ORIGINAL

PUBLIC HEARING

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

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RECEIVED

JUN 1 9 2012

TIME: 9:30 a.m.

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

DATE: Friday, May 25, 2012

PLACE: State Capitol, Room 447

Sacramento, California

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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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Reported by:

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COMMISSIONERS PRESENT

PEDRO REYES
(Commission Chair)
Representative for ANA MATOSANTOS, Director
State Department of Finance

KEN ALEX
Director
Office of Planning & Research

RICHARD CHIVARO
Representative for JOHN CHIANG
State Controller

FRANCISCO LUJANO
Representative for BILL LOCKYER
State Treasurer

SARAH OLSEN Public Member

M. CARMEN RAMIREZ
Oxnard City Council Member

DON SAYLOR
Yolo County Supervisor
Local Agency Member

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COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT

HEATHER HALSEY
Executive Director
(Items 2, 11, and 14)

NANCY PATTON
Assistant Executive Director
(Item 12)

CAMILLE SHELTON
Chief Legal Counsel
(Items 5 and 13)

PARTICIPATING COMMISSION STAFF

continued

ERIC FELLER
Senior Staff Counsel
(Items 3 and 6)

KENNY LOUIE
Staff Counsel
(Item 4)

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PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 3:

For County of Los Angeles:

LEONARD KAYE
County of Los Angeles
Department of Auditor-Controller
500 West Temple Street, Suite 603
Los Angeles, California 90012

LORI A. HARRIS
County of Los Angeles
Law Offices of the Public Defender
312 So. Hill Street, 3rd Floor
Los Angeles, California 90013

For Department of Finance:

SUSAN GEANACOU Senior Staff Attorney Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, California 95814

CARLA SHELTON

Department of Finance
915 L Street
Sacramento, California 95814

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 4:

For Clovis Unified School District:

ARTHUR PALKOWITZ Stutz, Artiano, Shinoff & Holtz 2488 Historic Decatur Road, Suite 200 San Diego, California 92106

For Department of Finance:

SUSAN GEANACOU Senior Staff Attorney Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, California 95814

CHRIS FERGUSON Education Systems Unit Department of Finance 915 L Street, 7th Floor Sacramento, California 95814

Appearing Re Item 5:

For City of Newport Beach:

JULIANA F. GMUR Manager, Financial Services MAXIMUS 625 Coolidge Drive, Suite 100 Folsom, California 95630

For Union Sanitary District:

DAVID M. O'HARA Attorney at Law 39300 Civic Center Drive, Suite 110 Fremont, California 94538

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 5:

For Department of Finance:

DONNA FEREBEE
Staff Counsel III
Department of Finance
915 L Street
Sacramento, California 95814

RANDALL WARD Budget Analyst Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, California 95814

For California State Association of Counties SB-90 Service:

ALLAN BURDICK
MGT of America, Inc.
2001 P Street, Suite 200
Sacramento, California 95811

Appearing Re Item 6:

For Castro Valley Unified School District:

ARTHUR PALKOWITZ Stutz, Artiano, Shinoff & Holtz 2488 Historic Decatur Road, Suite 200 San Diego, California 92106

For Department of Finance:

DONNA FEREBEE
Staff Counsel III
Department of Finance
915 L Street
Sacramento, California 95814

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Public Comment

ALLAN BURDICK
MGT of America, Inc.
2001 P Street, Suite 200
Sacramento, California 95811

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1	BE IT REMEMBERED that on Friday, May 25, 2012,
2	commencing at the hour of 9:31 a.m., thereof, at the
3	State Capitol, Room 447, Sacramento, California, before
4	me, DANIEL P. FELDHAUS, CSR #6949, RDR and CRR, the
5	following proceedings were held:
6	∂∞•••≼₅
7	CHAIR REYES: The hour of 9:30 having arrived,
8	we will begin the May $25^{ m th}$ Commission on State Mandates
9	meeting. The meeting will come to order.
10	It is good to be back. I think I've been gone
11	for the last two meetings, so good to see everybody.
12	Please join me in welcoming the new Commission
13	member, Carmen Ramirez. Carmen is currently the City
14	Councilmember for the City of Oxnard.
15	Welcome, Carmen. This is your first meeting.
16	MEMBER RAMIREZ: Thank you very much. I
17	appreciate the confidence.
18	CHAIR REYES: Excellent.
19	And also, this was going to be my first meeting
20	with Don Saylor. I know he was here last time.
21	But please join me in welcoming the new
22	Executive Director, Heather Halsey.
23	Welcome, Heather, in your new role. You were
24	with the Commission before.
25	MS. HALSEY: Thank you.

1	CHAIR REYES: And before we get into the roll
2	call, I would like to personally thank the Selection
3	Committee for all the extra work that was involved in
4	going through this process and finding an executive
5	officer. Thank you very much. It's much appreciated.
6	You'll all get a 20 percent raise on what the
7	Commission pays for that extra effort. And although
8	you
9	MEMBER OLSEN: In the next life, right?
10	CHAIR REYES: There you go.
11	Well, I was debating whether 25 or 50, so
12	But anyhow, so given the economic
13	circumstances, I will go with 20 percent.
14	May we have the roll call, please?
15	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Alex?
16	MEMBER ALEX: Here.
17	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Chivaro?
18	MEMBER CHIVARO: Here.
19	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Lujano?
20	MEMBER LUJANO: Here.
21	MS. HALSEY: Ms. Olsen?
22	MEMBER OLSEN: Here.
23	MS. HALSEY: Ms. Ramirez?
24	MEMBER RAMIREZ: Here.
25	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Saylor?

1	(No response.)
2	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Reyes?
3	CHAIR REYES: Present.
4	Thank you.
5	Are there any objections or corrections to the
6	March 23 rd minutes?
7	MEMBER RAMIREZ: I will be abstaining.
8	CHAIR REYES: Okay.
9	MEMBER OLSEN: I'll move the minutes.
10	CHAIR REYES: It's been moved.
11	Seconded?
12	MEMBER CHIVARO: Second.
13	CHAIR REYES: Moved and seconded.
14	(Commissioner Saylor entered the hearing room.)
15	CHAIR REYES: And the record will show that
16	Commissioner Saylor has joined us.
17	Good morning. Welcome.
18	We'll give him a couple seconds to settle in.
19	Sir, good to see you.
20	Okay, so the minutes have been moved and
21	seconded.
22	All those in favor, say "aye."
23	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
24	CHAIR REYES: Opposed?
25	(No response)

-	
1	CHAIR REYES: And we'll have two abstentions:
2	Myself and Ms. Ramirez.
3	Are we okay with that, in terms of the vote?
4	MS. HALSEY: Yes.
5	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
6	The next item?
7	MS. HALSEY: The next item is the Proposed
8	Consent Calendar, which consists of Items 7, 8, 9, and
9	10.
10	CHAIR REYES: Is there any objection to taking
11	up the consent items?
12	Does anybody want to pull any of the items?
13	(No response)
14	CHAIR REYES: Seeing none, can we take roll
15	call on or is there a motion on the Consent Calendar?
16	MEMBER CHIVARO: I move approval.
17	MEMBER LUJANO: I second.
18	CHAIR REYES: It's been moved and seconded.
19	Any other comments?
20	(No response)
21	CHAIR REYES: All those in favor, say "aye."
22	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
23	CHAIR REYES: Opposed?
24	(No response)
25	CHAIR REYES: The "ayes" have it.

1	Thank you.
2	Ms. Halsey?
3	MS. HALSEY: Item 2 is reserved for appeals of
4	the Executive Director's decision.
5	There are no appeals to consider under Item 2.
6	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
7	MS. HALSEY: So let's go ahead and move to the
8	Article 7 portion of the hearing.
9	Will the parties and witnesses for Items 3, 4,
10	5, and 6 please rise?
11	(The parties and witnesses were sworn.)
12	MS. HALSEY: Senior Staff Counsel Eric Feller
13	will present Item 3, a test claim on Juvenile Offender
14	Treatment Program Court Proceedings.
15	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
16	MR. FELLER: Good morning.
17	CHAIR REYES: Good morning.
18	MR. FELLER: This test claim alleges activities
19	of public defenders in the juvenile justice system as a
20	result of a test-claim statute that realigned the duties
21	of the former Youthful Offender Parole Board and the
22	former California Youth Authority.
23	Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the
24	proposed final staff analysis and statement of decision
25	to deny the test claim for the reasons stated in the

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analysis.
Would the parties and witnesses please state
your names for the record?
MR. KAYE: Leonard Kaye, Los Angeles County.
MS. HARRIS: Lori A. Harris, deputy public
defender from Los Angeles County.
MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, Department of
Finance.
CARLA SHELTON: Carla Shelton, Department of
Finance.
CHAIR REYES: Okay, you've all seen the
analysis.
Mr. Kaye?
MR. KAYE: All? Okay.
CHAIR REYES: Or you may want to I think you
presented
MR. KAYE: It's traditional that staff present.
CHAIR REYES: Go ahead, staff, present.
MR. FELLER: Well, I did.
MR. KAYE: Oh, you just did? Okay.
CHAIR REYES: He did.
MR. KAYE: Okay. We also feel that the record
is complete on our side as well. However, what we wish
to do this morning is briefly highlight some key points
and introduce a few brief exhibits into the record which

1	support our contentions.
2	Lori Harris has prepared Exhibits A through D.
3	We promise that they're brief.
4	CHAIR REYES: Has staff had a chance to look at
5	those exhibits?
6	MR. KAYE: We're going to distribute them now,
7	according to staff's recommendation.
8	CHAIR REYES: Okay.
9	MR. KAYE: So why don't you give that to
10	Camille Shelton?
11	And this has to do with Lori's portion of the
12	presentation. So she will give you an opportunity to
13	respond.
14	And as I say, these brief exhibits illustrate
15	some of the points we'll be making. There is no heavy
16	legal analysis that's required.
17	So let me know when I can begin with my
18	portion, which should be just momentarily.
19	CHAIR REYES: Hold on. Before we move any
20	further here, I have two copies, Camille. I have two
21	copies.
22	I'm looking at this Exhibit 1 is November $6^{ ext{th}}$;
23	another one is November 6 th of 2002; September 24, 2007;
24	November $21^{\rm st}$ of 2008.
25	And I'm not quite sure why they would not have

1	been the other one is at the bottom of the page, in
2	Exhibit D. I'm looking at December 2003.
3	MR. KAYE: Commissioner Reyes, we apologize for
4	any delay that we may have had. These recently came to
5	our attention.
6	CHAIR REYES: Finance did not get a copy of
7	this, Camille.
8	CAMILLE SHELTON: I'm sorry?
9	CHAIR REYES: Did Finance get a copy of this?
10	CAMILLE SHELTON: I'm sorry. You did not?
11	Okay.
12	CHAIR REYES: So are we complete with A, B, C,
13	and D exhibits?
14	MR. KAYE: Yes, that is correct.
15	We debated whether to give you these exhibits
16	during Lori's portion; but we felt it very important to
17	do it in the beginning. And we'll be getting to those
18	a brief discussion of those exhibits in a little bit.
19	First of all, let us say that we are very
20	pleased to have the Commission's time to consider our
21	case. We feel that apart from issues of equity, as a
22	matter of law, this program is SB 90-reimbursable.
23	We find that staff and we have a great deal
24	of respect for staff's prowess in this area, they've done
25	a very comprehensive and thorough analysis but we

1 respectfully feel that it's basically wrong.

And what are the reasons for this?

Mainly, staff seems to be basing the recommendation on analysis, which finds that SB 459 mandated that public defenders provide the same services to wards, as were required under prior law. And then they indicate that they have the same right, the public defender has the same right to receive copies of reviews on their behalf, under prior and current law. It sort of ends right there.

For the County, the relevant issue is: Were County Public Defenders mandated to implement new services designed to protect their clients' rights to new treatments specified in SB 459?

And just based upon a statutory analysis, there are a host of new services that are now required for the first time: individual treatment plans, individual education plans -- all these services and many, many other types of new services. And this will be illustrated by some of the exhibits that we'll be going into in a little bit.

And these are not found under prior law. This required our public defender, which, because of due-process requirements, was mandated to provide these new services, and to enforce the law.

The public defender, as you know, is charged with not necessarily representing all defendants, but those that can't afford these services. And, unfortunately, many of them are indigent, so they have no other alternative.

The court has no other mechanism to enforce the law. It's an adversarial proceeding. No one doubts that the prosecuting attorney in this case is, by statute, the district attorney. The district attorney is the sound of one hand clapping. I mean, you have to have a public defender and a district attorney; otherwise, the court is befuddled as to how to proceed. So there is no doubt that this is a mandated program and it's a new program.

And then when you look at what was the legislative intent, and you look at the tremendous number of analyses, newspaper reports, and most importantly, the Inspector General's report, that treatment planning, psychiatric services, and so forth, was nonexistent prior to SB 459. There just wasn't anything.

So the question arises, again: Why claim that it's the same? And staff respectfully suggests that the same type of services as were provided under current, prior law, are the same as those provided now; and they provide a list of 20 or so factors to consider, such as the sophistication or the maturity level of the

1	individual.
2	And this is completely different from an
3	individual education plan which, as you know, under
4	federal requirements, is required to be implemented.
5	So we have further analyses that we have submitted. We
6	stand on the record on that. We feel fairly confident
7	that this will be upheld.
8	But the real proof of the pudding, so to speak,
9	is the fact that we have five or six declarations, with
10	people with personal knowledge of this matter, that have
11	actually done this work, that have actually worked with
12	psychiatric social workers which we've had to hire, and
13	so forth, and provide these new services.
14	And in that regard, I introduce Lori Harris to
15	give some pertinent examples that are tied into her
16	exhibits.
17	MS. HARRIS: Good morning. I'm Lori Harris.
18	I am a Deputy Public Defender from Los Angeles County.
19	And in 2007, I was assigned to join what's called the
20	"DJJ unit." DJJ is the new name for what was formerly
21	known as the California Youth Authority.
22	Our unit was formed in 2004 in response to
23	SB 459. And historically, I think it's important for the
24	Commission to know why SB 459 came about.

25

Generally, it was in response to taxpayer

litigation and other civil litigation in relation to the care and treatment of the children that were housed within the California Youth Authority. Children were being — there were some DUFs, there was some harm done to the children, and there were kids that were not benefiting from the services that were being provided from the Youth Authority.

Now, the documents that you have before you, there is Exhibits A through D. You will note that these are true and correct copies of documents that could be found in court files within Los Angeles County related to the clients that the documents refer to.

For my clients' privacy, their names have been omitted. The only thing that I have added to these documents is highlighted in yellow, where it says "Before SB 459" and the words "Exhibits A through D."

Now, prior to SB 459, it resulted in a change -- SB 459 resulted in a change to what my obligation as counsel would be to a child who was committed to the Youth Authority.

So once a judge committed a child to the Youth Authority prior to SB 459, our office would monitor to make sure that the child got proper credits and actually got moved off. And then their case was basically put on a file and we were done with it.

And we never really heard about that child again until it was time for them to be considered for parole. And then at that time, DJJ would send out a letter saying that in 30 days' time you can expect that this child will be considered for parole. And there was no communication between our agency or, really, the court prior to SB 459.

Then after SB 459 -- so we have this letter here. And it is referred to as "Exhibit A."

The name of the child has been removed from the document, but it will indicate to you that the Youth Authority has reviewed the documents that were sent by the court and has decided to accept that child. And that's what you would normally receive. And then the County would have a responsibility for transferring that child to the Youth Authority within 90 days in order for there to be action on the acceptance.

After SB 459, in Exhibit B, that document indicates that, as required by SB 459, the Division of Juvenile Justice has, in fact, done an individualized change plan. And the individualized change plan is an analysis of the care and treatment that would be required for the care and rehabilitation of that minor.

Now, if you look at Exhibit -- CHAIR REYES: Hold on a second, though.

The individualized plan is required, but was 1 the child not entitled to that plan prior to SB 459 as a 2 3 matter of course? I mean, you talk about kids being hurt in the 4 Youth Authority. And technically, while not required by 5 law, there are certain rights that those kids had. 6 MS. HARRIS: Okay, if I could refer you to 7 Exhibit D, Exhibit D is a document that I retrieved from 8 the Department of Youth Authority Institutional Camps 9 Manual. The only thing that I added to that document, is 10 the highlighted portion that says "After SB 459" and the 11 words "Exhibit D." 12 You will note that therein, they list the 13 things that they are now required to do as a result of 14 the change in statute. 15 And the language at the side that -- there's a 16 line that runs vertically down the page; and in the 17 middle of that line, it says "New." That line was 18 created and printed by the Youth Authority at the time of 19 the preparation of that document. 20 And while it may be true that -- the Inspector 21 General's report, I believe that you have, indicates that 22 there was substantial substandard services that were 23 provided to the young people that were in the facility; 24

and that is why the Legislature took it upon themselves

25

to do this analysis to decide what kinds of care and treatment should happen and what authority does the court have in order to act upon it.

So the Owens court said that the court can't just substitute its judgment and move in and say, "Okay,

this child is not doing well within Youth Authority, and I'm going to move them out," or "This child is ready to parole and I'm going to move them out."

The Owens court wrote quite clear that the court does not have that authority.

SB 459 was designed to respond to that, and to give the court the authority to do that. But the court is a neutral and detached entity. They have no mechanism for getting to a child and removing them, or getting to a child and taking an action upon their case to determine what it is that they need.

And because of SB 459, our office formed, in response to this must, this mandate, to contact and monitor and evaluate the services that were provided to our clients. Because each kid is different, they're there for different reasons, and they present with different problems.

MEMBER ALEX: Excuse me, can I --

MS. HARRIS: And these children have dueprocess rights to counsel.

1	CHAIR REYES: Mr. Alex?
2	MS. HARRIS: Yes?
3	MEMBER ALEX: Let me ask you this way: If the
4	court determined that, as a constitutional matter, that
5	an individual should have been provided a right to
6	counsel and had previously not been, would that be a
7	mandated state obligation or would that have been simply
8	that the service had not been provided previously and was
9	a violation of the law?
10	MS. HARRIS: I'm not certain what you're asking
11	me.
12	I think what you're asking me is: If a kid has
13	a right to have an attorney, does the state have to
14	provide it?
15	MEMBER ALEX: Well, let's say that the
16	procedure before was, as a matter of course, no attorney
17	was provided; and then a court decides that either as a
18	statute or a constitutional provision, in fact, there is
19	an obligation to provide an attorney.
20	Does that create a state-mandated requirement
21	for which there is compensation?
22	MS. HARRIS: As long as you're going to have
23	the district attorney continuing to represent the people
24	of the state of California, then I believe that it does.
25	It doesn't make any sense for you to say that

1	you have a right to have counsel if a child is indigent.
2	Clearly, it has no meaning. Due process doesn't mean
3	anything if, in fact, you're not going to put something
4	behind it.
5	CHAIR REYES: Ms. Shelton?
6	CAMILLE SHELTON: Just to add a couple of
7	things on that very point.
8	A mandate exists only if a state statute or a
9	state executive order requires the public defender's
10	office to do something.
11	What has been discussed here are underlying
12	constitutional due-process requirements to allow the
13	child to have the right to counsel, which have existed
14	always.
15	If a court now is going to say that the public
16	defender needs to step in, that is a mandate by the
17	court, or required under constitutional law, and by a
18	long line of cases. That is not a state-mandated
19	program.
20	MR. KAYE: May I respond?
21	I think Camille is right, generally.
22	But in this particular case, we would rely upon
23	cases such as the San Diego Unified School District case,
24	33 Cal.App.4 th 859, which said that if the state creates
25	a mandate, then the courts have a which requires due

1	process, that even the federal due-process procedures
2	and requirements are now state-mandated and state-
3	reimbursable.
4	So there is a fine point that has to be put on
5	all of this. The issue is basically: Is this a new
6	state mandate?
7	And we would point out on a purely
8	plain-reading statutory basis, you won't find the
9	requirements to have the individual education plan, you
10	won't find the requirements to have individual treatment
11	plans, progress reports in statute before SB 459. They
12	may have been occasionally, or now and then, required in
13	specific cases; but the statutory requirement started
14	with 459.
15	Thank you.
16	CHAIR REYES: Ms. Shelton?
17	CAMILLE SHELTON: The San Diego Unified School
18	District case is completely distinguishable from this
19	case.
20	In that case, those statutes dealt with the
21	expulsion and suspension procedures for students in K-12
22	education. And they, on the plain language of those
23	statutes, explicitly provided excess due-process
24	requirements in order to expel or suspend a student.
25	Here, on these statutes that are pled, there is

.1

nothing requiring local government to do anything. These statutes were transferring duties from the Youthful Offender Parole Board to the CYA. So nothing on the face of these statutes requires local government to do anything.

Some of the information -- if you turn to page 31 of the analysis, there was a lot of prior regulations that were imposed on the Youthful Offender Parole Board. And under prior law, it did have to have an initial case conference conducted of the ward. They had to provide complete medical diagnostic services upon commitment to the CYA. And there were initial case conferences and annual reviews, all of which the ward had the right to request counsel.

So really, the statute is transferring just those duties. And certainly, they probably -- the communication and the services may have gotten better with CYA, when it transferred to CYA; but, again, those deputies imposed on the public defender's office under due process are not mandated by the state.

MR. KAYE: This is Leonard Kaye.

In response to Camille's thing, I refer you to Bates page 116. This is an excerpt at the bottom of the page from the California performance review in 2002, which, as many of you know, at the time was a very, very

1	comprehensive review conducted by experts out of the
2	state executive office that appointed various panels of
3	experts. And they did a very thorough analysis of this
4	matter.
5	And the title the headline for this thing
6	and I'll just read a sentence or so, it's found on Bates
7	page 116: "Judges and probation officers have no
8	role in decisions to continue incarceration."
9	And it says, "The California Youth Authority
10	has not been mandated to involve local courts, judges,
11	and probation officers in the treatment and incarceration
12	of youthful offenders. And one superior court judge
13	noted recently in correspondence to Senator Gloria
14	Romero, that local juvenile justice systems are not
15	afforded the opportunity to oversee or be involved in
16	decisions affecting wards committed to the California
17	Youth Authority."
18	And it goes on and on and on. But the basic
19	point is, there was no mandate before SB 459; now, there
20	is.
21	CHAIR REYES: Ms. Shelton?
22	CAMILLE SHELTON: The information that Mr. Kaye
23	is referring to, is the statutory change to section 1720.
24	And there, it did require the CYA to provide reports to
25	the court and to the parole officer That's a mandate on

CYA. It is not a mandate by the plain language on local government.

MS. HARRIS: However, it's my understanding that once this court gets this information, there is no mechanism for the court to take any action to do anything. And the monitoring that happens by the public defender's DJJ unit allows them to have some meaning behind these empty reports that they might receive.

So my role as a DJJ lawyer changes a bit because when I'm in the trial court, I'm clearly simply advocating for the child that is before the court and representing their interests.

Once I move into the role as DJJ unit attorney, then I am a liaison between the court and the youth and the Youth Authority, to let the court know exactly what is going on within the institution with the individualized child.

So I'm the eyes and ears of the court. And they may receive a report like you have in Exhibit C, which is a progress report. So Exhibit B is the initial report that they receive from CYA. Exhibit C is a progress report. And I'm in a position to give meaning to these words that are put on a page, to let the court know what exactly is happening with the ward.

And just to give you an example of the type of

1	work that we do in the CYA unit or the DJJ unit, is I
2	attend hearings with the client, to make sure that
3	they're getting appropriate services that would be within
4	CYA. I monitor their medical treatment. I monitor that
5	they are getting appropriate mental health treatment.
6	We have had clients who, after getting to CYA,
7	it became apparent that they were mentally disabled,
8	developmentally disabled, and that they were being
9	required to interact with materials that were presented
10	to them at a higher level than they could handle of the
11	curriculum. So we work with them to have adjustments
12	made to the curriculum, so that they could be successful.
13	CHAIR REYES: Mr. Saylor, and then Mr. Feller.
14	MEMBER SAYLOR: I'm interested in what you've
15	described as your duties. And I'm reading through the
16	packet, and see the various elements included in the
17	individualized change plan.
18	Frankly, I'm compelled by the points that
19	Ms. Shelton has made about the absence of a change in
20	responsibility for public defenders as a result of
21	SB 459.
22	MS. HARRIS: Well, we
23	MEMBER SAYLOR: Excuse me, if I may complete
24	MS. HARRIS: I'm sorry.
25	MEMBER SAYLOR: And so my interest is in

understanding specifically what changed in the responsibilities as you've identified them for public defenders in working with these cases.

My reason for asking the question is that the items that you've shown in Exhibit D were, I believe, unchanged for many years prior to SB 459, as requirements as a part of the interaction between the Youth Authority and the YOPB with wards incarcerated in the Youth Authority. So I'm not sure what your case is for what exactly changed for your responsibilities with this measure.

MS. HARRIS: I'm sorry for the confusion.

What I wanted to make sure that was clearly understood is, these documents are in addition to other documents that were provided to the Commission early on in the process.

And the other document --

MEMBER SAYLOR: What specifically changed as a result of the bill for your responsibilities? Because I don't see it.

MS. HARRIS: Okay. All right, well, prior to SB 459, as I said before, we normally closed out our cases, because we treated the clients as if they went to state custody. And now that they -- and they were then a state responsibility. After that SB 459, I continued to

monitor the conditions of confinement. I advocated for the clients to make sure they were receiving appropriate treatment, training, education, and mental health services.

I assured that they were getting the appropriate mental health treatment. And as I said, I gave you an example of a child who was in a sex-offender program which has a very complicated curriculum. We made adjustments to make sure that the curriculum was brought to a level that the developmentally disabled child could understand. We monitored their educational services that they received, to make sure that they're getting appropriate services.

We've had clients who were severely mentally ill, such that it was beyond what CYA could handle. And we brought them back on 779 motions to have their services changed.

Prior to SB 459, that information would not have come to light. We would not have been aware of the condition of that severely disabled client, had it not been for SB 459.

We continue to monitor clients to make sure that they were on track for parole. And that meant in addition to doing the programs that they were ordered to do, that if -- making sure that the programs were made

available to them. Because many times, the young people, 1 without an advocate, would languish in DJJ, waiting on a 2 waiting list to get substance-abuse programming. And 3 they couldn't get in it because the program was full, and 4 so we advocated to make sure they got what they needed. 5 And prior to SB 459, we wouldn't have known 6 about it, wouldn't have been able to do it, wouldn't have 7 been able to act on it. 8 CHAIR REYES: Who wants to go first: Mr. Feller or Ms. Shelton? I'll leave it up to you two. 10 MR. FELLER: I just wanted to emphasize, the 11 mandate question is a question of law. And for us, in 12 this analysis, the main question was the power of the 13 court to change, modify, or set aside an order of 14 15 commitment. And in looking at the legislative history that 16 referred to that in that amendment to section 779 as a 17 clarification and in comparing it to the Owen case, which 18 held that the court has that power where CYA has failed 19 to comply with the law or has abused its discretion in 20 dealing with the ward in its custody, we didn't see on 21 the face of these statutes any new programs or higher 22 levels of service. 23 I just wanted to emphasize that. 24 Ms. Shelton? 25 CHAIR REYES:

CAMILLE SHELTON: Let me just kind of put this 1 whole thing in perspective, maybe. 2 I think a lot of what counsel is arguing, is 3 that there has been better communication because of this 4 statute. And I think that was the intent, right, to 5 switch some of the duties from the Youthful Offender 6 Parole Board to CYA because there were problems. 7 And a lot of times, under old law, they had to 8 do annual reviews. All of those services were supposed 9 to be provided by the board; but they didn't have to turn 10 over their reports to the court or to the parole officer. 11 So I would imagine there probably was miscommunication or 12 noncommunication between, you know, what was going on 13 with the child and, you know, what the court may be 14 potentially overseeing in their role of maintaining 15 jurisdiction over that child. 16 So I'm sure communication has gotten better. 17 But a mandates analysis is not a but-for test. You know, 18 it's not "But for the statute, we've incurred costs." 19 You've got to have a statute or a regulation 20 that directly requires you to perform a new activity. 21 And that has not shown that here. None of these statutes 22 impose anything on the local government. 23 MR. KAYE: Okay, could I respond? 24

Yes.

CHAIR REYES:

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MR. KAYE: We understand Camille's point. And as usual, she is very, very accurate.

However, we feel that in this case, to use her term, is distinguishable, because there have been other cases in the history of SB 90 that necessarily implied mandates have been found to be reimbursable.

And I give you this hypothetical: We all know that the legislative intent for this was to vastly improve whether you call it communication, whatever, the treatment that is provided to these kids. So they weren't getting individual treatment plans, it wasn't in statute, there was no IEPs in statute. All these new services and so forth were to be provided.

So my hypothetical is: What was a judge to do when he got a copy of this report?

He could either do one of two things, let's suppose: He could either throw it in the trash can and ignore it, or he could take action.

Now, we say that it's a necessarily implied mandate because we presume that the judge would take action. And once the action the judge would take, he would have no alternative but to give it to the public defender. He can't give it to the prosecuting attorney, the district attorney who has no role in this type of discovery effort. It's a motion filed by the public

defender. 1 So we feel that it is, in effect, a necessarily 2 implied mandate; and reimbursement should be found in 3 this particular case because it has involved a huge 4 amount of work on the part of the public defender to 5 handle the avalanche of cases and treatment requirements 6 that are flooding our juvenile courts. 7 CHAIR REYES: Okay, so we have staff's 8 recommendation. We have clearly disagreement. 9 I'm not seeing Finance grabbing the microphone. 10 So I think they're happy with staff's -- Commissioner 11 12 Ramirez? MEMBER RAMIREZ: May I ask a question? 13 CHAIR REYES: Yes. 14 MEMBER RAMIREZ: I'm really interested in what 15 you just said, Mr. Kaye, on "necessarily implied" 16 17 mandate. I'd like to have Camille respond to that. 18 CAMILLE SHELTON: Since I've been here -- I 19 don't know about 15 years -- there have been occasions 20 where there are statutes that do impose activities on 21 local government by the plain language. But you don't 22 really know what it means, what the language means. And 23 so through statutory interpretation, you have to kind of 24 understand what that activity requires. And in some of 25

1	those cases, you would certainly imply something.
2	As an example, there was a statute for a report
3	given from one school district to the other school
4	district; but the plain language said that the second
5	school district
6	MEMBER OLSEN: Receive.
7	CAMILLE SHELTON: receive yes, received
8	the report yes, received the report; but there was no
9	requirement for the other the first school district to
10	provide it. And so, obviously, there needs to be a
11	requirement to provide it in order for the second school
12	district to receive it.
13	We've only done that when the statute on its
14	plain language does impose an activity on local
15	government.
16	Again, these statutes don't impose any
17	activities on local government.
18	MEMBER OLSEN: Well, if I might on that one, on
19	that case, I believe
20	CHAIR REYES: Ms. Olsen, do you want to turn on
21	your microphone?
22	MEMBER OLSEN: I'm sorry.
23	I believe the finding of the Commission on that
24	case was that the providing district, it wasn't a
25	mandate, but that it could be taken care of in the

1 P's and G's. CAMILLE SHELTON: Correct. And, you know, that 2 is where the Commission has discretion to include 3 activities that are reasonably necessary to comply with a 4 mandate. But you have to find a mandate first. As a 5 question of law, like Mr. Feller was saying, you have to 6 find a mandate in the language of the statute first. 7 MS. HARRIS: May I be heard? 8 Due process requires that people have 9 representation at every stage of any important 10 11 proceeding, okay. Now, my understanding of SB 459 imposed on 12 counsel an obligation to the post-dispositional child. 13 Prior to SB 459, we didn't have such an obligation. A 14 post-dispositional child was -- their case was shelved 15 and we were done with it. 16 In order for the court to take any kind of 17 action to have any kind of meaning for these simple 18 reports that are coming across their desk, there needs to 19 be active interaction and monitoring to know exactly what 20 it means, what's available, what can be done, whether the 21 child is materially benefitting or not, or if it requires 22 some change in action. 23 CHAIR REYES: Commissioner Saylor? 24

MEMBER SAYLOR:

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It just strikes me generally,

that prior to SB 459, there were activist judges who 1 obtained the information that would be now provided to 2 everyone as a result of the language in SB 459. 3 judges then would need to take whatever action was at 4 their discretion to unfold their commitment or their 5 disposition. So that prior to the legislation, there 6 already were mechanisms in place for judges and public 7 defenders, presumably, and others to look into these 8 9 matters. This simply -- this measure simply allows -- or 10 it simply requires the State to perform something that 11 it didn't perform before, and was a reorganization of 12

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responsibilities at the state level.

I'm failing to see a new requirement or mandated activity, though I appreciate that the tools that are now available to local judges and public defenders and communities to look into the cases more thoroughly after the kid has been sent to another location is a value to society. I don't see it as new mandated state activity.

MR. KAYE: And on that, Commissioner -- on that, we respectfully disagree.

I think if you'll look at the statutory requirements after SB 459, you'll find a whole host, a paragraph filled with specific requirements. And these are specific mandated requirements, as I said, that are heading their way towards the juvenile courts; and the judge has two choices: He can either trash-can them or he can implement them. And we presume that he would want to implement them.

Now, the big difference, before SB 459 -you're absolutely right, the judge from Santa Clara
County and a number of others were very active. But this
was on an ad hoc, idiosyncratic basis, and they would
have their pet treatment programs or this or that, or
legislators, and they would go to them and get results.
But that is definitely not a state-mandated situation.
That is a situation where judges took the initiative at
their discretion and solved the problem. And we applaud
that.

But this clearly is a uniform and reliable implementation of a new treatment standard. And I don't see any way around that.

CHAIR REYES: Ms. Olsen?

MEMBER OLSEN: I guess I'm struck by the idea that maybe this is the difference between a state mandate and a professional compulsion. That because information has improved and because the system at the state level has become more transparent, that you, as legal professionals, feel more compelled to provide services.

1	But that is not necessarily the same thing as a
2	state-mandated program.
3	And I think we're all sympathetic to the costs
4	you may be incurring because you are needing to do this
5	for your clients. But, again, as with Mr. Saylor, I'm
6	not seeing where the state mandate is.
7	MR. KAYE: Okay. And to that, we simply reply,
8	it's a due-process requirement that if a child is
9	entitled to a service and is not being provided that
10	service, then they have a due-process right and a new
11	remedy to get the new service. That's where our
12	difference is.
13	CHAIR REYES: Are there any further questions
14	from board members?
15	(No response)
16	CHAIR REYES: Anybody else from the public that
17	would like to speak on this subject?
18	(No response)
19	CHAIR REYES: Finance?
20	CARLA SHELTON: We would just like to support
21	the staff recommendation to deny the test claim.
22	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
23	Is there a motion?
24	MEMBER CHIVARO: I'll move adoption of the
25	staff recommendation.

1	MEMBER ALEX: Second.
2	CHAIR REYES: It's been moved and seconded.
3	Any additional comments?
4	(No response)
5	CHAIR REYES: All in favor, say "aye."
6	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
7	CHAIR REYES: Opposed?
8	(No response)
9	CHAIR REYES: Abstentions?
10	(No response)
11	CHAIR REYES: The "ayes" have it.
12	Thank you.
13	MR. KAYE: Thank you.
14	MS. HARRIS: Thank you.
15	MS. HALSEY: Moving on to Item 4, Commission
16	Counsel Kenny Louie will present Item 4, a test claim on
17	Public Contracts for school districts and community
18	college districts.
19	MR. LOUIE: This test claim addresses
20	allegations of public contract requirements imposed on
21	school districts and community college districts when
22	contracting for goods, services, and public works
23	projects.
24	Staff recommends that the Commission deny some
25	of the alleged public contracting activities on the basis

that the activities are triggered by the discretionary 1 decision to purchase goods and services and undertake 2 public works projects. This finding is consistent with 3 prior Commission decisions. 4 The claimants continue to disagree with the 5 staff's recommendation of a denial on this basis. 6 Finance disagrees with the recommended partial 7 approval contending that sufficient funding has been 8 provided for the test-claim activities through various 9 state grant programs and local fee authority for school 10 11 districts. However, none of the grant programs cited to 12 appropriate monies specifically intended to fund the 13 specific activities approved in this test claim. 14 In addition, the fee authority cited to does 15 not cover all of the activities -- or cannot be used for 16 all of the activities that have been approved in this 17 18 claim. Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the 19 staff analysis and the proposed statement of decision to 20 partially approve the test claim. 21 22 Will the parties and witnesses state their names for the record, please? 23 MR. PALKOWITZ: Good morning. Arthur Palkowitz 24 on behalf of the claimant. 25

1	MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, Department of
2	Finance.
3	MR. FERGUSON: Chris Ferguson, Department of
4	Finance.
5	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
6	It's been presented.
7	MR. PALKOWITZ: Yes, thank you.
8	CHAIR REYES: At this point, we have that
9	neither party agrees with the staff's analysis; is that
10	correct?
11	So you disagree with what's been approved, and
12	you disagree with what's been denied?
13	MR. FERGUSON: I would say we don't necessarily
14	disagree 100 percent. We believe it should be much more
15	narrowly confined.
16	CHAIR REYES: Okay, all right, go ahead.
17	MR. PALKOWITZ: Thank you, sir.
18	This test claim relates to activities that are
19	involved when you're doing construction. The activities
20	are listed as approximately 13 activities that involve
21	the bidding process, selecting the vendor, dealing with
22	minorities when it comes to who should be selected.
23	Staff has, out of the 13 activities, has
24	approved four and partially approved one and denied
25	approximately four activities. And I would like to

address those four activities that were denied.

approved relate to repair and maintenance type of work that staff has concluded is required by statute. Repair and maintenance, we're referring to usually school-related facilities. And staff said that based on statutes requiring that schools maintain and repair facilities, that those activities are then triggered by a statute that's reimbursable.

The denial of the activities, staff is concluding, do not relate to repair and maintenance; and, therefore, there is a belief that those activities are discretionary and are not required by the statute and is the basis for the denial.

Staff, in their thorough analysis, goes to great lengths on several pages. And I'd like to just highlight some of that.

Staff -- and so what we're really dealing with as an issue is, the need to build schools and other school-related facilities, and is that a requirement under the law.

Staff comments that the courts have consistently held publication as a matter of statewide concern, not local concern, which is the basis of the reimbursable state mandate process.

It goes on -- and they cite authority in the Butte versus California case. It also talks about that it is legislative policy that the state strengthen and be responsible for the control of school districts.

It is the State that holds title to the school districts. So we have evidence here -- ample evidence to show that this is a statewide, not a local concern.

And the authority that the staff is relying upon to say, "No, it's really a local decision and therefore, since it's a local decision, it is not a statewide mandate that should be approved for reimbursement" -- and they're relying on a Santa Barbara School District case that occurred fifty years ago. And in that case, the school district was faced with a decision to condemn schools based on the amount of repair greatly exceeded a value that they felt the school was worth; and there was other facilities able to absorb the children.

Based on that decision by the local, which was a local decision on what to do with a school, is the basis that they're using to show that since this is a local decision on whether you have or have not schools, it is then not a statewide decision.

Now, in that case, what I think is clearly easy to distinguish, is that the Court said, as long as there

are -- let me get the correct language here. 1 MS. HALSEY: Could you point us to the page 2 that you're --3 MR. PALKOWITZ: Of course. I'm sorry. It's 4 page 25 of the staff analysis. 5 And I apologize, I've lost my place here. 6 And in the first paragraph, near the end of the 7 paragraph, it said that, "The court held that absent 8 proof that there were no school facilities to absorb the 9 students, the school district, 'in the reasonable 10 exercise of its discretion, ' could lawfully take this 11 12 action." And I think this is the paramount part of the 13 discussion. What happened is, a school district made a 14 decision that they could lawfully take an action to close 15 down a school; and on the other flip side, they could 16 make a lawful decision to open a school. But when it 17 does that, in this case, there has to be proof that there 18 can be a facility to absorb it. 19 And that argument, contrary, is used when you 20 want to build a school; and that there is no way to 21 absorb the children, so now, the decision is, you must 22 23 build a school. That is not meant to be a discretionary 24 decision by a local that should bar it from being 25

reimbursed for the construction costs. 1 I think the previous page comments on how the 2 staff recommends -- or states, rather -- that there is a 3 statewide obligation to build schools, a statewide 4 5 obligation to provide free public education. Either can be viewed as this being a legal 6 compulsion or a practical compulsion to have schools 7 throughout the state; and that decision is not a 8 discretionary decision that a local has and, therefore, 9 should not preclude it from being reimbursed for 10 11 activities. CHAIR REYES: Let me ask you a question, 12 though: Has there been case law now that, in fact, 13 requires the State to build schools for local districts? 14 Or is it a permissive program under the State Allocation 15 Board Office of Public School Construction? 16 MR. PALKOWITZ: Has there been case law? 17 CHAIR REYES: Yes, is there case law that says, 18 "The state shall provide school facilities for kids"? 19 I'll agree that we have compulsory education, 20 kids under 16 must attend school. But is there a case 21 law or in statute that says, "And the state shall provide 22 for those school facilities"? 23 MR. PALKOWITZ: Well, there is no statute that 24 25 says you provide for teachers.

1	CHAIR REYES: That's not the question.
2	The question is because you say that the
3	State requires that you provide the school facilities.
4	MR. PALKOWITZ: Right.
5	CHAIR REYES: And so what is the citation for
6	that?
7	You're talking to the chair of the State
8	Allocation Board, by the way, in all fairness.
9	MR. PALKOWITZ: Thank you for that disclosure.
10	I think we have to not leave our common sense
11	outside the room here. That if we have to provide a
12	CHAIR REYES: I vehemently disagree with you on
13	that statement you are about to make because there is no
14	case law, there is nothing, there is no statute, there's
15	no case law.
16	Now, yes, you can argue the common-sense
17	approach, and the common-sense approach, too, is that
18	school districts are responsible for the facilities for
19	the kids and they must provide adequate facilities as
20	well. But that's a different issue of the mandate.
21	I just don't understand that there would be a
22	case law. At this point, I have not been able to find
23	one.
24	Okay, I'm sorry, proceed.
25	MR. PALKOWITZ: That has I believe I've made

my comments that I wanted to make on that issue. 1 CHAIR REYES: Okay. 2 MR. FERGUSON: In response to the staff's 3 analysis, we believe that there should be a more narrowly 4 tailored view of the mandate. 5 Specifically, Education Code 17070.75, which 6 outlines the requirements of the School Facilities 7 Program and participation in it, clearly states that any 8 applicant shall maintain and keep in good repair those 9 10 facilities. As such, any of those facilities should not 11 apply to this particular mandated claim for additional 12 contracting requirements, because as a condition of 13 participating in the School Facilities Program, they have 14 agreed to maintain those facilities. So it's a condition 15 of building; therefore, we don't see that as subject to 16 the partial mandate claim that's here, because they're 17 required to do that. 18 In addition, we also see that staff's analysis 19 references Education Code section 17002, which has the 20 definition for "good repair." 21 We would note that the definition for "good 22 repair" is further defined in the Emergency Repair 23 Program under section 17592 point -- I believe it's 75? 24 MS. GEANACOU: .70. 25

MR. FERGUSON: -- .70, which clearly identifies what are the emergency repairs and maintenance that are needed.

And if we look at that, it clearly identifies that all of those activities under section 17002 constitute emergency repairs.

So we would disagree that those would apply to this mandate claim.

To the extent that there are additional activities required when contracting for maintenance and repair, we would then state that the deferred maintenance program, which provides approximately \$250 million annually on a matching basis to school district funds, would cover any costs borne from the additional contracting requirements of the Public Contracting Code.

I think the staff's analysis states that while the program doesn't explicitly authorize the use of those funds for contracting, that that means it would be precluded from using that money for contracting.

However, we disagree; and we've been in contact with staff from the Office of Public School Construction who clearly have told us that school districts do, in fact, use that funding to pay for some of the contracting-related activities of their maintenance and repair.

1	MR. LOUIE: I'd just like to clarify that last
2	statement. That was in the draft staff analysis. We've
3	amended that in the final staff analysis to find that
4	those funds could be used but are not required to be used
5	for those purposes.
6	Additionally, the funding under SFFR, it's a
7	voluntary program. There is no in evidence in the
8	record in this particular record that any of the
9	school districts have clearly, they probably have.
10	But in this record, there is no evidence that school
11	districts have applied for that funding, nor is there
12	any specific requirement in that funding to use those
13	funds for these specific activities.
14	MR. FERGUSON: Sure. And we agree with that to
15	the extent there is no specific funding requirement to
16	it. But we would argue that those funds should be used
17	to offset any costs to the extent that they are used by
18	districts for that purpose.
19	MR. LOUIE: And I believe that we've allowed
20	for that within the findings of the staff analysis.
21	MR. PALKOWITZ: If I may respond?
22	CHAIR REYES: Hold on. Ms. Shelton has a
23	point.
24	Go ahead.
25	CAMILLE SHELTON: I was trying to understand

1	Finance's argument just a little bit more.
2	I think it is your argument that you're trying
3	to except from the mandate those districts that
4	participate in those grant programs, so that they would
5	not be eligible to claim reimbursement if they
6	participate in the School Facilities Program and the
7	Deferred Maintenance Program?
8	MR. FERGUSON: Correct, correct, those should
9	be excepted.
10	CAMILLE SHELTON: Okay, that's an interesting
11	argument. I have never heard it that way before.
12	The problem with that is that that is a grant
13	program, and they voluntarily entered that program.
14	The statutes that Mr. Louie was talking about
15	for repair and maintenance are statutes and requirements
16	imposed on all school districts, regardless of whether
17	they are participating in the School Facilities Program
18	or the Deferred Maintenance Program.
19	So they all school districts regardless,
20	are required to repair and maintain facilities.
21	CHAIR REYES: Mr. Ferguson, is it your position
22	that the State grant program meets 100 percent of the
23	needs for the maintenance and repair to the statewide
24	school district the school districts and throughout
25	the state?

1	MR. FERGUSON: No, that's not my position.
2	My position is that as a condition of accepting those
3	grant funds, they've agreed to do the activity, and that
4	includes the maintenance and repair of those facilities
5	to keep them in good repair. So any of the facilities
6	built under that program necessarily require that. And
7	that was a discretionary choice of the school districts
8	to participate in the School Facilities Program.
9	Therefore, it is a discretionary downstream activity
10	requirement.
11	CHAIR REYES: But if they did not participate
12	in the State's program and they built it out of their
13	own?
14	MR. FERGUSON: That is where we would agree
15	with the staff.
16	CAMILLE SHELTON: So what their argument is
17	doing, they're making it a mandate issue, and our
18	analysis is making it a cost issue.
19	I still strongly believe that it's not a
20	mandate issue because by law, those two statutes or
21	that one statute that requires repair and maintenance
22	is imposed on everybody, regardless of their decision.
23	CHAIR REYES: Everybody. Regardless of who
24	paid for the funding and whether or not they
25	participated.

CAMILLE SHELTON: Right. 1 CHAIR REYES: Yes? 2 MS. GEANACOU: May I ask -- I think it's maybe 3 a rhetorical or an actual question. 4 5 Susan Geanacou from Finance. I was just looking at the order in which the 6 statutes were adopted. The General Repair and 7 Maintenance statute, 17- --8 MR. FERGUSON: -565. 9 MS. GEANACOU: -565, I think is what is cited, 10 was a 1996 enacted statute. 11 And I think it was two years later that the 12 School Facilities Program, a piece of which is 17070.75, 13 said if schools elect to take that grant money, optional 14 money, to build their schools, with it comes the 15 attendant requirement on them to repair and maintain 16 their schools, which is a two-year later, arguably more 17 specific statute, so that they were aware of the prior 18 requirement; but then came along the assumption of 19 responsibility to, if they take the money, take on the 20 cost and responsibility of repairing and maintaining. 21 CAMILLE SHELTON: Do you have anything on that? 22 I believe the repair and maintenance statute, although it 23 may have been renumbered, I think that's been in law for 24 25 a long time.

1	We have other test claims that we have had a
2	triggering point for repair and maintenance. And without
3	having the Ed. Code with me do you have that?
4	MR. FERGUSON: That's correct, I don't have the
5	Ed. Code in front of me.
6	CAMILLE SHELTON: Okay.
7	MR. FERGUSON: But that's correct. So what
8	we're arguing here is that any of those
9	contracting-related activities specific to School
10	Facilities Program-built facilities should be excluded
11	from the mandate claim because, as a condition of
12	participating in that program, you have agreed to
13	maintain and repair those facilities. Therefore, you
14	should be excluded.
15	CAMILLE SHELTON: But their whatever their
16	decision is, they are still required by state law,
17	regardless of those local decisions that they made, to
18	repair and maintain under 170 I didn't write it
19	down 17065, or whatever that statute.
20	MR. FERGUSON: Yes, 17565.
21	So we're agreeing with you in those regards.
22	CAMILLE SHELTON: Right.
23	MR. FERGUSON: But we're saying it should be
24	more narrowly tailored to exclude any facilities that
25	were constructed under the School Facilities Program.

CHAIR REYES: So your position is if a school 1 facility -- if a school district participated in the 2 School Facilities Program in accepting that 3 4 participation, whether 50 percent or for hardship, a higher percentage, the agreement was made by that school 5 district that they will assume all maintenance and 6 responsibilities downstream --7 MR. FERGUSON: Correct. 8 CHAIR REYES: -- indefinitely? 9 MR. FERGUSON: That is correct. 10 In fact, within that, there is the routine 11 restricted maintenance account, which requires school 12 districts to set aside a portion of their general fund 13 monies for the purpose of maintaining those facilities, 14 built under the School Facilities Program. 15 CHAIR REYES: So under that scenario then, the 16 Emergency Repair Grant Program, does that mean that the 17 school facilities -- because the school districts that 18 participate in the school construction program can't tap 19 those? Because you sort of -- if I'm a school, and I tap 20 the School Construction grant bond program, then I assume 21 all responsibility for downstream of construction -- I 22 mean, for repairs, then the state grants for repairs, am 23 I then kicked out of that? 24 MR. FERGUSON: No, you would not. But that is, 25

again, a discretionary choice of the State to settle the Williams lawsuit and provide additional assistance to school districts for those types of repairs. But it does not mean that that is a mandate of the state; that is simply assistance of the state to school districts.

CAMILLE SHELTON: The argument is not working with case law with me. I mean, with case law, it says

with case law with me. I mean, with case law, it says you have to look at your triggering point. And if your triggering point in law requires you to do something, then downstream from that, new state-imposed requirements are eligible for reimbursement. So that's what the staff recommendation is.

Now, also the staff recommendation does point out all of the grant programs and the funding that you've identified. And to the extent that they receive that money and they apply it to the contracting activities, then those would be offsetting revenue and have to be reduced in their reimbursement claim.

But I don't see an argument that would allow the Commission to exclude those districts that participate in those grant programs. Mandates doesn't work like that.

MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou from Finance.

Then what would the Commission staff then think of the requirement of participating in the School

Facilities Program to repair and maintain? 1 CAMILLE SHELTON: Well, those -- I understand, 2 you're trying to say there is an overlap in statutes, and 3 that is hard for me to conceptualize. I understand what 4 5 you're saying. Those test claims have been filed and have been 6 denied by the Commission. So that was claimed in those 7 test claims that "once we participated in those funding 8 programs, we were required to comply with all these 9 activities." But independent of those programs, there's 10 a separate requirement in law to repair and maintain. 11 And those statutes haven't changed. They can't be 12 13 ignored. MR. FERGUSON: We're not disagreeing with what 14 you're saying, necessarily. What we're saying is that 15 further downstream, any district that elected to 16 participate in the program necessarily waived their right 17 to claim that mandate funding because they agreed to, as 18 a condition of participating in that program, to repair 19 and maintain the facility. 20 CAMILLE SHELTON: Well, I guess from the State 21 Allocation Board, when money -- when a school district 22 comes before the board, they apply for specific projects, 23 24 right?

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CHAIR REYES: They apply for construction,

modernization. 1 Let's think of this as new construction. 2 So what I'm hearing Mr. Ferguson say is if I'm 3 a school district, and I come up to the OPSC, and I seek 4 a grant for participation by the State in new 5 construction, and the project is -- I'm just going to say 6 \$10 million for lack of a better number, the locals put 7 five, the state puts five. 8 In accepting the five from the State, the 9 locals, therefore, assume all responsibility for 10 maintaining and repairing that facility. 11 So under your argument, Mr. Ferguson, is that 12 if years later, when there's a need to repair and this 13 statute kicks in, and says, "It needs repair, therefore, 14 you need to pay it," then by virtue of the fact that they 15 participate in the OPSC program, they're not entitled to 16 that mandate, but they're required to repair because they 17 now have met a substandard -- whether they recognize it 18 on their own or not, it is below standard and they need 19 to take care of it? 20 MR. FERGUSON: That would be correct. 21 CHAIR REYES: Okay. Commissioner Olsen, then 22 Commissioner Saylor. 23 MEMBER OLSEN: So it seems to me that that's 24 not an issue of whether there's a mandate.

That's an

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1	issue for the P's & G's.
2	That's a claiming issue; isn't it?
3	CAMILLE SHELTON: Well, we have it as
4	It's what? I'm sorry.
5	MEMBER OLSEN: It's a claiming issue?
6	CAMILLE SHELTON: Well, and that's how we've
7	written the analysis. I still think of it as a claiming
8	issue and an offset issue.
9	CHAIR REYES: I kind of agree with you there
10	because the broad law would be schools you're all
11	required to pay, to take care of the maintenance and
12	repairs; and then if you happen to participate through
13	this program, you're exempted from doing that, then
14	you're exempted.
15	But overall, all schools and then it's in
16	the P's & G's that you didn't differentiate who would and
17	who would not.
18	MS. GEANACOU: I don't think the analysis is
19	written that way, though, that it would
20	CAMILLE SHELTON: Well, maybe I'm missing
21	something. The analysis, as written, were those grant
22	funding programs are identified as offsetting revenue.
23	So to the
24	CHAIR REYES: But you're talking about the
25	offsetting for the emergency repair for the

1	offsetting. Not necessarily if you originally were built
2	through OPSC.
3	MEMBER LUJANO: I'd like to note that we have
4	specifically excluded new construction in this claim.
5	MS. HALSEY: Yes. Can I clarify? Because I
6	think I'm understanding what everybody is saying and kind
7	of going this way, because I did the School Facilities
8	Funding Requirement test claim.
9	But I think what Finance is arguing is, if you
10	build a new school and you're using school-facility
11	program financing, then you have entered into a
12	commitment for eternity to then repair and maintain that
13	at your own expense. And, therefore, you cannot be
14	eligible for reimbursement under a state mandate to
15	repair and maintain.
16	That's the argument, right?
17	MR. FERGUSON: That's correct.
18	MS. HALSEY: And then in our analysis, we find
19	a duty to repair and maintain is reimbursable. However,
20	there is also a state facility program for modernization
21	that can be used for major repairs and maintenance.
22	That's a separate issue.
23	CHAIR REYES: Right.
24	MS. HALSEY: That is a program you can apply
25	for. And in our analysis, we say you can use that as

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offsetting for the mandate, so...
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               CHAIR REYES: But you don't make the
2
     distinction whether or not the school was originally
3
4
     built for the OPSC?
               MS. HALSEY: Right, we don't.
5
                And also, just something to think about, if
6
     that's where the Commissioners are thinking of going:
7
     You can't say a school district isn't eligible because it
8
     would be a facility-by0facility.
9
                CHAIR REYES: Right.
10
                CAMILLE SHELTON: Exactly.
11
                MS. HALSEY: Whether or not they were built
12
     with the school -- and I don't know if there's even a way
13
14
     to track that.
                CHAIR REYES: Right. It gets back to the --
15
     Commissioner Olsen?
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                MEMBER OLSEN: Take care of it in the
17
     P's & G's.
18
                MS. HALSEY: Well, no, but I mean, as a claim,
19
      it could be -- I don't know how you would even do it in
20
      claiming, because I don't know how you track whether a
21
      school has been built with School Facilities Program
22
      funds, particularly schools that are really old,
23
      50 years -- I don't know how long these records are kept.
24
      Or I don't know what that would mean for claiming.
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1	don't have anyone here from the State Controller's office
2	that could speak to that.
3	CHAIR REYES: Well, let's have Mr. Ferguson
4	answer that question, then we will go back to
5	Commissioner Saylor.
6	MR. FERGUSON: I know under the late 90's,
7	under the lease purchase program, which was the prior
8	iteration of the School Facilities Program, we do have
9	data of schools constructed under those programs. We
10	know school-site by school-site what was constructed at
11	those schools.
12	CHAIR REYES: Okay.
13	MS. GEANACOU: I want to add, I don't think
14	Finance is arguing that whole school districts be
15	excluded because they may or may not have ever used the
16	school facility funding to build one or more of their
17	schools.
18	I think we just want to see in the analysis
19	an acknowledgment that for districts that did do
20	CHAIR REYES: "If the project" Call it a
21	"project."
22	MS. GEANACOU: Project-specific, yes.
23	CHAIR REYES: Project-specific?
24	Commissioner Saylor?
25	MEMBER SAYLOR: So on the issue there are

two issues, as I'm hearing: One is new construction and one is repair and maintenance.

It strikes me for repair and maintenance, that the staff analysis is on target.

Here is the circumstance that I see: If we've required somebody to do something in return for a grant and then we change the cost and procedures involved with that requirement, then that seems to me to be a mandate. Because we've required -- in fact, it's an even stronger one because we're requiring them to do something, and now we're adding an additional requirement downstream that they had no eyes open to understand that they were going to be facing at a later time.

We could just as easily require that as a part of any repair and maintenance, they lower the light switches from four feet to three feet. And that's a new cost, but we could say that's simply a matter of repair and maintenance to meet current standards.

So I think for the repair and maintenance portion, I certainly agree with the Commission staff that these procedural contractual, procedural requirements are a new mandate and we ought to figure out how to appropriately set the claim process.

For new construction, it strikes me then that our witness here said something about common sense. And

it strikes me that school districts don't have
unfettered, unlimited discretion in the area of whether
or not they construct schools. And, frankly, the State
Allocation Board is not paying for the full cost of
school construction, and hasn't and can't.

So what we have is a set of -- a framework,
I think, of statutes from the federal and state
governments, the "free and appropriate public education

in the least restrictive environment..." and all of that -structure that people have to live within, health and
safety requirements, where, what patterns of growth are.

12 It strikes me that there are limits to what we would think of as discretion.

This statute establishes a requirement. The requirement is that certain contractual procedures have to fall in place. That's a mandate. To me, that's a mandate.

And I don't care -- we can say that they don't have to build schools; but practically speaking, that's not accurate.

This is a requirement for people, when they are taking an action, they must fulfill this new requirement. That sounds like a mandate to me, under law and under practical common sense.

CAMILLE SHELTON: Can I just clarify that the

1	recommendation here on the the activities are
2	triggered only for repair and maintenance of existing
3	facilities. So we're not even talking about new
4	construction.
5	MEMBER SAYLOR: Well, I am.
6	CAMILLE SHELTON: Oh, you are? I'm sorry.
7	MEMBER SAYLOR: I am definitely talking about
8	new construction because I believe that is a part of the
9	statute that sets up the contractual requirements.
10	CAMILLE SHELTON: Okay.
11	MEMBER SAYLOR: And while the Commission staff
12	recommendation is not to identify these requirements for
13	new construction as a mandate, I disagree with that
14	because in practical terms, I don't I'm not compelled
15	that whether or not school districts have the discretion
16	is the relevant point. It seems to me that there is a
17	new requirement placed on them when they take a certain
18	action. And that requirement is a mandate.
19	So I believe that that's a mandate that we
20	should be identifying for reimbursement.
21	MR. PALKOWITZ: If I may follow up
22	CHAIR REYES: Yes.
23	MR. PALKOWITZ: to your previous question as
24	far as the legal authority.
25	And I'm not aware of one, but there is a

1	California Supreme Court case that follows, and that line
2	of thinking is that it could be legal or practical
3	compulsion. And that is really what I believe is correct
4	as far as the practical compulsion, that there really,
5	really is no discretionary decision on a board making a
6	decision and moving forward for a new school facility.
7	When a board goes through that analysis, they
8	have exhausted every alternative which is required under
9	CEQA and other requirements. It's not that school
10	districts are building new facilities because they have
11	extra money or there is no need for it. I mean, there is
12	an exhaustive process that's done.
13	CHAIR REYES: I'm just thinking of Elk Grove,
14	who built the school and I'm sorry.
15	MR. PALKOWITZ: Well, you know, there are
16	800 school districts out there, and you could find an
17	exception, but
18	CHAIR REYES: That's what the smile was about.
19	I apologize.
20	MR. PALKOWITZ: Yes, that's okay. I'm not
21	offended.
22	And I agree with the other comments that
23	really the other school facilities funding is really a
24	parameters and guidelines issue, so
25	Thank vou.

CHAIR REYES: Mr. Louie?

MR. LOUIE: I would just note, as in prior

Commission decisions, there is a slew of other options,
as pointed out I believe in SFFR and even CEQA, that
there's a slew of other options that districts can take.

And there have been instances based off of policy reasons
why they've -- why districts have decided to build a new
building rather than take the other options.

Here, there's no evidence in the record to suggest one way or the other that school districts, all the time, need to build these districts -- or need to build these schools. We can't find, just on our own, just based off of gut assumption, that this occurs. We can't make our mandates finding based off of that.

MEMBER SAYLOR: I think it's a mandate if you have a requirement for certain procedures.

Now, the school districts can choose to do a number of different things. They can choose to have overcrowded schools forever. But the point is, if they're ever going to have a contract to build something, they have to follow this requirement that's now set out. That's a mandate.

There's argument in the staff analysis about use of developer fees. Well, that's shifting -- that's a tax. If we actually say that we're going to have school

districts tax developers, that is a back door to avoiding a state responsibility.

And there are limits, frankly, to how much

developer impact fees can be raised. So I think it's a specious argument that somehow the district can avoid this cost simply by overcrowding their schools or by operating substandard schools. I don't find that compelling at all.

MS. GEANACOU: Could I make one comment for Finance, please?

CHAIR REYES: Sure.

MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou.

Regarding the Education Code 17070.75 in the School Facilities Program, which imposes on the districts the obligation to maintain and repair if they accept the School Facilities Program money, Mr. Saylor -- if I understood your comments correctly, you were concerned that the Legislature here, in the non-emergency repair contracted out area, has added new requirements on the districts that may not have been specified or are not contained in that statute that they agreed to upon accepting the money. So nothing precludes the state from adding on additional requirements.

And so you think that's a mandate?

I want to make sure I understood what you were

saying. 1 MEMBER SAYLOR: As I understand the measure, 2 the issue before us, is that as a requirement for 3 contract procedures for specific elements of the 4 contracting process. So that's a specific mandate. 5 Whether we're -- every time that a school district 6 chooses to take an action, whether it's for new 7 construction or for repair and maintenance, they must 8 follow this new mandate. 9 Now, I think we can set up some process for 10 what kinds of fees -- or what kinds of P's & G's, 11 parameters and guidelines may go into effect for 12 claiming; but I really hope that this Commission does not 13 dismiss this as not a requirement. 14 It is a requirement. We're saying, "For the 15 repair and maintenance, you're going to have to do this," 16 And we can say, "We're not going to pay you because you 17 agreed to do this forever." 18 Well, frankly, that doesn't seem right because 19 they didn't have any idea that they were going to be 20 facing this new set of requirements. That's a cost. 21 There is a statewide interest. The Legislature 22 has identified clearly a statewide interest in 23 establishing these standard contract procedures. 24

Great.

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It's appropriate. There is nothing

1	wrong with it. But it is requiring local governments to
2	do something they didn't have to do before.
3	That is a mandate. That's a state mandate for
4	every time they choose to or have to do either a new
5	construction or rehab. There has got to be a recognition
6	that that's a mandate; and we should figure out how we're
7	going to pay for it or not. But it is a requirement that
8	we're imposing on local government.
9	CHAIR REYES: Well, the Commission has to
10	decide whether or not it's a mandate.
11	MEMBER SAYLOR: Okay, well, that's my vote.
12	CHAIR REYES: Go ahead, Susan, you had a
13	question, or you wanted a clarification?
14	MS. GEANACOU: Well, I wanted to make sure I
15	understand what he was saying.
16	I think my concern on behalf of Finance is that
17	when the districts assume that obligation, I think it's
18	with the awareness that the Legislature can subsequently
19	amend or alter what the duty of repair and maintaining
20	involves.
21	And I'd be eager to hear what the Commission
22	staff has on that line of thinking.
23	CAMILLE SHELTON: Okay, there is case law from
24	the California Supreme Court.
25	If these public contract duties were placed in

the School Facilities Program statutes, or the Deferred Maintenance statutes, or the Emergency -- whatever --2 fund statutes, then the courts have said that that 3 initial decision to participate in that program is a 4 discretionary program of the school district, and the 5 Legislature can subsequently impose requirements. 6 And, yes, they're required to do those things; but those 7 are not state-mandated programs. 8 So you have to look at the underlying decision. 9

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If the underlying decision is discretionary, then any downstream requirement imposed by the Legislature is not mandated by the statute, okay.

So here, we have a -- it's kind of not the same because these test-claim statutes were not placed in these voluntary programs. They were not intended to be included in the voluntary programs. They're outside of They're imposed on every school district. And so that's the distinction.

Mandates law is very difficult, the Supreme Court has determined, because you are looking at it in the abstract. You don't have, usually, a lot of facts to show you what is really going on.

So what the court has said is, you have to perform that legal analysis, just like I explained. If you want to get to a practical compulsion situation,

1	though, the claimant has the burden to bring in
2	substantial evidence in the record.
3	We don't have any evidence filed here. I don't
4	have any evidence from a school district saying they have
5	exhausted all their alternatives and have felt compelled
6	to build new construction and then, therefore, they've
7	got to comply with all these downstream requirements.
8	If they had that, then that would be something we would
9	have to absolutely consider.
10	CHAIR REYES: Your point?
11	MR. PALKOWITZ: I'm not aware of there being a
12	court that has ruled the State School Facilities is not a
13	mandate.
14	CAMILLE SHELTON: The courts haven't, no.
15	The Commission has made that ruling.
16	The case law I'm talking about is San Diego
17	Unified School District, Kern High School District, and
18	the Department of Finance versus Commission on State
19	Mandates POBR case.
20	MR. PALKOWITZ: I just want to clarify that
21	there is no court that has made a ruling on school
22	facilities or deferred maintenance programs.
23	CHAIR REYES: Mr. Alex?
24	MEMBER ALEX: So, I don't want to get into a
25	debate over this, but I do want to make the point that as

1	director of the Office of Planning and Research, we see,
2	on a fairly regular basis, school districts that are
3	building schools in areas that, from a state perspective,
4	we may not think is appropriate.
5	And so I don't think that that creates that
6	building a new construction is necessarily a state
7	mandate. And I concur that there is no evidence in the
8	record that would support it on this particular record.
9	MEMBER SAYLOR: No, the contractual procedures
10	are the mandate.
11	MEMBER ALEX: That was his second step.
12	CHAIR REYES: Commissioner Saylor, do you have
13	your mike on?
14	Okay, anybody else?
15	(No response)
16	CHAIR REYES: Any other questions?
17	(No response)
18	CHAIR REYES: Okay, there are several
19	recommendations from staff. There are some denied, some
20	approved, and then there's some partially approved.
21	We can take all in bulk and see where the votes
22	go, or we can go one by one and see where the votes go.
23	And what it would take is a motion from somebody to get
24	the ball rolling.
25	CHAIR REYES: Commissioner Olsen?

1	MEMBER OLSEN: Well, I'll move staff
2	recommendation, and we'll see what happens with that.
3	MEMBER LUJANO: I'll second.
4	MEMBER OLSEN: And then we can go back, if we
5	need to.
6	CHAIR REYES: Okay, staff's recommendation has
7	been moved and seconded.
8	Commissioner Ramos?
9	MEMBER RAMIREZ: Aye.
10	CHAIR REYES: Okay, let's do
11	MS. HALSEY: Call the roll?
12	CHAIR REYES: Call the roll.
13	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Alex?
14	MEMBER ALEX: Aye.
15	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Chivaro?
16	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
17	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Lujano?
18	MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.
19	MS. HALSEY: Ms. Olsen?
20	MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
21	MS. HALSEY: Ms. Ramirez?
22	MEMBER RAMIREZ: Aye.
23	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Saylor?
24	MEMBER SAYLOR: No.
25	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Reyes?

1	CHAIR REYES: Aye.
2	MEMBER SAYLOR: If I could make a brief
3	comment?
4	CHAIR REYES: Yes.
5	MEMBER SAYLOR: I'll make it very briefly, and
6	I won't do this often.
7	But I would support the staff recommendation
8	pertaining to repair and maintenance, obviously; but I
9	disagree with the other part. And so that was the reason
10	for my vote in this case.
11	CHAIR REYES: Thank you, sir.
12	Let's take a five-minute recess, if we can,
13	very quickly. And be back here by 11:00, please.
14	(Recess from 10:53 a.m. to 11:01 a.m.)
15	CHAIR REYES: Okay, we're back.
16	MS. HALSEY: Item 5, Chief Counsel Camille
17	Shelton will present Item 5, a test claim on Local Agency
18	Ethics, AB 1234.
19	CAMILLE SHELTON: This test claim addresses the
20	required policy-making, reporting, record-keeping, and
21	ethics training and notice requirements imposed on local
22	agencies if they provide any type of compensation,
23	salary, or stipend to a member of a legislative body, or
24	provide reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses
25	incurred by a member of a legislative body in the

performance of official duties.

Staff finds that some of the code sections pled impose a reimbursable state-mandated program only on general-law counties and those eligible special districts subject to the tax-and-spend provisions of articles XIII A and XIII B that are required by their enabling acts to provide reimbursement to the members of legislative bodies.

Claimant City of Newport Beach did not file any comments on the draft staff analysis, and Finance did file comments concurring. However, the co-claimant Union Sanitary District argues that it is an eligible claimant because it operates primarily on proceeds of taxes, is subject to the tax-and-spend limitations of the California Constitution, and, under Prop. 218, the sewer service charges that it imposes are considered special taxes.

However, staff finds that the evidence in the record does not support the co-claimant's assertions that its charges have been determined to be proceeds of taxes; and staff finds that the co-claimant is not subject to the tax-and-spend restrictions of the California Constitution and, thus, not eligible to claim reimbursement under this program.

Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the

1	staff analysis and proposed statement of decision to
2	partially approve the test claim.
3	Will the parties and witnesses please state
4	your names for the record?
5	MR. O'HARA: David O'Hara, attorney for Union
6	Sanitary District.
7	MS. GMUR: Juliana Gmur on behalf of the City
8	of Newport Beach.
9	MS. FEREBEE: Donna Ferebee, Department of
10	Finance.
11	MR. WARD: Randall Ward, Department of Finance.
12	CHAIR REYES: Okay, thank you.
13	MS. GMUR: Good morning, Commissioners.
14	CHAIR REYES: Good morning.
15	MS. GMUR: The City of Newport Beach would like
16	to compliment staff on its analysis insofar as it
17	addresses issues for cities and counties. We support
18	that analysis.
19	My esteemed co-counsel would like to address
20	the balance of that analysis.
21	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.
22	MR. O'HARA: Honorable Commissioners, I'm here
23	to talk about Union Sanitary District and not the bulk of
24	the staff analysis that relates to the City of Newport
25	Beach.

1	We are not going to be talking about stipends
2	paid to officials attending ethics training or
3	disseminating information regarding the training, or
4	keeping records or expense forms or anything like that.
5	What we seek is the \$32,000 that it cost my client in
6	order to have the materials prepared to provide ethics
7	training in 2006.
8	In that case, it was 240 directors of sanitary
9	districts throughout the state of California who attended
10	a California Association of Sanitation Agencies meeting
11	in Monterey.
12	Since then, there have been two more repeats of
13	the ethics training, using essentially the same
14	materials. But this is a claim that was made in 2007 for
15	a set of expenses, and we have not made any subsequent
16	claims for any further compensation other than the
17	\$32,000 involved here.
18	There are three issues that are dealt with
19	regarding Union Sanitary District that are in the staff
20	analysis.
21	The first issue is: Are the directors of
22	sanitary districts required to be paid?
23	And that's very easy. That's, without a doubt,
24	Health and Safety Code section 6489 states, "Each of the
25	members of the board shall receive compensation in an

amount not to exceed \$100 per day for each day's 1 attendance of meetings of the board." It goes on to say, 2 "up to six different meetings, or six different days of 3 service per month." 4 As a practical matter today, with the 5 adjustments, they get a little over \$200 per meeting. 6 And, of course, the directors who attended ethics 7 training would have been paid by the district, as well as 8 the other 235 attendees in Monterey in 2006. 9 But that's not what we're dealing with here. 10 This is a threshold issue; and that is, that there's an 11 eligibility for mandate compensation if the compensation 12 to directors is mandatory. And, of course, it's 13 mandatory in this case. That isn't clear from the 14 analysis. 15 The second issue is a little more involved, and 16 Are sanitary districts able to raise 17 discretionary funds through sewer service charges? 18 Now, perhaps when I started representing my 19 client 35 years ago, the client could conceivably have 20 raised more funds through their sewer service charges 21 than they really needed to provide the sewer service. 22 But that was all a thing of the past in 1996, when 23 Proposition 218 was passed. 24 25 Now, revenue for operations of sanitary

districts is extremely limited, and there are no discretionary funds at all, or funds for complying with the law that required ethics training.

In 2005, AB 1234 -- or AB 1-2-3-4, as it's referred to -- required that each compensated public official, such as a sanitary district director, must every two years have two hours of ethics training.

The unfortunate situation was that when we got into the summer of 2006, having a deadline of the end of the year to provide the ethics training, the only place I could find that had any ethics training materials available, was one law firm located in Oakland, who provided ethics training for their own clients.

Therefore, under the auspices of the attorneys' committee for the California Association of Sanitation

Agencies -- and I believe your Executive Director was a member of that committee about that time -- several of us volunteered to set about getting a curricula prepared for the ethics training.

As it turned out, I ended up writing virtually all of the written materials, preparing the workbook and the PowerPoint, which was no real problem for me. At that point in time, I was younger and had a little bit more energy than I have today.

And my client, as is stated in the test claim

that we've submitted, paid me a total of \$22,000 for preparation of this particular document, which is a manual that was prepared. I don't have copies because this has been out of print since 2006. But this was the manual that was prepared and distributed to all of the directors who attended the ethics training. And there are other materials that accompanied that and dovetailed in with it.

Now, the question here is: When Union Sanitary District paid to comply with the new AB 1234 law, did they have discretionary funds? In other words, are they an enterprise district that has funds that they can utilize for purposes other than for the treatment and disposal of sewage?

And the answer to that question is, no, they have no discretionary funds because Proposition 218, enacted in 1996, provides that the revenue derived from a fee or a charge relating to public-agency fees, cannot exceed the funds provided to the property-related service.

And there's cases that have established that sewer service charges are properly related charges.

Further, article XIII D of the California

Constitution provides that "Revenues derived from a fee or a charge must not be used for any purpose other than

that for which the fee or charge was imposed." Fairly straightforward there.

These days, sanitary districts are not enterprise districts. I think of an enterprise district as -- I know Washington Hospital in Fremont, they made a profit, they were proud to report in about 2005 or 2006, \$50 million. That's an enterprise.

Union Sanitary District, however, doesn't do anything that would be an enterprise. They don't process their sewage sludge into pellets for sale, like milorganite or some of the other organic fertilizers. They simply collect, treat, and dispose of sewage that is produced by the cities of Fremont, Newark, and Union City.

Part of the scheme of Proposition 218 is that every landowner has a vote in the setting of rates for sanitary services.

Generally, every year, the rates are readjusted; but every landowner has a vote. And the bulk of them -- almost all of the sewer service charges are collected on the tax roll.

And as I indicated in my reply memorandum and provided some exhibits, of the \$30,900,000 that Union Sanitary District had in calendar year 2006, that we're referring to as sewer service charges, \$30,160,000 of

those came from the tax collector.

2.1

So the sanitary districts being unable to provide through their sewer services or their charges, anything in excess of what it costs to treat and dispose of the sewage, has no alternative when they comply with the new requirement, which is obvious in this case, a new requirement that all of the directors receive the ethics training.

Issue number three that comes up then is: Is ethics training a new program? Since it didn't exist, it wasn't required before 2006, from the 2005 legislation, the training has to come from somewhere. It can't come out of the air.

As I indicated, at the time I started working on this project, there was just one law firm that had any type of ethics training that could be provided. The staff has indicated that the FPPC has an online course to comply with the ethics training. However, that course wasn't available until October of 2006; and we presented the first of the ethics trainings in Monterey in August of 2006. And I started working on the project in May of 2006. So there was a vacuum, essentially, as far as the materials were concerned.

In the staff report, it appears that the Department of Finance agrees that this is a new program

1	in that if the sanitary district directors are required
2	to be paid by law, then it is compensable as a state
3	mandate.
4	In closing, we're just asking for the \$32,000,
5	which went for the preparation of materials and arranging
6	the ethics training for the 240 sanitary district
7	directors in Monterey in 2006, and nothing beyond that.
8	So the staff's analysis as it relates to other expenses
9	is not relevant to the claim that we've made here on
10	behalf of Union Sanitary District.
11	CHAIR REYES: Okay, does anybody have any
12	questions?
13	(No response)
14	CHAIR REYES: Staff?
15	(No response)
16	CHAIR REYES: It sounds like we're asking for
17	something that is really not there for us.
18	Go ahead, Ms. Shelton.
19	CAMILLE SHELTON: Well, our analysis is
20	presented a little bit differently. We have separated
21	out the analysis for the Union Sanitary District because
22	of Mr. O'Hara's claim.
23	And the whole purpose of reimbursement under
24	article XIIIB, section 6, is to provide reimbursement to
25	those agencies that are subject to the tax-and-spend

limitations in the Constitution.

The Union Sanitary District does not have any statutory authority to levy taxes. They do have authority to assess fees, and they have decided to assess fees through the ordinance -- through the property taxes of the county. But the money they receive is a fee assessment and not a tax.

There hasn't been any evidence submitted into the record that the District has gone out for a special tax requiring two-thirds vote of the voters to authorize a special tax under Prop. 218, and no voter has come forward whereby the court has ruled that their fees are now taxes. So they don't have authority to levy taxes and their money comes from fee revenue.

The courts have made it pretty clear that the purpose of our article XIIIB, section 6, is not to reimburse for those expenditures of fees or assessments. The purpose is to reimburse for the expenditures of tax revenue. So there's a lot of special districts in the state that are not eligible to claim reimbursement under this process.

With respect to developing the training, our recommendation was based on the plain language of the statute, which imposes the duty to get trained on the individual.

It doesn't, on the plain language, require that the training be developed; and, in fact, there was the training program prepared as Mr. O'Hara was mentioning by the A.G.'s office and FPPC, which was available online, free of charge, by October 1st, '06.

CHAIR REYES: So my take of this is, the closest we can come to this is, if in recovering his \$32,000 he imposed a fee on special districts as part of the cost of providing the ethics training and recover that way, then the special districts would come to us and say, "In order to receive the ethics training, it would cost us X dollars."

Right now, you can get the ethics training for 50 bucks or 500 bucks to recover the costs -- I'm just making up a number. And it's that cost that then comes before the Commission as a reimbursable mandated cost.

And then the question to the Commission is: It is a mandate, but is it reimbursable? And the position of the Commission is that it is not reimbursable because they have fee authority.

The claimants then would say that is not -they don't have a fee authority because it is, A, tax;
and, B, the fee that they currently charge is only for
the processing of the sewage treatment and so forth, and
not for the administrative costs.

1	And then the Commission would then say: Yes,
2	but there is an administrative component to doing that,
3	since the water doesn't turn itself on and off, and
4	somebody has to supervise that person, write the check.
5	So some administrative component would need to be added
6	to the fee structure, which should include the ethics
7	training.
8	Is that
9	CAMILLE SHELTON: Close. Yes.
10	CHAIR REYES: close?
11	Okay, I'm tracking. Go ahead.
12	CAMILLE SHELTON: Well, the only other thing
13	I was going to mention is that the Sanitary District's
14	report to the Controller's office does list their
15	revenues from fee authority and their expenses. And it
16	includes, you know, 12 percent for administration and
17	general expenditures, which is paid for by their fee.
18	CHAIR REYES: Which would have included the
19	ethics training?
20	CAMILLE SHELTON: Right.
21	CHAIR REYES: Mr. Burdick, you joined the
22	table, sir.
23	Welcome.
24	MR. BURDICK: Mr. Chairman, Members of the
25	Commission. Allan Burdick here; and my role is director

of the CSAC SB-90 Service.

And part of it is clarification I kind of want on this issue because I'm a little bit confused. Because the cities have agreed and the League agrees that this is not placing a mandate on cities. However, as I believe the analysis is, that it does place a mandate to some extent, on general-law counties.

So my question kind of -- and it appears that one of the things that counties are responsible for doing is to tell their supervisors about the availability of training. But it doesn't appear that the costs of training or going to the training are reimbursed, if I read it right -- I hope I'm reading it wrong.

So, for example, your board members for the Del Norte County Board of Supervisors who have to receive this ethics training, and the only closest place to get this ethics training is in Sacramento, as an example, it appears to me to say that if those supervisors were then told, yes, the closest, best, cheapest training available is in Sacramento, they had to travel to Sacramento and go, take the training or whatever and come back, then none of those expenses are reimbursable? Am I reading that right? Is that your recommendation?

CAMILLE SHELTON: Well, we haven't reached that issue because there is nothing in the plain language of

1	the statute that requires training be conducted during
2	their normal business hours, number one. And number two,
3	the training is provided free, online. It's a duty
4	imposed on the member of the legislative body.
5	So the requirements are listed or the
6	alleged reimbursable activities that we're recommending
7	reimbursement for are on page 41.
8	MR. BURDICK: Well, I would
9	CAMILLE SHELTON: These are not employees.
10	They're members of a legislative body. It's a little bit
11	different.
12	You know, in past test claims, before the
13	Commission, we've had training claims. And under certain
14	laws and certain federal laws, the agency is required to
15	provide the salary, continued salary of the employee if
16	they receive the training during normal business hours.
17	That law would not apply to a member of a legislative
18	body because they're not employees.
19	MR. BURDICK: They're not employees?
20	CAMILLE SHELTON: Or you could provide some
21	do you have any legal analysis to say otherwise?
22	CHAIR REYES: But I think to Mr. Burdick's
23	point, though, if they don't incur costs to go to the
24	training site, and you're saying because the training is
25	available online and you're not required to go to a

facility...?

MS. HALSEY: Backing up a little bit, it's because the agency's not required to provide the training. It's similar to a professional responsibility requirement, where attorneys may be required to have certain training to maintain their status as attorneys, but the employer is not necessarily required to provide that training. It's on the attorney. It's similar. But it is provided.

MR. BURDICK: A couple things clearly on the online part: This was not available initially, you know, I don't think. There was a lot of confusion earlier.

Now, it may be fine. Back in 2005, I think, when AB 1234 was there, there was real questions who did it, it was done differently, whatever.

Now, you know, seven years later, people got this under control. It's routine. They understand it, whatever.

I'm sure that probably both of our local members have received this training and gone to some training during their tenure, and probably didn't do it online, is my guess. I'm just guessing. Because normally, I think most elected officials go to where the training is provided; provided, generally, the best place for local agencies is by the Institute of Local

Self-Government, an organization of CSAC and the League of Cities, for city and county people.

But that's what I was looking at, it looked pretty clear to me. If I was -- so let's go back to 2005, so we don't have to deal with the other stuff when this first came into place.

I'm a member of the Del Norte County Board of Supervisors. I now have this obligation to get this training. And the only place I can get this training, probably, would be to come to Sacramento, San Francisco, some place. I'd doubt if there's any place north of Sacramento at that time that was providing this training, whether or not the time and expenses of those members.

Also at that time, I know there's some indication about the fact that, you know, level of compensation could be set. Well, when it was passed, those people, for the term of their office, their compensation had been set. That compensation can't be changed, I don't believe. And I'm not an attorney and I'm not sure of that. But generally speaking, elected officials' compensation is set during their term.

And so if, unless you'll say they were getting a hundred dollars a day in Del Norte, it would seem to me that -- and the county had to pay that hundred dollars, that that compensation and their expenses should seem

1	like it would be reimbursable.
2	CHAIR REYES: Well, I think to the first
3	question, would the well, I'll ask the supervisor:
4	If you have to go to a training in your role as a
5	supervisor, does the county have to compensate you for
6	that function, for being gone to do that?
7	MEMBER SAYLOR: Well, they're different.
8	County supervisors and some of the special district
9	people that are being described here are different, so
10	they're
11	CHAIR REYES: All I'm asking you is the
12	supervisor.
13	MEMBER SAYLOR: Okay, no, you're not.
14	Supervisors do not receive compensation on a per diem or
15	per-meeting basis.
16	MS. HALSEY: Right.
17	MEMBER SAYLOR: Nor do city council members nor
18	school board member, unless there are charter or city
19	arrangements that I don't know about.
20	CHAIR REYES: Right.
21	MEMBER SAYLOR: But there are special district
22	representatives who are subject to the AB 1234
23	requirements that do have the per-meeting.
24	That doesn't mean that they have to have a
25	special meeting to do this particular training.

Currently, of course, you do have the online versions. You could also combine this meeting -- this training with another meeting, if you had to do it. Most of the organizations are associations of special district or city council members, the League of Cities, the CSB -- the School Board Association, CSAC, have provided this kind of training at their annual conferences as a way to make it accessible to people, like the Del Norte folks who may be remote and far away.

In the first going, I would -- personal observation is accurate, that in the 2005-2006 era, there was a tremendous panic. People didn't know exactly what this was all going to be, how to do it; and they were all spinning wheels to try to put things in place. So there were circumstances where if they had waited a couple more months, they could have had access to the online training. They didn't know that was going to happen, and they were trying to find ways to deliver the training. So CSAC, the League of Cities, CSBA all did things to try to get the training in place.

Cities, in their local areas, would make the training available to whoever was required to do it, so you'd have mixed groups of planning commissioners and school board members and others all in one room, which is my experience that we had.

1	Certainly, there were costs imposed for
2	conducting the training. Whether people had to have all
3	of the those costs is a question. It was at their
4	discretion. There were alternatives that didn't require
5	the cost. But putting in context at that moment in time,
6	did people believe they had to they knew they had a
7	requirement. Did they believe they had an option that
8	was a no-cost-option? I think, reasonably, some of them
9	didn't.
10	CHAIR REYES: But the requirement was on you as
11	a supervisor.
12	MEMBER SAYLOR: Yes, it was a requirement for
13	the individual to seek to be sure that they had the
14	training. And there were many that's correct, yes.
15	And in terms of compensation for the stipend,
16	that sort of thing, I'm not compelled by that.
17	CHAIR REYES: Yes, okay.
18	MEMBER SAYLOR: That's a discretionary act; and
19	there are a variety of ways of achieving the purpose.
20	In terms of the cost to the organization to
21	assemble the materials and provide the training, that's
22	another question.
23	CHAIR REYES: Okay.
24	MR. BURDICK: Chairman Reyes, if I could just
25	clarify?

1	CHAIR REYES: Yes.
2	MR. BURDICK: I wasn't suggesting that there be
3	additional compensation. All I'm saying is, supervisors
4	are compensated. It varies, depends on county, but they
5	get compensation for their work. So they're paid for
6	that day.
7	So when that person goes, they're receiving
8	compensation for the work they perform that day. So I'm
9	not suggesting that there was additional compensation.
10	And it varies by county in terms of their
11	CHAIR REYES: Absolutely. In some counties,
12	it's full-time job
13	MR. BURDICK: And I don't know if
14	CHAIR REYES: and other times, it's a
15	volunteer job.
16	MR. BURDICK: Yes, sometimes it's full-time,
17	sometimes it's voluntary. So it's going to vary.
18	CHAIR REYES: Right.
19	MR. BURDICK: But whatever it is, they're
20	compensated; essentially, that that compensation is for
21	that.
22	So you could compute and say well, let's say
23	they had to take a whole day and go and do this or
24	whatever. They say, "Well, what is your compensation for
25	a dav's work?"

1	And that would be what I would say would be a
2	reimbursable state-mandated cost. I'm not suggesting
3	additional stuff, but
4	So let's just say
5	CHAIR REYES: So if you did it on Sunday
6	training, that would be?
7	MR. BURDICK: Well, they don't offer those
8	trainings to you on a Sunday.
9	CHAIR REYES: I know, but I'm just saying, if
10	they did it on Sunday, you'd split the salary by 31 or
11	30 or 28
12	MEMBER SAYLOR: With the church split it
13	with the church.
14	MR. BURDICK: So I guess the question would be,
15	as an example, if you had to go to training, and went
16	to a conference, and you said, "Okay, well, I'm going to
17	the League's conference, and it's going to be on
18	Saturday, and I can pick up that training on Saturday."
19	The Department of Finance compensates me. So if I go on
20	Saturday, I can't claim any costs because I went on
21	Saturday? But you did something that you're being
22	compensated for, right?
23	CHAIR REYES: Not for Saturdays. Being a
24	salaried employee, I
25	MR. BURDICK: Well, that's always an issue with

1	the Controller when you talk about people who are they
2	compensated for overtime.
3	CHAIR REYES: What is the actual cost, right.
4	MR. BURDICK: But the only thing I'm just
5	saying is, I did not want to suggest that this was
6	additional compensation. I'm just talking about base
7	salary of a supervisor who has to who goes to attend,
8	to not take care of his normal business and duties and
9	responsibilities because the state required him or her
10	to attend ethics training.
11	CHAIR REYES: Not compel.
12	Ms. Shelton?
13	CAMILLE SHELTON: Just to clarify. The staff
14	recommendation is that the decision to compensate a
15	member is a local decision. There is no mandated cost to
16	compensate these members.
17	MR. O'HARA: If I might clarify again?
18	CHAIR REYES: Yes, Mr. O'Hara?
19	MR. O'HARA: As Commissioner Saylor pointed
20	out, in 2006, there was panic, this had to be done.
21	There was no assistance.
22	I had to go to both the Attorney General's
23	office and the FPCC to have the outline of my course
24	materials approved. And no one told me that they were
25	going to offer some kind of online or other training at

1	that time.
2	Now, plus, by having this particular training
3	at a meeting that all of these sanitary districts'
4	directors from around the state were attending, anyway,
5	there's transportation, meals, habitation, and tuition
6	that they might have had to spend to go someplace else,
7	particularly if they're from a less populous area.
8	CHAIR REYES: Any questions for follow-up by
9	board members?
10	(No response)
11	CHAIR REYES: Any additional comments by staff
12	or Finance?
13	Finance?
14	MR. WARD: Randall Ward, Department of Finance.
15	We support the staff recommendation to deny and
16	partially recommend reimbursement for elements of the
17	mandates.
18	MS. FEREBEE: And Donna Ferebee, Department of
19	Finance.
20	I'd also just like to respond specifically to
21	the arguments presented by Union Sanitary District.
22	As Mr. Ward said, we agree with the staff
23	recommendation. And it did not seem to us that Union
24	Sanitary had met its burden of showing that it is subject
25	to the tax-and-spend limitations of article XIII B

1	article XIII A and B, and that its revenue is considered
2	proceeds of taxes, particularly I think in light of the
3	conflicting information from the State Controller's
4	Office.
5	And that's all. Thank you.
6	CHAIR REYES: Okay.
7	MR. O'HARA: If I could then respond briefly.
8	In 1991, when the Fresno decision was made,
9	article XIII B was the only thing that related to tax-
10	and-spend limitations.
11	But since then, Proposition 218, enacted in
12	1996, added articles XIII C and D, which were tax-and-
13	spend limitations to Union Sanitary District and other
14	sanitation districts because they had what's been
15	determined by other court cases to be property-related
16	fees and charges. And, therefore, they are limited in
17	what they can spend it on.
18	So it's kind of outdated to look back at 1991,
19	when article XIII only had A and B; and 2006, when
20	Proposition 218 added article XIII C and D that relates
21	to the limitations on expenditures and revenues for water
22	districts, sanitary districts, other special agencies.
23	CHAIR REYES: Okay. Is there anybody else from
24	the public who would like to comment on this item?
25	(No response)

-	
1	CHAIR REYES: Okay, seeing none, is there a
2	motion?
3	MEMBER CHIVARO: I'll move staff
4	recommendation.
5	MEMBER LUJANO: Second.
6	CHAIR REYES: Staff recommendation has been
7	moved and seconded.
8	All in favor, say "aye."
9	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
10	CHAIR REYES: Opposed?
11	(No response)
12	CHAIR REYES: Abstentions?
13	(No response)
14	CHAIR REYES: The ayes have it.
15	Thank you.
16	MS. GMUR: Thank you, Commissioners.
17	MR. O'HARA: Thank you very much.
18	MS. FEREBEE: Thank you.
19	CHAIR REYES: Item 6.
20	MS. HALSEY: Mr. Eric Feller will present
21	Item 6, a test claim on California English Language
22	Development Test II.
23	MR. FELLER: All right, this test claim alleges
24	activities based on statutes and regulation governing
25	bilingual education, or more accurately, identification

1	and instruction of limited English proficient pupils and
2	activities related to the California English Language
3	Development test.
4	Staff found that the test claim should be
5	denied because the bilingual education statute ceased to
6	be operative in 1987, and the remaining regulations are
7	either required under or part and parcel of federal law
8	or part and parcel of a 1988 ballot initiative,
9	Proposition 227.
10	Staff recommends the Commission adopt the
11	attached proposed final staff analysis and statement of
12	decision to deny the test claim.
13	Would the parties and witnesses please state
14	your name for the record?
15	MR. PALKOWITZ: Good morning. Arthur Palkowitz
16	on behalf of the claimant.
17	MS. FEREBEE: Donna Ferebee, Department of
18	Finance.
19	CHAIR REYES: Please.
20	MR. PALKOWITZ: Thank you.
21	I don't know if you wanted to summarize the
22	argument that I'm going to make because you do it a lot
23	better than I do.
24	CHAIR REYES: It seems to me that
25	No, I'm kidding.

1	I just want to show that I've read the stuff.
2	MR. PALKOWITZ: You're doing a great job.
3	CHAIR REYES: Go ahead. You have the mike,
4	sir.
5	MR. PALKOWITZ: Thank you.
6	Well, I think the issue I would like to focus
7	in on is not the federal-law preemption. And I
8	understand staff analysis, we've submitted that already.
9	I think it's interesting when there is a
10	statute, and then another statute comes about, and the
11	interpretation is the recent legislation carries the same
12	mandate. And, therefore, since the previous statute
13	already existed, it's not a new statute that requires a
14	mandate.
15	I mean, that interpretation leads one to
16	believe that the Legislature passed this bill with really
17	no value to it because the previous statute already had
18	those requirements. And to me, I think there is case law
19	that says we have to have a reasonable basis that the
20	Legislature passes new bills for reasons.
21	And so if there's a recommendation that some of
22	these activities are to be denied because it already
23	existed, to me, flies in the face of legislative intent
24	that there is an intent to create a new statute that has
25	its own activities.

I don't know if I misinterpreted staff 1 2 analysis. And that only applies to some of the 3 activities, not all of the activities. 4 MR. FELLER: I think you're talking about the 5 Parent Notification statute, the one at the -- I think 6 it's at page 49, on. 7 And I believe that wasn't a case -- well, that 8 was more of a case of renumbering of an existing statute. 9 MR. PALKOWITZ: Isn't there language in the 10 staff analysis that this -- I mean, if you look at the 11 summary that is on pages 5 and 6 -- well, the one on 12 page 7, the top activity regarding 2003, English Language 13 Learner, it states the activities are either expressly 14 required by prior statutes and the Ed. Code. 15 And so when that is written, does that mean 16 that this legislation that's part of the test claim, if 17 it has the same activities required, is not to be 18 considered as a mandate because of the prior statute that 19 had those activities? 20 MR. FELLER: I think, if you're talking about 21 the Proposition 227 regulations -- is that under B on 22 page 7? Those -- what happened was, yes, those were 23 regulations adopted in the aftermath of Proposition 227. 24 And so some of the regulations repeated 25

1	requirements in the Proposition 227 statutes, and it
2	clarified and did some other things as well.
3	CAMILLE SHELTON: And the authority in
4	reference to those regulations are the statutes.
5	MR. FELLER: Right. So those weren't statutes
6	enacted as much as just the regulations the Department of
7	Ed. adopted.
8	MR. PALKOWITZ: And is that the same reasoning
9	with the notices you just mentioned, which was the last
10	activity in the summary of page 6?
11	MR. FELLER: That was actually that was a
12	statute that was enacted in 1981 or amended in
13	let's see.
14	It was a '77 statute, amended in 1981.
15	What we found, however, was that an identical
16	statute was enacted in 1976 as Education Code 10926.
17	It appears that the '77 was a renumbering. But
18	because it was the '77 and not the '76 statute that was
19	pled, we had to find that it wasn't a new program.
20	MR. PALKOWITZ: Thank you for the
21	clarification.
22	I have no other comments.
23	CHAIR REYES: No other comments?
24	(No response)
25	CHAIR REYES: Finance is fine with it?

1	MS. FEREBEE: Donna Ferebee, Department of			
2	Finance.			
3	We do concur with the final staff analysis			
4	denying the test claim. The statutes claimed do not			
5	impose a new program or higher level of service for the			
6	reasons that are stated in the analysis; and we urge you			
7	to adopt the staff recommendation.			
8	Thank you.			
9	CHAIR REYES: Any other comments or questions			
10	from board members?			
11	(No response)			
12	CHAIR REYES: Any comments from the public?			
13	(No response)			
14	CHAIR REYES: Seeing none, is there a motion?			
15	MEMBER OLSEN: I'll move the staff			
16	recommendation.			
17	CHAIR REYES: It's been moved.			
18	MEMBER SAYLOR: Second.			
19	CHAIR REYES: It's been seconded.			
20	All in favor, say "aye."			
21	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)			
22	CHAIR REYES: Opposed?			
23	(No response)			
24	CHAIR REYES: Abstentions?			
25	(No response)			

1	CHAIR REYES: The "ayes" have it.	
2	Thank you.	
3	And then we have Item 7 is consent, Item 8 is	
4	consent.	
5	MS. HALSEY: Items 7 through 10 are consent.	
6	Moving on to Item 11. Item 11 is reserved for	
7	County applications for findings of significant financial	
8	distress or SB 1033 applications.	
9	No SB 1033 applications have been filed.	
10	CHAIR REYES: Okay.	
11	MS. HALSEY: Item 12, Nancy Patton will present	
12	the legislative update.	
13	MS. PATTON: I have no new legislation to	
14	report on. We still have the two pending spot-bills	
15	which have not moved; of course, not including the budget	
16	trailer bills that are going through right now.	
17	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.	
18	MS. PATTON: Thank you.	
19	CHAIR REYES: Nancy, for the benefit of the	
20	dais and the folks in the audience, would you please	
21	introduce the Nancy-in-training?	
22	MS. PATTON: Heidi, do you want to stand up?	
23	I think everyone knows Heidi, but she is going	
24	to be taking over my duties, at least temporarily after	
25	I retire on August 14 th . So I think everyone knows Heidi	

1	Palchik.	
2	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.	
3	MEMBER RAMIREZ: Excuse me, Mr. Chair?	
4	CHAIR REYES: Yes?	
5	MEMBER RAMIREZ: I would like to ask at some	
6	appropriate point, information about the two spot-bills,	
7	which I'm not familiar with, that you just mentioned.	
8	That's all for later.	
9	CHAIR REYES: Thank you very much.	
10	MEMBER RAMIREZ: Thank you.	
11	MS. PATTON: They're listed on Item 12.	
12	MEMBER RAMIREZ: Okay.	
13	CHAIR REYES: Heather?	
14	MS. HALSEY: Okay, Item 13, Chief Legal Counsel	
15	Camille Shelton will present the Chief Legal Counsel's	
16	report.	
17	CAMILLE SHELTON: Good morning.	
18	Just a couple of things.	
19	The litigation dealing with the Commission's	
20	decision on the Graduation Requirements, parameters and	
21	guidelines amendment, has been continued to September.	
22	So that one's put off.	
23	Also, for the last time, I'll list this Fenton	
24	Avenue Charter School lawsuit that was brought by charter	
25	schools against the Controller's office, where the	

1	Controller returned reimbursement claims on 21 separate			
2	programs filed by charter schools.			
3	The court has finally decided that case, and			
4	has dismissed the lawsuit by the charter schools on the			
5	ground that they failed to exhaust their administrative			
6	remedies with the Commission; and also that the decision			
7	on who the eligible claimant was, was not meant for the			
8	Controller. It is one that was meant for the Commission.			
9	So we could see continuing litigation on that,			
10	or we'll see what happens.			
11	CHAIR REYES: Okay, thank you.			
12	MS. HALSEY: Moving on to Item 14, the			
13	Executive Director report.			
14	With regard to workload, our backlog reduction			
15	plan has been included as an attachment to the Executive			
16	Director's report. And it's the most up-to-date document			
17	in terms of our workload.			
18	And as of today, I'm happy to announce the			
19	Commission has completed all the 2002, 2004 test claims,			
20	and also all the community college test claims. So that			
21	is a big milestone for the Commission.			
22	CHAIR REYES: Okay.			
23	MS. HALSEY: With regard to the 2012-2013			
24	budget, on May 14 th , the Governor issued his May Revise.			
25	It now includes a reappropriation of \$79,000 for the			

Commission to pay for staff retirement and related

employee costs, increasing our total operating budget to

\$1,599,000 for the next fiscal year.

Additionally, the May Revise proposes employees

savings, equivalent to 5 percent reduction in pay. The

Administration's pursuing a four-day, 38-hour workweek.

But the Administration is currently negotiating with unions on how that might look.

But if his original proposal does go forward, it may mean the closing of the office one day a week and some possible rescheduling of hearings. So I wanted to alert everyone. And we'll definitely notify everyone if our hearings change, and post that on our Web site as well.

CHAIR REYES: Okay, thank you.

MS. HALSEY: Also, with regard to the budget, there are three major program changes with regard to mandates.

One is to suspend and repeal mandates for a decrease in \$728.8 million in the 2012-2013 fiscal year, by suspending most mandates that are not related to law enforcement or property taxes.

In addition, the Administration is proposing trailer billing language to repeal or make permissive many of the mandates that have been suspended for two

1 years or more. CHAIR REYES: Okay, thank you. 2 MS. HALSEY: Of particular interest, is the 3 proposal to eliminate many of the -- or the existing 4 mandates claiming process for K-12 -- or, actually, 5 K-14 -- by creating a block grant, rolling many of the 6 mandated programs into a block grant and providing 7 funding that would then go to all school districts 8 without going through the SCO's claiming process. 9 Our understanding is that that would not 10 eliminate the mandate process here. That first new 11 mandates would be found by the Commission, and then 12 the Administration would then roll future mandates 13 conceivably into that block grant in the future. 14 CHAIR REYES: Okay. 15 MS. HALSEY: And then moving on to our 2012 16 meeting calendar. We currently have scheduled, our next 17 few meetings are July 27th, September 28th. We have a 18 tentative meeting on October $26^{\rm th}$, and then our final 19 meeting of the year scheduled for December 2^{nd} . And as 20 I said before, keep an eye on the Web site and, of 21 course, we'll be sending out official notices to everyone 22 if anything changes with that. 23 CHAIR REYES: Okay. 24 MS. HALSEY: And finally, we have the backlog 25

reduction plan which everyone should have a copy of now. 1 And just a few highlights from that. 2 The Commission has a backlog of 36 test claims 3 and 129 incorrect reduction claims. And I can actually 4 update that. It's now 127 as of yesterday. And that is 5 down from 51 test claims and 163 IRCs last year at this 6 time. So we are definitely working that backlog 7 expeditiously. And we're going to continue to try and 8 speed that along. 9 And last year, we developed our first backlog 10 reduction plan. This is the first annual update of the 11 plan. It describes several tools we're employing to 12 expeditiously reduce the backlog. 13 Main points include completing all of our 2003 14 test claims in 2012, continuing to support the SCO and 15 claimants in settling incorrect reduction claims, 16 completing all but ten storm-water NPDES claims by the 17 18

end of 2013. And then ideally, completing the remaining test claims and IRCs in 2014. And part of that will depend on what happens in the court with the NPDES stormwater test-claim cases.

And I'm happy to field any questions that any Members have on any of that -- or anyone from the public.

CHAIR REYES: Does anyone have anything?

Mr. Saylor?

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1	MEMBER SAYLOR: Pursuant to your suggestion			
2	that we look at the dates the alternative dates,			
3	anticipating the possibility of Fridays going away, the			
4	Yolo County Local Agency Formation Commission is			
5	rescheduling its meetings so that I can attend meetings			
6	of this Commission on Thursdays.			
7	So we should send them a "thank you" note to			
8	each of them.			
9	MS. HALSEY: Thank you, Yolo County.			
10	CHAIR REYES: We wouldn't change anything until			
11	negotiations are concluded by the Administration and			
12	unions. We don't want to upset anybody.			
13	MEMBER SAYLOR: So it's very tentative.			
14	CHAIR REYES: It's very just kind of a			
15	heads-up. It may come up. It may end up something			
16	different. But at this point			
17	MEMBER SAYLOR: We will be submitting the claim			
18	for the discussions that we've been having about			
19	calendar.			
20	CHAIR REYES: Very good.			
21	Okay, public comments?			
22	MR. BURDICK: Chairman Reyes and Members, I			
23	would like to address the backlog reduction plan.			
24	First, I would like to I guess it's			
25	personally because I don't have official authority to do			

this -- is to congratulate you on the selection of your former member, and now Executive Director. Heather Halsey I think was an outstanding selection. And with her knowledge as both a member, staff, and I think it's more of -- we're going to welcome her to the team.

And you have an outstanding staff of people that you have, and they did a very nice job on this backlog report.

You have one serious problem, and that is the fact that because you do not have enough staff -- and if you look at this backlog plan, one of the things it points out, clearly, is you have a statutory obligation to perform this process in 18 months.

The backlog plan talks about hoping to get, I think it's the 2003 test claims done by the end of this calendar year. That's nine years later. That's a little different than the 18 months.

You are the exclusive body to determine what is and what is not a reimbursable state mandate. By delaying the action, and every year you delay, you're incurring 20, 30, 50 -- maybe more -- million dollars a year.

Let me give you a couple of examples. Last year, a few minutes ago you adopted a statewide cost estimate for *Crime Statistics* DOJ reports. \$120 million.

Basically, ten years, starting off earlier now is about \$15 million a year. So every year that was delayed the last few years, the State incurred an additional \$15 million for that one, single mandate.

I have prepared, and CSAC has filed four requests for reasonable reimbursement methodologies. Some of those will result in additional obligations to the state. Some of those will reduce the requirements for the State Controller to have to spend the time on the review, payment, and audit of those claims.

The amount of money that is incurred by the delay in this process versus the amount of staff you have, to me, in looking at it, is very, very difficult to understand.

I was in the office yesterday. I looked at the whiteboard, and could not believe that the number of staff is probably about half of what it was when you first moved into that office.

When I first moved in there -- I think there are ten people on that list now. There were about 18, I think, when I first moved in there. And at that time, because of the process which I, as a non-attorney, feel is a little overkill on the legal side but obviously because everything is subject to court review, that's the way it has to be -- I accept that -- the Commission is

falling further behind on its ability to stay up.

Now, the one thing that's been helpful is because the State is in such a difficult problem the last several years, so many bills have been killed in Appropriations; because if it says "reimbursable state mandated program," those bills don't see the light of day.

And so the one thing is, there have been far fewer mandates passed in the last three years than there were since 1979, when this was placed in the Constitution. I can personally adhere to that.

So the one thing I'm looking at is, it seems to me that this Commission, who has the responsibility given to it to oversee this process, who has the statutory obligation, up to 18 months, should take a look at this and say, you know, this is a dereliction of our duty to say we're going to adopt something without at least going forward and trying to say this is costing the State money.

The Legislature has made it clear, the

Administration has made it clear, I'm sure that the

Treasurer does not want to incur additional debt. You

know, I've talked to the Treasurer personally about the

amount of debt that is going to be incurring. And what

is happening is, every year you fail to act, that debt

1 is growing. The costs of the State is growing. And my 2 thought is, you should go back and look at it. 3 You probably need at least twice as many staff. 4 What is that, a million? 1.2, 1.5 million? But every 5 year something is delayed because of that, you're 6 incurring tens of millions of dollars, and even more. 7 And I'm just looking at the local government side. My friends from the school district behind me, 8 9 you know, they have some mandates in there that may even be much more substantial than that. 10 One of the other things that has happened in 11 12 this process is because of the fact that the more complicated mandates tend to take longer to get there, 13 sometimes the most expensive ones, one of which you're 14 15 going to be seeing hopefully before the end of this calendar year, that's been delayed for ten years, is 16 going to be even bigger than that \$120 million statewide 17 cost estimate you adopted. 18 Why? Because the Commission didn't have staff. 19 So I was very pleased to see that there was an 20 21 acknowledgment of the 18-month statutory requirement. 22 The former Executive Director and I had a little dispute about that, having to have been the 23 drafter of AB 1960, Reyes, in 1998 to put that into code, 24

I could not understand how that could not be viewed as a

statute. But Paula is not here to defend herself. But it is clear in there that the Commission staff is now saying they have 18 months to hear these claims. And this proposal is to hear 2003 test claims by the end of 2012.

And I just look at this, in 1981 I was a party to a lawsuit relative to the futility of the process. And one of the reasons also you don't have more IRCs and more other things and other actions is because people look at the futility of this process. And I can tell you that if people felt that this was moving or something was going to happen in a reasonable period of time, your workload would be much greater -- substantially greater.

So I think we've gone back to reaching the futility of this process.

That lawsuit led to the creation of this

Commission. We have some new members that probably

weren't there, but this Commission was created based upon
a joint meeting of the California Legislature. The

Attorney General, the Legislative Counsel Bureau pulled
the two houses together in June of '84, and said, "We
have a problem: Local government is killing us in the
courts." And the key thing that was coming up was what
is called Contra Costa County, it was really the CSAC
lawsuit, in 1981, on the futility of this process.

1 And I think if you look at this workload and look at your duties and responsibilities and those things 2 3 that you want to do as administrative representatives or 4 as you want to do, I know, as the Controller, the 5 Treasurer's representative is concerned about the debt that California is growing, and the Legislature is 6 7 concerned about getting decisions quickly so they know 8 what the cost of a mandate is; I would urge you to send 9 this back, ask your staff to come back and say, "What do 10 we need to do to meet our 18-month statutory 11 requirement?" -- take that forward, still have 22 days 12 before the budget is adopted, and at least tell the 13 Legislature, "Look, if you don't do this, if you don't 14 spend this one, one and a half, two million, whatever 15 it's going to take, to add that staff, you're going to be 16 incurring" -- and they can make an estimate better than 17 me. 18 As I said, I read this at ten o'clock last 19 night, so I didn't have much time to do much analysis. 20 And I apologize, and I appreciate you putting up with 21 me -- but I urge you not to accept this, and I urge you 22 to go back and to say, "What do we need to do?" 23 And then if the Legislature and the Governor 24 say, "No, you know, we don't have \$2 million some place,"

whatever it is, "to avoid these tens of millions

1	of dollars," then at least you've done your job; because			
2	I think you're the ones that are responsible out there			
3	to tell the Legislature, when it comes there, that "Hey,			
4	wait a minute, you gave us a duty and responsibility to			
5	do, but we can't do it with the little money you've given			
6	us."			
7	So with that, I again thank you so much for			
8	putting up with me. Obviously, I feel overly passionate			
9	about this issue. But when I read that last night, I			
10	Anyway, thank you very much.			
11	CHAIR REYES: Thank you.			
12	Any other public comments before we go into			
13	closed session?			
14	(No response)			
15	CHAIR REYES: All right, so we're going to go			
16	to closed session.			
17	And I have to read this:			
18	The Commission will meet in closed executive			
19	session pursuant to Government Code section 11126,			
20	subdivision (e), to confer and receive advice from legal			
21	counsel for consideration and action, as necessary and			
22	appropriate, upon the pending litigation listed on the			
23	published notice and agenda, and to confer with and			
24	receive advice from legal counsel regarding potential			
25	litigation.			

1		Thank you.
2		(The Commission met in closed executive
3		session from 11:57 a.m. to 12:03 p.m.)
4		CHAIR REYES: We're coming back from closed
5	session.	
6		There is nothing to report. We were updated by
7	counsel.	
8		Thank you. And the meeting is adjourned.
9		Thank you, everybody.
10		(Proceedings concluded at 12:03 p.m.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify:

That the foregoing proceedings were duly reported by me at the time and place herein specified; and

That the proceedings were reported by me, a duly certified shorthand reporter and a disinterested person, and was thereafter transcribed into typewriting by computer-aided transcription.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand on the $18^{\rm th}$ of June 2012.

Daniel P. Feldhaus California CSR #6949

Registered Diplomate Reporter Certified Realtime Reporter