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COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

PUBLIC HEARING

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

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**ORIGINAL** 

TIME: 9:33 a.m.

DATE: Thursday, September 25, 2003

PLACE: Commission on State Mandates


State Capitol, Room 126 Sacramento, California

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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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Reported By: DANIEL P. FELDHAUS, CSR #6949, RDR, CRR



#### COMMISSIONERS PRESENT

SHELLEY MATEO, Chair Representative of STEVE PEACE, Director State Department of Finance

WALTER BARNES
Representative of
STEVE WESTLY
State Controller

JOHN LAZAR City Council Member City of Turlock

DAVID ROSEBNERG
Supervisor
Yolo County Board of Supervisors

BRUCE VANHOUTEN
Representative of
PHILIP ANGELIDES
State Treasurer

SHERRY WILLIAMS
Representative of
STEVEN A. NISSEN, Director
State Office of Planning and Research

#### COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT

PAULA HIGASHI Executive Director

PAUL M. STARKEY Chief Legal Counsel

CATHERINE M. CRUZ Program Analyst

SHIRLEY OPIE
Assistant Executive Director

# COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT continued

CAMILLE SHELTON
Counsel

KATHERINE TOKARSKI Counsel

#### PUBLIC TESTIMONY

#### Appearing Re Item 4:

For Claimant Santa Monica Community College District:

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For Department of Finance:

SUSAN S. GEANACOU Senior Staff Attorney State of California Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, CA 95814

#### Appearing Re Item 5:

For Claimant County of Los Angeles:

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Certified Public Accountant
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#### PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 5: continued

For Department of Finance:

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Budget Analyst
State of California
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SUSAN S. GEANACOU Senior Staff Attorney State of California Department of Finance

#### Appearing Re Item 8:

For Claimant Santa Monica Community College District:

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For California State Association of Counties:

ALLAN BURDICK California State Association of Counties 4320 Auburn Boulevard, Suite 2000 Sacramento, CA 95841

#### PUBLIC TESTIMONY

#### Appearing Re Item 16 and Item 17:

For San Diego Unified School District:

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San Diego, CA 92103-2682

For State Controller's Office:

SHAWN D. SILVA Staff Counsel State Controller's Office

#### Appearing Re Item 18:

For California State Association of Counties:

ALLAN BURDICK California State Association of Counties 4320 Auburn Boulevard, Suite 2000 Sacramento, CA 95841

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Thursday, September 25, 2003 9:33 a.m. Sacramento, California 1 --000--2 (The following proceedings commenced with Mr. Barnes absent from the hearing room.) 3 4 CHAIR MATEO: Good morning, folks. The hour of 5 9:30 having arrived, we are convening the meeting of the 6 Commission on State Mandates. 7 Paula, will you give us the roll call? 8 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes is absent at the moment. 9 Mr. Lazar? 10 MEMBER LAZAR: Present. 11 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Rosenberg? 12 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Here. 13 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. VanHouten? 14 MEMBER VANHOUTEN: Here. 15 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Williams? 16 MEMBER WILLIAMS: Here. Ms. Mateo? 17 MS. HIGASHI: 18 CHAIR MATEO: Here. 19 We have a quorum. 20 Paula has asked me to just introduce myself. 21 Quickly, I'm Shelly Mateo. I'm the policy deputy from 22 the Department of Finance. And there was a time and a place, almost a decade ago, when I was sitting over there 23

1	[pointing to Ms. Higashi].
2	I'm pleased to see in the audience some of the faces
3	that I dealt with a decade ago. But you're going to need
4	to be patient with me today. It has been a long time.
5	So if I take a wrong turn here anywhere on protocol, let
6	me know. I would appreciate it.
7	So, Paula, that takes us to our first item.
8	MS. HIGASHI: The first item, which is Item 1,
9	approval of minutes of our last hearing on July 31st.
10	CHAIR MATEO: Do we have any questions or comments?
11	MEMBER WILLIAMS: No.
12	CHAIR MATEO: No?
13	Do we have a motion?
14	MEMBER ROSENBERG: I'll move the minutes.
15	MEMBER WILLIAMS: Second.
16	CHAIR MATEO: I have a motion and a second.
17	All in favor.
18	(A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
19	MEMBER VANHOUTEN: And for the record, I abstain.
20	CHAIR MATEO: We have one abstention.
21	That motion passes.
22	MS. HIGASHI: This brings us to the proposed consent
23	calendar. All of you should have before you a green
24	sheet, which lists the items on the consent calendar.
25	For the record, I'll read them: Item 6, Item 9, Item 10,

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Item 11, Item 12, Item 14, Item 15.
1
 2
            MEMBER LAZAR: I move adoption.
            CHAIR MATEO: Move adoption?
 3
                              So moved.
 4
            MEMBER WILLIAMS:
            MEMBER ROSENBERG: I'd like to discuss Items 6, 9,
 5
       10, 11, 12, 14 -- I'm kidding, actually.
 6
                               [Laughter]
 7
 8
            CHAIR MATEO:
                          It's okay.
            MEMBER ROSENBERG: You were ready for that.
 9
            MS. HIGASHI: We were ready.
1.0
            CHAIR MATEO: Paula, you didn't warn me about this.
11
            Okay, I have a motion and a second on the consent
12
       calendar.
13
            All in favor?
14
                    (A chorus of "ayes" was heard.)
15
            CHAIR MATEO: Do we do voice votes on these?
16
17
            MS. HIGASHI: We have in the past, especially if
       it's unanimous.
18
            CHAIR MATEO: Okay. So that motion passes.
19
            MS. HIGASHI: This brings us to Item 2. And just
20
       for the record, this is a standing agenda item, which
21
22
       relates to executive director appeals. There are no
       appeals to be heard today. So we can move forward to the
23
24
       hearing portion of the meeting.
            And, as we typically do at our hearings, we have a
25
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mass swearing-in of the witnesses for all of the items 1 that are under Article 7. 2 So at this time I'd like to ask all of the witnesses 3 and representatives for Items 4, 5 and 8, who are in the 4 5 audience, to please stand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony 6 7 which you are about to give, is true and correct, based upon your personal knowledge, information or belief? 8 (A chorus of "I do's" was heard.) 9 MS. HIGASHI: Thank you. 10 11 With that, we'll go to Item 4. And this item will be presented by Commission counsel, Katherine Tokarski. 12 13 (Mr. Barnes entered the hearing room.) MS. HIGASHI: I'd just like to note for the record, 14 15 that Mr. Barnes has arrived. CHAIR MATEO: Walter, we're on Item 4 now. 16 17 MS. TOKARSKI: Good morning. Peace Officer Personnel Records: Unfounded 18 19 Complaints and Discovery was originally four test claims 20 filed individually by a city, county, and a community 21 college district on legislation addressing the discovery 22 of peace officer personnel records and citizen complaints on peace officers. 23 At the July hearing, the Commission went forward on 24 25 the substantive issues for county and city claimants, and

1 the staff analysis for those issues was adopted by a 2 5-to-1 vote. The issues specific to community college 3 districts as eligible claimants were postponed for 4 testimony and vote until today's hearing. 5 Staff found that pursuant to state law, school 6 districts -- the essential government function of which 7 is to provide public education -- remain free to 8 discontinue providing their own police department, and statutory duties that follow from such discretionary 9 10 activities, do not impose a reimbursable state mandate. 11 Discussion of this issue is found on pages 8 through 12 12 of the staff analysis. Staff recommends that the 13 Commission find that school districts are not eligible claimants for these test claim statutes. 14 15 Will the parties and witnesses please state your 16 names for the record? 17 MR. PETERSEN: Keith Petersen, representing Santa Monica Community College District. 1.8 19 MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, Department of 20 Finance. 21 CHAIR MATEO: Would you go ahead and begin, 22 Mr. Petersen? 23 MR. PETERSEN: Thank you. 24 Today we're discussing a threshold issue that the 25 Commission had resolved about 12 years ago. So you won't

be so far out of time on this one.

2.0

The threshold issue is whether you are reimbursing specific employees to perform a mandate, or whether you are reimbursing the mandate itself.

There is no dispute in the documentation that the activity to be reimbursed is new. The dispute turns on whether you want to reimburse school. It also includes community-college peace officers, reimburse their costs associated with the mandate; because the Commission staff alleges they are discretionary.

The Commission -- this commission -- has never excluded any class of employee from reimbursement before. The Commission staff is recommending that you exclude peace officers from reimbursement.

The Commission, 12 years ago, decided that as an exception to that general rule, that the cost of classroom teachers performing mandates during the classroom won't be reimbursed, because the classroom day does not grow longer. They did not decide not to reimburse teachers; they decided not to reimburse mandates occurring during the classroom time. So it's very clear to understand that -- it's very important to understand that the Commission has never said any one employee is not reimbursable. Because of the nature of their employment, they have said some activities are not

reimbursable. So we have to focus on which activities are reimbursable.

The Commission, two months ago, decided that parts of the test claim were reimbursable; so some of those activities are reimbursable. The only difference is, they sliced out peace officers working for school districts and colleges.

The Commission staff concludes that operating police departments is not an essential governmental function of providing public education. However, they also admit that schools have a statutory public safety duty; that is, to maintain safe campuses. So, clearly, peace officers can be a necessary employee to maintain safety on campus.

I believe that about 30 colleges have peace officers; seven or eight school districts have peace officers. I'm informed and believe that the Los Angeles City School District police force is the third largest in Los Angeles County, behind the sheriffs and the city police. So they definitely have a function on some campuses, in some school districts.

And what is wrong about the staff's conclusion that school districts only reimburse for public education, is that it contradicts the definition in the County of Los Angeles, and it contradicts the definition in Carmel

Valley.

Mandate case law does not limit school district reimbursement for education items. Some of you know, there are 56-approved mandate programs for schools right now, most of which are funded, to the extent that funding is available. Several of them have nothing to do with public education. Scoliosis screening, immunization records, collective bargaining, none of these have anything to do with classroom education services.

The correct interpretation of the County of
Los Angeles and Carmel Valley is that school districts
are like any other local agency, they provide public
service. Most of their public service is public
education.

I'd like to read a couple short quotations from the staff material. It's on page 9 of the -- I guess this is a proposed decision now.

I don't know if that's the same page numbering for the Bates page; is it? I'm not sure.

MS. TOKARSKI: If you're in the proposed decision, that's not the same item as Item 4.

MS. HIGASHI: It's a different item.

MR. PETERSEN: Can I reference it, though?

It's the first document in Item 4.

MS. TOKARSKI: Those are the final staff analysis.

MR. PETERSEN: Fine, okay.

If you look on page 9, halfway down -- and I hope we're on the same page -- it says,

"District, in comments, on the draft analysis received June 30th, disagrees.

District argues Carmel Valley does not exclude school district eligibility. The fact that school district police departments are permissive has not been dispositive in prior test claims."

And here we have the quote.

"Just as Carmel Valley establishes 'police protection' as an essential and basic public service" -- citing Long Beach -- "Long Beach concludes that public education is administered by local agencies to provide service to the public."

It doesn't say that public education is the only reimbursable activity at schools. It's one of the reimbursable activities.

There are several other points of departure.

There's several things that make this recommendation not work.

The jurisdiction of the peace officer is not at issue. In other words, these are not junior peace officers; they're not reserves or pretend peace officers.

Their jurisdiction is decided by the Penal Code, just like the jurisdiction of the sheriff, the park police, who are also peace officers now. They have specific jurisdiction. The fact that their jurisdiction is not the same as the city police does not exclude them from providing a public safety duty. Their public safety duty is just different.

The fact that peace officers at school districts are discretionary doesn't work, either. Obviously, peace officers are discretionary at school districts and colleges because not all of them have it.

The fact that an employee is discretionary does not exclude the employee from reimbursement.

You may be surprised to know that vice-principals, counselors, bus drivers, cafeteria staff -- most everybody in the district office at a school district or at a college is not a mandatory employee. These people are not in the statutes as required employees. Yet nearly the 20 years this Commission has been functioning, they are reimbursing those employees for conducting the mandates.

So clearly eliminating peace officers because they are peace officers is arbitrary. It's what they -- it's the duties, the mandate, and not who does them, with the exception of the classroom.

One of the points raised by the Commission staff says the district has the discretion of firing or discontinuing their peace officers. That's true. School districts and colleges always have the discretion of reducing staff. And just like state government, the local school districts and colleges had severe staff reductions, in the last few years.

The fact that you're reducing a certain type of employee, in this case peace officers, does not remove the mandate. The mandate is still required, the public safety part of the mandate is still required, but you just have to do it differently. And different sized school districts do the mandates differently.

And so, in other words, the fact that these people are discretionary and you can remove them and vice-principals are discretionary, they've been removed en masse in the last few years due to cutbacks, doesn't mean that the mandate doesn't continue. So there must be something new.

In the determination of the test claim two months ago and in the recommendation here, the staff did not point out anywhere in the law that makes peace officers compulsory for cities and counties. Yet for schools, for some reason, the staff thinks they must be compulsory or else you won't reimburse them. They did not apply the

same tests to the cities and counties. And you did not apply the same tests when you adopted the mandate two months ago. There was no showing that peace officers are compulsory for cities and counties.

It may seem inherently logical to you; but you probably know that there are some cities that do not have peace officers. So they are not mandated.

I'm sure if deputy sheriffs were mandated by a certain amount or city police were mandated by a certain amount, the cities and county groups would have test claims filed on that.

So if they're not compulsory at cities and counties and they're not compulsory at school districts, why were school districts chosen to exclude peace officers from reimbursement? There is no logic there.

There must be something new. And I think what the Commission staff thinks is new, is the recent Supreme Court decision on the Kern case. As quoted twice in the documents -- and I'll have to reference those in a moment -- but essentially the Kern case as recently decided said that the state need not reimburse the cost of public agendas for school site councils because the councils were funded by categorical funds. And the fact that they were funded was the incentive to -- the requirement to publish the agenda.

1 Now, in the case before you, there's no funding 2 involved. They don't hire peace officers to obtain 3 funding, okay. That's not the mandate. And the part of the quote from the court case that 4 5 the Commission staff picked was on page 11. It's just a 6 couple sentences. It's two-thirds of the way down after 7 the indent. It says, "In the Department of Finance," the case I referenced, 8 "the Court stated, 'Our conclusion is based on 9 10 the following determinations: First, we reject 11 the claimants' assertion that they had been 12 legally compelled to incur costs, and, hence, are entitled to reimbursement...without regard 13 14 to whether claimant's participation in the 15 underlying program is voluntary or compelled." 16 So voluntariness and compulsion was not an issue in 17 that court case. 18 The quote that staff did not include in their 19 analysis, that I included in my responses is in 20 Exhibit N. And it starts on the bottom of page 388. 21 It's another short quote. 22 So to recap at this point, staff is recommending not 23 reimbursing because peace officers are not compulsory. 24 So starting on the bottom of page 388:

25

//

"For the reasons explained below, although
we shall analyze the legal compulsion issue, we
find it unnecessary in this case to decide
whether a finding of legal compulsion is

necessary in order to establish a right to

reimbursement."

1.1

In other words, they're saying, "We've decided this case for another reason. This case is not decided on legal compulsion."

The staff is trying to use this case to eliminate peace officers because they are not compelled -- they're not compulsive employees.

Now, this Commission has already approved school and college peace officers for reimbursement in seven previous test claims: The Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights, Threats against Peace Officers, Peace Officers' Survivors Health Benefits, Law Enforcement Sexual Harassment Training, Photographic Record of Evidence, Law Enforcement College Jurisdiction Agreements. And in that particular test claim, they approved only community-college police and no other peace officers. And finally, Sex Offenders: Disclosure by Law Enforcement Officers; that's reimbursement for maintaining the Megan's Law register. So, obviously, these peace officers have serious duties.

Now, nothing has changed since this Commission has 1 decided to reimburse peace officers, except for that 2 recent court case. And if you look at the quotes, you 3 know the court case was not based on compulsion; it was 4 based on a funding issue. There is no funding issue in 5 this test claim and there is no legal requirement that 6 peace officers be compelled, or compulsory employees. 7 There are very few compulsory employees in local 8 9 government. So that is not an adequate basis for excluding peace officers. 10 Thank you. 11 The Department of Finance? 12 CHAIR MATEO: MS. GEANACOU: Do you wish to hear our comments now 13 or hear our staff response to Mr. Petersen's assertion? 14 CHAIR MATEO: What would we normally do here? 15 MS. HIGASHI: You can do whatever you prefer. 16 at the pleasure of the Commission. 17 CHAIR MATEO: Okay. 18 MS. GEANACOU: Okay, I'll proceed. 19 Susan Geanacou, Department of Finance. 20 The Department of Finance supports the Commission's 21 staff analysis as to this remaining item in this test 22 claim. 23 24 And I will note for the record, that the Department

of Finance court decision to which Mr. Petersen refers

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did, in part, turn on the fact that the district's participation in eight of the nine underlying programs was discretionary. And as to the ninth program, that is where the funding issue came in; and they found that because the funds could be used to cover the reimbursable costs, there was no requirement for reimbursement in that case. So I do believe that's a relevant issue.

And here, participation in the underlying program of creating a police department at a school district and community-college level is discretionary. And for that reason, we support the Commission's staff analysis.

CHAIR MATEO: Staff?

MS. TOKARSKI: First of all, I'd like to address the issue of whether the staff analysis discusses whether counties and cities have a law enforcement responsibility. And that can be found in the first full paragraph on page 9. Basically, there is a discussion of the fact that school districts are not functioning within their educational governmental capacity when they are operating police departments. However, in contrast, article XI of the California Constitution provides for the formations of cities and counties.

Section 1, counties, states that, "The Legislature shall provide an elected county sheriff," and section 5, city charter provisions, specifies that, "City charters

are to provide for the government of the city police force." Thus, at the constitutional levels, cities and counties are given local law enforcement responsibilities, while school districts are statutorily permitted to form police departments." So there is the distinction that I have identified of why it's permissible to reimburse the identified activities that were discussed at the July hearing for city and county police departments; because they have the primary function of providing law enforcement for the state's residents.

However, school districts only have to do these activities if they become employers of peace officers; and that's where the Department of Finance Supreme Court decision comes in, which does say that you must look at whether the underlying program is voluntary or compelled when making these determinations.

And in this case, the underlying program is a discretionary activity of forming police departments and employing peace officers which, granted, is clearly good public policy for some of these districts that have done so, but it's not required and, therefore, is not reimbursable for the activities stated in this test claim.

CHAIR MATEO: Are there any questions from Members?

Go ahead.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Yes, thank you.

I'm impressed with the logic of both your positions.

One of you has got to be wrong.

Mr. Petersen makes kind of a compelling argument.

And I'd like staff to address, perhaps by analogy, his point; and that is, that we really ought to be looking at the function and not at who is doing it, in terms of assessing whether or not it's a mandate.

By analogy, let's assume that you have a situation where a vice-principal is responsible for undertaking a new program. Let's assume the new program is clearly a new program; and if you were looking just at the program, it would be considered a mandate by the state. If the vice-principal position is a discretionary position, as Mr. Peterson says, then I guess the threshold question is, is it a discretionary position? But if it is a discretionary position and a vice-principal is charged with undertaking this new program, wouldn't we find that, as a Commission, to be a state mandate? We wouldn't look at who's doing it; we would look at what the program is?

MS. TOKARSKI: Okay, this is the distinction I'll try to articulate. If the state mandate in that case was a state mandate that all vice-principals -- whenever you have a vice-principal, they must clock in at 9 a.m. every

morning, or something that is specific to vice-principals.

Now, if vice-principals were not required to be part of the educational system, then that would not be a reimbursable state mandate under this analysis.

Must comply with a particular -- I know vice-principals often deal with discipline issues -- but they must comply with a particular discipline issue; and it happens to be the vice-principal who is charged by that school district with performing those activities, the activities are reimbursable and, within reason, it doesn't matter who is performing those activities; these activities in this case only come about because they are employing peace officers, which they do not need to do. So that's the best way I can explain that situation.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: I would truly be interested in hearing a brief comment by Mr. Petersen.

MR. PETERSEN: The staff position contradicts what this Commission has always done. The vice-principal is a good example. There is a mandate called Pupil Counseling and Pupil Classroom Visits. It's a mandate which requires school site personnel to respond to requests from parents to visit the classroom and to discuss reasons why their pupil has been removed -- discipline

reasons.

When that test claim went forward 11 years ago, the Department of Finance suggested that only counselors and not vice-principals be reimbursed. And this Commission decided there was no distinction about who provided the services. It was whether the services were provided.

So not until today has the Commission considered excluding any one class of employee because of the nature of their employment. They've always considered whether the activity had to be done.

Bus drivers are reimbursed, to some extent, in the school bus mandate because there are buses.

Vice-principals are reimbursed because they perform a discipline function. Not every school site has a vice-principal. Some school sites have several vice-principals based on the need. Not every school district has peace officers. Large, urban school districts have peace officers based on the need. They all have the same public education and public service function.

Public education is not the only reimbursable aspect of school district and college mandates. This commission has recognized that these local agencies do other things, other than public education; and they are reimbursed for doing these other things.

So the Commission staff position on this today has no basis in fact or law. It's just a policy preference. The court cases make no distinction between the public safety function of schools and cities and counties.

1.5

Obviously, cities and counties have the brunt of the burden of public safety; but so do schools. And school districts and colleges meet that commitment -- in some cases by hiring peace officers, in some cases by hiring what we would call "rent-a-cops." They meet these functions in various ways, cost-effective ways, in what meets their individual needs.

The fact that city police and county sheriffs are the traditional peace officers in the state is not controlling.

The Penal Code, 830.31, in 1980, said that, "Those persons who are peace officers, who extends authority any place in the state for the purpose of performing their primary duty or where making arrests, included are community-college police and school police." They have the same statewide peace officer responsibilities as any other peace officer. They are not second-class peace officers. They're performing a mandated function.

Discretionary, again, is not the issue. They are using "discretionary" here to make a change.

Discretionary employees has never been the issue. It is

whether the activity was done and who did the activity.

One of my favorite examples is, I was told several years ago, that down in Furnace Creek in Death Valley, the principal of a very small school, one of his tasks is driving the bus and picking up the kids. That's how they implement that mandate. It's not who does it. It's whether the activities are implemented or not.

CHAIR MATEO: I'm having trouble picking up some of the distinctions here. The emphasis you have placed is on employees, and yet it's the activity within school districts rather than the employees that I'm hearing is the issue, that the activity is discretionary, itself, within school districts. And so it's not clear to me that this discussion on employees is germane.

MR. PETERSEN: I'm sorry, as to who does the work?
CHAIR MATEO: Yes.

MR. PETERSEN: I agree.

CHAIR MATEO: And so what I'm hearing staff say, is that they're seeing a constitutional direction to cities and counties that is not made to districts; and that the requirement, if you will, in statute is discretionary; and that that is the basis, as opposed to the kinds of employees performing the function.

Am I missing something here?

MR. PETERSEN: I believe you are.

MR. STARKEY: Can I weigh in? I believe you understand exactly.

The notion was raised that this was -- that staff was somehow making a policy decision. The policy decision is set out in the Constitution, which vests traditional police functions in the local agencies and in the precise specific Education Code that says that the police function can be carried out through the school districts, but that is at their discretion. They can elect to do that.

And that is exactly the issue of discretion that staff believes that -- the City of Merced, which was a long-standing case, was upheld by the Supreme Court recently in the Kern case. And so we believe the clear direction -- clear direction from the Supreme Court now -- is that if you find that the local agency can make an election, a policy decision -- a policy decision in this case, for example: "We shall elect to have safety enforcement on our campus." That's a policy decision they make, it's at their discretion. It's allowed by the Education Code, not required. That is not going to be reimbursed by a state mandate because of the discretionary choice.

So, yes, you understand that exactly correct.

MR. PETERSEN: I would disagree.

CHAIR MATEO: Go ahead, Mr. Barnes.

MEMBER BARNES: Sure. I had two questions.

One question had to do with the list of mandates that were cited in Exhibit N.

MR. PETERSEN: Uh-huh.

2.2

MEMBER BARNES: On page 389.

My impression is that these mandates have been approved before the Kern case came about.

MR. PETERSEN: Yes.

MEMBER BARNES: Am I correct about that?

The other issue that I'm kind of struggling with, although I tend to feel the staff analysis is on point on this, is that it seems to me that there may be a distinction here, and maybe you can help me with it, which is the fact that most mandates -- excuse me, most mandates are imposed upon agencies, like school districts or counties or whatever; and there are people within those districts who carry them out, some of whom may be discretionary hires or may be non-discretionary hires.

In this case, my impression is that the law was intended to apply to all people who were categorized as police officers. And I guess the fact that some of those police officers are discretionary on the part of school districts or community colleges, to a certain extent, they're discretionary in the police and sheriffs, too.

They can decide that they're going to have one police officer or ten police officers. And in addition, the school district could make a decision that instead of hiring staff to police their district, they could go and work with the board of supervisors or the city to hire more police officers who might be targeted at a particular school.

So on another case, that if you had something that was specifically required of a school district, like -- and I forget what the example was -- but let's say that they decided that a discretionary employee, like a vice-principal would do it. I tend to think that since the mandate is on the school to do something, whether they had it being done by a discretionary employee or a non-discretionary employee, shouldn't make a difference. Because to a certain extent, they can't shove that off on somebody else. They can't go to the city council and say, "Could you have the police department or the department of sanitation or somebody else do that for us, because we don't want to do it?" It's imposed upon the institution, in most cases.

In this case, I guess what I'm hearing is that it's being imposed upon a certain class of employee, regardless of where they are.

Am I mistaken about that? And if so, I'd like any

comments that you have.

MS. TOKARSKI: Well, just sort of a semantic point of clarification.

The activities are being imposed not on the class of employee, but on the employer of the peace officers. I don't know if that makes any distinction for you in what you're saying.

But the point is that school districts do not have to be employers of peace officers. And, therefore, under the Department of Finance case, they're not compelled to -- if they have a peace officer program, then yes, they need to follow these statutes. But practical or not, they can make that choice to step out of the mandate program, which is distinct from many other examples of test claims that have been approved by the Commission.

MR. PETERSEN: Can I respond now?

CHAIR MATEO: Go ahead.

MR. PETERSEN: The staff position just cannot work. There's no support in Kern for it.

The law does not mandate vice-principals, cafeteria workers, counselors, librarians, bus drivers. Yet in mandates, some of those functions -- and whether they're done by cafeteria workers or the janitor, whatever, is a local choice. The mandate is on public education, not on

specific employees.

If you choose to employ a particular category of employees, with them comes some baggage. The baggage is this test claim, and that is personnel procedures regarding requests for their records and unfounded complaints. If you've got a peace officer, you have this higher level.

Similar baggage exists -- if you want to call it "baggage" -- if you hire teachers. You have collective bargaining. It has nothing to do with classroom education. It's a huge mandate. Over 50 million dollars a year, that's reimbursed by the State. It's the nature of the employee relationship that you have. You have employees, if they select to be represented by union, must collectively bargain. It has nothing to do with public education.

Public schools provide public education and other public services, as required by law. The test is whether it's a duty on local government, not required of private employers. Private employers do not employ peace officers, only governments do.

So the basic definitions in place for the last 20 years have directed this Commission to decide to reimburse the activity, not the person doing it.

The only change is the Kern case. And the Kern

case, as you saw, does not turn on any sort of compulsion. Your staff says that law enforcement officers are not compelled and cites Kern as support.

Kern says there's nothing about compulsion in their decision. So the reliance is misplaced. Nothing has changed.

Kern is about school site council agendas being posted because you have these school site committees which are funded by categorical funds. There is no funding issue. Kern is not relevant. There is no reason to change what you've been doing for 20 years.

And if you do exclude peace officers because they're "discretionary," nearly every other employee in local government is discretionary. And if that's the basis, there's no mandate reimbursement, which might be attractive to some.

But the Constitution, Article XIII B 6, says the state will reimburse new programs and higher levels of service. And this Commission decided 12 years ago that, with the exclusion of duties occurring in the classroom, you would reimburse the employee doing the work, regardless of which employee it was.

This is not a new issue. This has been decided 12 years ago.

Vine, McKinnon & Hall (916) 371-3376

Thank you.

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1
            CHAIR MATEO: Any further questions from any
 2
       members?
 3
            Do I have a motion?
            MEMBER WILLIAMS: I would like to move the staff
 4
 5
       analysis.
            CHAIR MATEO: Do I have a second?
 6
 7
            MEMBER BARNES:
                            I'll second.
 8
            CHAIR MATEO: We have a motion and a second.
 9
            All in favor?
10
            MEMBER ROSENBERG: Any discussion --
11
            MS. HIGASHI:
                          I will do roll call, too.
12
            CHAIR MATEO: Oh, you do roll call on these?
13
       thank you.
14
            MS. HIGASHI: If there isn't discussion.
15
            CHAIR MATEO: Go ahead.
16
            MEMBER ROSENBERG: I would just like to say that
17
       Mr. Petersen makes a very good policy argument. But the
1.8
       law would compel a different result, I'm afraid.
19
       the law was sorted out in the Constitution, which imposes
       a mandatory duty on the cities and counties to provide
20
21
       law enforcement. And although school districts have the
22
       ability to provide the law enforcement, it is a
23
       discretionary decision given to --
24
            MR. PETERSEN: Actually, that's in the Constitution,
25
       too, safe public schools.
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MEMBER ROSENBERG: All the more reason that the 1 2 policy argument has been sorted out in the Constitution. There is no mandate on school districts to provide 3 4 law enforcement. That function can and, in most cases, 5 is provided by cities and counties. 6 School districts can chose to provide law 7 enforcement; and so that is a discretionary decision they The rest of this falls out as a result of that. 8 CHAIR MATEO: Paula, please call the roll. 9 10 MEMBER BARNES: Before you --11 CHAIR MATEO: Oh, I'm sorry, Walter. I didn't see 12 you. 13 I just had one question. MEMBER BARNES: raised this at the last meeting. And we've talked about 14 15 school districts and we talked about community colleges. 16 And my impression, when I asked this question at the last 17 meeting, is that we were talking about community 18 colleges, as opposed to school districts. And I guess I just want to make sure what we're voting on here. Are we 19 20 voting on school districts, K-14; or are we just voting 21 on community colleges? 22 MS. TOKARSKI: Yes, in this case Santa Monica 23 Community College District is standing in the shoes of 24 all types of school districts as --25 MEMBER BARNES: So it is K-14?

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1	MS. TOKARSKI: It is K-14.
2	MEMBER BARNES: Thank you. Just to clarify.
3	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
4	MEMBER BARNES: Yes.
5	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
6	MEMBER LAZAR: Yes.
7	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Rosenberg?
8	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Aye.
9	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. VanHouten?
10	MEMBER VANHOUTEN: Yes.
11	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Williams?
12	MEMBER WILLIAMS: Aye.
13	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Mateo?
14	CHAIR MATEO: Aye.
15	MS. HIGASHI: The motion is adopted.
16	At this point, what I would like to suggest we do,
17	is move to Item 8, which is adoption of the proposed
18	Statement of Decision on this test claim.
19	Mr. Petersen, we're going to move to Item 8, which
20	is the Proposed Statement of Decision. And we need to
21	have you at the table.
22	This is for the Proposed Statement of Decision.
23	MR. PETERSON: What?
24	MS. HIGASHI: This is for the proposed Statement of
25	Decision.

MR. PETERSEN: Well, the school district is no 1 longer in there. 2 It's still part of the decision. MS. HIGASHI: 3 MR. PETERSON: Okay. 4 Ms. Tokarski will present this item. 5 MS. TOKARSKI: What you have before you is the 6 Proposed Statement of Decision. Because we're doing 7 bimonthly hearings, as much as possible, we'll try to 8 move the statements of decision, along with the item, 9 when feasible. 10 So this Statement of Decision includes all of the 11 material that was approved at the July hearing, as well 12 as the vote taken today. There will be, of course, some 13 clerical changes to reflect the vote taken today, when 14 the Final Statement of Decision is mailed. But other 15 than that, it is identical to the material that you 16 approved in the final staff analysis. 17 CHAIR MATEO: I'm lost on my script here, Paula. 18 19 Okay, let's see. MS. HIGASHI: I'm sorry. 20 CHAIR MATEO: Bear with me, folks. They are guiding 21 22 me through this. MS. HIGASHI: I know I made this change; but this is 23 for Item 8, and it's the proposed Statement of Decision. 24

And it's up to the Commission members to decide if they

25

1	want to adopt the Proposed Statement of Decision.
2	CHAIR MATEO: Okay. And so normally we would go
3	through the similar routine?
4	MS. HIGASHI: Normally, it would be on the consent
5	calendar. But because we're doing this a little bit
6	differently, we're calling the item so Mr. Petersen has
7	a chance to speak on this issue.
8	CHAIR MATEO: So we would at this point ask for a
9	presentation from
10	MS. HIGASHI: Correct.
11	CHAIR MATEO: Okay.
12	MS. HIGASHI: I'm sorry.
13	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Can we clarify that? We're not
14	here to reargue the matter?
15	MS. HIGASHI: No.
16	MEMBER ROSENBERG: We're here to simply determine
17	whether the Proposed Statement of Decision reflects
18	the
19	MS. HIGASHI: Commission's decision.
20	MEMBER ROSEBERG: decision.
21	CHAIR MATEO: Correct.
22	MS. HIGASHI: Which previously was to adopt
23	MEMBER ROSENBERG: And is there anything in the
24	statement of
25	MS HTGASHT: the staff analysis.

1	MEMBER ROSENBERG: decision which does not
2	accurately reflect the decision of the Commission, even
3	though one may disagree with that decision?
4	MR. PETERSEN: That's my understanding.
5	MS. HIGASHI: Yes. And I'd just like to note,
6	Mr. Burdick has joined us; and I don't believe he was
7	here when we did the swearing in.
8	MR. BURDICK: No.
9	MS. HIGASHI: Had you intended to testify?
10	MR. BURDICK: Yes, I do.
11	CHAIR MATEO: Go ahead and swear Mr. Burdick in,
12	please.
13	MR. PETERSEN: Actually, could I just say the
14	Statement of Decision reflects the decision you just made
15	and bow out?
16	[Laughter]
17	CHAIR MATEO: That's fine, Mr. Peterson.
18	MR. PETERSON: But I still disagree with it.
19	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Burdick, do you solemnly swear or
20	affirm that the testimony which you are about to give is
21	true and correct based upon your personal knowledge,
22	information or belief?
23	MR. BURDICK: I do.
24	MS. HIGASHI: Okay.
25	MR. BURDICK: Thank you very much. Madam Chair and

Members of the Commission.

Allan Burdick.

And in this case, the person who argued this last time on our behalf, Ms. Pamela Stone, had a family emergency and was unable to be here, so I'm kind of a last-minute pinch hitter for her. I apologize for that.

So I'm actually here representing both the City of Hayward and the County of San Mateo in this particular case.

As you know, while we've raised a number of issues at the last meeting, I think, you know, we do not disagree with the Statement of Decision.

I think the only comment would be made, is some that we might want to talk with staff later on; and that's that I think the Statement of Decision generally reflects the staff analysis and what was presented to the Commission prior to the discussion. There was a discussion of a number of items, I think, during the hearing, and that are not necessarily included in there.

And I don't want to open up a whole can of worms because this may create a lot more staff work. But we recently have had some questions about the Statement of Decision and what it reflected. And in some cases, when there was discussion about, "Well, that was discussed at the hearing," there was an indication that that is not

contained in the Statement of Decision.

So I think that maybe there is -- if I could switch for a second and say that I'm representing the California State Association of Counties and all the counties for a second, I think there's a need to talk about the Statement of Decision and what it's intended to do.

Because if, in fact, those items are not included in there later on, many people are saying that other state agencies which are auditing or looking at some of these items are questioning some of the discussion that may have been taking place, or some of the decisions that may have been made by the Commission on various items.

But setting that aside, we have no objection to the Statement of Decision.

CHAIR MATEO: I almost think I heard you did, and you didn't.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Don't egg him on.

MR. BURDICK: No.

CHAIR MATEO: Don't egg him on? Okay.

All right. Understanding that there's no objection from the audience on our Statement of Decision --

MEMBER ROSENBERG: I just have a question, and perhaps you can help me on this. In the hearing previously, I voted "no" on the decision. I was in the minority on that decision. What has been the practice in

the past for Members of the Commission who find themselves in that position when voting on the Statement of Decision? Do they vote "yes" or do they vote "no" or do they abstain?

MS. HIGASHI: Typically, they have voted to adopt the Statement of Decision because it does reflect the vote taken by the Commission.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Right.

MS. HIGASHI: But the votes of the prior members of the hearing are reflected.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Thank you.

MS. HIGASHI: And let me just add, this is unusual because this is our first hearing that we've had on this bimonthly schedule. So normally, a decision would come at the next month's hearing; but we're experimenting, as we had talked about doing, in terms of putting proposed statements of decision on the same agenda as the test claim. And in the event that it could be adopted and there would be no objection so that we could move items along -- and this is just in the spirit of trying to keep the test claims moving. But going to the bi-monthly has created some scheduling issues and just changes in agenda setting.

CHAIR MATEO: Thank you. I think we appreciate staff's effort to keep things moving.

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Do I have a motion on this item?
1
           MEMBER LAZAR: I'll move adoption.
2
            MR. BARNES: I'll second.
3
            CHAIR MATEO: I have a motion and a second.
4
            Paula, will you call the roll?
5
            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
6
7
            MEMBER LAZAR: Yes.
            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Rosenberg?
8
9
            MEMBER ROSENBERG:
                               Aye.
            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. VanHouten?
10
            MEMBER VANHOUTEN: Yes.
11
            MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Williams?
12
13
            MEMBER WILLIAMS:
                              Aye.
            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
14
            MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
15
            MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Mateo?
16
17
            CHAIR MATEO: Aye.
            MS. HIGASHI: The motion is carried. The Statement
18
       of Decision is adopted.
19
            MR. BURDICK: Thank you very much.
20
            MS. HIGASHI: This brings us to Item 5.
21
            Commission counsel, Camille Shelton, will present
22
       this item.
23
            MS. SHELTON: Good morning.
24
            Item 5 is the request for reconsideration on the
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Commission's Statement of Decision issued in May 2003 on the Crime Victims' Domestic Violence Incident Reports test claim. The issue on reconsideration is limited to whether storage of the report and face sheet, pursuant to Family Code section 6228(e) constitutes a new program or higher level of service for five years as the Commission found, or for three years.

As indicated in the staff analysis on reconsideration, existing Government Code statutes require local agencies to keep all documents required by law to be kept for two years. These statutes were not considered in the Statement of Decision.

The County of Los Angeles argues, however, that the Government Code statutes are not relevant, since no law prior to Family Code section 6228 required local agencies to store domestic violence incident reports in a readily-accessible manner.

Staff disagrees with the county. The plain language of Family Code section 6228(e), does not address the manner of storage. It simply establishes the length of time the documents must be kept by the local agency.

Thus, the existing law in Government Code sections 26202 and 34090, which established the timing for the retention of all records required by law to be kept, are relevant and apply to the test claim statute.

1 The Commission does have the discretion, however, to 2 address the manner of storage in the parameters and 3 guidelines, when establishing the reasonable means of 4 complying with this mandate. 5 For the reasons stated in the analysis, staff finds 6 that Family Code section 6228(e), mandates a new program 7 or higher level of service for storing the domestic 8 violence incident report and face sheets for three years 9 instead of five. Staff, therefore, recommends that the 10 Commission find that the Statement of Decision contains 11 an error of law. 12 Staff further recommends that the Commission amend 13 the Statement of Decision to reflect the analysis of the Government Code sections, and to change the five-year 14 15 finding to three years. Under the Commission's regulations, a supermajority 16 17 of five affirmative votes is required to change a prior final decision. 18 19 Will the parties and representatives please state your names for the record? 20 21 MR. KAYE: Leonard Kaye, County of Los Angeles. MS. MANGUM: Sarah Mangum, Department of Finance. 22 23 MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, Department of Finance. 24

CHAIR MATEO: Mr. Kaye, would you like to begin?

25

MR. KAYE: Thank you. Good morning.

We appreciated the legal scholarship that Commission staff have poured into this matter. They held a special hearing, as Camille mentioned, in the end of June, where this was, I believe, the only matter on the agenda. And they've gone to some lengths to try and be very specific and correct in phrasing their finding.

Apparently, as I understand it, the error of law is that they studied, to some great extent, is accurately stated. On page 11, on their Statement of Decision. And it says,

"The Commission finding that the State has not previously mandated any record-retention requirements on local agencies for information to victims of domestic violence, does not take into consideration prior law."

And I would like to focus our attention on the specific words, because as the current discussion among many of us is: How specifically should we refer to language when it's incorporated into a decision? Do we have license to say that retaining something is the same as storing something? Or must we adhere to the specific context and the specific wording as found in statute?

And I would argue that we must continue to adhere to the specific terminology as found in statute. And prior

law makes no reference to the storage of domestic violence records.

There is other law, as correctly noted by Commission staff, which talks about retaining records or failing to destroy records.

And so what we recommend, if I may jump to the conclusion, in the interest of time, is a slight modification of Commission staff's terminology and finding. Because, as Camille correctly noted, we will shortly -- and the County of Los Angeles will be responsible for coming up with Parameters and Guidelines which hope to delineate the reimbursable activities.

So our finding, hopefully, will give us a little head start in this area.

And what we propose, I believe on page 30 of the Commission staff analysis, their version, which I'll repeat verbatim, is that they find reimbursable the activity of storing domestic violence incident reports and face sheets for three years. We recommend modifying that, again, in keeping with the literal interpretation and use of the specific words that appear in statute, "to storing domestic violence incident reports and face sheets, including retaining such documents for only three years."

Thank you.

CHAIR MATEO: Staff? 1 2 MS. SHELTON: If I can comment on that? Staff does 3 not have a problem with that recommended change. 4 Under the law that we have analyzed for you in the 5 staff analysis, local agencies are required to keep those 6 documents in a manner that they are not destroyed. 7 this still preserves the discretion with the Commission 8 in the Parameters and Guidelines to determine how exactly they -- how they should be storing these documents and 9 10 the manner in which they store the documents, which 11 certainly can be left for Parameters and Guidelines. 12 CHAIR MATEO: Department of Finance? 13 MS. GEANACOU: We're wanting to make sure -- Susan 14 Geanacou, Department of Finance. 15 We wanted to make sure we captured Mr. Kaye's 16 language correctly. 17 Could you reread, please, what you're proposing? 18 MR. KAYE: Yes. I'll try and be consistent. 19 MS. GEANACOU: No, that's okay. 20 "Storing domestic violence incident MR. KAYE: reports and face sheets, including retaining such 21 22 documents for only three years." 23 MS. GEANACOU: Okay, could you please clarify how 24 that is materially different from what the Commission is 25 proposing right now?

MR. KAYE: I think it provides a little bit more guidance. For example, one might adopt the metric, and say that we simply should take our total storage costs and claim that 60 percent, or three-fifths, is reimbursable, and the other three-fifths are. And as a CPA, I can tell you that that metric is not necessarily reliable.

This wording would allow us to say that there's certain, perhaps, fixed costs. And as Camille said, we can argue about this or talk about this in the Parameters and Guidelines phase; but it would get us away from the simple mindset of simply saying that a certain proportion of the storage costs are reimbursable. And we would be able to analyze and present to this Commission all the activities required under storage costs, of which record retention is a very important cost.

CHAIR MATEO: I have a question of staff. I want to know whether this clarification abridges, in any fashion, our limited reconsideration of this item?

MS. SHELTON: I don't believe that it does, no.

MEMBER WILLIAMS: I have one question. Inserting the word "only three years," doesn't that kind of restrict with the locals?

MR. KAYE: Well, this is what Commission staff found, is that under prior law, we were required to

1	retain these types of documents for two years. So the
2	five years, minus the two years under prior law, would be
3	the new requirement to retain them for three years.
4	MEMBER WILLIAMS: But inserting the word "only" kind
5	of worries me.
6	MS. SHELTON: I didn't have that in mine.
7	Did you
8	MR. KAYE: Okay, we can delete the word "only for
9	three years," yes, that would be fine.
10	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Help me out here.
11	MR. KAYE: Okay.
12	MEMBER ROSENBERG: You seem to be making a
13	distinction between the word "retention" and the word
14	"storage."
15	MR. KAYE: Yes.
16	MEMBER ROSENBERG: I'm not sure I understand there
17	to be a significant difference. Why don't you explain to
18	me why you're making an issue of that?
19	MR. KAYE: Okay.
20	MEMBER ROSENBERG: What is the difference between
21	retaining something and storing something?
22	MR. KAYE: Okay. Under the particular statute,
23	there are requirements by which we must make these
24	documents readily available, and certain penalties or
25	sanctions if we don't.

1 And it is my understanding that, in order to do 2 this, we have to perform certain storage activities that 3 have nothing to do with the duration of how long you keep a document, whether it's transforming them into a certain 4 5 software or optically-read characteristics and so forth. 6 So retaining a document then is a necessary but not 7 sufficient condition for performing the storage 8 requirements under the test claim legislation. 9 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Okay, you're going to have to 10 clarify a little bit more. Are you saying that retaining 11 is a lesser duty than storing? 12 MR. KAYE: I believe so. 13 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Okay, explain why. In other words, are you suggesting that "storing" means to take 14 the document and put it in a box; whereas "retaining" can 15 16 mean simply --17 MR. KAYE: Failing to destroy. 18 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Well, that's no difference. just a second. Are you suggesting that "storing" is 19 20 taking the document and putting it in a box; whereas 21 "retaining" can include taking the document and putting 22 it in electronic form --23 MR. KAYE: Yes. 24 MEMBER ROSENBERG: -- and actually taking the

original document and throwing it away?

25

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1	MR. KAYE: Well, my baseline distinction is the fact
2	that irrespective of whether one activity is subsumed
3	under another, the statutory language is different. And
4	I think that I'm trying to be literal in terms of the
5	statutory language.
6	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Okay.
7	MR. KAYE: And whether it's more or less, and to the
8	extent that it's more or less, I think that's a
9	Parameters and Guidelines issue.
10	But I'd like to preserve the distinction that under
11	prior law, they talked about retaining records. Under
12	the current test claim, they talk about storage
13	requirements.
14	MEMBER ROSENBERG: All right, let me ask staff then,
15	if I may, is the more appropriate word to use, if we
16	follow the literal language of the statute, "retain" or
17	"retention," as opposed to "storing" or "storage"?
18	MS. SHELTON: Actually, I think we're getting off
19	the language of the statute.
20	If you look on Bates page 15, that is the quote of
21	the entire statute. And subdivision (e), at the very top
22	of page 15, says
23	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Wait. Page 15, where?
24	MS. SHELTON: On the very top.
25	MEMBER ROSENBERG: No, no. We have a staff report

1	and then numerous exhibits.
2	MS. SHELTON: They're all chronologically numbered.
3	This is page 15.
4	MS. GEANACOU: Of the staff analysis?
5	MS. SHELTON: Of the staff analysis, yes.
6	Everything is chronologically numbered.
7	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Well, everything you may have,
8	may be chronologically numbered; but everything I have is
9	not.
10	MS. SHELTON: Okay. Under the staff analysis on
11	page 15. So that should be before Exhibit A.
12	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Chronological numbering is a very
13	helpful tool; and it would be useful if all of us had
14	that.
15	MS. SHELTON: Well, we normally do that.
16	I'm not sure why it's not done in your case; but I
17	do
18	MEMBER ROSENBERG: All right, go ahead.
19	MS. SHELTON: At the very top of page 15 is
20	subdivision (e). Do you all have that? Okay.
21	It says,
22	"This section shall apply to requests for
23	face sheet or reports within five years from
24	the date of completion of the domestic violence
	ingident werent "

Going back to the time that this claim was originally heard, the claimant argued that that subdivision required local agencies to store the report and face sheets for five years. And the Commission agreed with that interpretation.

Let me try to help, maybe with the storage and the retention. And it's going back to the first -- to the test claim hearing in April. This whole program requires local law enforcement agencies, upon request of a victim of domestic violence, to provide to the victim a copy of the report within short turn-around time frames. They have to provide a copy of the face sheet within 48 hours or five days, if they can show that they have good cause for not turning it over in 48 hours; and a copy of the report within, I believe it's five days, or ten days, if they show good cause why they cannot turn it over.

Now, as part of the existing decision, which is not before you on reconsideration, was the Commission finding, that under prior law, this report had to be already turned over to the victim and made promptly available, which is language under the Public Records Act.

So before, they had to keep this report for two years and make the report promptly available to the victim. Now, they have to keep the report for five years

and turn it over within either 48 hours, five days, or ten days.

So the issue of the manner of storage can be addressed by the Commission in the Parameters and Guidelines. Because I believe before, during the two years, they had to retain those documents in a certain manner, to make them readily available, and now you have three additional years that you also have to make them readily available to the victim.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: I understand that we can and we will address that, when we address Parameters and Guidelines.

MS. SHELTON: Okay.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: And I understand that the issue today is simply the period of time for reconsideration.

All I want to know is, what word would be appropriate to use, based on the statutes, "storage" or "retention"?

MR. KAYE: Sir, if I --

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Before you answer, let me hear from staff; and then I'd be pleased to hear from you as well.

MS. SHELTON: Legally, I believe that they're required to do both. They're required to store and retain the document.

1 MEMBER ROSENBERG: So you think there may be a difference between the two terms? 2 3 MS. SHELTON: Well, maybe not. To store and retain 4 something --MEMBER ROSENBERG: Well, maybe that is the best 5 6 solution, just say "storage and retention," and be done 7 with it. 8 CHAIR MATEO: I have --9 MS. SHELTON: And the courts have used -- I'm sorry. 10 CHAIR MATEO: I was going to say I have some 11 hesitancy here because I'm not sure whether the change in 12 the language opens the door to essentially retread a 13 decision that was made previously by the Board. And so I am really at this point not supportive of the change. 14 15 Department of Finance? 16 MR. STARKEY: Let me -- on that point, I've been 17 looking at the request for reconsideration the way it was 18 phrased. The original request came in with the exact language of the word "store," which is in the Statement 19 of Decision. And I share your concern that -- I 20 understand what the reason for this, for the 21 22 clarification would be. But at this point in time, I 23 believe that we're beyond that; and we're focusing on 24 three years or five years. 25 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Right.

MR. STARKEY: And not the possible interpretations 1 2 of what "storage" means. 3 And while I greatly appreciate and truly understand the need to have as much specificity as we can, the 4 5 Statement of Decision at this point, I think, we've 6 picked a term, and we've decided on that. 7 So I believe the sole issue is three to five years. 8 MEMBER VANHOUTEN: I agree with what you're saying; 9 but Mr. Burdick's testimony leaves me uncomfortable in 10 that --11 MR. KAYE: Mr. Kaye. 12 MEMBER VANHOUTEN: Mr. Kaye, I'm sorry. 13 MR. KAYE: That's all right. 14 MEMBER VANHOUTEN: It almost sounds like you're 15 saying that there would be a higher level of custody if 16 we put in that word. 17 MR. KAYE: Okay. 18 MEMBER VANHOUTEN: It might at one point be on a PC 19 and readily available. And now it's in storage, and 20 because it's in storage, it's at a higher level of 21 security, so you don't just take your costs by 22 two-thirds; you go in and you look at the square footage, 23 you look at the boxes, you look at the --24 There are many aspects which we will get

into in the Parameters and Guidelines.

25

I merely think this would be a clarifying matter; and it goes to the essence of the heart of the matter.

I think if you go to that page 15, that we were searching at before, and you dropped down four or five lines, you'll see that the very essence, the intent of the legislation is to make that distinction. And then I believe this was captured in the Statement of Decision. It says,

"The author notes that the victims of domestic violence do not have an expedited method -- an expedited method of obtaining police reports under existing law. Currently, victims of domestic violence must write and request that copies of reports be provided by mail. It often takes between two and three weeks to receive the report."

And this statutory requirement, requires us to make them readily available.

And what we're saying is, we understand the Commission's staff uses the word "storage"; and we don't mean to quibble, but under prior law, which they're talking about here, which this statute appears to correct, and the sole purpose, as a matter of fact, is to correct this, is to make these documents readily available.

And so what we're saying is that retaining documents is not synonymous under this particular statute with the storage requirements of documents.

And so we hope to provide some further guidance for the parameters and guidelines that we're about to enter into, as opposed to leave this statement as an inscrutable statement where, you know, we ponder what "storage" means.

CHAIR MATEO: I think, though, that that has the potential for redefining the previous decision, beyond what we were going to look at today, which is really the question of three years versus five years.

Walter?

MEMBER BARNES: Personally, I think the record is fairly clear that we sort of recognize the fact that your duty to have documents readily available would affect your storage of those documents. And so perhaps I think the clarification of that is a proper thing for the Parameters and Guidelines to make that a little bit more clear.

So I tend to think that we don't need to deal with that kind of clarification here. And I think the record is fairly clear, in the direction to the staff about what to do with that.

I do have a little bit of a concern -- and, boy, I

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hate to do wordsmithing in this environment -- but the way in which it is discussed, it seems to indicate that there's three years of storage costs when, in fact, I think the intent of all of this was to reflect the fact that you get three years after the two years. So the first two years are already covered by the current law and rule; and the additional three years is what's on the table, now which, to me, argues potentially for leaving it as it is, as five years and, again, letting the Parameters and Guidelines deal with it. I'll take any suggestions, comments or questions on that.

MS. SHELTON: Mr. Barnes, I think your analysis is right; but I don't think you can keep it in the Statement of Decision as five years, because you need to make the finding of what exactly is the new program or higher level of service now.

So if you say -- if you keep it at five years and they're going to get reimbursed for five years and not But if you want to add, as you were suggesting, clarifying language here, that's also within your discretion to do that.

MR. KAYE: Right.

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MS. SHELTON: To maybe indicate that the storage domestic violence incident reports and face sheets for

1	three years, after the initial two years, or some
2	language to that effect to.
3	MR. BARNES: And that, to me, would clarify it and I
4	think put it directly on point as to what we're trying to
5	get at here.
6	CHAIR MATEO: So would you state again your
7	suggested language there?
8	MS. SHELTON: Mr. Barnes, correct me if you have
9	something much better than I do; but "storing domestic
10	violence incident reports and face sheets for three
11	years" you might just
12	MEMBER BARNES: "Following the initial
13	MS. SHELTON: "following the initial two-year"
14	MEMBER BARNES: two-year period covered by"
15	MS. SHELTON: "period, required by prior law."
16	MR. KAYE: Okay. This is Leonard Kaye, County of
17	Los Angeles.
18	I feel that that particular statement does provide
19	clarification. But respectfully, I believe it's
20	erroneous because it's not supported by any matter
21	litigated before this Commission.
22	I don't think we've ever discussed, or it's not in
23	the administrative record, as to whether it's the first
24	three years or the last two years or what the chronology
25	is. And this would add further confusion because as many

of you know, the placed items in storage, the really big costs are initially placing it into storage, which would occur within the first -- the initial period.

And so we would argue just the reverse, that we would say that it would be the initial three years, and that the last two years would not be reimbursable.

However, this matter has not been addressed at all by the Commission to date and it's certainly not present within anything that I've seen within the Statement of Decision.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Well, that's certainly an interesting point; and it goes back, regrettably, to the initial questions that were raised, as to whether there really is a distinction between "storage" and "retention," and what are the requirements of existing law versus what this law imposes.

Unfortunately, I think the only way we can sort that out is during the Parameters and Guidelines discussion; and that all we are dealing with here today is not rewriting the prior decision and not writing the Parameters and Guidelines, but simply addressing whether we're talking about a three-year mandate or a five-year mandate.

And so I think we can either adopt that new language that was just cited, or we can keep it a little bit vague

1 and just use the three-year language. 2 What do you suggest? 3 MS. SHELTON: Well, let me clarify. This item is 4 the -- the staff is recommending that the Commission 5 first find that there is an error of law; and secondly, 6 to adopt the proposed corrected Statement of Decision, 7 which is on page 11, and incorporates all of the staff 8 analysis on our reconsideration. So it would be changing the Statement of Decision. 9 10 But on the Proposed Statement of Decision, on page 28, it does address what Mr. Barnes was indicating. 11 The second full paragraph down, it says, 12 13 "Based on these authorities, the Commission 14 finds that before the enactment of the test claim statute, cities and counties were 15 16 required by Government Code section 34090 and 17 26202, to keep domestic violence incident 18 reports for two years." 19 So the two years has to come first. 20 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Okay. 21 MR. KAYE: But, respectively, it doesn't say that 22 there. 23 MS. SHELTON: But we're talking about a higher level 24 of service is something up and above an existing program. 25 You already have an existing program in place, and this

is a higher level of service, going beyond that.

MR. KAYE: I agree with everything that you've said, except the fact that it's not in writing, that specific thing above the order.

MS. SHELTON: That is the definition of a "higher level of service." You have an existing program and you're adding activities to that.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Okay, I think --

CHAIR MATEO: Any further questions?

Walter?

MEMBER BARNES: No, actually, I was just going to make a motion.

CHAIR MATEO: Do we have a motion?

MEMBER BARNES: And I guess, you know, this points why it's important to try to be as specific in the Statement of Decision as possible, because those are going to get dealt with in the Parameters and Guidelines, and then the claiming instructions, and then later on brought out through the audits and things like that.

So I think that, clearly, from my point of view, the expectation was, it was three years on top of the two years, which I think needs -- because of the different interpretations that we've already seen put on this, that it would be good to adopt the language that you proposed, that clarifies that this three years is on top of the two

1 So that would be my motion. years. 2 CHAIR MATEO: Does anybody need to hear that 3 language once more? 4 MEMBER ROSENBERG: No. But I would second the 5 And as I understand the motion, it is to find --6 it is to follow the staff recommendation, which is to 7 find an error of law and to adopt the Proposed Statement 8 of Decision as recommended by staff. 9 MEMBER BARNES: Right. 10 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Parenthetically --11 CHAIR MATEO: As amended --12 MS. HIGASHI: As revised. 13 MS. SHELTON: With the correction that Mr. Barnes and I suggested with the language, so that it now will 14 15 say -- the bullet will now say, 16 "Storing domestic violence incident reports 17 and face sheets for three years, following the 18 two-year period required under prior law." 19 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Okay, I'll withdraw my second. 20 I'm not prepared to go that far at this time. I would be 21 prepared to have that discussion at the Parameters point. Because I don't know at this moment in time whether the 22 23 new requirements of the mandate actually impose greater 24 requirements of storage or retention than existing law 25 proposed for those first two years. I just don't know

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So I will just withdraw my second at this time.
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       that.
 2
            CHAIR MATEO:
                          I have a motion.
 3
            MEMBER VANHOUTEN:
                               I'll second.
            CHAIR MATEO: Paula, will you call the roll?
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            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Rosenberg?
 6
            MEMBER ROSENBERG:
                               No.
 7
            CHAIR MATEO: Mr. VanHouten.
 8
            MEMBER VANHOUTEN: Yes.
            CHAIR MATEO: Ms. Williams?
 9
            MEMBER WILLIAMS:
10
                              No.
            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
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            MEMBER BARNES: Yes.
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13
            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
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            MEMBER LAZAR: Yes.
15
            MS. HIGASHI: And Ms. Mateo?
            CHAIR MATEO: Yes.
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17
            MS. HIGASHI: I have four votes.
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            CHAIR MATEO: All right. That motion fails.
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            MEMBER ROSENBERG: We'll have to have another motion
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      because, clearly, I think all of us agree that there was
21
       an error of law; it's just a matter of the language that
22
       should be adopted at this point in time.
23
            CHAIR MATEO: Shall we break it up and decide the
24
       first?
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            MEMBER ROSENBERG:
                               Sure.
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CHAIR MATEO: May I have a motion on the question,
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      on whether there was an error in law?
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           MEMBER ROSENBERG: I'll move that we find there was
3
      an error of law.
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           MEMBER WILLIAMS: Second.
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           CHAIR MATEO: We have a motion and a second.
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           Paula, will you call the roll?
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           MS. HIGASHI: Mr. VanHouten?
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           MEMBER VANHOUTEN: Yes.
9
           MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Williams?
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           MEMBER WILLIAMS:
                              Aye.
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           MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
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            MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
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            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
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            MEMBER LAZAR: Yes.
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            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Rosenberg?
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            MEMBER ROSENBERG:
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            MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Mateo?
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            CHAIR MATEO: Yes.
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            MS. HIGASHI: The motion is carried.
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            MEMBER ROSENBERG: And could I ask if staff could
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       recommend the language? We may have to just go back to
22
       the original language you recommended in order to get
23
       five votes. But could you read that language again?
24
                          Certainly. I'll read the full
            MS. SHELTON:
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conclusion that's proposed for the Statement of Decision 1 2 for you. "The Commission concludes that Family Code 3 section 6228, as added by Statutes 1999, 4 chapter 1022, mandates a new program or higher 5 level of service for local law enforcement 6 7 agencies within the meaning of article XIII B, 8 section 6 of the California Constitution, and 9 imposes costs mandated by the state pursuant to 10 Government Code section 17514 for the following activity only: Storing domestic violence 11 12 incident reports and face sheets for three 13 years." 14 MEMBER ROSENBERG: I would move we adopt the 15 Proposed Statement of Decision, with that language included. 16 17 CHAIR MATEO: I have a motion. 18 Do I have a second? 19 MEMBER LAZAR: I'll second. 20 CHAIR MATEO: Paula, will you call the roll? 21 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Williams? 22 CHAIR MATEO: Pardon, just one moment. 23 MEMBER BARNES: I guess, Mr. Rosenberg, I want to clearly understand your concern about the previous 24 25 motion, in terms of this one here, because I kind of

heard you say that during those first two years, when there is already a mandate or an expected level of activity, this mandate might impose a greater level of costs in those two years. So that by limiting it strictly to costs in the three years following those two years, we may be depriving them of that incremental cost, whatever it might be, that this mandate imposes during the first two years.

Is that correct?

1.2

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Let me clarify. As a matter of process, I'm not prepared to make that decision today.

I may very well agree with the point you were making earlier and the motion you made; but I'm not in a position to make that decision today. I just don't have enough facts or information on what the new mandate required and whether or not greater duties were imposed, even in those first two years.

MEMBER BARNES: And I guess I would ask, would you agree that to the extent we're talking about costs associated with this, we're trying to talk about costs that are in addition to the costs that are already incurred, as a result of that new mandate -- I mean, that old mandate.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Old mandate, yes, precisely.

MEMBER BARNES: So I guess rather than talking about

it in terms of three years or two years, I wonder if it might be more clear to all of us if we basically went back to the five years but indicated that, in effect, it's the costs associated with those five years that are in excess of the costs that are already incorporated in the current mandate during those first two years, which then allows the P's and G's to be developed to deal with -- I mean, the P's and G's, they can determine whether or not there's a particular cost element and what that would be.

I won't offer it necessarily as an amendment to your proposal, but I'd like -- that may be a way of kind of getting us through this and giving the guidance that we need, to the staff with regard to the P's and G's, and preserving, I think, Mr. Kaye's comment about there might be an incremental cost during those first two years that they would want to try to have available to them.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: It's an interesting thought, and it would be useful to hear from counsel on that. I mean within the five-year period, we should not be finding more than three years of costs are reimbursable.

So is there a way to state that?

MR. STARKEY: My concern is that the posture of this case is that the original decision was that there was a new program or a higher level of service for five years.

And staff had overlooked an existing requirement in prior law that the documents be stored for two years -- retained for two years under both local and city statutes.

The intent of the reconsideration motion was simply to say: Was that a mistake? And the Commission has found that there was an error of law. And so the focus now is getting language that the Commission can agree upon that the years three, four and five are a new program of higher level of service.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Let me suggest something based on what Mr. Barnes suggested. Why don't we stay with the five years, but except from that the two years of storage under existing law? What is wrong with that?

MS. SHELTON: I'm not sure if I can answer your question or not. But I just want to put this into perspective. When you're ruling on a Statement of Decision, the courts have instructed the Commission to not apply standards of equity or define what is necessary to comply with the mandate. We're supposed to just look at the plain language of the mandate. And here, we're only talking about time element, not the manner of storage.

During the Parameters and Guidelines phase, the Commission does have discretion to determine what is

reasonable in the manner of storage.

So I think that those discussions, as far as how they store these documents, if the three years comes before or after the initial two years, are really questions reserved for the Parameters and Guidelines.

And I think that to keep it at five years could -and then even with the qualifying language -- could
cause confusion if this were litigated, because you have
to define what is the new program or higher level of
service. And the two Government Code statutes, under
prior law, already required them to keep and store -- or
to keep these documents for two years.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Certainly no more confusing than what has already been caused.

I think under the circumstances, I'll just stand by the motion that I've made.

CHAIR MATEO: Ms. Geanacou, do you --

MEMBER BARNES: I'll second.

CHAIR MATEO: Just one second.

Did you have something you wish to say?

MS. GEANACOU: Yes, Department of Finance, Susan Geanacou. I admit to being somewhat confused.

I just wanted to make sure; I thought I heard testimony that the activity -- that the Commission was possibly leaving open the possibility that in years

three, four and five, the activities for which reimbursement would be appropriate might be different and implicitly greater than those in years one and two. And my concern is: Are we possibly leaving to Parameters and Guidelines an even greater level of reimbursement than is being proposed for adoption in this Statement of Decision? I thought I heard testimony to that effect. I just want to be clear.

CHAIR MATEO: I guess my take on it is, staff was persuasive to me that what we're talking about is a higher level of service, so that there is a base there. Logically, to me, this means the first two years. But I also, like Mr. Rosenberg, am okay with the original staff proposal, because I think that isn't such a gray area, and should be able to be worked out in P's and G's.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: So we come full circle.

CHAIR MATEO: Camille?

MS. SHELTON: I was just going to say that the issue for the Parameters and Guidelines on this matter, would be the first two years the documents had to be stored in a manner that they could make them promptly available.

And that's language from the Public Records Act.

The three years that constitutes the higher level of service, they have to store them to make them available within the statutory time frames established in Family

1	Code 6228, so within the 48 hours, five days and ten
2	days. If that's a difference, I don't know. And I'm
3	suggesting that that be put off for the discussion at the
4	Parameters and Guidelines.
5	MEMBER VANHOUTEN: I'm confused as to the motion
6	that's before us. I'm completely lost.
7	Could you reread the motion that we're going to be
8	voting on?
9	MEMBER ROSENBERG: It's a motion for adjournment, I
10	think.
11	CHAIR MATEO: You have to stay an hour longer.
12	I think the motion that was before us was for the
13	staff recommendation on the change in the language.
14	MEMBER BARNES: Right.
15	MEMBER WILLIAMS: To the three years? Is that what
16	we're going with?
17	MS. SHELTON: The staff recommendation as is, with
18	no change.
19	MEMBER ROSENBERG: That's correct.
20	CHAIR MATEO: I had a motion at this point, I don't
21	recall from whom.
22	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Me.
23	CHAIR MATEO: Mr. Rosenberg, and we had a second.
24	(Member Barnes raising his hand.)
25	CHAIR MATEO: Okay. Paula, will you call the roll.

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MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Williams?
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            MEMBER WILLIAMS:
                              Aye.
            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
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            MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
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            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
 6
            MEMBER LAZAR: Aye.
 7
            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Rosenberg?
 8
            MEMBER ROSENBERG:
                               Aye.
            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. VanHouten?
 9
10
            MEMBER VANHOUTEN:
            MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Mateo?
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12
            CHAIR MATEO: Aye.
13
            MS. HIGASHI: The motion is adopted.
14
            MR. KAYE:
                       Thank you.
15
            MS. HIGASHI: Thank you.
            MEMBER ROSENBERG: We had five "ayes" and one "yes."
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       I don't know what that means.
17
18
            MEMBER WILLIAMS: Some of us go back and forth.
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            MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Mateo, could we take a brief
       break, five-minute break?
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21
            CHAIR MATEO: Surely. Five minutes?
22
            MS. HIGASHI: Yes.
23
            CHAIR MATEO: Okay, we will get back together again
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       at ten after 11:00.
25
          (A recess was taken from 11:04 a.m. to 11:14 a.m.)
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MS. HIGASHI: At this time, I would like to call 1 Items 16 and 17, which are Proposed Parameters and 2 Guidelines on the agenda. I understand that we have a 3 4 request from Mr. Shawn Silva to continue this item. And so would you like to have a staff introduction 5 of the item and then have Mr. Silva speak? 6 7 CHAIR MATEO: Yes, that's fine. Mr. Silva, you were sworn in? 8 MR. SILVA: No, I have not been sworn in. 9 MS. HIGASHI: It's okay, it's P's and G's. 10 MS. CRUZ: Good morning. 11 Before you is an errata sheet on yellow buff-colored 12 13 paper. Item 17 is the proposed consolidation of the 14 existing Parameters and Guidelines for Charter Schools, 15 with the Parameters and Guidelines for Charter Schools 16 II. 17 Staff proposes that the effective date of reimbursement period for the consolidated Parameters and 18 19 Guidelines be changed from fiscal year 2003 to 2004, to 20 January 1, 1999, which is the effective date of the 21 Charter Schools II test claim legislation. Item 16 included a provision that requires claimants 22 to refile reimbursement claims for the Charter Schools 23 program for fiscal years 1998-99 through 2002-2003. 24

was included because of changes in the law that, one,

25

established a fee authority that school districts or county offices of education must use to offset any claimed reimbursement for the costs of charter school supervisorial oversight under the existing Charter Schools program; and second, it replaced the activity related to the petition appeals in the existing Charter Schools program.

However, direction to refile reimbursement claims resides with the State Controller's Office. Government Code section 17558(a) requires the Commission to submit the adopted Parameters and Guidelines to the Controller who shall pay and audit the reimbursement claims.

Subdivision (b) of the section of the Government Code requires the Controller to issue claiming instructions after receiving the Parameters and Guidelines to assist local agencies and school districts in claiming costs.

With the modification to 17, Item 16 is no longer necessary. As indicated in the table of contents for Item 17, the exhibits for Item 16 are incorporated as part of the record. Therefore, staff withdraws Item 16 for consideration and vote, and recommends that the Commission only adopt the consolidated Parameters and Guidelines, but with the reimbursement period beginning January 1, 1999.

The proposed consolidated Parameters and Guidelines

begin on page 9 of Item 17.

Staff also recommends that the Commission authorize staff to make any nonsubstantive technical corrections to the P's and G's following the hearing.

Will the parties and representatives please state their names for the record?

MR. PALKOWITZ: Good morning. Arthur Palkowitz on behalf of San Diego Unified School District.

MR. SILVA: Shawn Silva on behalf of the State Controller's Office.

I guess procedurally, it's simpler if I go first, since my request is to continue.

Recently, a concern has been raised on the issue of refiling, when we have to look back at changes in the P's and G's as to how they apply to claims that have already been filed. And this presents an important issue, which can affect the ability of the Controller's office to review and audit those claims. And since it's an important issue, which should foreclose the ability to look at claims based on the new P's and G's, and has been recently raised, we request the opportunity to delve into that legal issue and to be able to present a logical researched argument on our position. And so that it's appropriately decided, and that ability to review is not foreclosed.

So for that reason, we are seeking to have this put 1 on the next calendared meeting agenda, which I guess 2 would be two months hence. 3 MS. HIGASHI: Which would be November 20th. 4 CHAIR MATEO: Any comments or questions? 5 MEMBER ROSENBERG: You want time to present a 6 7 logical researched argument as opposed to sitting here, flying by the seat of your pants? 8 9 MR. SILVA: Yes, please. [Laughter] 10 Procedurally, how would we do that, CHAIR MATEO: 11 Paula? 12 MS. HIGASHI: It would be if the Commission decided 13 14 to grant the continuance, since the request came during 15 the hearing. MR. PALKOWITZ: May I be heard? 16 CHAIR MATEO: Yes. 17 18 MR. PALKOWITZ: Thank you. 19 I received this morning a September 5th letter 20 signed by Mr. Barnes, which deals with the issue about 21 requesting that school districts go back to 1998-99 through 2003, and amend their claims that were filed. 22 Procedurally, I think there is a code section or a 23 regulation that requires that the school district cannot 24

go back after one year and amend the claim.

25

Second of

all, we have issues that school districts don't maintain records for an indefinite period. So I'm not sure how that's going to be feasible for schools to do that.

Also, I think one of the issues in deciding to continue a matter is whether it's good cause or not. This claim was filed in 1998. I would think these issues should have been addressed at an earlier time. So I would feel that it would be inappropriate to grant a continuance.

MEMBER BARNES: Since you're looking at me, I guess I should say something.

#### [Laughter]

MEMBER BARNES: On the one hand, I have to say that I really hate postponements. So it's a little awkward for me to argue for a postponement in this particular case.

The issue that we're concerned about is that in the previous item, which staff is now withdrawing, this issue was dealt with and dealt with in a way that we felt was appropriate.

It is not dealt with in the revised 17, you know, that we have before us now; and I think it does raise some questions to us, particularly given the quickness with which this change has taken place, that we do need to have some time to take a look at it.

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I mean, obviously we all got this notice of this change last night -- at least that's when I got it. And so it really doesn't give us much time to take a look at it.

I don't think we have any problem with the concept of what they're doing of consolidating this into one, single claim. We don't object to taking Item 16 off.

But I think we would like to have some time to make sure that, in fact, our ability to deal with what may have been erroneous claims submitted is going to be taken care of.

And we may end up concluding that the recommendation of the staff would come up with is just fine. But, again, I think your comment: Do you want to have some time to think about it, or do we want to fly by the seat of our pants? I think this has -- in fact, it could affect counties -- I mean, school districts very significantly. And I just -- I'm a little reluctant to take quick action on it, without having a chance to take a look at it. So that's what I would request.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Even though I always prefer the latter option, I see no hardship in a brief continuance. The next meeting is --

MS. HIGASHI: November 20th.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: November? I mean, if this matter

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has already been pending for four or five years, I'm not
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      sure I see the hardship of continuing the matter six,
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      seven weeks from now.
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           CHAIR MATEO: Yes, I certainly have some sympathy
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      with this, too, putting it over. The change was quick.
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            So procedurally, how do we do this?
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           MS. HIGASHI: If the Commission wishes to grant it,
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      we should just have a motion to grant the continuance.
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            CHAIR MATEO: Do I have a motion?
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           MEMBER BARNES: I'll make the motion.
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           MEMBER WILLIAMS:
                              Second.
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            CHAIR MATEO: We have a motion and a second.
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           Will you call the roll, Paula?
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           MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
           MEMBER BARNES: Yes.
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           MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
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           MEMBER LAZAR: Yes.
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           MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Rosenberg?
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            MEMBER ROSENBERG:
                               Aye.
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            MS. HIGASHI: Mr. VanHouten?
            MEMBER VANHOUTEN:
                              Yes.
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            MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Williams?
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            MEMBER WILLIAMS:
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                              Aye.
            MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Mateo?
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            CHAIR MATEO: Aye.
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MS. HIGASHI: The motion is carried. The item is 1 continued. 2 MR. SILVA: Thank you. 3 CHAIR MATEO: A clarification, Paula. That was both 4 items? 5 MS. HIGASHI: Yes, both items, 16 and 17. And staff 6 will issue a letter with a new draft, so we can receive 7 feedback on the item before it comes back again. 8 MEMBER BARNES: I should say, I guess I thought that 9 the issue of 16 was settled; that, essentially, we were 10 going to consolidate into 17. And the only question that 11 was at odds was whether or not something that was in 12 16 should be put into 17 as well. So personally, I have 13 no interest in having 16 come back to us again. 14 MS. HIGASHI: Okay. 15 MEMBER BARNES: I'd rather go with 17, and then --16 MS. HIGASHI: I'll note that clarification. 17 MEMBER BARNES: Is that okay? 18 That's fine. MEMBER ROSENBERG: 19 CHAIR MATEO: Good. 2.0 MS. HIGASHI: This brings us to Item 18, which is 21 our rulemaking item. We had a request for this to come 22 off the consent calendar. This item will be presented by 23 Shirley Opie. 24 MS. OPIE: Good morning. 25

The purpose of this rulemaking is to incorporate the 1 2 current methodology for developing statewide cost 3 estimates into the Commission's regulations. proposed rulemaking also includes changes to the conflict 4 5 of interest code that would require designated filers to 6 complete ethics training, as required, to changes in the 7 Government Code that took effect the beginning of this 8 year. 9 If anybody has any comments or questions about the 10 rulemaking, I'd be happy to answer. 11 MEMBER ROSENBERG: There's no intention to provide redundant ethics training; is there? In other words, if 12 a member of the Commission takes the ethics training 13 14 pursuant to another position or another commission on which they serve, they don't have to do it twice; do 15 16 they? 17 MS. OPIE: That's correct. 18 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Okay. 19 CHAIR MATEO: This is an action item? Do we need a motion? 20 21 MS. HIGASHI: Yes, it is an action item. 22 MEMBER BARNES: Yes, I did have a question. 23 I have no problem with the part of the regulations

orientation and training. I'm a little -- I think we may

that deals with the requirement to provide ethics

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be a bit premature on the incorporation of the procedures for developing statewide estimates. As many of you know, or will find out, the Bureau of State Audits has been conducting a review of two mandates, POBR and Animal Adoptions. And one of the specific areas they've been looking at is the issue of statewide estimates and how those estimates are developed now. And my expectation that that report, which is due to come out today in draft form, will contain some specific recommendations for how to compute and computate and develop statewide estimates. So I think that it would be appropriate for us to see what that report has to say, before we contemplate moving ahead on these regulations, which basically just sort of incorporate the process as it is.

So I would ask that we move ahead with the ethics orientation training part of the regulations but save the rest of it for the next session, when we should have the BSA recommendations and decide whether or not we'd like to incorporate some of that. That's my recommendation.

I don't know if we need a motion to consider or -- MS. HIGASHI: I would like to have Ms. Opie respond just to your comments.

MEMBER BARNES: Sure.

MS. OPIE: It's a little difficult to comment on for sure what's going to be included in the BSA's findings in

the audits that were recently completed.

This change in the regulations, it came out of the last report from the Bureau of State Audits on the School Bus Safety audit. And in that report, they recommended that the Commission just incorporate the methodology for adopting the statewide cost estimates.

My understanding of the preliminary -- in preliminary discussions with the Bureau of State Audits, their issues were more about the points and times -- and it does have to do with the calculation of the statewide cost estimate. But I don't see that their recommendations would have any material effect on what we're proposing here.

MS. HIGASHI: The other concern I have is that we have already filed our final report with the Bureau of State Audits for the School Bus Safety II audit, where we indicated that this rulemaking was in progress, to incorporate the changes that they had proposed.

And so that would be my hesitation at agreeing with Mr. Barnes; because it takes so long to do a rulemaking, that I don't want to find myself in a hearing and be asked the question of what happened to those recommendations, and we did not proceed.

MEMBER BARNES: And I think we actually have a good excuse for that, because, in effect, what we'd be

delaying for, is to deal with additional recommendations that come from the same agency that made the original ones.

And I agree with you, I think that the original recommendation was to put the current process in the regulation. And again, we will know better when we see the draft report today; but my impression is that they are going to recommend not just some timing, but also some processes about how the statewide recommendation would be developed that would be different than these here.

Now, we have the ability to say, "Thanks very much, but we're going to do what we currently do." But we also may decide that we want to incorporate some of those changes within these regulations.

So I think postponing this particular part of it until next session, when we definitely will have the final report and we'll know what it specifically says, I think it would be a better way to go.

CHAIR MATEO: But is there any harm in moving forward now, and then prepare another rulemaking to pick up whatever the Bureau of State Audits says?

MS. HIGASHI: I would say no, because we're not even sure yet what recommendations, in terms of the specificity in their findings and whether or not some of

first to be implemented. CHAIR MATEO: Any other discussion? MEMBER ROSENBERG: Is there testimony? 4 Comment? CHAIR MATEO: 5 MR. BURDICK: Madam Chair and Members of the 6 7 8 Mr. Barnes' recommendation. 9 10 11 12 13 14

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those recommendations would require statutory change

Commission, Allan Burdick on behalf of the California State Association of Counties. And we would second

I think what we would like to see, is this to be made as an alternative that could be used if agreed upon by the parties who develop the statewide cost estimate.

In some cases, I don't think it's necessary that you actually have to file claims. If there's a unit cost developed, as an example, and a set of Parameters and Guidelines, you may have the statewide statistics that just need to be multiplied times that dollar amount, and you could come up with an outstanding estimate of what the costs would be.

The reason for the difference is the timing. adopt this as the methodology for doing it, I don't think there's any way you can meet your statutory obligation to complete a test claim from beginning to end in 12 months.

Now, there's a provision to extend it to 18 months; but this would take a minimum of seven months, and

probably in most cases nine months for the Commission to do a statewide cost estimate.

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And, you know, I think part of the regulations that you initiate in this process will bring them into conformance with Assembly Bill 1693, which established that statutory limitation to try to speed up this process.

So I would suggest that if you want to go to this methodology, which sometimes I would agree is the best methodology, you might want to make it as an alternative. But I would not want you to preclude the option of being able to develop your own statewide cost estimate under your previous methodology that you have used, because in some cases, that may be the most expeditious way to do it.

And from a local standpoint, if the state ever starts paying again and has a claims bill, then that could make a difference as much as 14 or 15 months, as to when local government would get their money.

So we would like to see it from the standpoint of being an alternative available for developing it, but not as the sole method for determining in how you adopt the statewide cost estimate.

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CHAIR MATEO: Shirley?

MS. OPIE: Yes, thank you. In the regulation, I believe that we have allowed for what Mr. Burdick is suggesting. I'd just like to read it to you. That,

"Commission staff may develop the statewide cost estimate based on initial reimbursement claims filed with the office of the State Controller; or staff may use a different methodology based on recommendations from the test claimant, the Department of Finance or other interested parties."

So I think it preserves that flexibility that Mr. Burdick is asking for.

MR. BURDICK: I guess our only comment probably is we would like agreement obviously from the local agencies that we find ourselves in a situation, obviously very often, that it's not in the best interests sometimes of the state sometimes to be moving forward quicker, because interest doesn't start accruing until after the development of a statewide cost estimate. And so, you know, you're always behind the eight ball in terms of what it's done.

It seems like if the intent is to try to complete the process in 12 months, that whenever possible, you should probably look for the other alternative, if you want to stay within the prescribed statutory scheme.

1	CHAIR MATEO: Any other discussion?
2	MEMBER BARNES: I'll make a recommendation that we
3	proceed with Part 2, dealing with the ethics of the
4	proposed regulations, and postpone consideration of the
5	other part until the next meeting.
6	MEMBER ROSENBERG: I'll second that.
7	CHAIR MATEO: Shirley?
8	MS. OPIE: I would just like to make one more
9	comment, just from a process standpoint.
10	And that's fine to do that; but just as long as you
11	know that that will require us to renotice the
12	regulations because there's been a substantial change.
13	MEMBER ROSENBERG: What is the substantial change?
14	MS. OPIE: In removing the portion related to the
15	statewide cost estimates.
16	MEMBER ROSENBERG: So if we just continued the
17	entire matter, we wouldn't need to renotice it?
18	MS. OPIE: That's correct.
19	MEMBER ROSENBERG: We might want to just continue
20	the whole thing.
21	MEMBER BARNES: I'll make that I'll amend it to
22	just put it all over again. That's a good point. I
23	appreciate your bringing it up.
24	MEMBER ROSENBERG: I'll second that motion.
25	CHAIR MATEO: Okav. we have a motion and a second.

1	Will you call the roll?
- 2	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Barnes?
3	MEMBER BARNES: Aye.
4	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar?
5	MEMBER LAZAR: Aye.
6	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Rosenberg?
7	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Aye.
8	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. VanHouten?
9	MEMBER VANHOUTEN: Yes.
10	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Williams?
11	MEMBER WILLIAMS: Aye.
12	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Mateo?
13	CHAIR MATEO: Aye.
14	MS. HIGASHI: The motion is carried.
15	MR. BURDICK: Thank you very much.
16	MS. HIGASHI: This brings us to Item 19.
17	Mr. Starkey will present this report.
18	MR. STARKEY: This is an informational item. And
19	the information is provided in a writing that was given
20	to the Commission. What I'd like to do, for purposes of
21	the hearing, is simply to provide some short updates.
22	There have been no new filings, other than the
23	Animal Adoption case, which is referenced in the report.
24	Under recent decisions, the County of Los Angeles
25	case, which is described in the report, is now final.

And that matter is concluded.

And, again, it is a published decision. So as appropriate, that case will be worked into our future Commission recommendations as guidance from the court.

Under the litigation calendar, there were two matters heard. The Eastview Optional Attendance Area case, which was in the Sacramento Superior Court, was heard in September and decided in favor of upholding the Commission's decision. There will be some period of time for that matter to be appealed, if the parties decide to do that. I don't have any information with respect to that. But the Commission's decision was upheld in that case.

And in the second matter that's listed on the litigation calendar, that was the matter of the County of San Diego case, which we referred to as the "San Diego MIA case," a decision came down yesterday that the court, on appeal, overturned the Commission's decision. And there will be further reporting back to the Commission with respect to the next actions.

And I don't have any information from the positions of the other parties with respect to any other further proceedings at this time.

So that's the status of litigation.

MS. HIGASHI: This brings us to Item 20, and that's

my report. In the very, very back of the third binder, unless you moved it forward, is Item 20.

The first thing that I've reported is the status of workload after Labor Day. And at that point in time, we had about 121 test claims on file. This is a record number of test claims that we have ever had on file with the Commission, to my knowledge.

Among those test claims are about 14 claims that could be called "duplicates," which in some way, shape or form, plead statutes that are identical to statutes pled in other test claims. So frequently that happens in the case of a test claim that's filed by a city or a county, and then a school district also files a claim on the same or some of the same statutes, and vice versa.

So when those cases come forward, what we typically do, as you saw today, is consolidate; because for purposes of the substantive analysis, if it's the same statutes or code sections, it's much more economical for us to proceed in that way.

The other items on the agenda are the Budget Act of 2003. When the binders went out, I indicated that I would give you an update today on our current new budget. As you may recall, the Budget Act this year appropriated 1.3 million dollars to the Commission for its operating budget. And it was subject to control section 4.10.

This section authorized the Director of Finance to make additional budget reductions and to report reductions to the Legislature.

On August 28th, the Department of Finance notified the Legislature that the Commission's budget would be reduced by 195,300 dollars; and that these reductions will be approved no later than 30 days after the notification. The Department also indicated in its letter, that if there were subsequent adjustments to these amounts, those adjustments would be made in a separate letter.

The Commission on State Mandates had requested that an adjustment be made to this requirement for the adjustments. And we have been notified that our request was approved; but we have nothing in writing, and we have not seen a subsequent letter, notifying the Legislature of any change in the amounts which were originally proposed. But because it has not been disclosed yet, this is all still confidential.

On the 2004-05 budget year front, after we issued the binders, another budget letter was issued, and that was, like, 4:45 on a Friday. And that letter directed state agencies to submit 20 percent budget reductions to the Department of Finance; and that these reductions should be intended to be permanent. We were instructed

that the 20 percent reduction should be based on the amount in the final 2003-04 Budget Act, before any control sections were taken. And the 20 percent target applies to each agency, not each department.

However, because the Commission is not in another agency, a super agency, we are treated with the full 20 percent that is expected of us.

We submitted a request to be excluded from this base to the Department of Finance based on the role that the Commission has to implement the determinations of the amounts to be subvened to cities, counties and school districts under the Constitution. This week we were formally notified that this request was denied.

Yesterday, we met with the Department of Finance budget staff to discuss their decisions and also to review the requirements of the budget letter. Based on our discussion yesterday, we have agreed to submit a 20 percent reduction proposal next Wednesday. And so staff continues its work on determining whether it will be submitting a reduction proposal and if any statutory or constitutional changes should be proposed that are necessary to support the budget proposal.

And this is the state I think all state agencies find themselves in. There might be some differences with constitutional officers.

And let me just note lastly, that 20 percent 1 2 reduction would equal 260,400 dollars, out of the -- for 2004. 3 4 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Could I just comment, if I may? That there really needs to be a distinction made, I 5 6 think, to a very small agency like this one, that is 7 charged with constitutional duties. It is always 8 possible for state agencies to reduce and find ways to 9 reduce. But when you have a very small agency, with 10 very limited staff, a 20 percent reduction is 11 significant. And I think it will be difficult for this 12 Commission to meet its constitutional requirements with a 13 reduction of that magnitude. 14 CHAIR MATEO: Any other comments on the report? 15 MEMBER BARNES: Yes. I'm curious. Basically, their 16 comment was that we should sponsor a constitutional 17 amendment to eliminate or reduce our recommendations? Ιs that what they're saying? 18 19 MS. HIGASHI: I guess if we wanted the exclusion to 20 apply, we would have to have our name in the 21 Constitution. 22 CHAIR MATEO: I'd doubt that was an official Finance recommendation. 23 24 MS. HIGASHI: But, basically, because the 25 Constitution does not specify that the Commission on

State Mandates is the agency that is required to carry out Article XIII B, section 6. That's one take on it.

And then the other is that, you know, one other method for exclusion would be court-ordered. And we are starting to get some court orders to change decisions and to rehear cases; but it's not like it's a major health or welfare policy or something where the state is under a court order to perform a service.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Well, the function of the Commission is to implement a constitutional mandate.

MS. HIGASHI: Right.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: It may not be identified in the Constitution, but the function is certainly identified.

MS. HIGASHI: The Department of Finance budget letter this time is very different from others because it really gives us the opportunity to propose changes to statute or the Constitution, in order to carry out our program, based on the proposed reductions that we would have to submit.

But since we're an agency with basically one program, the mission, which is XIII B, section 6, to determine test claims and incorrect reduction claims, we don't have the flexibility as a large department would have. And virtually, all staff work on this program to carry out the Commission's mission.

CHAIR MATEO: You do need to distinguish between what's required right now for a planning process and how the ultimate decision process will go. And this is, right now, part of the planning process.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Good point.

MS. HIGASHI: That is correct. And since they are requesting 20 percent proposals, there is a view that with all of these proposals submitted, that there will be a number of good ideas generated for statutory changes that, you know, maybe some would be taken, others would not have to be. And there is definitely sympathy towards the Commission's status. It's just it's very difficult, though, to have to go through these drills.

And I appreciate all of your support.

CHAIR MATEO: The planning process, because there's not an agency here, is going to be by department; but the decision process for non-agency departments won't be by department, in the same sense.

MEMBER ROSENBERG: Good. Good to know.

MS. HIGASHI: The next item that I wanted to bring up is just what happened with the Assembly Committee, Special Committee on State Mandates. They continued to have weekly meetings until the end of session. And I've given you a compilation. It's a matrix that's folded over. And it's a compilation of all of the recommended

actions that were taken by the Special Committee. At the end of session, there was a belief that the committee would sponsor legislation; and actually four bills were drafted to carry out and implement the recommendations of the Special Committee. And it included corrections to the State Budget Act, repeal of mandates that had been suspended for 20 years. It also included suspensions of mandates that were new, and that had not yet been funded, and just a variety of changes that had not been covered in the Budget Act.

And this is the first time that a committee, acting on a policy basis, actually looked at prior mandates that had been found, either by the Board of Control or the Commission on State Mandates, and tried to examine them and consider whether or not those mandates should continue in state law.

So the Committee has plans to reconvene again in January. And the next phase of their process is to begin to examine more the procedures and the processes involving the mandate determinations, the filing of reimbursement claims, preparation of statewide cost estimates, examining the Commission's functions, the State Controller's functions, and all of the parties involved in that process.

I gave you, in my report, a list of some of the

issues that have come up, Commission staff as well as Finance staff, Controller's office staff and representatives of the cities and counties and school districts have participated in state-level meetings with the committee staff, as well as the Leg. Analyst's office staff and other leg. staff. And some of the issues that have come up repeatedly are the ones that I have listed here; and they're all issues that require further discussion.

The committee itself has not gotten to the point of having this further discussion or to focus on the processes; but at the staff level, the discussions have started. And so briefly enumerated is:

The first one is the Commission on State Mandates, continuing jurisdiction to reconsider prior actions in order to respond to changes in law and new court decisions.

Two, rethinking Parameters and Guidelines and statewide cost estimates. Just what procedures should be in place, should it continue to be the same, or should it be completely altered?

Three, establishing a cost recovery or fee authority for the Commission. And this is something also that the Leg. Analyst's office is very interested as well as the Senate staff for Subcommittee Four of our budget, in

seeing this develop. Staff is currently researching other agencies to find out what fee authorities other quasi-judicial agencies have, and to see what we would need to do and what would be reasonable.

Four is examining the State Mandates claims fund, which is established in statute to reimburse only local agencies for the costs of claims, when the first year costs are under a million dollars. And this fund has not been used in recent years. It has a balance of about 875,000 dollars.

There have been suggestions that perhaps the fund's purpose could be expanded to also provide additional revenue source for the Commission.

Item 5 is reports to the Legislature. This issue comes up quite frequently, where Leg. Analyst's office is always requesting additional information from the Commission and changes are being proposed in terms of what should the Commission report, at what time; and is the report that's going back to the officers of the Legislature, the appropriate venue for the report to be received; or should we be reporting back to the budget committees or the policy committees; and should we be reporting back at the time the statement of decision is rendered, and not just at the point in time specified in statute, to report when the statewide cost estimate is

adopted statewide. Because at that point in time, often the statute of limitations has run out on the decision. And certain members of the Legislature have indicated an interest in finding out sooner which subdivisions the Commission finds to be reimbursable state-mandated programs.

This also is something that fiscal committee staff is interested in because it would assist them in doing the bill analyses and appropriations committee to have a sense of the Commission's current direction.

So these are all issues that have been discussed at the staff level in some way, shape or form, and will probably come up again when the Committee reconvenes in January.

And at this time, there are no plans for interim hearings.

Are there any questions?

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On the last page I've given you, I've identified some of the test claims and Parameters and Guidelines that are scheduled for the next agenda. This is still tentative. The drafts would have to be released within the next few days for these items to stay on the November calendar. Plus, we also have the item of the Bureau of State Audits report. Assume that it is released on the schedule that the staff has indicated to us, which is

around mid-October, the first opportunity to place it on 1 the agenda for member discussion and receipt of public 2 comment would be the November hearing. So I would 3 propose to add that to the agenda; plus, the items that 4 were continued today. 5 Are there any other questions about the agenda? 6 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Well, this is not so much a 7 question but a comment. The next meeting with the 8 Commission is scheduled to be -- you said November 20. 9 That is the week of the County Supervisors meeting, which 10 I attend, as a county supervisor. Do we have any ability 11 to -- if this Commission is interested -- to change that 12 date? 13 MS. HIGASHI: It would be up to the Commission. 14 We have, in the past, changed the date, I guess 15 before you were appointed. 16 MEMBER ROSENBERG: Okay. 17 MS. HIGASHI: So we perhaps were not sensitive to 18 19 that scheduling concern. CHAIR MATEO: I certainly don't have a problem with 2.0 21 looking for a better date. MEMBER LAZAR: Does it have to be a Thursday meeting 22 23 date, too? MS. HIGASHI: It could change. 24

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What we'll do is we'll check with you and find out

1	what dates are available.
2	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Thank you.
3	The 27th and 28th are state holidays; but I have no
4	problem meeting on those days.
5	CHAIR MATEO: By yourself.
6	MS. HIGASHI: Some of us have already had our
7	vacations approved.
8	MEMBER ROSENBERG: All right, all right. Thank you.
9	MS. HIGASHI: And that concludes my report, unless
10	there are another questions.
11	CHAIR MATEO: Okay, are we ready for our closed
12	session?
13	Okay, the Commission
14	MS. HIGASHI: We should ask for public comment, the
15	last requirement under Bagley-Keane.
16	CHAIR MATEO: Okay, do we have public comment?
17	(No audible response was heard.)
18	CHAIR MATEO: Okay. Then the Commission will now
19	meet in closed executive session pursuant to Government
20	Code section 11126(e), to confer with and receive advice
21	from legal counsel for consideration and action, as
22	necessary and appropriate, upon the pending litigation
23	listed on the published notice and agenda, and to confer
24	with and receive advice from legal counsel regarding
25	potential litigation; and Government Code section

1 11126(a) and 17526 of the Commission will also confer 2 on personnel matters listed on the published notice and 3 agenda. We will reconvene in open session at this location 4 5 at approximately -- Paula, what's your quess? MS. HIGASHI: 20 minutes, 30 minutes. 6 7 CHAIR MATEO: That would be approximately 12:25 p.m. 8 (Whereupon the Commission met in executive closed 9 session from 11:55 a.m. to 12:36 p.m.) 10 CHAIR MATEO: We reconvene to close the closed And whatever the time is -- I can't see from 11 12 here -- 1:36? 13 MEMBER ROSENBERG: 12:36. 14 CHAIR MATEO: Thank you. 15 Do we have any other issues? 16 MR. STARKEY: Shelley, there is magic language to be 17 read off for closed session. CHAIR MATEO: Okay, the magic language. 18 19 Okay, this is our report from the closed executive 20 session. The Commission met in closed executive session 21 pursuant to Government Code section 11126(e), to confer 22 with and receive advice from legal counsel for consideration and action, as necessary and appropriate, 23 upon pending litigation listed on the published notice 24 25 and agenda and potential litigation, and Government Code

# Commission on State Mandates - September 25, 2003

1	section 11126(a), and 17526 to confer on personnel
2	matters listed on the published notice and agenda. All
3	required reports from the closed session having been
4	made.
5	And with no further business to discuss, I will
6	entertain a motion to adjourn.
7	MEMBER WILLIAMS: So moved.
8,	MEMBER ROSENBERG: Second.
9	CHAIR MATEO: All in favor?
10	(A chorus of "ayes" were heard.)
11	CHAIR MATEO: We are adjourned.
12	(The proceedings concluded at 12:38 p.m.)
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### REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were reported by me at the time and place therein named; that the proceedings were reported by me, a duly certified shorthand reporter and a disinterested person, and was thereafter transcribed into typewriting by computer.

I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for any of the parties to said proceedings, nor in any way interested in the outcome of the cause named in said matter.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 20th day of October 2003.

DANIEL P. FELDHAUS CSR #6949, RDR, CRR