statute was amended, to narrow the time frame within which you could make claims going back. And so we have -- you know, I think our documents cite 400 statutes and 500 regs that are cited in these 2002 test claims.

Our plan contemplates completing these all by the end of this calendar year at best; and at worst, this next fiscal year. And then we'll be able to move on, and we get into when we think we can get up to speed, and it's in a couple years. So we'd get rid of '02, let's say, at the end of this year, if all went perfectly. In calendar year '12, we'd get rid of '03, '04, '05; and the next year, '06, '07, and '08, and by 2013 or so, and the plan will spell that out, we'd be up to speed.

Also I wanted to just point out in terms of IRCs, the oldest one was completed today. It was

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withdrawn, but we had the staff rec prepared. So we got
rid of the oldest one. We're working diligently on the
next oldest one. And so we'll proceed with our standard
approach of dealing with the oldest things first.
However, we met with the claimant community as
was recommended by the Commission at the last meeting,
and we pitched some of the ideas that I've just spelled

We did get a suggestion, though, that we don't necessarily take everything in order. There are times when, because those 2002 claims are largely education-related claims, that we bring in -- we mix and match a little bit. But we'll stay to the spirit of trying to do things in order, in the spirit of fairness.

out, and we got, I think, very positive feedback on that.

And finally, I just wanted to point out of the 363 IRCs that are pending, about 102 of them focus on just two programs. And we've been working closely with Mr. Spano at the Controller's office and the other claimants and others to try to see if we can't resolve some of the issues that would resolve all of those or a good chunk of them in one fell swoop.

And that's all I have.

Thank you.

CHAIR REYES: Thank you.

Public Comment time.

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_	Commission on State Mandates – Mai en 24, 2011
1	I see Mr. Hamilton up front, at the table.
2	Welcome.
3	MR. HAMILTON: Thank you.
4	Richard Hamilton, Director of CSBA Education
5	Legal Alliance.
6	I just wanted to follow up on Ms. Shelton's
7	representations as to the status of litigation.
8	We did file a petition for review with the
9	California Supreme Court of the decision relating to the
10	deferral of payment on mandates.
11	The problem with the Court of Appeals'
12	decision, from our perspective, after having found that
13	this practice of putting a thousand dollars towards each
14	of the education mandates is unconstitutional, is that
15	the Court found that we were not entitled to an
16	injunction that held the Legislature and the Governor to
17	the task of putting into the budget fully funding the
18	mandate, and then making a conscious decision whether to
19	zero it out or to fully fund it, or actually suspend the
20	mandate expressly in a statute.
21	That's the process that's outlined in the code.
22	And this deferral practice allows the Legislature to
23	bypass that process.
24	We want the Legislature to say that that

mandate needs to be performed or not performed. They put

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1 it in place in the first place. 2 The business about trying to get payment, 3 that's what's commonly referred to as the Mandell 4 [phonetic] relief, where there is previously appropriated 5 money and allocated that is not used, and are claimants entitled to have that money used to fund the backlog of 6 7 the mandates. 8 Secondly, with regard to the AB 3632 case, dealing with Mental Health services, that's a mandate 9 10 on the counties. The Governor went into the budget --11 it wasn't a line item -- picked out the amount of money that was going to the counties to fund that effort, 12 zeroed it out, and said, "I'm suspending that mandate." 13 14 That was his proposal in the Legislature, that was rejected by the Legislature. 15 16 So the question here is: Is that as far as the 17 Governor can go with that line-item veto? And there will be a petition for review of the 18 19 decision filed as well. 20 Thank you for listening. 21 CHAIR REYES: I think you should recall that 22 Governor. 23 MR. HAMILTON: Thank you. CHAIR REYES: Okay, we will go in closed 24 25 session on some legal matters.

1	I need to read a statement.
2	MEMBER OLSEN: And could we take a five-minute
3	break?
4	CHAIR REYES: Yes, we will do that.
5	I will read this statement.
6	The Commission will meet in closed executive
7	session pursuant to Government Code section 11126,
8	subdivision (e), to confer and receive advice from legal
9	counsel for consideration and action, as necessary and
10	appropriate, upon the pending litigation listed on the
11	published notice and agenda; and to confer with and
12	receive advice from legal counsel regarding potential
13	litigation.
14	I know nobody's interested.
15	We will reconvene in open session in
16	approximately ten to 15 minutes.
17	(A brief break was taken, and the
18	Commission on State Mandates met in
19	closed executive session from
20	11:43 a.m. to 11:55 a.m.)
21	CHAIR REYES: Okay, we're back.
22	The Commission met in closed-session pursuant
23	to Government Code section 11126, subdivision (e), to
24	confer with and receive advice from legal counsel on
25	for the consideration and action, as necessary and

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	Outside of State Hamilton Ham Ett 2011
1	appropriate, under the pending litigation listed on the
2	published notice and agenda; and to confer with and
3	receive advice from legal counsel regarding potential
4	litigation.
5	With no further business to discuss, I'll
6	entertain a motion to adjourn.
7	MEMBER GLAAB: So moved.
8	MEMBER OLSEN: Second.
9	CHAIR REYES: All those in favor, say "aye."
10	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
11	CHAIR REYES: The meeting is adjourned.
12	Thank you, everybody.
13	(The meeting concluded at 11:56 a.m.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify:

That the foregoing proceedings were duly reported by me at the time and place herein specified; and

That the proceedings were reported by me, a duly certified shorthand reporter and a disinterested person, and was thereafter transcribed into typewriting by computer-aided transcription.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand on the $12^{\rm th}$ of April 2011.

Daniel P. Feldhaus California CSR #6949

Registered Diplomate Reporter Certified Realtime Reporter