MINUTES

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

State Capitol, Room 126 Sacramento, California July 29, 2004

Present: Chairperson James Tilton

Representative of the Director of the Department of Finance

Member Bruce Van Houten¹

Representative of the State Treasurer

Member Walter Barnes

Representative of the State Controller

Member Jan Boel

Acting Director of the Office of Planning and Research

Member John Lazar City Council Member

Vacant: Local Elected Official

Public Member

CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL

Chairperson Tilton called the meeting to order at 9:34 a.m.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES

Item 1 May 27, 2004

Upon motion by Member Boel and second by Member Van Houten, the minutes were adopted. Member Lazar abstained.

APPEAL OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DECISIONS PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, SECTION 1181, SUBDIVISION (c)0

Item 2 Staff Report on Appeals Related To Current Agenda Items (if necessary)

No appeals were filed.

PROPOSED CONSENT CALENDAR

INFORMATIONAL HEARING PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 8 (action)

ADOPTION OF PROPOSED PARAMETERS AND GUIDELINES

Item 11 Postmortem Examinations: Unidentified Bodies, Human Remains, 00-TC-18

County of Los Angeles, Claimant Government Code Section 27521.1 Statutes 2000, Chapter 284 (SB 1736)

¹ Mr. Van Houten left the meeting upon conclusion of the Executive Director's report and Ms. Linda McAtee, represented the Treasurer for the remainder of the meeting.

ADOPTION OF PROPOSED STATEWIDE COST ESTIMATES

Item 12 Standards-Based Accountability, 98-TC-10

San Diego Unified School District, Claimant

Department of Education Standards-Based Accountability Memoranda,

Dated June 30, 1997 and April 15, 1998

Item 13 School District Reorganization, 98-TC-24

San Luis Obispo County Office of Education, Claimant Education Code Sections 35704, 35705.5, and 35707

Statutes 1980, Chapter 1192 (AB 3018) Statutes 1994, Chapter 1186 (SB 1537)

Item 14 Attendance Accounting, 98-TC-26

Campbell Union High School District, Grant Joint Union High School District,

and San Luis Obispo County Office of Education, Co-claimants

Education Code Sections 2550.3 and 42238.7

Statutes 1997, Chapter 855 (SB 727) Statutes 1998, Chapter 846 (SB 1468)

Item 15 Redevelopment Agencies—Tax Disbursement Reporting, 99-TC-06

County of Los Angeles, Claimant

Health and Safety Code Section 33672.7 Statutes 1998, Chapter 39 (SB 258)

Member Lazar moved for adoption of the consent calendar, which consisted of items 11 through 15. With a second by Member Boel, the consent calendar was unanimously adopted.

HEARINGS AND DECISIONS, PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 7 (action)

Paula Higashi, Executive Director, swore the parties and witnesses participating in the hearing of agenda items 3 through 10.

TEST CLAIMS AND PROPOSED STATEMENTS OF DECISION

Item 3 Algebra Instruction, 00-TC-14

Sweetwater Union High School District, Claimant

Education Code Section 51224.5

Statutes 2000, Chapter 1024 (SB 1354)

Eric Feller, Commission Counsel, presented this item. He stated that the test claim statute requires pupils to pass a course in algebra to obtain a high school diploma. The claimant pled reimbursable activities related to remedial instruction to help pupils pass the course. However, staff found that the test claim statute neither requires nor refers to remedial instruction, and thus, those activities were found not to be reimbursable.

Regarding the algebra course itself, Mr. Feller indicated that prior law already required the successful completion of two mathematics courses in order for students to graduate from high school. Thus, the test claim statute merely places algebra instruction within the existing framework for mathematics instruction without adding to the framework. Therefore, staff found that this activity was not reimbursable.

Staff recommended that the Commission deny the Algebra Instruction test claim.

Parties were represented as follows: Ruth Ann Duncan and Larry Hendee, on behalf of the claimant; and Michael Wilkening, with the Department of Finance.

Mr. Hendee disagreed with staff's findings that: 1) remedial instruction is not reimbursable under article XIII B, section 6; 2) there is no threat of penalty for the failure to provide remedial instruction; and 3) remedial instruction is an activity undertaken at the discretion of the school district.

Mr. Hendee noted that in the staff analysis, it was disclosed in a discussion about the State Board of Education math standards that 30 to 40 percent of pupils do not take high school algebra. He contended that a large percent of those students do not take algebra because of the lack of desire for higher education, the inability to be successful in algebra, or the inability to simply do algebra. He also noted staff's statement that the test claim statute was enacted, in part, to protect the High School Exit Exam from court challenges because pupils need the opportunity to learn the subject matter being tested. Applying this to the large portion of students not taking algebra, he asserted that it implied the probable need for remediation intervention.

Regarding staff's first finding, Mr. Hendee argued that the minutes of all of the Assembly and Senate hearings on this legislation disclosed that 30 to 40 percent of pupils choose not to take algebra, and that there was a need to preserve the opportunity for students to learn the subject matter. As to the second finding, he contended that ultimately the students would suffer the penalties because the district must either graduate the student or not. With regard to the third finding, he maintained that for those 30 to 40 percent of pupils not taking algebra, remediation intervention was necessary for success.

Further, Mr. Hendee disagreed with staff's reliance on the *County of Los Angeles* decision regarding domestic violence training to support its position that *Algebra Instruction* was not a new program or higher level of service. He believed the comparison was inappropriate.

Mr. Hendee also asserted that in the process of setting priorities, the Legislature imposed a higher level of service on school districts. He introduced Ms. Duncan, a math curriculum specialist for the Sweetwater Union High School District.

Ms. Duncan discussed the algebra requirement and provided context as to what the district had done, including the development of courses and diagnostic tests, in order to comply with the requirement. She argued that requiring a student to take algebra as one of the two required math courses constituted a higher level of service because math teachers must raise skill levels and address the needs of special education students, at-risk learners, and low performers. She contended that this was a costly and labor-intensive effort. She also stated that there was not a clear financial penalty to the district for not providing remedial instruction; however, the students would suffer by not receiving their high school diplomas.

Mr. Wilkening concurred with the staff analysis.

Chairperson Tilton requested clarification about what was at issue because the claimants were arguing the issue of expanded workload while staff maintained that the requirement of two math courses remained and the issue was prioritization. Mr. Feller responded that those activities pled by the claimant were not found in the law, and therefore, staff found that they are not mandated by the state within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6.

Member Boel asked questions regarding the pass rate on the High School Exit Exam, to which Ms. Duncan responded.

Member Barnes made a motion to adopt the staff recommendation. With a second by Member Van Houten, the motion carried unanimously.

Item 4 Proposed Statement of Decision: *Algebra Instruction*, 00-TC-14, as described above in Item 3

Eric Feller, Commission Counsel, presented this item. He indicated that unless there were objections, staff recommended that the Commission adopt the proposed Statement of Decision, which accurately reflected the test claim decision. Staff also recommended that the Commission allow minor changes to be made to reflect the hearing testimony and vote count.

Member Lazar made a motion to adopt the proposed Statement of Decision. With a second by Member Boel, the motion carried unanimously.

Item 5 Mandatory On-The-Job Training for Peace Officers Working Alone 00-TC-19, County of Los Angeles Claimant 02-TC-06, Santa Monica Community College District, Claimant Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Bulletin: 98-1 and POST Administrative Manual, Procedure D-13

Camille Shelton, Senior Commission Counsel, presented this item. She stated that the test claim was filed on documents issued by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. The POST Bulletin 98-1 and the POST Administrative Manual Procedure D-13 establish field-training requirements for peace officers that work alone and are assigned to general law enforcement patrol duties. Staff found that the POST field-training program is required only if the local agency or school district employer elects to become a member of POST, and for those officers employed by a POST-participating agency, only upon the officer's completion of the basic training course.

Staff recommended that the Commission adopt the staff analysis, which denies the test claim for the following reasons:

- 1) State law does not require school districts and community college districts to employ peace officers, and thus, POST field-training requirements do not impose a state mandate on school districts and community college districts.
- 2) State law does not require local agencies or school districts to participate in the POST program, and thus, the field-training requirements imposed by POST on their members are not mandated by the state.

Parties were represented as follows: Leonard Kaye, on behalf of County of Los Angeles; Leo Shaw, on behalf of the Santa Monica Community College District; Pamela Stone, on behalf of the California State Association of Counties; Bud Lewallen and Al Stowe, with the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training; and Georgia Johas, with the Department of Finance.

Mr. Kaye stated his belief that there was an unambiguous legal compulsion to provide mandatory field training and that the field-training standards and requirements applied to all peace officers. He indicated that the language of POST Bulletin 98-1 had an implied and express understanding that these standards and requirements were to be consistently applied throughout California. He added that this bulletin was sent to all "affected state agencies," which he understood to include all sheriffs' departments, police departments, schools, etc.

Mr. Kaye argued that POST's new field-training program for peace officers assigned to general law enforcement duty was an integral and required component of basic officer training. In addition to being legally compelled, he felt that there was no reasonable alternative to providing the training. He noted that if an agency were not a member of POST, it contracted with officers from agencies that were members.

Mr. Shaw concurred with Mr. Kaye's comments and submitted on the record.

Ms. Johas and Mr. Stowe concurred with the staff analysis.

Mr. Stowe added that POST was created in the late 1950s with an agreement among the Legislature, local agencies, and law enforcement that it would be created as a voluntary program. He noted that those agencies participating in the POST program received the benefits of reimbursement, certificates, and other services in return for voluntarily meeting the selection and training requirements. Over the years, the requirements had been embellished, but all at the concurrence of the members. He indicated that the claimants both passed ordinances to voluntarily participate in the POST program, and the field-training program had been part of the requirements effective in 1999.

Chairperson Tilton restated Mr. Stowe's comments that the state established a standard that local entities can use to measure themselves against, but it was not a mandate by the state.

Mr. Kaye reiterated that there was a legal compulsion to make sure that the officers are properly trained so that their arrests are valid.

Chairperson Tilton explained that the fundamental issue was whether or not the state required this additional effort. He said that clearly there was an increased level of service required to get the POST certification, but unless there was a statute requiring agencies to be POST-certified, then there was no underlying legal requirement for the state to reimburse costs.

Ms. Stone contended that there were two subdivisions in the Penal Code that addressed the issue. She explained that the first subdivision spoke to the standards, including training requirements, that were required to be met for a person to become a peace officer within the state of California. The second subdivision dealt with the fact that an entity could be a voluntary member of POST. However, she maintained that regardless of membership, the POST standards were applicable to all officers. Ms. Stone noted that there was also an Attorney General's opinion underlining the fact that for one to exercise peace officer duties in California, one must meet the POST standards.

Mr. Stowe clarified that the only certificate required of individual peace officers in California is the Basic certificate. He noted that an Attorney General's opinion says that POST is obliged to provide that certificate whether the person's agency participates in a POST program or not.

Mr. Kaye explained that they required field training as an essential element before an officer could be assigned to uniformed patrol duties because of the POST Executive Director's characterization of the field-training as an integral part of the Basic training.

Ms. Shelton added that in the plain reading of the POST Bulletin 98-1, it states that the requirements for the regular Basic certificate are not affected by the field-training requirements. In addition, she quoted POST regulations section 1005, subdivision (a)(1), which indicates that an officer can exercise the powers of a peace officer during the field-training program. Thus, it is not part of the Basic training requirement.

Member Lazar made a motion to adopt the staff analysis. With a second by Member Barnes, the motion carried unanimously.

Item 6 Proposed Statement of Decision: *Mandatory On-The-Job Training for Peace Officers Working Alone*, 00-TC-19 and 02-TC-06, as described above in Item 5

Camille Shelton, Senior Commission Counsel, presented this item. She indicated that the sole issue before the Commission was whether the proposed decision accurately reflected the test claim decision. Unless there were objections, staff recommended that the Commission adopt the proposed Statement of Decision, and authorize staff to make minor changes to reflect the vote count and witnesses present at the hearing.

Mr. Shaw noted that in the last paragraph on page 14, there was a typographical error in the citation of Penal Code section 13522. Ms. Shelton indicated that the error would be corrected in the final decision.

Member Boel made a motion to adopt the proposed Statement of Decision. With a second by Member Barnes, the motion carried unanimously.

Item 7

DNA Database, 00-TC-27

County of San Bernardino, Claimant
Penal Code Section 14250

Statutes 2000, Chapter 822 (SB 1818)
-andAmendment to Postmortem Examinations: Unidentified Bodies, 02-TC-39

County of Los Angeles, Claimant
Penal Code Section 14250

Eric Feller, Commission Counsel, presented this item. Staff found the test claim to be a reimbursable state mandate for the following three sets of activities:

Statutes 2001, Chapter 467 (SB 297)

- 1. For coroners to collect samples for DNA testing from the remains of unidentified persons, and to send the samples to the Department of Justice in accordance with the DOJ-developed standards and guidelines for preservation and storage.
- 2. For local law enforcement to:
 - a. inform parents or other appropriate relatives of those missing under high-risk circumstances, as defined in statute, that they may give a voluntary sample of DNA within 30 days after making a report; and
 - b. take a DNA sample, in a manner prescribed by the Department of Justice, including the use of a model DNA collection kit.
- 3. For local law enforcement to:
 - a. re-verify the status of a missing person before submitting a DNA sample to the Department of Justice; and
 - b. send the DNA sample and any supplemental information to the Department of Justice with a copy of the crime report 30 days after the filing of a report.

Mr. Feller outlined the possible points of disagreement:

- 1. Whether exhuming unidentified remains to submit to the Department of Justice is reimbursable.
 - Staff found that this activity was not based on language in Penal Code section 14251.
- 2. Whether storage of DNA from an unidentified person's remains is reimbursable.

 Staff found that neither the test claim statute nor the Department of Justice's guidelines support reimbursement for storing DNA from unidentified remains.

Staff recommended that the Commission approve the test claim for the identified activities.

Parties were represented as follows: Bonnie Ter Keurst, on behalf of the County of San Bernardino; Leonard Kaye and David Campbell, on behalf of the County of Los Angeles; John Tonkyn and Jeannine Willie, with the Department of Justice, Missing Persons DNA Program; and Dirk Anderson, with the Department of Finance.

Ms. Ter Keurst had no issues with staff's analysis of the law enforcement duties. However, she disagreed with staff's findings regarding the exhumation and storage activities for coroners. Reading from Penal Code section 14250, subdivision (c), she pointed out that the legislation was directed to the coroner to collect samples from *all* unidentified persons. Staff interpreted this to apply to those remains held by the coroner, which she disputed.

Ms. Ter Keurst indicated that according to the San Bernardino Deputy Coroner, most skeletal or mummified remains are stored or retained as opposed to buried for economic reasons. However, bodies in various stages of decomposition need to be buried for health and safety reasons. Using staff's interpretation then, she argued that in pre-existing cases where the remains were not mummified, they would not be a part of the DNA investigative process because they had been buried. She disagreed with staff's statement that the Department of Justice did not deem exhumation necessary.

In addition, Ms. Ter Keurst explained that the storage, retention, and refrigeration of evidence represented activities deemed necessary by the coroner's office to carry out the directives of the legislation, which is to provide good samples to the Department of Justice. She disagreed with staff's conclusion that the DOJ Information Bulletin 01-BFS-04 did not address storage, and believed that such costs should be reimbursable.

Mr. Kaye concurred with Ms. Ter Keurst's comments and stated that when the Department of Justice requires the exhumation of bodies, coroners are under a legal compulsion to do so when possible. He suggested that this was the Legislature's specific intent.

Mr. Campbell asserted that the law requires bodies to be exhumed. With advanced DNA technology now available, he stated that it could bring closure to the families. He added that simply because bodies were examined and buried did not mean that coroners relinquished their responsibility.

Mr. Campbell concurred with Ms. Ter Keurst's comments.

Mr. Tonkyn also concurred with the comments made by the claimants. He provided historical information about the records of unidentified human remains and noted that prior to the effective date of this law, many varying methods of remains disposal were used. He indicated that no state-mandated minimum procedure was established.

Mr. Tonkyn explained that in a survey of coroners about three years ago, roughly 350 bodies were buried. Being such a high number, he felt it was necessary that the Commission allow reimbursement for exhumation costs, arguing that Penal Code section 14250, subdivision (c)(1), does not distinguish between "buried remains" and "remains in the possession of the coroner."

Mr. Anderson concurred with the staff analysis. He commented that as stated in the staff analysis, exhumation was subject to funding, as deemed necessary by the Department of Justice. He mentioned that the statute provided a two-dollar fee per death certificate to help fund this program. Regarding the storage costs, he indicated that the statute did not require the coroner to dispose of the sample.

Mr. Feller stated that under the rules of statutory construction, the specific governs the general. Thus, with regard to exhumation costs, any specific reference to it would trump any other general references in the legislative history or in Penal Code section 14250. He maintained that the funding provision in section 14251 controls in this area because none of the Department of Justice bulletins deemed exhumation necessary. Therefore, staff did not find a reimbursable mandate.

Chairperson Tilton asked a question about the Department of Justice's requirements for handling samples. Mr. Tonkyn responded and clarified that if an identification of the remains was made, they were returned to the coroner to be given to the family for proper disposal. If an identification was not made, the DNA profile was maintained in the database but the remains were still returned to the coroner.

Mr. Tonkyn also stated for the record that the primary purpose of the funds referenced in section 14251 was to fund the functions of the laboratory. If the Department of Justice deemed it necessary and had the discretionary funds available, they would be used for exhumation. However, he indicated that this has not been the case since DNA is very expensive.

Mr. Kaye added that traditionally, any funds made available were offset from the reimbursement claims. He reiterated that the Department of Justice required that bodies be exhumed under certain specific conditions.

Member Barnes asked if the information bulletins specifically notified coroners to exhume bodies. Mr. Tonkyn said no and reiterated that no distinction was made between "buried remains" and "remains in the possession of the coroner's office" because it did not seem necessary. Also, Mr. Tonkyn submitted that corners interpreted a mandate from section 14250, subdivision (c)(1), which states that samples must be collected from all unidentified persons.

Member Barnes asked if there was a definition of unidentified person's remains. Mr. Feller responded no. He noted that in order for the statute to apply retroactively, there would have to be an indication of Legislative intent, which was not the case here.

Ms. Ter Keurst noted that funds for the program were used for administrative purposes, but asserted that the fee issue was apart from the mandate imposed on coroners to obtain samples from all unidentified bodies.

There was further discussion prompted by questions from Member Barnes about the issue of exhumation and whether the statute was retroactive, or governed prior to its enactment.

Chairperson Tilton commented that this was a good example of where Legislative intent was unclear. As a member, he felt that he had no basis to make a determination on this test claim. Rather than guess what was intended, he proposed that clarifying legislation be sought.

Mr. Kaye proposed that staff's analysis be modified to specify that anyone buried on or after September 2000 was included by the term "all unidentified persons."

Ms. Willie, administrator of the Department of Justice Missing Persons DNA Program, reviewed the history of the legislation, Senate Bill 1818, which was initiated by the families of missing persons. She stated that the intent was to get all unidentified bodies identified by the Department of Justice using the new DNA technology. She added that lack of funding prevented the bodies from being exhumed; not a misunderstanding or thinking that it was not a law.

Member Barnes indicated that after rereading the language, he felt that there was a reasonable presumption that the Legislature intended this to apply to all unidentified bodies.

Mr. Anderson commented that the Department of Justice's requirements were completely lacking as far as requiring exhumation. He noted that the Commission's decision should be based on what was required.

Chairperson Tilton asked if there were examples of satisfying the requirement to get DNA tests without exhuming the body. Ms. Campbell responded that it was possible in some, but not all. Ms. Ter Keurst added that DNA tests were more like a final resort.

Chairperson Tilton requested comments as to Mr. Kaye's suggestion to modify the language. Mr. Tonkyn replied that the intent of the legislation was to not distinguish between the statute's effective date or the burial date of the remains, nor to distinguish between buried remains or remains at the coroner's office.

Ms. Willie clarified that the only bodies that would be exhumed were those for which there was no biological evidence in storage.

Chairperson Tilton articulated that all bodies did not have to be exhumed because there were other ways to obtain proper DNA. Ms. Willie indicated that there would not be a large number of exhumations. Mr. Tonkyn added that this should not be an ongoing problem because as of January 2001, coroners are required to take biological samples.

After further discussion, Member Barnes stated that he had enough information to make a decision and give guidance to staff in the development of the parameters and guidelines. He felt that exhumation costs should be covered to the extent that it is the only way to comply with the law. Chairperson Tilton agreed in general.

[At this time, a short break was taken.]

Mr. Feller recommended that the Commission adopt the final staff analysis, with any amendments they wished to make, and allow staff to re-draft the proposed Statement of Decision to incorporate the hearing testimony and present it at the next hearing.

Member Barnes made a motion to adopt the staff recommendation with an amendment to allow for exhumation costs in those circumstances where it is the only alternative available to meet the reporting needs under this particular law. With a second by Member Lazar, the motion carried 4-0. Member Boel abstained.

Item 8 Proposed Statement of Decision: *DNA Database*, 00-TC-27, 02-TC-39, as described in Item 7

Item 8 was postponed to the next hearing.

Item 9 Cancer Presumption (K-14); 02-TC-15

Santa Monica Community College District, Claimant

Labor Code Section 3212.1

Statutes 1982, Chapter 1568 (AB 3011)

Statutes 1984, Chapter 114 (AB 1399)

Statutes 1988, Chapter 1038 (SB 1145)

Statutes 1989, Chapter 1171 (SB 89)

Statutes 1999, Chapter 595 (AB 539)

Statutes 2000, Chapter 887 (SB 1820)

Camille Shelton, Senior Commission Counsel, presented this item. She noted that Labor Code section 3212.1 provides an evidentiary presumption in workers' compensation cases to specified firefighters and peace officers that develop cancer during employment. She stated the claimant's contention that the test claim statute imposed a reimbursable state-mandated program by requiring school districts and community college districts to pay additional costs of claims caused by the shifting of the burden of proof of the cause of the cancer from the police officer employee to the district.

Staff concluded that school districts and community college districts are not eligible claimants for this test claim because the test claim statute does not provide a rebuttable cancer presumption to employees of a school district or community college district. However, if it is assumed that Labor Code section 3212.1 does apply, staff further concludes that Labor Code section 3212.1 is not subject to article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution because school districts are not required by the state to employ peace officers and/or firefighters. Therefore, Ms. Shelton maintained that pursuant to the *Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates* case, litigating a workers' compensation case under this test claim statute does not impose a state-mandated program on school districts and community college districts.

Staff recommended that the Commission adopt the staff analysis to deny the test claim. Ms. Shelton noted that an errata sheet was issued for the executive summary because a line was mistakenly omitted from the last analysis.

Parties were represented as follows: Leo Shaw, on behalf of the claimant; and Thomas Todd, with the Department of Finance.

Mr. Shaw stated that based on prior decisions of the Commission regarding this issue, the claimant submitted on the record.

Mr. Todd concurred with the staff analysis.

Member Barnes made a motion to adopt the staff recommendation. With a second by Member Lazar, the motion carried unanimously.

Item 10 Proposed Statement of Decision: *Cancer Presumption (K-14)*, 02-TC-15, as described in Item 9

Camille Shelton, Senior Commission Counsel, presented this item. Staff recommended that the Commission adopt the proposed Statement of Decision, and allow staff to make minor changes to reflect the vote count and witnesses present at the hearing.

Member Lazar made a motion to adopt the proposed Statement of Decision. With a second by Member Van Houten, the motion carried unanimously.

STAFF REPORTS

Item 16 Hearing Schedule (info/action)

Paula Higashi, Executive Director, presented the proposed hearing schedule for 2005.

Chairperson Tilton noted that as authorized by statute and budget, the Commission was still holding bimonthly hearings.

Member Barnes made a motion to adopt the proposed hearing schedule for 2005. With a second by Member Van Houten, the motion carried unanimously.

Item 17 Chief Legal Counsel's Report (info)
Recent Decisions, Litigation Calendar

Mr. Starkey reported that the decision from the Third District Court of Appeal in the *San Diego Unified School District* case was received. He noted that it was an unpublished decision that upheld the Commission's decision in the *Physical Performance Tests* and *Standardized Testing and Reporting* case. However, he stated the possibility that it may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

Item 18 Executive Director's Report (info/action)
Workload, Budget, Assembly Special Committee on State Mandates,
Legislation, Next Hearing

Ms. Higashi noted the following:

• Workload. Prior to this hearing, there were 117 test claims pending determination.

Chairperson Tilton requested that at the next hearing, an overview be provided about the Legislative discussions regarding reforms to the mandate process, as well as the status of backlogged cases and resources. Ms. Higashi affirmed.

Proposed changes in a few budget trailer bills were discussed. Ms. Higashi stated that the total impact of the proposed changes would significantly increase the Commission's workload. The members discussed the potential workload, and dealing with the issue through budget change proposals.

Member Barnes asked about the status of the Butte County application. Nancy Patton, Assistant Executive Director, provided an update.

- Legislation. One bill related to elections procedures has been enrolled. All other bills were going to Appropriations.
- Next Agenda. The test claims for Acquisition of Agricultural Land for a School Site and California English Language Development Test are scheduled for the next hearing, along with proposed parameters and guidelines and statewide cost estimates.

CLOSED EXECUTIVE SESSION PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE SECTIONS 11126 and 17526.

To confer with and receive advice from legal counsel, for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the following matters pursuant to Government Code section 11126, subdivision (e)(1):

- 1. San Diego Unified School District v. Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number S109125, in the Supreme Court of the State of California. CSM Case No. 02-L-02 [Pupil Expulsions]
- San Diego Unified School District and San Juan Unified School District v.
 Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number C044162, in the Appellate Court of the State of California, Third Appellate District.
 CSM Case No. 02-L-05 [Physical Performance Tests]
- 3. State of California, Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number 03CS01069 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento. CSM Case No. 03-L-01 [Animal Adoption]
- 4. State of California, Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number 03CS01432in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento. CSM Case No. 03-L-02 [Behavioral Intervention Plans]
- 5. San Diego Unified School District v. Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number 03CS01401 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento. CSM Case No. 03-L-03 [Graduation Requirements IRC]
- 6. Castro Valley Unified School District v. Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number 03CS01568 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento. CSM Case No. 03-L-04 [Graduation Requirements IRC]
- 7. San Jose Unified School District v. Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number 03CS01569 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento. CSM Case No. 03-L-05 [Graduation Requirements IRC]
- 8. Sweetwater Union High School District v. Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number 03CS01570 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento. CSM Case No. 03-L-06 [Graduation Requirements IRC]
- 9. Clovis Unified School District v. Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number 03CS01702 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento. CSM Case No. 03-L-09 [Graduation Requirements IRC]
- 10. Grossmont Union High School District v. Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number 04CS00028 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento. CSM Case No. 03-L-10 [Graduation Requirements IRC]
- 11. County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number BS087959, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles. CSM Case No. 03-L-11 [Animal Adoption]
- 12. County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. State of California, Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number BS089769, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles. CSM Case No. 03-L-12 [Transit Trash Receptacles, et al.]
- 13. City of Artesia, et al. v. State of California, Commission on State Mandates, et al., Case Number BS089785, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles. CSM Case No. 03-L-13 [Waste Discharge Requirements]

To confer with and receive advice from legal counsel, for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the following matter pursuant to Government Code section 11126, subdivision (e)(2):

• Based on existing facts and circumstances, there is a specific matter which presents a significant exposure to litigation against the Commission on State Mandates, its members and/or staff (Gov. Code, § 11126, subd. (e)(2)(B)(i).)

PERSONNEL

To confer on personnel matters pursuant to Government Code sections 11126, subdivision (a), and 17526.

Discussion and action, if appropriate, on report from the Personnel Sub-Committee.

Hearing no further comments, Chairperson Tilton adjourned into closed executive session pursuant to Government Code section 11126, subdivision (e), to confer with and receive advice from legal counsel for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the pending litigation listed on the published notice and agenda; and Government Code sections 11126, subdivision (a), and 17526, to confer on personnel matters listed on the published notice and agenda.

REPORT FROM CLOSED EXECUTIVE SESSION

Chairperson Tilton reported that the Commission met in closed executive session pursuant to Government Code section 11126, subdivision (e), to confer with and receive advice from legal counsel for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the pending litigation listed on the published notice and agenda; and Government Code sections 11126, subdivision (a), and 17526, to confer on personnel matters listed on the published notice and agenda.

ADJOURNMENT

Ms. Higashi introduced a new student assistant, Latoya Jackson.

Hearing no further business, and upon motion by Member Lazar and second by Member Boel, Chairperson Tilton adjourned the meeting at 12:30 p.m.

PAULA HIGASHI
Executive Director

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PUBLIC HEARING

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

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ORIGINAL

TIME: 9:34 a.m.

DATE: Thursday, July 29, 2004

PLACE: Commission on State Mandates

State Capitol, Room 126 Sacramento, California


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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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Reported By:

DANIEL P. FELDHAUS CSR #6949, RDR, CRR



COMMISSIONERS PRESENT

JAMES TILTON
(Commission Chair)
Representative for DONNA ARDUIN
Director
Department of Finance

BRUCE VAN HOUTEN
(Commission Vice Chair)
Representative for PHILIP ANGELIDES
State Treasurer

WALTER BARNES
Representative for STEVE WESTLY
State Controller

JAN BOEL
Acting Director
State Office of Planning and Research

JOHN S. LAZAR City Council Member City of Turlock

COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT

PAULA HIGASHI Executive Director

PAUL M. STARKEY Chief Legal Counsel

CAMILLE SHELTON
Senior Commission Counsel

ERIC FELLER Commission Counsel

NANCY PATTON

Legislative Coordinator

Assistant Executive Director

LaTOYA JACKSON Student Assistant

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 3 and Item 4:

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For Santa Monica Community College District

LEO SHAW, J.D. Associate SixTen and Associates 5252 Balboa Avenue, Suite 807 San Diego, CA 92117

PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 5 and Item 6:

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Appearing Re Item 7:

For Claimant, County of San Bernardino

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PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 7:

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For the Department of Finance:

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PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 9 and Item 10:

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For the Department of Finance:

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		ERRATA SHEET
Page	Line	Correction
2		CHANGE "Legislative Coordinator" 10 "Assistant
		Executive Director"
52	10	CHANGE matter" TO "manner"
<u>52</u>	20_	CHANGE "as" TO "is"
91	14	CHANCE "Leonard's" TO "Kaye's"
97	_2_	CHANGE "Leonard's" TO "Kaye's" OHANGE "3112.1" TO "3212.1"
106	19	CHANGE "FCA" TO "SCA"
		
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1	BE IT REMEMBERED that on Thursday, July 29, 2004,
2	commencing at the hour of 9:34 a.m., thereof, at the
3	State Capitol, Room 126, Sacramento, California, before
4	me, DANIEL P. FELDHAUS, CSR #6949, RDR and CRR, the
5	following proceedings were held:
6	000
7	CHAIR TILTON: The time of 9:30 arrived and it looks
8	like we've got a quorum. And I'd like to establish the
9	meeting of the Commission on State Mandates.
10	Paula, can you call the roll?
11	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
12	MEMBER BARNES: Here.
13	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
14	MEMBER BOEL: Here.
15	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
16	MEMBER LAZAR: Here.
17	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Van Houten?
18	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Here.
19	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
20	CHAIR TILTON: Here.
21	We have a quorum.
22	Paula, can you introduce the first item?
23	MS. HIGASHI: The first item on the agenda is
24	adoption of the minutes from our last meeting.
25	CHAIR TILTON: Are there any objections or

1	corrections to the minutes from the last meeting?
2	MEMBER BOEL: I move we adopt the minutes.
3	CHAIR TILTON: Do we have a second?
4	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: I'll second.
5	CHAIR TILTON: A motion for a second.
6	Any discussion?
7	(No audible response was heard.)
8	CHAIR TILTON: All in favor, say "aye."
9	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
10	CHAIR TILTON: Opposed?
11	(No audible response was heard.)
12	CHAIR TILTON: The minutes are approved.
13	MEMBER LAZAR: I'll abstain because I was absent
14	from the last meeting.
15	CHAIR TILTON: Okay, so noted.
16	MS. HIGASHI: I'd just like to note for the record
17	that there are no appeals to be considered under Item 2.
18	And this brings us to the test claim portion of our
19	meeting. And as is our custom, what I'd request is that
20	all of the parties and witnesses that will be speaking
21	on the test claims that are set for hearing, please
22	stand. And what we will do is have the swearing in of
23	witnesses.
24	(Several people stood up.)
25	MS. HIGASHI: Do you solemnly swear or affirm that

1	the testimony which you are about to give today is based
2	upon your personal knowledge, information or belief?
3	(A chorus of "Yeses" was heard.)
4	MS. HIGASHI: Thank you very much.
5	The first claim today is Item 3. And it is on the
6	Algebra Instruction test claim. This item will be
7	presented by Eric Feller, Commission Counsel.
8	Oh, I'm sorry. I skipped the Consent Calendar.
9	Sorry about that.
10	The proposed Consent Calendar, I'll just read it
11	very quickly, is Items 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15. And it is
12	my understanding that there are no objections to any of
13	these items on the Consent Calendar. It is the green
14	sheet that you have before you.
15	CHAIR TILTON: Do we have a motion to approve the
16	Consent Calendar?
17	MEMBER LAZAR: So moved.
18	CHAIR TILTON: Do I have a second?
19	MEMBER BOEL: Second.
20	CHAIR TILTON: Okay, we have a motion and a second
21	to approve the Consent Calendar.
22	Is there anyone that wants to raise any issues with
23	any of these items?
24	(No audible response was heard.)
25	CHAIR TILTON: Hearing no objections, we'll take

1	roll call.
2	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
3	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
4	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
5	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
6	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
7	MEMBER LAZAR: Aye?
8.	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Van Houten?
9	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Aye.
10	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
11	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
12	Motion passes.
13	MS. HIGASHI: The motion is carried.
14	This now brings us back to Item 3. And Mr. Feller
15	will introduce this item.
16	MR. FELLER: Good morning. As Paula mentioned, this
17	is the <i>Algebra Instruction</i> test claim.
18	The test claim statute requires pupils to pass a
19	course in algebra, before obtaining a high school
20	diploma. Claimant pled activities related to remedial
21	instruction to help pupils pass the course. Staff found
22	that the test claim statute does not require or refer to
23	remedial instruction, so these activities are not
24	reimbursable.
25	As to the algebra course itself, preexisting law

already requires two courses in mathematics in order to 1 2 graduate from high school. Therefore, the test claim 3 statute merely places Algebra Instruction within the 4 existing framework of mathematics instruction, without 5 adding to the framework. So staff found that this activity was also not reimbursable. 6 7 Therefore, staff recommended that the Commission deny this test claim. 8 Would the parties and witnesses please state their 9 10 names for the record? MS. DUNCAN: Ruth Ann Duncan. 11 MR. HENDEE: Larry Hendee, Sweetwater. 12 13 MR. WILKENING: Mike Wilkening with Finance. 14 CHAIR TILTON: Mr. Hendee, do you want to start? 15 MR. HENDEE: Well, I'm here this morning on behalf 16 of the claimant to indicate that we don't agree with the 17 staff's findings. 18 First, let me qualify my statements by indicating to 19 you that I'm not an attorney, and I'm also not a 20

curriculum instruction-type person. So I won't be trying to address issues related to that.

What I am is a school businessperson; but probably more importantly -- at least more importantly to me --I'm a father of three, one of which had problems with math in high school. I'm a grandfather of seven, with

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one of them being a high-school-aged student, who is currently having problems with math. And the other ones are a little bit young yet to be able to determine whether they're going to have the same kind of problems.

But the bottom line is, I want all of them to go to college. And as importantly, if they need not to go to college, I want them at least to get a high school diploma and graduate.

So with that said, let me talk for a few minutes about what the staff's findings were and our positions on those findings.

The staff found that the statute and legislative history didn't mention remedial instruction, and made the conclusion that it was not reimbursable under Article XIII B, section 6. Staff supported those statements by indicating that if the Legislature had intended that the activity to be part of the Algebra Instruction program, that intent would have been stated in either the test claim statute or the legislative history.

Two, the staff indicated, nor is there a threat of penalty for not providing it.

And three, staff indicated that remedial instruction would be undertaken as a discretionary or optional activity by the school district.

In the staff analysis background statement, the State Board of Education math standards were discussed. And in that discussion, it was disclosed that 30 to 40 percent of the pupils don't take high school algebra. There is no disclosure, either by the staff or the legislative history, relative to why those 30 to 40 percent don't take algebra.

Our contention, i.e., the claimant's contention, is that a large percent of those 30 to 40 percent don't take algebra because, one, they don't have the desire for higher education; two, they don't have the ability to be successful with algebra; and/or three, they don't have the ability -- they lack the ability to do algebra, period.

Staff also discloses in the staff analysis background statement, in the section, "Related Claims," that the test claim statute was enacted, in part, to protect High School Exit Exam from court challenges because pupils must have the opportunity to learn the subject matter tested.

Our contention -- again, claimant's contention -is that the student must have the ability to learn the
subject matter as it relates to that portion of the
30 to 40 percent that are in those three categories
above, implies the probable need for remediation

intervention.

Claimant also disagrees with staff analysis finding that remediation is not subject to Article XIII B because it's not so stated in the statute or legislative history. The minutes of all of the Assembly hearings and Senate hearings on this piece of legislation disclose the facts of 30 to 40 percent of pupils that choose not to take algebra and the need to protect the High School Exit Exam because of the need to -- or they must have the opportunity to learn the subject matter.

Claimant disagrees that there's no penalty to the District for not offering algebra as a course. The District has to either graduate the student or not. The student suffers the penalty.

And I'd also like to indicate in the same area, that the staff has used a term "enforceability," as it was defined by the Court, to determine whether an item is mandatory or discretionary. And I'd like to point out that that basically renders 90 percent of the Education Code, as an advisory code, which, in other words, means that the school districts don't have to do anything unless it's in the code, unless there's something in there that indicates there's going to be a penalty if they don't.

The claimant also disagrees that remediation becomes

an option or discretionary to school districts. Only in settings where districts don't care whether the students are successful or not in algebra, would those two terms be appropriate. The students who fall in that 30 to 40 percent class need to have some sort of remediation intervention in order to be able to be successful in the classroom with algebra, with an algebra course.

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Just as a safe and secure building can't be built without doing an enormous amount of groundwork and preparation, the same thing is true with an instructional program. You have a lot of ground work and preparation that needs to be done.

Staff also found that the other activities were not mandated because they fall into the same categories of not being in the legislative history or in the statute.

And we contend that the opposite is true, that there is a process of getting to an end result, and that includes all of these things that have to be done, i.e. primarily remedial intervention.

Staff found that Algebra Instruction is not a new program or a higher level of service based upon court decision involving domestic violence, training courses being required as a 24-hour continuing education requirement for law enforcement officers. Claimant disagrees with that. Claimant believes that that is an

apples and oranges comparison. You have law enforcement officers who have the same abilities, essentially, they have the same desires and goals and so forth; and they are not comparable with a group of school students who may or may not even know what they want to do at the time that they enter into high school.

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Claimant would also like to point out that staff ignored the April 10th, 2000, and May 25th Appropriations Committee fiscal summaries, in which there was disclosure to the committee that, one, additional costs to be incurred to attract, retain or retrain teachers for the new course work demands; and two, that the mandate in the bill would make districts eligible for reimbursement for all related costs.

The question is not whether the Legislature has the right to establish its priorities. The question is, in the process of setting those priorities, did the Legislature impose a higher level of service? Claimant believes it did. And under the Constitution, the State of California is entitled to be reimbursed, dollar-for-dollar, for the cost of those impositions.

At this point, I'd like to introduce Ms. Ruth Ann

Duncan, who is currently serving as a math curriculum

specialist for the Sweetwater Union High School District.

Ruth Ann has served as a mentor teacher and business

support provider for more than six years, and was selected out of 1,300 employees in our District, a certificated teacher employees, as Teacher of the Year in 2000-2001.

2.0

She also was selected as a one of three American teachers in 2000-2001 to participate in an international study on how students process algebra instruction, which was conducted by the University of Australia. Ruth Ann has also participated in an assessment of community teachers, which was a project conducted by the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Department of Education. And she is a member of the National Council of Supervisors of Mathematics.

I've asked Ruth Ann to come this morning, and she has over 25 years of teaching experience also, which I didn't mention, but she does have that. I've asked her to come this morning to answer questions that you might have, as well as discuss some of the subject offerings that had to be written and developed in order to implement the legislation that was passed -- imposed upon us. And she'll also touch on the effects that remediation, intervention, assessments and trainings as a result of the legislation.

MS. DUNCAN: Good morning. I'd like to talk about the algebra requirement and the higher level of service

the District must provide as a result of its inception.

I have, indeed, been a math teacher in the Sweetwater Union High School District for 14 years. Seven of those years have been spent as an algebra teacher and an algebra readiness teacher. And the last three, part-time developing curriculum in our office of curriculum, as a middle-school math specialist.

I have seen enormous changes as a result of the changing requirements and the level of proficiency to which we need to raise our students over the 14 years in which I have been in the District.

I wanted to give a bit of a context of the requirement because it's important to me. Larry mentioned it, but I'd like to reiterate it, so that you can see it clearly and see it through my eyes.

This is the context: Prior to 2000, California high school students were required merely to take two high school math courses for their diploma. These courses were decided at the discretion of their districts.

Around about 2000, we had the inception of the California high school exit examination. As you probably know, 70 percent of that test consists of grade seven standards, certainly a minimal expectation for California high school graduates.

30 percent of the tests -- 30 percent of the items

address algebra standards.

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As Larry pointed out, the imposing of the algebra requirement and the birth of the California high school exit examination coincided, as it were; because in order to impose the KC, we need to offer the opportunity to learn the algebra standards to all of our students who are the potential test-takers.

The staff has suggested that replacing the two math courses with an algebra requirement is a one-to-one trade-off, as it were. The requirement states that a student may take the algebra as two math courses -- that is, the content may be delivered over two years; thus, fulfilling that two-year requirement; or algebra plus something else, obviously, what remains to fulfill the two requirements.

I am here to say that to impose an algebra requirement as one of those two suggested courses does, indeed, constitute a higher level of service. It is a unprecedented request that involves a multitude of students who have not been successful heretofore, nor credentialed in algebra at the time of their graduation.

Our framework, our mathematics framework refers to universal access. This is really the issue around which I state the claim that a higher level of service needs to be provided. If we are, indeed, to provide universal

access and, thus, a diploma to all of our students, we must for the first time address the needs of special education students, our language learners, our at-risk learners who are struggling and who lack a number of prerequisite skills, and also students who heretofore have chosen vocational or general math paths as their life choice.

So, therefore, it is up to us as curriculum people and as math teachers to raise skills levels, to enable our students to be verifiably algebra-proven. This is a costly and labor-intensive effort.

It is a far different thing to deliver an abstract and rigorous discipline like algebra to the aforementioned at-risk students, special education students, low performers, that seems to be evident in the thinking that I have seen reflected in our documentation.

Our Board has struggled to develop policies that will enable all of our students to meet the expectation of the algebra requirement. We have had a great deal of reshuffling. Many programs have been rewritten. And I will be describing them a little bit more fully in a second.

Our counselors -- although this is not the year in which the algebra requirement must be demonstrated, our

counselors have spent a great deal of time and energy examining transcripts, to see that, indeed, our students have met the letter of the law; and that is to say, that they have addressed all 26 of the algebra standards, and have not simply given lip service to an algebra course. That would be our "easy out," but the state requires us to address all 26 quadratics, rational expressions, those of you who remember in algebra what is like.

Let me describe some of the courses that have been developed. Certainly, a higher level of service.

Heretofore, we were teaching algebra to those who had the desire and the ability to be successful. I have to be honest about that, after 25 years of math instruction.

Now, these are the variations that our district has developed. We have special ed. algebra classes, and we have three- and four-year sequences for our Level 1's and our Level 2's, respectively, which presents the algebra in the increments by which we hope students to be able to achieve mastery.

Also, these courses are written at the minimal degree of complexity, so that the students have a chance to be able to master the standards. For the students that the framework described as our "intensive and strategic group," that is, those who have shown themselves to be short in a series of measures over time

and who have demonstratively proven that they do not have a strong background, we have various forms of extended time. These take several models.

2.2

There's an extended algebra that has been administratively developed to deliver the content over two years, one of the possibilities that is given to us.

We have an academy model, which is an extended algebra, two years' delivery, with an additional support class in each of those successive years.

We have, a third variation, an algebra with a concurrent support class, in which the core content is presented in the mathematics hour; and in the elective, the different approaches are taken to reach various learners.

Additionally, we have drafted some algebra-readiness courses that are delivered in the summer, to scaffold eighth graders -- incoming eighth graders who would not necessarily be successful in algebra at the eighth grade.

There is a small penalty, not a financial penalty, but a small penalty, as you know, attached to not taking algebra at the eighth grade level. And that is a loss of API points.

There are a series of interventions and remediations that we have put into place. For our benchmark students -- that is, students who are making good

progress but who are experiencing minimal or temporary difficulties in their understanding -- we have developed before- and after-school classes, Saturday classes, special intercession classes, not the traditional ones, not the traditional summer school, but classes which address small pieces of the content for these students.

We have the whole panoply of tutoring opportunities, which our teachers are sometimes delivering gratis.

Professional development involved is also a cost to us. Our special education teachers who are delivering math content, now on a much higher level, often lack the content knowledge, although they are rich in instructional strategies that work for these students. Conversely, our regular ed teachers need a great deal of help with differentiation and diagnostic teaching.

We have supported our innovative courses and remediation measures with a backup of assessments that measure before the California standards test and before the California high school test, exit examination, how well our students are doing, vis-a-vis the algebra standards. We have written end-of-course exams, which verify mastery and give us a legitimate reason for passing our students in algebra.

We have benchmarks that tell us at intermittent points whether or not a student is making progress

toward the standards.

And lastly, we have had to implement a number of diagnostic tests and, again, unprecedented quantity because of the necessity of placing students correctly and judiciously; and also of providing for intervention for those students who need it.

Lastly, the implementation of these support classes, this extended time; what do we do with that? We don't deliver algebra by speaking longer and louder. To reach the students who are now under our umbrella, we need a different delivery. So we have spent a great deal of money on software technology, supplemental materials, models, manipulatives, to provide that active learning that our framework calls for special-needs learners.

In terms of the penalty to our district, there's not a clear financial penalty. But what are the two penalties that I see every day, as a math teacher, dealing with students and parents? I see the great fear that our students will not be receiving a high school diploma, just as Larry mentioned, if they cannot meet these expectations. And it is an expectation far beyond any that has existed in my career -- 25 years, actually, plus.

Thanks.

CHAIR TILTON: Maybe we can hear from the Department

of Finance and then ask you questions. I know some members may have questions.

MR. WILKENING: Michael Wilkening, the Department of Finance.

We concur with the staff analysis in that the Legislature is prioritizing within the existing mathematics curriculum for high school.

CHAIR TILTON: Can I hear from staff?

One question I had, what we're hearing from the claimants, is the issue of expanded workload, and I understand the change. And I want to respond to the perception that this is a prioritization of the workload, not a new workload. It seems to me that's the point that staff hears, that there's a requirement of two classes, there's still a requirement of two classes, and it's a matter of prioritization of your staff time and your prep time to do that.

Is that a fair -- or is that the issue here? Can the staff respond?

MR. FELLER: Yes. That's a part of it.

The other part is that all the activities that the claimants mentioned weren't anywhere to be found in the law or in the statutes or elsewhere, that we could find, so that all those activities, as laudable as they are, they're just not state-mandated, that we could determine

1	within the meaning of Article XIII, section 6.
2	CHAIR TILTON: Any questions by the Board members?
3	MEMBER BOEL: Yes, I have a question.
4	Before you implemented all these supplemental
5	classes and remedial classes, what was your pass rate on
6	the exam for high school exit, and how much did that
7	change when you implemented all the remedial classes?
8	Did it change substantially?
9	MS. DUNCAN: It has in the range of 20 points, yes.
10	MEMBER BOEL: 20 points, you said?
11	MS. DUNCAN: Yes.
12	MEMBER BOEL: Before you put these remedial
13	classes
14	MS. DUNCAN: Since.
15	MEMBER BOEL: 20 percent
16	MS. DUNCAN: Since.
17	MEMBER BOEL Since?
18	MS. DUNCAN: Since we have them, yes, over the time.
19	MEMBER BOEL: And prior to that, you think most of
20	those people were failing the test because of the algebra
21	requirements? Was that the main things that they were
22	not passing the test on, the algebra requirements? Or
23	were they just not taking algebra?
24	MS. DUNCAN: In the California high school exit
25	examination?

MEMBER BOEL: 1 Yes. 2 MS. DUNCAN: It is a component and it is assumed 3 within the test, that the student has had those standards. So some of the students were taking algebra, 4 a number of them were. 5 The requirement came to be. so, yes, but they were confounded with algebra as it was 6 7 taught at the beginning of this experience. It was -our algebra has terribly been taught to people who are 8 9 ready to learn it, people like ourselves, like the math teachers, and those who are successful stay with it and 10 11 persevere. And those who were not, were just suddenly not involved in this. 12 13 CHAIR TILTON: Any more questions? (No audible response was heard.) 14 15 CHAIR TILTON: Do we have a sense of the Commission? 16 MEMBER BARNES: I move the staff recommendation. 17 CHAIR TILTON: We have a motion to move the staff recommendation. 18 Do we have a second? 19 20 MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: I second. 21 CHAIR TILTON: We have a motion and a second. Any further discussion? 22 23 (No audible response was heard.)

CHAIR TILTON: Paula, will you call the roll?

Mr. Barnes?

MS. HIGASHI:

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1	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
2	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
3	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
4	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
5	MEMBER LAZAR: Aye.
6	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Van Houten?
7	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Aye.
8	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
9	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
10	MS. HIGASHI: The motion carries.
11	Item 4.
12	MR. FELLER: Unless there's objections, the Staff
13	recommends that the Commission adopt the Proposed
14	Statement of Decision which accurately reflects the
15	decision on the test claim. Staff also recommends the
16	Commission allow minor changes be made to the Statement
17	of Decision, including reflecting the hearing testimony
18	and the vote count will be included when in final
19	Statement of Decision.
20	CHAIR TILTON: Do we have a motion to approve
21	Item 4?
22	MEMBER LAZAR: So moved.
23	CHAIR TILTON: We've got a motion.
24	MEMBER BOEL: Second.
25	CHAIR TILTON: And a second.

1	Call the roll please, Paula.
2	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
3	MEMBER Bowl: Aye.
4	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
5	MEMBER LAZAR: Aye.
6	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Van Houten?
7	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Aye.
8	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
9	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
10	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
11	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
12	MS. HIGASHI: The motion carries.
13	This brings us to Item 5. And this is the test
14	claim on Mandatory On-The-Job Training for Peace Officers
15	Working Alone.
16	This item will be presented by Ms. Shelton.
17	MS. SHELTON: Good morning.
18	This test claim has been filed on documents issued
19	by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and
20	Training. POST Bulletin 98-1 and the POST Administrative
21	Manual Procedure D-13 establish field training
22	requirements for peace officers that work alone and are
23	assigned to general law enforcement patrol duties.
24	As indicated in the staff analysis, staff finds that
25	POST field training program is required only if the local

agency or school district employer elects to become a

member of POST and for those officers employed by a

POST-participating agency, only after the officer has

completed the basic training course.

Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the staff

analysis and deny this test claim for the following

reasons:

One, that state law does not require school

One, that state law does not require school districts and community college districts to employ peace officers, and, thus, POST field training requirements do not impose a state mandate on school districts and community college districts; and

Two, state law does not require local agencies or school districts to participate in the POST program and, thus, the field training requirements imposed by POST on their members are not mandated by the State.

Will the parties and their representatives please state your names for the record?

MR. KAYE: Leonard Kaye, County of Los Angeles.

MR. SHAW: Leo Shaw for Santa Monica Community College District.

MR. LEWALLEN: Bud Lewallen. I'm with the Commission on POST; and we support the staff recommendation.

MS. JOHAS: Georgia Johas, Department of Finance.

MR. STOWE: Al Stowe, with the Commission on POST.

CHAIR TILTON: Mr. Kaye, would you like to start?

MR. KAYE: Thank you. Good morning.

It is a real pleasure being here this morning; and we certainly appreciate this opportunity to discuss and clarify this very, very critical area. We believe that there is a legal compulsion -- unambiguous legal compulsion to provide this subject of mandatory field training; and we just have a few brief remarks in this area, and are anxious to hear from our colleagues in POST and Finance, why they might believe otherwise.

To us, it appears that the field training standards and requirements apply to all our officers, all our peace officers, patrolling all our streets, whether they be city streets, whether they be county streets, whether they be streets in school districts, on our campuses, and so forth.

We think that there is an implied and, certainly in the language of POST Bulletin 98-1, an express understanding that they are to be applied consistently throughout California; that no jurisdiction, no locale, in effect, should be excused simply because their City Council or their Board of Supervisors elected not to receive POST reimbursement.

That, in a nutshell, is our argument, in addition to

the very, very clear and explicit language that we found, that we read in the POST training bulletin and question.

And I'd like to just briefly cite a few sections of that.

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But before I do, I will note that this bulletin was sent with some attachments to all, quote, "affected agencies." Now, there are two ways of reading that phraseology, and I don't propose that we parse and get into some highly theoretical discussion; but the way we read it is that the attachments, those that this memorandum was sent to -- and maybe we can get clarification this morning -- the way we read it, is to all sheriffs' departments, to all police departments, schools, et cetera. And the phrase, "and other agencies participating in POST, " that modifier, "other agencies participating in POST, " immediately applies to those other agencies. And it doesn't say that this applies only to police departments participating in POST, et That's the way we read it. And we recognize cetera. that it's subject to various interpretations.

But nevertheless, the one thing to us that is not subject to interpretation, is the clear language in POST Bulletin 98-1, entitled, "Mandatory field training program." It says it's a mandatory field training program. And it also indicates it's an integral part of the previously mandated Basic training requirement. And

Mr. Kenneth O'Brien -- excuse me, Mr. Kenneth J. O'Brien,
POST Executive Director, specifically states that,

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"The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, POST, approved amendments to Commission Regulation 1005 and Procedure D-13 relating to establishing a mandatory POST-approved field training program for peace officers assigned to general law enforcement This Commission action patrol duties. implements one of the objectives in a strategic plan to increase standards and competencies of officers by integrating a mandatory field training program as part of the Basic training requirement. POST regulations and procedures have incorporated most of the important elements of successful field training programs already in existence in California law enforcement agencies."

And I must note that it is a cooperative effort; and we appreciate what POST is doing and has done in this area.

Nevertheless, we believe that POST's new field training program for all peace officers assigned to general law enforcement patrol duty is, as POST has stated, an integral and required component of such

officer basic training. And this is further illustrated in pertinent part of section 1005(a) of Title 11,

Division 2 of the California Code of Regulations. And this is on Bates page 570, for those of you that would like to follow along. But I think it graphically represents -- and I'll give you a minute to find that page -- at the top of page 570, Bates page 570, it says -- the entire section is called "Minimum Entry-Level Training Standards," and then it has parentheses, "required."

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And under that section, to us, it's instructive that POST portrays as, one, basic course requirements, and then they go into the basic course requirements, which most of us know about.

And then at the bottom of that paragraph, they have requirements for the regular basic course are set forth in PAM section D-1-3. And then as a subset or a subtopic within the required training, they have, "Field training program requirements."

Now, maybe we're reading along and we don't understand how it's organized; but to us, this clearly states that the field training is part and parcel, a subset of the required training. So that's how we read it.

Finally, we note that the POST mandate, and I think

Commission staff -- Camille -- has done a really outstanding job in looking on the Internet and seeing all of the agencies that do participate in POST and don't participate in POST and so forth; but what we found, when we checked the same information, is that basically, every agency that we found, if they're not members of POST, uses officers from agencies that are members of POST. In other words, they contract, for example, with county sheriffs' departments that receive the mandated training. So in our view, this training requirement is not only legally compelled; we have no reasonable alternative -we have no alternative but to provide this; but also in fact, in the state of California, it is also very pervasive, and it is consistently applied which, to us, is a good thing.

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And I'd just like to conclude by saying that we cannot believe that if certain peace officers are to be excused from meeting this very, very important requirement, that they be done so on the basis that our city councils and our boards of supervisors simply have not elected to receive POST reimbursement. We feel, respectfully so, that this is irrelevant to the fundamental issue before us.

And as I say, I'm very anxious to hear what others have to say in this matter; and we'd like to reserve

further comments, if we could, based upon what they say. 1 2 Thank you. 3 CHAIR TILTON: Very good. Thank you, Mr. Kaye. Mr. Shaw? 4 Yes, on behalf of Santa Monica, we would, 5 6 of course, concur with the comments of Mr. Kaye; and otherwise we would submit on the record. And, of course, 7 I'd be happy to answer any questions of the Commission, 8 9 as they might particularly relate to community colleges 10 and school districts. 11 CHAIR TILTON: Thank you. 12 The Department of Finance? 13 MS. JOHAS: Georgia Johas, Department of Finance. 14 We would concur with the staff analysis that 15 training requirements do not impose a reimbursable 16 state-mandated cost. 17 CHAIR TILTON: I think we heard POST's position, but maybe we can hear it officially again for the record. 18 19 MR. STOWE: Yes, Mr. Chairman and Members, we concur 20 with the staff analysis and conclusion that this is not a 21 state mandate. 22 I should also add a couple of other historical 23 comments, and that is that POST was created back in the late fifties, with an agreement between the Legislature, 24

local agencies, city and county, primarily, and law

enforcement, to create POST as a voluntary program. And it is clear that it is a voluntary program, even though all cities and all counties have elected, voluntarily, to pass ordinances of participating in the POST program.

And the agreement was that those agencies agreeing to participate in the POST program would get the benefits of reimbursement, certificates and other services in return for voluntarily meeting our selection and training requirements. And over the years, we have embellished upon those training and selection requirements with the concurrence of our clients.

And it is true that both of these agencies have passed ordinances to voluntarily participate in the POST program. And the field training program is a part of our training requirements that became effective in 1999. And so the POST program was and continues to be a voluntary program.

We do make provisions for agencies that have financial hardship to exempt from that particular requirement, but not the others.

We have a few agencies that have elected to seek a waiver for this requirement. But the vast majority of agencies participating in the POST program do, in fact, meet this requirement.

I'd be happy to answer questions.

CHAIR TILTON: Let me restate that, because basically you've answered the question I had, which was the issue, it seems like this is one of those areas where the State has stepped in to establish a standard that then local entities can use to measure themselves against.

But our basic point here, it's not a mandate by the state. It's a service we provide to establish the standard in terms of training. And then your basic premise is that then is -- responding to Mr. Kaye's point, is it makes it a voluntary program to do that. So we've stepped in and taken on the role of establishing some standards. But in order to acknowledge this is really assisting in a local effort in terms of providing peace officer responsibilities and quality staff, we've just stepped up to do that standardization establishment.

Any other questions from the board members?

(No audible response was heard.)

CHAIR TILTON: Mr. Kaye, do you want to respond?

MR. KAYE: No, I think our position is and remains, respectfully, that we view this as a mandated program.

We, I think, along perhaps with other jurisdictions that I've met and conferred with on this matter, feel that if they were to, you know, not to elect to participate in POST, that POST standards and requirements would still

be imposed, certainly in the area of basic training, where peace officers certainly can't arrest folks without having met minimum basic training. And since the County Sheriff, at least, is required to make arrests when appropriate to do so and to deputize folks, to do that. Our position is that any fact -- there is enormous legal compulsion to participate in POST. And even apart from that legal compulsion, there's legal compulsion to make sure that our officers are properly trained, so that their arrests are valid.

And I guess we could go on and argue about whether they would be valid if they weren't on patrol and they simply came into the station house and gave themselves up or whether our streets are really safe, as we would want them to be, and ensuring that every peace officer is consistently trained and meets certain standards when they're out in the street, keeping us safe.

And so I think our position is, we understand the other side and we understand the constraints that everyone is under. But we feel, I think, that we are under legal compulsion to provide these services.

Thank you.

CHAIR TILTON: Camille, do you have any comments?

MS. SHELTON: I don't have anything further to add,
unless you have a specific question that I'd be happy to

answer.

CHAIR TILTON: Let me just summarize this, I think, for the record, because it's clear sometimes, at least from our perspective, to document what our responsibilities are here, in terms of the issue.

It seems to me that the fundamental issue is whether or not the State is requiring this additional effort. It is clear to me that in order to get POST certification, there's an increased level of service or requirement in order to get that certification. But the fundamental issue for me is the fact, unless there's statutes somewhere that require these agencies to, in fact, be POST-certified, then there's not that underlying legal requirement for the State to pay the mandate.

And I haven't heard that, unless someone can cite where the Legislature has required these agencies to be POST-certified. Without that, I think there's not the linkage that we would need.

MS. STONE: Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, Pamela Stone on behalf of the CSAC SB90 Committee.

I have had to do research on this because I also have another test claim which is pending before your Commission, addressing the issue of meeting POST standards. There are two subdivisions in the Penal Code that address this issue.

The first subdivision speaks to the standards which are required to be met if you are to be a peace officer within the state of California, and the training standards and standards which must be met. It is not incumbent that one be a member of POST in order for the standards to be applicable. They are applicable whether or not you are a member of POST. In other words, in order to be able to exercise peace powers, you must have the requisite training and certificates of POST.

The second division is separate and apart, and deals with the fact that an entity can be a voluntary member of POST. But this does not mean that the POST standards are not applicable to all officers, whether or not their agency is, in fact, a member of POST.

There's also -- and I don't have the citation with me, sir, for which I apologize -- but there is an Attorney General opinion which also underlines the fact that for one to exercise the office of a peace officer within the state of California, one must meet peace officer -- the POST standards, as set forth in the code and regulations.

Thank you.

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CHAIR TILTON: Camille, do you want to respond to that?

MR. STOWE: Yes, just a clarification.

The only certificate that is required of individual peace officers in California, is the Basic certificate.

And we have an Attorney General's opinion that says that we're obliged to provide that certificate, whether the person is participating in an agency participating in the POST program or not. So the --

CHAIR TILTON: Is that what is referred to as "Basic 832"?

MR. STOWE: That refers to the Basic course, 832.3, which is the regular basic academy.

So if asked by a non-participating agency, we will issue a Basic certificate, if they meet all the other requirements, whether that person's agency participates in a POST program or not.

CHAIR TILTON: Okay, thank you.

MR. KAYE: Yes. I think in this regard, perhaps it was a euphemism, but I think the Executive Director's characterization of the field training as an integral part of the Basic training, we required as an essential element before an officer can be assigned to uniformed patrol duties. And so that's how we reasoned that result.

But we see the other side of it as well. So as I say, this is something that I am sure the others will look at very closely in the future, because it is a very,

very important issue. Because as our understanding is, the one thing that we all want to achieve is, we all want to be very uniform and consistent throughout California, so that, you know, one jurisdiction doesn't go off on their own and have one set of values and standards, and another one abides by the very high standards, the very great standards that POST has asked them to perform.

CHAIR TILTON: Do you have questions of Members?

MR. LEWALLEN: I'd ask for Camille's comment also.

MS. SHELTON: I'd add to some of the information that's on page 16 of the staff analysis. In the plain reading of the POST Bulletin 98-1, it states that the requirements for regular Basic certificate are not affected by the field training requirements.

Also, the field training was incorporated into POST regulations section 1005. And subdivision (a)(1) indicates that, "The officer is authorized to exercise peace-officer powers while engaged in the field training program." So that officer does have the power to make an arrest and serve warrants and carry a concealed weapon during the field-training program. So it's not part of the Basic training requirement.

CHAIR TILTON: Thank you.

Any other questions? Do I have a motion?

MEMBER LAZAR: I'll make the motion to adopt the

1	staff analysis.
2	CHAIR TILTON: Okay. Second?
3	MEMBER BARNES: I'll second.
4	CHAIR TILTON: We have a motion and a second. Any
5	other discussion?
6	(No audible response was heard.)
7	CHAIR TILTON: Call the roll please.
8	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
9	MEMBER LAZAR: Aye.
10	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Van Houten?
11	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Aye.
12	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
13	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
14	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
15	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
16	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
17	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
18	MS. HIGASHI: The motion is carried.
19	This brings us to Item 6, which is the Statement of
20	Decision on the previous test claim.
21	MS. SHELTON: This is the proposed Statement of
22	Decision. And the sole issue before the Commission is
23	whether this decision accurately reflects your decision
24	and your motion today.

Unless there's any objection, staff recommends that

the Commission adopt the proposed Statement of Decision 1 2 and authorize staff to make any minor changes necessary 3 to reflect the vote count and the witnesses present at 4 the table today. 5 MR. SHAW: I have a comment on this matter. 6 CHAIR TILTON: Sure, Mr. Shaw? 7 MR. SHAW: Because there is a mistake in the 8 proposed statement of substance, and not a minor one, 9 that's on page 14, the last paragraph reads Penal Code 10 section 13352. It should read Penal Code section 13522. 11 And that's a substantive matter which should be changed. 12 MS. SHELTON: Can I ask a question? That might be 13 true. I'd have to go back and take a look. 14 Do you disagree with the substance of the quotation, of the statute? Is that an accurate citation? 15 not the citation, but the language of the statute? 16 17 MR. SHAW: Yes, it's just a transposition and a typo there. 18 19 MS. SHELTON: I can change that when we get back and 20 before it's issued. 21 CHAIR TILTON: Very good. Thank you. 22 Do we have a motion? MEMBER BOEL: I move we adopt the proposed Statement 23 24 of Decision.

I'll second.

MEMBER BARNES:

1	CHAIR TILTON: We've got a motion and a second.
2	Any discussion?
3	(No audible response was heard.)
4	CHAIR TILTON: The motion is to approve the staff
5	recommendation with Camille double-checking the citation.
6	Call the roll.
7	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Van Houten?
8	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Aye.
9	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
10	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
11	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
12	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
13	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
14	MEMBER LAZAR: Aye.
15	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
16	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
17	MS. HIGASHI: Thank you.
18	This brings us to Item 7. It's the test claim on
19	the DNA Database and the amendment from the Postmortem
20	Examinations: Unidentified Bodies test claim. This item
21	will be presented by Commission counsel Eric Feller.
22	MR. FELLER: Good morning again. As indicated in
23	the analysis, staff found the test claim to be a
24	reimbursable state mandate for three sets of activities:
25	First, for coroners to collect samples for DNA

testing from the remains of unidentified persons, and send the samples to the Department of Justice in accordance with the DOJ-developed standards and guidelines for preservation of storage.

Second, for local law enforcement to do two things:

First, inform parents or other appropriate relatives of those missing under high-risk circumstances as defined in the statute, that they may give a voluntary sample of DNA within 30 days after making a report; and second, to manner take a DNA sample, in a matter prescribed by DOJ, including using a model DNA collection kit.

Third is the local law enforcement to, again, do two things: Reverify the status of a missing person before submitting a DNA sample to DOJ; and second, send the DNA sample and any supplemental information to DOJ with a copy of the crime report 30 days after the filing of a report.

Possible points of disagreement with the analysis are: First, whether exhuming unidentified remains to submit to the DOJ as reimbursable. Staff finds that it is not based on language in Penal Code section 14251.

And second is, whether storage of DNA from an unidentified person's remains is reimbursable. Staff finds that neither the test claim statute nor DOJ guidelines support reimbursement for storing DNA from

unidentified remains. Therefore, staff recommends 1 2 approving the test claim for the activities listed. Would the parties and witnesses please state their 3 names for the record? 4 I'm Bonnie Ter Keurst with the 5 MS. TER KEURST: Hi. County of San Bernardino. 6 7 MR. KAYE: Leonard Kaye, Los Angeles County. John Tonkyn, California Department of MR. TONKYN: 8 Justice, Missing Persons DNA Program. 9 10 MR. CAMPBELL: David Campbell, Los Angeles County. Jeannine Willie, Department of Justice, 11 MS. WILLIE: Missing Persons DNA Program. 12 Dirk Anderson, Department of Finance. 13 MR. ANDERSON: CHAIR TILTON: Who would like to start? 14 MS. TER KEURST: I think I got elected. 15 16 Before I start, I did want to introduce Jeannine 17 I asked her to be in attendance as part of the Willie. Bureau of Forensic Services, to answer any questions you 18 19 might have concerning any administrative issues, so that's why she is here this morning. And I thank her for 20 21 being here. 22 While I agree, in most respects, with the staff 23 analysis, in particular, we have no issues with their 24 analysis of the law enforcement duties.

I would like to address the two issues that were

mentioned, primarily the exhumation and the storage. The executive summary begins with,

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"Enacted in 2000 the test claim statute requires the Department of Justice to create a data bank of DNA samples for two purposes: To identify unidentified deceased persons, and/or remains, and to close missing-person cases."

Penal Code 14250(c) 1 reads,

"A coroner shall collect samples for DNA testing from the remains of all identified persons, and shall then submit those samples to the Department of Justice."

I think it is important to note that this legislation is directed to the coroner. The coroners have the responsibility to collect samples from all unidentified persons, with the key word being "all."

The staff, on page 11 of the summary, refers to a statement in the preamble of that statute, which reads,

"Coroners retain dozens of remains each year that cannot be identified...Further references are to 'these remains,' meaning, those held by the coroners."

The staff position in that statement is, in a sense, a type of a legal play on words.

I met with the San Bernardino Deputy Coroner, who

explained to me that skeletal or mummified remains in most cases will be stored or retained as opposed to buried. This is economically more feasible for investigative purposes like the DNA-testing process. He said as technology is evolving, they want to have the ability to go back and do those types of processes. However, bodies that are in various stages of decomposition need to be buried for health and safety reasons.

That scenario would create a conflict within the staff position. Preexisting cases, as was the terminology used again by the staff on page 11, could be part of the DNA testing because they were in a different state of decomposition. So you could have preexisting cases where your results are different. So those where they were skeletal could be investigated and hopefully resolved; those that were not mummified, would not be part of the DNA investigative process because they were buried.

The staff also states "these remains," meaning those held by the coroner. In San Bernardino County's unidentified, we bury them in county's potter's field. So I would suggest that "held by the coroner" could mean those bodies that are buried in our plot, per se.

I agree with the staff statement at the top of

page 12, which reads, "Although its comments" -- and

"its" referring to the Department of Justice -- "on the

test claim indicate that DOJ expects exhumation, there is

nothing in the record to show the DOJ requires it or has

funded it." I disagree with the end of that statement,

which says, "or otherwise deemed it necessary.

Mr. Tonkyn, in his letter to the Commission, said there will be additional cost for exhumation and pathology. His statement isn't, you know, "There may be costs," or "We would like to see costs -- or we would like to see exhumation. So while I really don't want to speak for him and he is going to speak shortly, I wouldn't interpret his statement as finding exhumation not deemed necessary.

The second statement I would like to address is storage -- or the second item, I'm sorry -- is storage, retention and refrigeration of evidence. This item, while probably not a major part of this claim, still represents activities which our coroner's office deems reasonably necessary to carry out the directives of the legislation, which will be providing good samples to the Department of Justice. The staff analysis indicates that the Department of Justice Information Bulletin 01-BFS-04 addresses refrigeration of non-desiccated remains, but did not otherwise address storage. That's on page 12.

I disagree. The first page of the info bulletin reads, "The primary purpose of this bulletin is to provide guidance for collection, for storage and submission of samples for DNA testing." The last paragraph on the first page of that bulletin reads, "Contamination could come from the person handling the remains, from the environment, or the tools used during the examination." "The environment" does include means of storage and/or retention.

In the section entitled, "Sample submission prioritization," each state of decay refers to a method of storage and shipping. I do not believe storage and/or refrigeration costs should be discounted.

I would like at this time to pass the mike on to Leonard Kaye.

MR. KAYE: Thank you. Leonard Kaye, County of Los Angeles.

It's a pleasure to be before you again this morning. This time, on the same side of the table with our esteemed colleagues from the state, the State Department of Justice.

I think that we certainly concur with San Bernardino County's -- Bonnie's remarks; and we found that this is an exceptionally important program, as Eric Feller, commission staff, indicated, it's early history. But I

would remind folks, as we're trying to see the importance, particularly where we disagree over the issue of exhuming bodies, just to cite you the Legislature's intent, specifically in this legislation.

The Legislature said,

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"The unidentified remains and unsolved missing persons cases constitute a critical problem for law enforcement and victims families here in the state of California. Hundreds of people, both children and adults, vanish each year under suspicious circumstances, and their cases remain unsolved. Meanwhile, coroners retain dozens of remains each year that cannot be identified. Families of missing persons must live with no sense of closure, even though their loved ones may have already been found. The Legislature finds that this new technology can play an invaluable role in identifying these remains through DNA analysis."

And we would respectfully suggest that when the State Department of Justice requires or asks us or mandates, that we are under a legal compulsion to exhume the bodies where it is possible for this purpose. This is specifically the intent that the Legislature had in

mind. And I don't think we should equivocate on this matter. I think it's very, very central to the fundamental purpose of its legislation.

Thank you.

MR. CAMPBELL: My name is David Campbell. And I want to thank the Commission for the time it has dedicated to our concerns since the inception of the test claim.

Oftentimes, we complain about mandates imposed on government agencies by the state. In this one, the L.A. County Coroner's Office welcomes this mandate because it not only allows the coroner to provide a higher level of service, it requires it.

The language that I was concerned about was the reference to "those remains held by the coroner." When a coroner completes as much as it reasonably can, in terms of its investigation and inquiry into death and identification of the Doe, we may relinquish physically the body to a pauper's field, as described by San Bernardino; but it doesn't mean we relinquish our responsibility to the decedents. We are advocates of the dead and also advocates for the families.

The mandate does, in fact, in my opinion, require that these bodies be exhumed, so that, indeed, with the advanced technology we now have in the area of DNA

analysis, we can bring closure to the families. And I think that is extremely important to us.

In Los Angeles County, we recently resolved a case by means of improved fingerprint methodology, and identified a case from 1999. We just accomplished that last month. Cases that came to us -- Los Angeles, or more specifically, California is a Mecca that has drawn people from all over the world -- not really the United States, but all over the world, to live both the California dream and the American dream. We have lots of people here. Many, sadly, have died under tragic circumstances and have come under the coroner's jurisdiction.

Simply because they have died, we have examined the bodies and they are now buried, no longer means we have no more responsibility. We are grateful that the mandate imposes this obligation on the coroner; and we feel that because it is mandated, we do, indeed, incur expenses that should be reimbursed. And, again, we concur with San Bernardino County's conclusions and opinions; and I welcome questions for clarification.

MR. TONKYN: Yes, my name is John Tonkyn. I am the supervisor in charge of Missing Persons DNA Program within the Attorney General's office. And I would like to concur with the statements said previously.

Just to give you some historical information on the law, it's quoted that, dating back to 1959, there are approximately 2,100 records of unidentified human remains, and dating back to approximately 1972, there are approximately 3,100 reports of high-risk missing persons. And we believe that many of those high-risk missing persons ended up as unidentified persons.

And the technology, obviously, with DNA has advanced to the point that it can be used now. But before this law became effective, there were many widely varying methods of dealing with these cases and disposing of remains.

So along with Senate Bill 1818, enacted in January of '01, Assembly Bill 1736 was enacted, mandating specific procedures for coroners to deal with unidentified remains, including retaining samples for DNA testing.

But before that date, there were no state-mandated minimum procedures.

And so what we have found in going back and surveying coroners, that many of these bodies are buried. And roughly, in a survey we took three years ago, roughly, 350 bodies were buried. And there was never any distinction made between those that were held at the coroner's facility, versus those that had been disposed

of by being buried in a pauper's field.

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With such a high number of cases that we will never have a chance to analyze and never be able to make those identifications, I think it's incumbent upon this committee to allow the reimbursement to local agencies for exhumation costs. Because without that, we're at a standstill, as far as those cases that bodies have been buried. And I also just wanted to reiterate what section 14250(c)(1) states: "That the coroner shall collect samples from DNA testing from the remains of all unidentified persons." There's no distinction in the law made between "buried remains" and "remains in the possession of the coroner."

And if you had any other problematic or technical questions, I'm happy to answer those as well.

Thank you.

CHAIR TILTON: Thank you.

The Department of Finance?

MR. ANDERSON: Dirk Anderson, Department of Finance.

We concur with the staff analysis. And in response to some of the concerns made, namely on exhumation and also on retention of records, we concur with the analysis, and the effect that section 14251 -- I'm at the bottom of page 11 in their analysis -- where they refer to the fact, plainly speaking, that the exhumation is

subject to the funding, and as DOJ deems necessary, we agree with that. And we do recognize it as well, just because it has been mentioned to this point about the two-dollar fee that has been stated in the statute to help pay for these programs.

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As far as the storage and retention goes, we also want to state for the record that after the sample is returned, the statute doesn't state -- it doesn't require the coroner or the local entities to dispose of it, but it's at their discretion again. And so in these matters, we simply agree with the staff analysis and we concur with it.

CHAIR TILTON: Is your point that if the exhumation is required by the DOJ, then it is covered, or covered under the two-dollar fee?

MR. ANDERSON: It would be subject to available funding.

CHAIR TILTON: Eric, you have a comment?

MR. FELLER: Just to reiterate what Dirk said, a lot of mention was made to 14250 and the general intent behind the statute and the things that are reasonably necessary to comply with it. But one of the rules of statutory construction is that the specific governs the general. So if we're looking for whether exhumation is required, any specific reference to it would trump any

other references in the leg. history or in the accompanying statutes, section 14250. So we found that this statement in 14251, that was the funding provision that was going to add two dollars per death certificate to fund this program, this statement controls in this area.

"Funds may be distributed by the Department to various counties for the purposes of pathology and exhumation as the Department deems necessary." And in the two information -- well, in all the information bulletins that I could find from the Department of Justice, I didn't see that they deemed that necessary.

As you know, in order to find a reimbursable program, something has to be compelled legally. And in this case, because the law refers to DOJ standards and guidelines that have to be followed, those are incorporated into that legal compulsion. But because there was nothing in there about exhumation, we did not find it was a reimbursable mandate.

As Dirk said, if it seems as if it were, then the DOJ would need to find that based on the language in 14251.

CHAIR TILTON: Any questions of members?

Ms. Ter Keurst, I think you referenced requirements by DOJ over handling of samples.

MS. TER KEURST: Yes.

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CHAIR TILTON: Is that requirement before the DNA tests are made, or is that -- it sounded like those were samples -- or make sure you're making total evidence and maintaining that sample in a particular fashion, so that you can do a good DNA test. And the issue we're talking about here is storage after the test has been done; is that a proper distinction?

MR. TONKYN: Yes, I think that information that we described were procedures for handling those remains, and handling before shipping to us and the shipping requirements.

The other thing I just want to clarify about what would happen to those remains if we make an identification, they're returned to the coroner, to be given back to the family for proper disposal. If we do not make an identification, we maintain the DNA profile in the database. Those remains are still returned to the coroner.

And there is always the prospect of future technology. And the one thing that has hampered a number of our cases and investigations has been cremation of remains. If remains are cremated, then we can't do anything with regards to the DNA.

So although we don't require it, it's a practice

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that those remains are maintained in some fashion, whether it's being buried in a pauper's field for possible future reference, or maintained in the coroner's office for possible future technology.

If I could just also state for the record about the discretionary funds to expand on that, it says,

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"The funds shall be directed on a quarterly basis to the Missing Persons DNA Database Fund"
-- this is section 14251(b) --

"hereby established to be administered by the Department for establishing, maintaining laboratory infrastructure, DNA sample storage, DNA analysis and labor costs for cases of missing persons and unidentified remains.

Funds may also be distributed by the Department to the various counties for the purposes of pathology and exhumation, as the Department deems necessary."

And I think, again, the intent behind that, was that the primary purpose of this fund was to fund the functions of the laboratory. If the Department deemed it necessary, and in addition had the discretionary funds available to it, they would be used for exhumation. But DNA is very expensive, and that has not been the case.

MR. KAYE: Leonard Kaye, County of Los Angeles.

I would also like to add that traditionally, one of the provisos in our parameters and guidelines is that if certain funds, from time to time, may be made available, which it sounds like these funding sources are not a sure thing, then they'll be subtracted from whatever SB 90 claims that are eventually sent in.

So I see a sort of a bipolar situation. We have, on one hand, uncertain funding, which we can certainly deal with in our Parameters and Guidelines; but we have absolute mandatory exhumation of bodies under certain specific conditions, conditions deemed to be required by the State Department of Justice. And we cannot presume to second-guess or fail to obey an order -- an executive order that's a specific order -- a very, very specific order -- "That body, that grave, dig it up." I can't see us failing to obey that. I think that's the most specific executive order that one could think of.

Thank you.

CHAIR TILTON: Walter?

MEMBER BARNES: Yes, I've been perusing the information bulletins that you've sent out, which I assume is the basis for the county coroners to do the work under this bill.

Is there a specific place in here where the

Department of Justice notifies the coroners that they are

to specifically exhume the bodies?

MR. TONKYN: No

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MEMBER BARNES: And is that -- and why is there not something like that?

MR. TONKYN: I would say, again, we didn't make a distinction between bodies that were buried in a pauper's grave versus bodies that were stored at their facility. They're all, as was said earlier, in the possession of the coroner's office. They're the ones who are responsible for that body, until it becomes identified. So I don't think there was a feeling that they needed to be distinguished between those that have been buried and needed exhumation, which, really, the process of exhumation isn't related to the quality of the DNA sample that would be obtained from that grave. You know, the quality of getting a sample is related to time and environment; and there is nothing to change about the fact that it's been buried or how these things have been stored.

And as I said, there's been a wide variety of storage conditions, whether it's frozen, refrigerated, room temperature or cremated, buried. There's a wide variety of storage means out there. And we didn't specify any of those. But more the point that when they bring the body or body parts out on the slab, how they

1	should prepare the samples. And at that point, you know,
2	how they should be stored and shipped.
3	MEMBER BARNES: Then I guess the question is, how do
4	the counties interpret that to indicate that they should
5	go out and exhume the bodies?
6	MR. TONKYN: Yeah, the section 14250(c)(1) says,
7	"The coroner shall collect samples for DNA testing."
8	MEMBER BARNES: Do you want to tell me where you're
9	reading from?
10	MR. TONKYN: Sorry. Penal Code do they have a
11	copy of this Penal Code 14250, section (c)(1). It's
12	not in the
13	MR. FELLER: Page 112 of the it's right after
14	Exhibit A, it has the statute.
15	MR. ANDERSON: It's also at the top of page 11, at
16	least partially probably the point he's going to make,
17	of the staff analysis.
18	MEMBER BARNES: Okay, so which section now?
19	MR. TONKYN: Yes, the top of section 11, page 11,
20	staff analysis. It says, "Exhumation."
21	MEMBER BARNES: Let's go to 112, where the bill is
22	itself. Where is that?
23	MR. FELLER: Are you reading from (c)(1) in 14250;
24	is that correct?
25	MR. TONKYN: I'll read the whole sentence from

(c)(1). It says,

"A coroner shall collect samples for DNA testing from the remains of all unidentified persons, and shall send those samples to the Department of Justice for DNA testing and inclusion in the DNA data bank."

So I believe that the coroners interpret their mandate from that statement. It says "they shall collect samples from all unidentified persons." Again, no distinction being made between buried or otherwise cremated or stored remains.

MEMBER BARNES: Is there a definition somewhere about the remains of unidentified persons somewhere in the law, either this one or someplace else?

MR. FELLER: You're asking if there's a definition?

No, I didn't see a definition in this test claim.

I think in order for the statute to apply retroactively, there would have to be some indication that the Legislature intended that to be the case. And we don't have that here, except for potentially the reference to exhumation, 14251(b), which you have the full text on page 113.

I've already read the applicable provision there.

That's the only place exhumation is required.

MEMBER BARNES: Excuse me, can you give me the cite

one more time?

MR. FELLER: It's 14251(b). So it's on page 113, the third paragraph from the bottom.

CHAIR TILTON: The point, Eric, is that if there hadn't been a reference here to exhumations that are required or necessary -- in other words, that's not all. So that's the legal citation we have that says -- there is inference that we're not requiring all bodies to be exhumed.

MR. FELLER: Well, yes, the interpretation is that it's only as the Department deems necessary.

And also, as Mr. Kaye suggested, there's sort of some funding priorities expressed in this statute -- or Mr. Tonkyn suggested that the laboratory be funded. And then the second sentence, that funds may also be distributed by the Department for those other purposes.

CHAIR TILTON: I guess my point is that because this says "this," by inference, this provides -- the only place we talk about whether there's a requirement to exhume bodies or not, and this reads as if the intent is not to exhume all bodies.

MR. FELLER: Right, unless the DOJ funds it and deems it necessary.

MS. TER KEURST: I would interpret that section -- that particular section is talking about funding, not

about the mandate to the coroners.

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The funding is a two-dollar fee, a dollar ninety -it's a two-dollar fee per death certificate. And it was
intended to get this program off the ground. Five -let's see, ten cents of it stays within the county, but
it stays in the administrative area for the cost of the
actual person that is doing the death certificates, not
the program for the coroner. So any of this funding does
not go back to the coroner; it's for the administrative
purposes of this program.

I think that distinction needs to be made because this whole piece is dealing with the Department of Justice. It's not dealing with the piece that says to the coroner, "You have to get samples of all unidentified persons." So there's two separate issues here.

And I think that the fee thing, because it was addressed in the staff analysis, it was addressed early on -- and I think we all came to the same conclusion, that that has nothing to do with the mandate to the coroner, which is to get samples from all unidentified bodies.

CHAIR TILTON: Except it is some part of the record in terms of establishing the program and the direction from the Legislature around the program; correct? I mean, I understand the distinction you're making, but I'm

trying to find, where is there any guidance from the Legislature in terms of dealing with this issue? And where there is guidance, it seems to appear that it's not a requirement to do all. That's the only point I'm trying to catch on here.

MR. FELLER: One of the rules of statutory construction is, you read the statute as a whole, and you harmonize all the parts. And I think the claimant's interpretation would leave a little bit of a contradiction, in that 14250 would, according to them, indicate that exhumation is required; but 14251 would indicate that they only have to do it as DOJ deems necessary and as it funds that activity.

But because there is no express referenced exhumation in 14250, it's our position that 14251 controls.

CHAIR TILTON: Okay.

MS. TER KEURST: And I would argue that when it talks about the funds being distributed, that I think that the Department of Justice interprets that to mean the funds distributed as they deem necessary. I don't think it's defining exhumation in the funding section.

MR. TONKYN: The other thing I would just want to add, is that the funding has a five-year sunset. It expires January 1st, 2006. That's 14251. So at this

point, the funding only exists for less than another year and a half. Nonetheless, the requirement under 14250 will remain. So whether the DOJ has discretionary funds or not regarding exhumation becomes a moot point after January 1st, 2006, I believe; because the requirement that coroners take samples from all unidentified persons remains.

CHAIR TILTON: Walter?

MEMBER BARNES: I guess the other question I have is with regard to the sentence, it says, "The funds may also be distributed to pay for purposes of pathology." What do you feel "pathology," means, with regards to the activities that we're talking about here?

MR. TONKYN: It would refer to things like anthropology and odontology examinations of bodies.

There may be other investigations as to the nature and cause of death, whether something becomes classified as homicide or not.

MEMBER BARNES: But in this particular case, with regard to this particular requirement, as I understand it, it's basically to pull the sample and provide that sample to the Department of Justice. So does this imply that you would reimburse them, if you had money for additional information and additional activities?

MR. CAMPBELL: If I may, Mr. Barnes.

MEMBER BARNES: Sure.

MR. CAMPBELL: Further pathology may require that the pathologist, the coroner, may be required to conduct further examination of the various body parts in order to identify the most appropriate sample for DNA collection and retention.

MEMBER BARNES: Okay. I guess my other question has to do with the question of exhuming bodies. My assumption is, this is a one-time cost that you're going to -- your expectation is that they would exhume all of the bodies that are out there. And from that point on, you would only be dealing with bodies that are -- or pieces of bodies that are coming in the door, so to speak. Am I correct about that?

MR. TONKYN: Yes.

MEMBER BARNES: And what have the counties done?

MR. TONKYN: In terms of exhumation? Very little to none. Almost, we received human remains for about 300 individuals, unidentified individuals to this day. And I can only think of one, that I know of, that was exhumed.

MEMBER BARNES: So it sounds like they don't necessarily think it's an absolute requirement on their part.

MR. TONKYN: I think, actually, the -- as I said

earlier, I think there's kind of a loggerhead here. I think they do think it's a requirement; but the question is, who pays.

CHAIR TILTON: Good question.

MEMBER BARNES: Can I -- and I'm not sure who to ask this to -- but a previous question that I asked about who has responsibilities for these remains and the unidentified remains or missing remains. And I think somebody had said something about the fact that all of these remains are the property, so to speak, or under the guardianship, if you will, of the particular county coroner. And is that in law some place?

MR. CAMPBELL: I believe it is in the provisions provided through 27491, in sequence, where it mandates the responsibilities of the coroner to conduct an investigation to establish manner, mode and cause of death; to confirm the identity of the decedent, and notify the next of kin.

MEMBER BARNES: This one's a little less clear than perhaps we thought about it.

I guess my impression is that nobody really made a distinction between whether a body, or a body remains was buried or not buried. It just seemed to focus -- the legislation seems to focus on the aspect of the missing or unidentified person. And if there is a requirement,

you know, that those remains are to be under the control of the coroner, then it does seem that when they're asking for all of the missing persons to have this sample sent in, it seems like it would logically include them, as well as the ones that just happened to be in the lab.

I guess I'd like any thoughts that you may have on that -- the staff and also the Department of Finance, too.

MR. FELLER: Just two points. As I say, retroactive application of a statute would need to be either in the statute itself or somewhere in the legislative history, indicating that was the intent. And I did not see any intent in that direction, except for that statement in 14251, which mentions exhumation as the Department funds and deems necessary.

So we found that in looking to the legislative intent, that was governed as the only statement expressly calling for exhumation.

MR. CAMPBELL: If I may, I'm a little confused by the issue of retroactivity. The decedents did not cease to be Does; they remain areas of concern for the coroner's office. When new information becomes available, we don't simply say, "Whoops, we closed that case two years ago, therefore, we're not going to reopen it."

Again, I don't understand what you mean by "retroactivity," if the coroner continues to have authority and responsibility over the decedent, independent of the statute.

MR. FELLER: If I can explain. A "retroactive statute" means any statute that governs prior to the time that it was enacted. So we didn't see any evidence that this statute applied to cases before it was enacted in 2000.

MR. KAYE: Yes, I think it's very confusing. Let me see if I can, in plain English, say what I think is going on. I think what the Commission staff are saying is if a body is buried prior to the enactment of this legislation, which I note is September 28th, 2000, then you can't go back and bring that body out because the statute doesn't go back that far.

And, on the other hand, if that's their position, then anybody put in the ground on or after September 28th, 2000, we can dig up. So I see that as a dividing line, if you want to use that.

But I'd like to get back to Captain Campbell's point, as to what the Legislature intended here. And I think this legislation was passed specifically for all those unidentified folks that were either buried previously because the Legislature had no way of knowing

who would be buried in the future; but the previous thing. So I think the legislative intent is that it should expressly apply retroactively; that, at long last, we finally do dig up these people, we bring closure to the family.

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I think it's crystal clear that it should be applied retroactively, even in the legal sense. I think this is specifically what the Legislature had in mind.

CHAIR TILTON: Let me ask the question more of process, since I'm new to this since November. It seems to me this is a good example where we've been trying to articulate what the Legislature intended or did not intend. We've got, in my view, at least one citation staff has brought to our attention that appears to be a message that there's not an assumption that all remains are exhumed.

But if the counties haven't gone off and done this, it seems to me this is one of those chances we have to get clarifying legislation, is to go back and get clarification, and have the Legislature be more specific on this particular issue, rather than us sitting here and try to guess -- you know, there's arguments on both sides that I think are very valid. But then is it still up in the air for me as a member to say, is there something in the statute that I can point to that gives me the basis

for making a vote here that, in fact, this is a mandated cost? And there's enough on both sides that make me kind of feel it's not clear. And especially if the situation is -- from the program, it sounds like you would like to have these bodies exhumed to get more cases solved.

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But the counties are reserving -- there's even a judgment somewhere along the line here in terms of, at the County level, they're not even sure that it's reimbursable under mandates, so they're not doing it. So it looks like, even on both sides, there's some doubt here. I mean, that's the solution, is to go back and do that.

MR. KAYE: I think basically you're correct, with one small caveat. I think that we are sure that, as Dr. Tonkyn has pointed out, that all human remains are subject, and we are all sure that the law was enacted effective September 28th, 2000.

So in the Parameters and Guidelines, we can specify that anyone buried on or after September 2000 is included in the "all," because "all" means all. And I think that is absolutely crystal clear. So I respectfully request that we could modify staff's analysis for this small point.

And we're not talking about many bodies, I don't think. So it won't be too many.

MS. WILLIE: I'd like to say something. My name is
Jeannine Willie. I'm the administrator of the Missing
Persons DNA Program. I've worked with Missing Persons
for about 21 years.

This piece of legislation, Senate Bill 1818, which implemented 14250 through 14251, one of the instrumental persons in getting this legislation passed was a mother of a missing child. Kim Schwartz is the mother, her daughter is Amber Schwartz-Garcia, who disappeared in 1988. And she found out about these bodies in our files, because bodies are not well-publicized. The wheel that squeaks the most, gets the most grease. And when you're an unidentified person, there's nobody squeaking for you.

When she found out that we had all of these bodies, she was the one who went forward to carry this piece of legislation because we have over 150 unidentified dead children, probably over 90 percent of them are homicide victims, because children just do not go out in fields and die on their own. And she went forward to carry this piece of legislation. She was instrumental in getting this passed because she believes, as well as many of these other parents and family members of these other 200 -- excuse me two thousand-plus unidentified persons, believe that their missing persons are these dead people that are buried in pauper fields or unidentified and have

been, you know -- the remains have been saved in the coroner's office.

The whole intent of this piece of legislation was to get those bodies, get them up to the Department of Justice, now with new technology of DNA, analyze them and get them identified. With every identification, we all know, you bring closure for the family; but you also open up that homicide investigation. And hopefully, you're able to track an individual who has murdered this individual, and possibly solve a series of homicide cases.

But the intent of that bill was from the families of these old cases. I mean, the majority of these cases, as they said, they go back to 1959. If you don't bring those bodies up, those coroners -- the reason why they didn't bring those bodies up, they don't have funding.

And that's why they're waiting for this test claim decision. It's not a misunderstanding or thinking that, you know, it's not a law. They understand the law. They just don't have the funds.

Thank you.

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CHAIR TILTON: Walter?

MEMBER BARNES: You know, I've been reading -rereading, I guess -- section 1 of this bill that defines
the legislative intent. And if you read the language in

it, it does seem to indicate that the intent of the Legislature was to deal with all missing persons, as opposed to, you know, those that were in one place or the other.

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So I guess, you know, it seems to me that there is some fairly clear intent of the Legislature about which missing persons or which unidentified persons this is supposed to cover.

So I don't know that a new law is necessary to clarify this in any kind of way. It does seem to me that they indicated what they wanted.

Now, could they have drafted the legislation better? We all know that they could do a better job in drafting legislation. But it does seem to me that there is a reasonable presumption that this was an intent. And, I mean, I think you articulated it a little bit with regard to the sponsors and initiators of this bill, that they wanted to do the most that they could to deal with those bodies or remains that were unidentified, that were out there and known to, you know, the coroners.

So it does seem to me that, you know, the exhumation part of this is probably an appropriate reimbursable activity.

MR. ANDERSON: Could I say something, Mr. Chair?
CHAIR TILTON: Yes.

MR. ANDERSON: I just want to remind -- despite all of the very eloquent testimony given and their interpretation of intent, it seems to me that the DOJ's guidance, as far as requirements on exhumation, if that was the intent -- and the DOJ is so strongly behind this -- their requirements are completely lacking, as far as requiring exhumation. And I just wanted to bring that back up because we mentioned that early, and we had all of this testimony and all of these good thoughts; but then just to remind the Commission, it's my understanding, the Commission's job is to make decisions based on what is required. And it's just -- again, it is our understanding, that it's not --

CHAIR TILTON: Let me ask one more question, given where I think Walter is going, to take my other question and turn it around.

Could there be examples where you could satisfy the requirement to get DNA tests without exhuming the body? Is there other samples that you would have, blood samples or anything else on those individuals that you would have kept, besides the body, to allow a situation where you may not need to exhume it because you have some other way to get a DNA test, not knowing anything about your process? But is that what the Legislature could have --

MR. CAMPBELL: The reasonable answer I could give,

is that there may be samples in some; but not in all.

CHAIR TILTON: That's my point is, could the Legislature turn it around, with the way Walter is heading, is they're saying, "Well, you've had other ways to get tests without exhuming the body; therefore, you don't need to exhume all bodies." Could that be an interpretation?

MS. TER KEURST: My understanding from my coroner -and I'm definitely not an expert on this -- is that DNA
is probably one of the last -- I mean, they do blood
work on bodies that they have available to them, they
will start with blood work. They go to odontology, and
there's one other thing. And so DNA is not like the
first choice.

I think what has happened here, is that we have bodies that are beyond those stages. And so in speaking with my coroner as well, you know, all of those resources -- the ones that are the most reliable, followed by the ones most available, those type of things would all be followed. So it's not like we're trying to make DNA the end-all.

The other thing that he said to me is, you know, in our field, we have bodies that go back over a hundred years, because we've just been around for a long time as a county. And he said, you know, what I would do is look

for reasonableness. There are -- like Jeannine said, there are some people that are really seeking closure. Those are the ones we would deal with. You know, somebody that's been dead for a hundred years, we're assuming, you know, we wouldn't just go out and exhume all those bodies in our pauper's field. So I think -- you know, I think from that standpoint, I think there are cases where we wouldn't do that. But I think we need to give the coroners and the Department of Justice the framework to work within that, to make those decisions.

CHAIR TILTON: May I ask, what's the response or reaction to the recommendation Mr. Kaye made, to say that you exhume bodies as of "X" date, and that wouldn't cover some of these ones we've talked about right here? Your point was that if you didn't do the retroactive issue, you'd say, okay, when the bill is signed, if a body had been buried after that date, then that would be eligible under the mandate.

MR. TONKYN: Well, one of the things that we think about, whether the person was recovered by the coroner before or after the date or whether the person deceased before or after the date. And that's hard to measure.

Someone may have been recovered after the date of this bill, but their estimated date of death places them having been deceased and become a Jane Doe --

CHAIR TILTON: Let's assume it's when you have possession of the body.

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MR. TONKYN: Well, again, we would make no decision between the date that the coroner got possession of the body.

The other thing I just want -- I just want to add one thing Mr. Barnes had mentioned about intent. And I was present during the drafting of this legislation, along with the California Coroners Association, California State Sheriffs Association. As Jeannine mentioned, there were some family advocates, the Amber Foundation, Polly Klaas Foundation and other law enforcement agencies. And it certainly was the intent, as Jeannine mentioned, with someone like Kim Schwartz, who felt that her daughter may be out there somewhere since 1988. If the body was in a coroner's possession since 1988, it certainly would have been buried by this So depending on the agency, the coroner's office, they would maintain an open file and not bury an unidentified body for some period of time. After perhaps six months or a year, many of these agencies said, "Okay, now, we don't have enough storage space so we're going to bury the body."

So, again, the intent during the drafting of this legislation was not to distinguish between the date of

the enactment of the legislation, nor was it the intent to distinguish between those bodies that have been buried or not.

MS. WILLIE: Also, I just wanted to answer your question with regards to the body. The only bodies they would be bringing up, are the bodies that they do not have biological evidence in storage currently in their office.

CHAIR TILTON: That was my point. So I was trying to articulate --

MS. WILLIE: Right.

CHAIR TILTON: -- that that would be the example, "No, this is acknowledging that you don't need to do it in all cases because there may be other ways to get a proper DNA.

MS. WILLIE: Right. And it's not a large number, thank God, for Los Angeles, because Los Angeles being our large county, they actually started taking biological samples many years ago. Now, if they have some that are buried prior to when we started taking biological evidence, then we would ask them to exhume those.

Especially your small children. You have these children that have been murdered by serial killers. Those are the ones -- and that was the intent of the law, was to focus on the children first and then move to the adults. But

it would not be all of them, and there would not be a drastic amount. I mean, there's not a lot of amount there.

CHAIR TILTON: All you're helping with is in reading this statute, the legislation, the one we do have that talks about it, all you're saying is, this could be written this way because we know we don't necessarily need to exhume all bodies in order to get a valid DNA test.

MS. WILLIE: In some counties none. You wouldn't exhume any.

MR. TONKYN: And the other thing is after the passage of AB 1736, also in January of 2001, that mandated specific requirements for coroners. So we're not talking about an ongoing problem. They are required now, for the last few years, to take the biological sample. So we're just talking about before the enactment of that legislation requiring coroners to do that. They may or may not have.

In the cases where they have, absolutely, it's quicker, it's easier, there's no need to exhume a body, and there would be no reason to.

MEMBER BARNES: Yes, I think, you know, we're gradually getting to something here because, you know, again, I keep going back to the intent language of this

thing, which seems to indicate that they want some effort made to try to preserve evidence to identify everybody out there.

MEMBER BARNES (speaking to Chair Tilton): And I think you're correct that, in effect, this should be done in the most cost-efficient manner. To that extent that that evidence already exists, there's no need to dig up a body to pull another sample.

So I don't know if we're ready to --

CHAIR TILTON: I guess, I'm fishing -- hate to leave it kind of open-end, and I don't want to go to a situation that says, "By the way, if you exhume a body, then we will pay for it." So it seems to me -- maybe it's the next step in terms of some criteria that we could agree to --

MR. KAYE: Yes, I think the bright line for us is when Dr. Tonkyn and his staff -- you know, we send these samples in, we send this information in and so forth.

And for us, we rely basically on the Department of Justice mandates and requirements for those specific and not frequent cases. But where it's really critical, I think that's how the parameters and guidelines should read, that it's in a very limited circumstance wherein the opinion of the state Department of Justice, it is absolutely required. And we could live with that kind

of language.

MR. CAMPBELL: Indeed, the Los Angeles County

Coroner's Office, and I know coroners' offices throughout
the state, consistently apply all of the available
methodology to us before we even pursue the DNA. We do
the fingerprints, we do the full-body x-rays, we do the
circumstantial evidence, we do document scars, marks,
tattoos, et cetera. For us, DNA has always been that
final effort to confirm an identification. And even
L.A. County that has a huge number of Doe cases that
comes before it every year, by the end of the year,
we're down to less than 200 that remain unidentified.
That's at this point.

MR. FELLER: My concern with Mr. Leohard's recommendation, is that it would somewhat conflict with 14251 because the Legislature there mentioned exhumation and required it as DOJ deems it necessary and as it funds it.

If we're funding it outside the two-dollar per death certificate fee and we're funding it within the mandates process, then it's putting it outside where it appears the Legislature intended for it to be, the activity of exhumation.

MEMBER BARNES: And just to go back and answer your comment that you raised earlier, about we normally look

1 at the record, the written record, and try to interpret 2 from that. You are correct, that that is basically what 3 we do. But in addition, we also encourage departments and agencies to come help us to understand what that 4 5 record means. And the Department of Justice, which issued, you know, the notice, has provided some 6 7 clarification which, quite honestly, although it's not within our jurisdiction to say anything about it, but it 8 9 certainly would probably be a good idea to maybe issue a 10 supplement to this, to clarify what you really want done 11 under this particular bill.

But having said that, I think there is enough information here for us to make a decision and to -- as Mr. Kaye mentioned, give some guidance in our decision to the writers of the Parameters and Guidelines, to ensure that exhumation costs are covered, but they're covered to the extent that that's the only way in which the law can be dealt with here.

And I would certainly hope, again, the Department of Justice would help the staff here in developing those limitations and expectations.

So having said that, are we ready to --

CHAIR TILTON: I generally agree.

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Let me ask a process question to Paula.

Paula, I think I generally agree with you; but I'm

left with the uncomfortable level about what is that 1 2 What are we saying here in terms of criteria? 3 Because we're all going to disagree, maybe, what that Procedurally, what would we do to --4 means. MS. HIGASHI: Procedurally, immediately, what I'd 5 like to propose we do is take a ten-minute recess, which 6 7 will allow us a moment to confer as staff. And then, two, it will give our court reporter a much-needed break. 8 9 CHAIR TILTON: Good point on both sides. 10 MS. HIGASHI: And then if we could come back and 11 then we will have a response to your question. 12 CHAIR TILTON: Your wisdom we appreciate. Let's take a ten-minute break. 13 (A recess was taken from 11:28 a.m. to 11:38 a.m.) 14 15 CHAIR TILTON: First of all, I want to make a 16 I appreciate the fact that we have the 17 Department of Finance and the program folks here with us. 18 Many times, I think, we do our deliberation without 19 having the input from Finance staff and program staff. 20 And I think your testimony here has helped us get a 21 better understanding. And so I want to, first of all, 22 thank you for coming and making that time for us. 23 helps us do our job better. 24 With that, I think --25 MS. HIGASHI: Could we wait just a few moments for

Mr. Lazar?

CHAIR TILTON: Oh, excuse me. We'll wait for John to get back.

I just wanted to pass on that, just in terms of these issues. And we will continue, I think, to push to get program people in Finance here. Again, I just want to thank you for that effort.

And thanks, Paula. We'll wait for John. I was going to run without him.

(Brief pause from 11:40 a.m. to 11:46 a.m.)

(Mr. Lazar entered the room.)

CHAIR TILTON: One comment. John, in your absence, I was just commenting to the group it was nice to have Finance and the program people here on an issue. It really helps in our deliberations. I hope we can encourage that for future issues.

With that, I think -- Eric, I think you have some recommendations for us, or in terms of your reaction to some of the dialogue here about how we may proceed.

MR. FELLER: At this point, I would recommend that you adopt the final staff analysis, with any amendments that you wish to make to it, and then Commission staff would redraft the Statement of Decision, incorporating the testimony that we've heard today and the amendments to the final staff analysis, and bring that to the

hearing two months from how.

CHAIR TILTON: Okay, Walter, do you have a motion then?

MEMBER BARNES: Yeah, although I don't know why we'd have to wait two months for this. Is it that complicated?

MR. FELLER: We feel it would be prudent to include all the testimony that we've received today in the Statement of Decision, so that there would be concrete findings for any changes that you made to the final staff analysis.

MEMBER BARNES: Okay. Well, I think the motion that I would like to make is to adopt the staff's recommendation, with an amendment that would allow for exhumation costs in those circumstances where it is the only alternative available to meet the reporting needs under this particular law. That would be the motion.

CHAIR TILTON: Do I have a second?

MEMBER LAZAR: Second.

CHAIR TILTON: We have a motion and a second. I think we've heard all the testimony, and I think, Eric, you've got -- I think this is one of those things where we do need to wait for the second step and see the details.

So with that, do you want to call the roll?

1	MS. HIGASHI: Certainly.
2	Mr. Lazar?
3	MEMBER LAZAR: Aye.
4	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Van Houten?
5	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Aye.
6	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
7	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
8	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
9	MEMBER BOEL: Abstain.
10	MS. HIGASHI: And Mr. Tilton?
11	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
12	MS. HIGASHI: The motion carries.
13	Thank you.
14	CHAIR TILTON: Thank you.
15	With that, I think we'll also put over Item 8 then
16	to
17	MS. HIGASHI: Yes, Item 8 will be scheduled for the
18	next meeting. And the proposed Statement of Decision
19	will be issued prior to that hearing, so parties will
20	have a chance to take a look at it, as well as members,
21	certainly.
22	CHAIR TILTON: Thank you.
23	MS. HIGASHI: This brings us now to Item 9, which is
24	a test claim on Cancer Presumption. And this item will
25	be presented by Commission counsel Camille Shelton.

MS. SHELTON: This case addresses Labor Code section 3212.1, which provides an evidentiary presumption in workers' compensation cases to specified firefighters and peace officers that develop cancer during employment.

In the present case, the claimant, a community college district, contends that the test claim statute imposes a reimbursable state-mandated program by requiring school districts and community college districts to pay additional costs of claims caused by the shifting of the burden of proof of the cause of the cancer from the police officer employee to the district.

As described in the analysis, staff concludes that school districts and community college districts are not eligible claimants for this test claim because the test claim statute does not provide a rebuttable cancer presumption to employees of a school district or community college district.

Assuming for the sake of argument only that Labor Code section 3212.1 does apply, staff further concludes that Labor Code section 3212.1 is not subject to Article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution because school districts are not required by the state to employ peace officers and/or firefighters; and, therefore, pursuant to the Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates case, litigating a workers' compensation

case under this test claim statute does not impose a 1 state-mandated program on school districts and community 2 3 college districts. Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the staff 4 analysis and deny this test claim. 5 I will mention that I did issue an errata sheet for 6 the executive summary on this manila piece of paper. 7 Something happened to my printer, and the top line on 8 9 page 2 did not print when it was -- when the item was 10 sent out with your binders. So here's an errata sheet 11 with the correct line on top. 12 Will the witnesses and parties please state your names for the record? 13 14 MR. SHAW: For the record, Leo Shaw of SixTen and 15 Associates appearing for the test claimant. And based upon prior decisions of the Commission on 16 17 this specific issue, we'd be very happy to submit on the 18 record; and, of course, I'd be happy to answer any 19 questions the Commission may have. 20 Thank you, Mr. Shaw. CHAIR TILTON: Thomas Todd, the Department of Finance. 21 MR. TODD: 22 CHAIR TILTON: So that's your testimony, Mr. Shaw? 23 MR. SHAW: That's it. CHAIR TILTON: Okay, I appreciate it. 24 25 The Department of Finance?

1	MR. TODD: For the record, Mr. Chair, we would
2	simply like to indicate our concurrence with the final
3	staff analysis on this claim.
4	CHAIR TILTON: Thank you.
5	Thank you.
6	Any questions from the members?
7	(No audible response was heard.)
8	MEMBER BARNES: I'd follow the staff recommendation.
9	CHAIR TILTON: Second?
10	MEMBER LAZAR: (Waved hand.)
11	CHAIR TILTON: We have a motion and second to
12	approve the staff recommendation.
13	Any other testimony?
14	(No audible response was heard.)
15	CHAIR TILTON: Call the roll.
16	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Van Houten?
17	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Aye.
18	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
19	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
20	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
21	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
22	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
23	MEMBER LAZAR: Aye.
24	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
25	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.

1	MS. HIGASHI: The motion is carried.
2	Item 10.
3	MS. SHELTON: This is the proposed Statement of
4	Decision on the item that you just adopted. Staff
5	recommends that you adopt the proposed Statement of
6	Decision and allow the staff to make any minor changes
7	to reflect the vote count and the witnesses present here
8	today.
9	CHAIR TILTON: Do we have a motion on this item?
10	MEMBER LAZAR: (Waved hand.)
11	CHAIR TILTON: We have a motion.
12	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Second.
13	CHAIR TILTON: And a second.
14	Any discussion?
15	(No audible response was heard.)
16	CHAIR TILTON: Recommendation to approve staff
17	analysis. Call the roll.
18	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
19	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
20	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Boel?
21	MEMBER BOEL: Aye.
22	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
23	MEMBER LAZAR: Aye.
24	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Van Houten?
25	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Aye.

1	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Tilton?
2	CHAIR TILTON: Aye.
3	MS. HIGASHI: Thank you.
4	Item 11, Item 12, Item 13, Item 14 and Item 15 were
5	adopted on the Consent Calendar.
6	This brings us to Item 16. This is our proposed
7	hearing schedule for 2005.
8	As is customary, we present the dates to you, and
9	then we publish the dates on our Web site and provide the
10	information to all the parties.
11	Are there any questions about that?
12	(No audible response was heard.)
13	CHAIR TILTON: As you'll note, we are still doing
14	bimonthly hearings, which is what we're authorized by
15	statute and budget to do.
16	MEMBER BOEL: My only question would be, what is our
17	backlog at this point?
18	MS. HIGASHI: That will come up in Item 18, and
19	we'll cover that.
20	MEMBER BOEL: Okay.
21	MS. HIGASHI: So I would just like a motion on
22	adoption of this hearing calendar for 2005.
23	MEMBER BARNES: (Raised hand.)
24	CHAIR TILTON: We've got a motion.
25	MEMBER VAN HOUTEN: Second.

CHAIR TILTON: And a second to approve the calendar
for next year.

All in favor, say "aye."

(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)

CHAIR TILTON: Opposed?

(No audible response was heard.)

MS. HIGASHI: Thank you.

Mr. Starkey will present Item 17.

MR. STARKEY: This is a public report. A copy is filed with the Commission. The only update is that we received two days ago a decision from the Third District Court of Appeal in the <u>San Diego Unified School District</u> case. It's an unpublished decision that upheld the Commission's decision in the performance testing, STAR Testing case. It's possible that that may be appealed to the Supreme Court. At this time I don't have any information about that.

CHAIR TILTON: Thank you.

MS. HIGASHI: Item 18, the first item is part of my report. It indicates what the workload looks like, what our accomplishments were for the immediately past fiscal year, and also what new filings looked like. Just a comparison, so you can see what our record has looked like over the years and our pending caseload. Before the hearing, it was 117. And what we'll do next is, we'll

subtract out those test claims that were determined today.

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Ms. Boel, did you have some additional questions?

MEMBER BOEL: No, that's fine.

CHAIR TILTON: Paula, I've got a comment. Maybe this is the time to do it. I think, as we know, there were significant discussions in the Legislature in terms of revising or modifying the mandate process. It seems to me it would be helpful for you at the next meeting to come back and kind of give us a recap of those issues.

In addition, given the cycle we have, this is the time for -- I know that you're taking a look at this backlog and preparing resource requests that you'll submit to those folks at the Department of Finance for consideration, addressing that fact. So I expect that between now and the next meeting, we will have some report back on those two activities.

MS. HIGASHI: Certainly. We are, in fact, working on that. Since we're not sure yet what the mandate reform changes ultimately will end up being, we're having to look at our backlog in different ways, whether, one, is there a priority imposed only on local agency test claims; or two, is the priority imposed on all test claims.

And the other fact is that we're also not sure yet

how many cases will be remanded back to the Commission for reconsideration. Some of the language actually in budget trailer bills, some of it is proposed in the Assembly Special Committee on State Mandates Legislation, some has actual date-certains as to when actions need to be taken. Other provisions may not have a date-certain but directives.

One of the budget trailer bills yesterday, for example -- and I think it was part of the administration's initial proposal -- recommended that it recommend making some of the local agency mandates optional. And some of those proposed changes were included in one of the trailer bills yesterday. And there was also an additional provision that required the Commission on State Mandates to then go back and adjust the parameters and guidelines, so that if those mandates are made optional, then we would then have to adjust the parameters and guidelines to put a cap on the reimbursement period. So then the Controller's Office would have the notification it needs to proceed accordingly, to notify the claimants.

The Education Budget trailer bill, additionally, suspended some mandates that had not been suspended previously, that had been suspended for local agencies. And that was pretty much cleanup.

Also, there was a provision in that Ed. trailer bill to require the Commission to reconsider the STAR test claim decision. And as we continue to review these and as they move forward, we'll certainly be giving you much more specific information. But the list keeps changing. Added to the local government trailer bill is a provision also that requires the Commission to reconsider all of its decision or Board of Control decisions on the regional housing needs determinations. That same bill does some very interesting things in adding fee authority for local agencies, as well as for councils of governments that are performing some of these functions.

And all of these reconsiderations are made with the instruction to the Commission to reconsider these decisions that are all older decisions, in light of current case law and current statute -- federal statute, state statute. So these are items that don't yet show up here on the workload and caseload sheet.

And as we look at these bills, when you only see one reconsideration or one P's and G's amendment that needs to be made in the bill, the fiscal impact does not appear to be great. It appears to be something we could absorb. But once we see what the total impact is, you know, there's no doubt that there is going to be significant workload added to the Commission. And it's all going to

come out of the budget trailer bills or the Assembly Special Committee on state mandates package.

And so as I indicated earlier --

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CHAIR TILTON: Times are changing, huh?

MS. HIGASHI: Times are changing and there is also, just for everyone's information -- I know Jim knows all of this, but there are also provisions in one of the trailer bills to require the state to pay deferred mandate obligations over a period of no more than five years, beginning in 2006-07, and that's the obligation that's well over a billion dollars.

And there was also a constitutional amendment that was adopted by the Assembly; and that is the one that is the state local agreement that has been under negotiation for some weeks now.

And what is interesting is that since Prop. 65 had already qualified, what the Legislature did is also enacted another bill that basically had not withstanding language numbering this new FCA 4 as Proposition 1A, I believe, and also authorizing the parties that had previously submitted valid arguments, to withdraw those valid arguments.

So there's a lot of cleanup work going on; and it's not all in print and some of the analyses that were passed out on the floor last night were only made

available this morning. So we are following it as quickly as we can, as we have time; but it's changing very quickly.

MEMBER BOEL: Well, considering the workload and the potential workload, should we consider going to monthly meetings, or your staff can't handle that?

MS. HIGASHI: With our current staffing, going to monthly meetings is not going to increase output.

MEMBER BOEL: Okay.

MS. HIGASHI: In fact, when we went to the bimonthly meetings --

CHAIR TILTON: It would slow it down.

MS. HIGASHI: -- I think we improved our output, just by having fewer hearings to prepare for and having more time in between to get all of the support work done that needs to be done.

CHAIR TILTON: My point, Jan, I think with the attention on mandates issues, there would also be an expectation that these backlogs not be there, the basic principles. So that's one of the issues that I've asked Paula to get a sense of what's going on. There's some active dialogue going. But rather than just take a look at this and assume we have the same process, let's do a workload analysis base, and give Paula a chance to add these new activities and then come back to us with,

"Okay, what do we need to do and what positions should we take in terms of how aggressively or what resources can or can't be brought to bear to have reasonable expectation on our work as a commission?"

MS. HIGASHI: And what also is uncertain is we have some pending court decisions and cases coming up that will have significant impact.

CHAIR TILTON: Thank you.

MEMBER BARNES: Have you thought about the BCP process for this year?

MS. HIGASHI: We're in the midst of -- we have at least a second draft, a third draft.

MS. PATTON: (Nodding yes.)

MS. HIGASHI: We've been having meetings for the last four months -- three months, ever since we became aware of the state-local agreement that was publicized during the May revision process, and even before that, because of the Assembly Special Committee, and their interest in having the Commission address the backlog. And those are all issues that we expect that committee to resume taking testimony on, and we expect them to start formulating the recommendations for mandate reform because there are a number of bills that are now parked at the Senate Appropriations, and those with fiscal impact will then go to suspense, and then there will be a

process for amendments to be made.

MEMBER BARNES: And I guess more specifically, are you going to propose BCP to deal with workload issue?

MS. HIGASHI: Yes, we'll have to. We'll have to. We haven't seen the sentence that was in some of the proposed language that had circulated after the May revision, and that was language that said that the Commission will address its entire -- well, all of its local agency backlog by July 1, 2006. And so if that language shows up in one of these bills, that would certainly be the impetus for making sure that at least the local agency backlog would be handled.

There's also the 17553 statute, which can always be relied upon, which basically requires the Commission to make its mandate determinations and adopt statewide cost estimates in 12 to 18 months' filing.

As you know, looking at our backlog here, that we have exceeded that timeline on most of our test claims.

Only the most recent filings have not had that timeline.

CHAIR TILTON: Well, it's a strange process. I'm saying, you need to submit a BCP, and I'll come over here and say I need to receive the BCP.

MEMBER BARNES: You have to pitch and catch at the same time here.

One of the questions I have, is there a way to, you

know, age out particularly the test claims? 1 MS. HIGASHI: Certainly. 2 MEMBER BARNES: And, I mean, I don't know that you 3 need it every month, but perhaps we've got some new 4 5 members, too. If you, if this next meeting, if you could age out the --6 7 MS. HIGASHI: The backlog? The backlog, that would give us some MEMBER BARNES: 8 sense of what we're dealing with. 9 1.0 MS. HIGASHI: Not a problem. I keep that data. 11 It's on my desk. 12 MEMBER BARNES: Very good. I guess one other question, and maybe you're going 13 to cover this. But anything new on the Butte County 14 issue? 15 16 MS. HIGASHI: We are -- let me defer to Ms. Patton 17 on this issue. She had the most recent communication. 18 MS. PATTON: Butte County is indicating that they 19 still plan to file their application around September 1. 20 They said it might come a week or two after that. 21 We have submitted a request to the Department of 22 Finance for funding, to complete the process. And we do have word from the OSA unit of Finance, that they're 23 willing to contract with us and do the fiscal analysis. 24

So we're getting pieces and, you know, getting it put

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together.

But we do not have the application yet.

MEMBER BARNES: Okay, I just wondered if --

CHAIR TILTON: Walter, there's the new -- this budget that's does not provide an deficiency process anymore for agencies to come forward and get that; but there is a pot of funds that the Finance has. So what I would move forward is a request to use that pot of funds and approve resources for them. We haven't got an answer for that yet but at least we moved that forward and say this is the first test of that nondeficiency process and see whether or not we'll -- so the process is being laid out but that's in our front office. So hopefully in the next week, we'll get an answer soon, as soon the budget is done.

MS. HIGASHI: Super. But we've done about as much as we can do at this point to get ready for it.

MEMBER BARNES: That's fine.

MS. HIGASHI: As soon as it's been filed, we'll be in communication with you, because we'll have to work immediately to set up a hearing date and get you the application materials.

MEMBER BARNES: Butte County is lovely this year.

MS. HIGASHI: Yes, Oroville is quite lovely.

Are there any other questions?

(No audible response was heard.)

Our pending legislation, as I MS. HIGASHI: indicated, there's one bill that has gone as far as enrollment, and that is the bill that has the elections procedures in it, one election procedure. election procedure, I believe, is also in one of the budget trailer bills. And it would be a modification of a mandate that's been suspended for a number of years. All the other bills are in Appropriations on Monday.

CHAIR TILTON: Okay, thank you.

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Regarding the next agenda, we have a MS. HIGASHI: couple of test claims, Acquisition of Agricultural Land for a School Site and California English Language Development Test, which have been issued in the draft The other two have not yet been issued in the draft stage. And we will be moving those forward because of our delay in getting them out.

And also, we would be adding to the agenda the proposed Statement of Decision for the test claim, the decision that was made today, that was not adopted.

We also have proposed parameters and quidelines. And we're working on a number of proposed statewide cost estimates. And as you can see, the list is long, so the efficiency just went up, if you adopt this.

Vine, McKinnon & Hall (916) 371-3376

Do you have any other questions?

CHAIR TILTON: Any questions from Members of Paula? 1 (No audible response was heard.) 2 MS. HIGASHI: Thank you. 3 With that, I think we're going to CHAIR TILTON: 4 move into executive session, pursuant to Government Code 5 sections 11126(e), to confer with and receive advice from 6 legal counsel for consideration, action --7 MR. STARKEY: Will we have public comment before we 8 move into closed section? 9 10 CHAIR TILTON: Sure. 11 MR. STARKEY: Just ask if there is any. 12 CHAIR TILTON: Is there any other public comment? 13 (No audible response was heard.) CHAIR TILTON: Thank you, hearing none. 14 15 And I'm going to continue reading into the record --16 as necessary and appropriate upon the pending litigation 17 listed on the published notice and agenda; and to confer with and receive advice from legal counsel regarding 18 19 potential litigation; and pursuant to Government Code 2.0 sections 11126(a) and 17526, the Commission will also 21 confer on personnel matters listed on the published notice and agenda. 22 We'll come back, but we're done with today's 23 business. 24 25 (The Committee met in executive session from

12:09 p.m. to 12:29 p.m.)

CHAIR TILTON: Okay, now, we're reconvening the Commission on State Mandates. The Commission met in closed executive session pursuant to Government Code 11126(e) to confer with and receive advice from legal counsel, for consideration and action as necessary and appropriate upon the pending litigation listed on the published notice of agenda and potential litigation; and Government Code sections 11126(a) and 17526, to confer on personal matters listed on the published notice of agenda.

All required reports from the closed session having been made, and with no further business to discuss, I will entertain a motion to adjourn.

MEMBER LAZAR: So moved.

CHAIR TILTON: So moved.

MEMBER BOEL: Second.

CHAIR TILTON: All in favor, say "aye"?

(A chorus of "ayes" were heard.)

MS. HIGASHI: Before you leave the room, I wanted to introduce our newest student assistant, Latoya Jackson.

I didn't have a chance to do it during the public session. But you may see her at your offices bring by documents, binders, boxes.

MEMBER BOEL: Oh, all those binders we love. If we

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don't welcome you with open arms, don't take it
 1
       personally.
 2
                             Thank you.
             CHAIR TILTON:
 3
                   (Proceedings concluded at 12:30 p.m.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were duly reported by me at the time and place herein specified;

That the testimony of said witnesses was reported by me, a duly certified shorthand reporter and a disinterested person, and was thereafter transcribed into typewriting.

I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for either or any of the parties to said deposition, nor in any way interested in the outcome of the cause named in said caption.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand on August 23, 2004.

DANIEL P. FELDHAUS CSR 6949, RDR, CRR