#### PUBLIC HEARING

#### COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

#### A ...

TIME: 9:39 a.m.

DATE: Thursday, December 6, 2007

PLACE: State Capitol, Room 126

Sacramento, California

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#### REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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# ORIGINAL

#### Reported by:

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#### COMMISSIONERS PRESENT

TOM SHEEHY
(Commission Chair)
Director, State Department of Finance

CYNTHIA BRYANT
Director
State Office of Planning and Research

RICHARD CHIVARO
Representative for JOHN CHIANG
State Controller

PAUL GLAAB
City Council Member
City of Laguna Niguel

FRANCISCO LUJANO
Representative for PHILIP ANGELIDES
State Treasurer

SARAH OLSEN Public Member

J. STEVEN WORTHLEY
Supervisor and Chairman of the Board
County of Tulare

**₽••**••

#### COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT

PAULA HIGASHI Executive Director (Item 18)

NANCY PATTON
Assistant Executive Director
(Item 2)

CAMILLE SHELTON
Chief Legal Counsel
(Item 17)

DEBORAH BORZELLERI Commission Counsel (Items 9 and 10)

KATHERINE TOKARSKI
Commission Counsel
(Items 3 and 4)

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#### PUBLIC TESTIMONY

#### Appearing Re Item 3:

For the County of Los Angeles:

LEONARD KAYE, ESQ.
County of Los Angeles
Department of Auditor-Controller
500 West Temple Street, Suite 603
Los Angeles, California 90012

DAN SCOTT (Sergeant)
Special Victims Bureau
County of Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department
11515 S. Colima Road, D106
Whittier, California 90604

#### PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 3: continued

For Department of Finance:

SUSAN GEANACOU Senior Staff Attorney Department of Finance 915 L Street Sacramento, California 95814

CARLA CASTAÑEDA
Principal Program Budget Analyst
Department of Finance
915 L Street
Sacramento, California 95814

#### Appearing re Item 9:

For Claimant City of Newport Beach:

JULIANA F. GMUR
Manager, Cost Services
MAXIMUS
4320 Auburn Boulevard, Suite 2000
Sacramento, California 95841

For Claimant City of Newport Beach: continued

GLEN EVERROAD
Revenue Manager
City of Newport Beach
3300 Newport Boulevard
Newport Beach, California 95658

ANTONY BRINE, P.E.
Transportation Engineer
Public Works Department
City of Newport Beach
3300 Newport Boulevard
Newport Beach, California 95658

#### PUBLIC TESTIMONY

continued

Appearing re Item 9: continued

For Department of Industrial Relations:

GARY J. O'MARA
Attorney
Department of Industrial Relations
Office of the Director - Legal Unit
2424 Arden Way, Suite 130
Sacramento, California 95825

ANTHONY MISCHEL
Staff Counsel
Department of Industrial Relations
Office of the Director - Legal Unit
320 West Fourth Street, Room 600
Los Angeles, California 90013

For Department of Finance:

SUSAN GEANACOU Senior Staff Attorney Department of Finance

CARLA CASTAÑEDA
Principal Program Budget Analyst
Department of Finance

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# Commission on State Mandates – December 6, 2007

1	BE IT REMEMBERED that on Thursday, December 6,
2	2007, commencing at the hour of 9:45 a.m., thereof, at
3	the State Capitol, Room 126, Sacramento, California,
4	before me, DANIEL P. FELDHAUS, CSR #6949, RDR and CRR,
5	the following proceedings were held:
6	00
7	CHAIR SHEEHY: The Commission on State Mandates
8	will come to order the meeting this morning will come to
9	order.
10	Paula, will you please call the roll?
11	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Bryant?
12	MEMBER BRYANT: Here.
13	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Chivaro?
14	MEMBER CHIVARO: Here.
15	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Glaab?
16	MEMBER GLAAB: Here.
17	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lujano?
18	MEMBER LUJANO: Here.
19	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Olsen?
20	MEMBER OLSEN: Here.
21	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Worthley?
22	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Here.
23	MS. HIGASHI: And Mr. Sheehy?
24	CHAIR SHEEHY: Here.
25	The Commission will meet in closed executive

1	session pursuant to Government Code section 11126,
2	subdivision (e), in order to confer with and receive
3	advice from our legal counsel for consideration and
4	action, as necessary and appropriate, upon the pending
5	litigation listed on the published notice and agenda and
6	also in order to confer with and receive advice from
7	legal counsel regarding additional potential litigation.
8	We will reconvene in open session at the same
9	location in approximately 15 minutes.
10	Thank you.
11	(Closed executive session from 9:45 a.m.
12	to 9:52 a.m.)
13	CHAIR SHEEHY: The Commission met in closed
14	executive session pursuant to Government Code section
15	11126, subdivision (e), in order to confer with and
16	receive advice from our legal counsel for consideration
17	and action, as necessary and appropriate, upon pending
18	litigation listed on the published notice and agenda and
19	potential litigation.
20	The Commission will now reconvene in open
21	session, and we will recess until ten o'clock this
22	morning.
23	Thank you.
24	(Recess from 9:53 a.m. to 10:02 a.m.)
25	CHAIR SHEEHY: The Commission on State Mandates

1	meeting will come to order.
2	We've already had a roll call, established a
3	quorum, and taken care of some preliminary business.
4	So having said that, I'd like to ask the
5	members of the Commission if there are any objections or
6	corrections to the September 27th minutes?
7	(No response)
8	CHAIR SHEEHY: Hearing none, is there a motion
9	to adopt the minutes from September 27th?
10	MEMBER LUJANO: Moved.
11	MEMBER GLAAB: Second.
12	CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you.
13	Paula, please call the roll.
14	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Bryant?
15	MEMBER BRYANT: Aye.
16	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Chivaro?
17	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
18	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Glaab?
19	MEMBER GLAAB: Aye.
20	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lujano?
21	MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.
22	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Olsen?
23	MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
24	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Worthley?
25	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Aye.

1	MS. HIGASHI: And Mr. Sheehy?
2	CHAIR SHEEHY: Aye.
3	Okay, so the minutes have been approved.
4	MS. HIGASHI: There are no appeals to consider
5	today under Item 2.
6	And this brings us to the proposed consent
7	calendar.
8	Ms. Patton, do you want to present the consent
9	calendar?
10	MS. PATTON: I just wanted to let you know that
11	I just found out from San Bernardino County that they are
12	requesting that Item 11, Mentally Disordered Offenders,
13	be postponed. So it's coming off calendar today.
14	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Does that require a motion?
15	MS. PATTON: No.
16	So that leaves Item 13, Pupil Safety Notices
17	Parameters and Guidelines, and Item 16, the
18	implementation of AB 1222 regulations.
19	CHAIR SHEEHY: Okay, so the consent calendar is
20	as presented in the agenda, minus Item Number 11; is that
21	correct, Ms. Patton?
22	MS. PATTON: Right.
23	CHAIR SHEEHY: Do we have a motion to approve
24	the consent calendar?
25	MEMBER OLSEN: So moved.

1	CHAIR SHEEHY: Can I have a second, please?
2	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Second.
3	Mr. Chairman, just a point of clarification
4	because the agenda did indicate initially that 14 and 15
5	were also going to be consent items, they are being
6	postponed. So the consent calendar would be, as I
7	understand it, Items 13 and 16?
8	MS. HIGASHI: That's correct.
9	CHAIR SHEEHY: Is that accurate, Paula?
10	MS. HIGASHI: Yes, that's correct.
11	CHAIR SHEEHY: Let the record show that the
12	consent calendar is amended as per Mr. Worthley.
13	MS. HIGASHI: All of you should have a blue
14	sheet of paper. On the back of it, it indicates the
15	postponed items that were initially on the consent
16	calendar. So if you would just mentally move Item 11 to
17	the back of the page, then we'll have a current list.
18	CHAIR SHEEHY: Oh, I see. It's on the front
19	side and you want to have it on the back.
20	MS. HIGASHI: And then just move Item 11 to the
21	back.
22	We were just made aware of this issue this
23	morning.
24	CHAIR SHEEHY: I hope too many people didn't
25	fly in from out of town for that one item.

# Commission on State Mandates – December 6, 2007

1	Okay, Paula, is the motion still in order? Do
2	we have to
3	MS. HIGASHI: Let me clarify -
4	CHAIR SHEEHY: Does the motion need to be
5	remade?
6	MS. HIGASHI: Let me clarify the motion
7	CHAIR SHEEHY: Can you clarify what the motion
8	is, please?
9	MS. HIGASHI: Okay. It was my understanding
10	that the motion that was made was to adopt the proposed
11	consent calendar. And as Ms. Patton indicated, it
12	consisted of Items 13 and 16.
13	CHAIR SHEEHY: Okay, so that's the motion.
14	Paula, could you please call the roll?
15	MS. HIGASHI: Certainly.
16	Mr. Chivaro?
17	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
18	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Glaab?
19	MEMBER GLAAB: Aye.
20	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lujano?
21	MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.
22	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Olsen?
23	MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
24	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Worthley?
25	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Aye.

1	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Bryant?
2	MEMBER BRYANT: Aye.
3	MS. HIGASHI: And Mr. Sheehy?
4	CHAIR SHEEHY: Aye.
5	MS. HIGASHI: The motion carries.
6	This brings us to the hearing portion of our
7	meeting.
8	First, I'd like to ask all of the parties and
9	witnesses who are here to testify on one of the
10	test-claim items to please stand.
11	(Parties and witnesses were sworn or affirmed.)
12	MS. HIGASHI: Thank you very much.
13	Our first test claim today is Item Number 3.
14	And there have been some changes regarding how this item
15	is being presented today.
16	And I would just like to briefly read into the
17	record a statement regarding Items 3, 4, 5 and 6,
18	essentially. And a copy of a letter that I issued
19	yesterday is available for all the parties, and was
20	mailed to all the parties on this test claim.
21	On December 5th, the Commission received a
22	request from the Department of Finance to postpone the
23	hearing and determinations of those portions of the
24	analysis of Item 3 that are related to the adjudication
25	of the following case: Department of Finance vs.

Commission on State Mandates, currently pending in the California Court of Appeal, Case Number CO56833. And this is known as the POBOR case.

This request was approved. Therefore, today's Commission hearing on Item 3 will be limited to the analysis of the test-claim statutes and executive orders for cities and counties.

The test-claim statutes and executive orders pled by the County in Item 3, as they may apply to other types of local governmental entities, are hereby severed and consolidated with another pending test claim, Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting, 01-TC-21, which is on this agenda as Item 5. This test claim was filed by the San Bernardino Community College District.

By this consolidation, the Commission is also postponing the December 6th hearing on Item 5, for 01-TC-21. The consolidated test claim comprised of 00-TC-22 and 01-TC-21 will be set for hearing within 60 days after the final adjudication of the Department of Finance vs. Commission on State Mandates case. At that time, a new draft staff analysis will be issued for review and comment.

And it's my understanding that all of the parties that are involved in these two test claims are in agreement with this action that's been taken.

1 Are there any questions? 2 CHAIR SHEEHY: Do we have any questions or 3 comments from members of the Commission? 4 (No response) 5 MS. HIGASHI: Item 3 will be presented by 6 Commission Counsel Katherine Tokarski. 7 MS. TOKARSKI: Good morning. The County of 8 Los Angeles filed a test claim on June 29th, 2001, 9 alleging that amendments to California's mandatory child 10 abuse reporting laws since 1975 impose a reimbursable state-mandated program on law enforcement agencies and 11 12 other county departments. A number of changes to the 13 Penal Code are claimed, including a reenactment in 1980, 14 and substantive amendments in 1997 and 2000. 15 In initial comments filed, the Department of Finance and the Department of Social Services both oppose 16 the test claim, arguing that the claim alleges duties of 17 18 law enforcement and child protective services that were 19 required by prior law. Where the state agencies acknowledge that some 20 21 new duties may have been imposed, they contend that adequate funding has already been provided to counties as 22 23 part of the joint federal, state, local funding scheme 24 for child welfare. 25 At this time, there is no evidence in the

1 record to demonstrate that the mandated activities have 2 been fully offset or funded by the state or federal 3 government in a manner and amount sufficient to fund the 4 cost of the state mandate. 5 Staff finds that the test-claim statutes and 6 executive orders have created numerous new local duties 7 for reporting child abuse to the state that were not 8 required by prior law, thus mandating a new program or 9 higher level of service. 10 Such activities include distributing the 11 suspected child-abuse report form, cross-reporting 12 suspected child abuse and neglect by telephone and in 13 writing between local departments, completing the 14 investigation needed to prepare and submit the state 15 child-abuse investigation report to DOJ, as well as 16 related record-keeping and notification activities. 17 Staff recommends the Commission adopt the staff 18 analysis to partially approve this test claim for 19 counties and cities. 20 Will the parties and witnesses please state 21 your names for the record? 22 MR. KAYE: Leonard Kaye, County of Los Angeles. 23 SERGEANT SCOTT: Daniel Scott. 24 CHAIR SHEEHY: Mr. Kaye, do you have some 25 testimony for us this morning on this item?

1 MR. KAYE: Very brief. 2 CHAIR SHEEHY: Okay, please precede. MR. KAYE: We concur completely with Commission 3 4 staff's analysis and urge you to adopt their recommended 5 position on this in developing this test claim, which I 6 think we did it six and a half years ago. 7 We feel it's important to update the 8 Commissioners, should they have questions at this point 9 in time. And Sergeant Dan Scott, who is a POST-certified 10 trainer in this area and also has substantial experience 11 in this area, is prepared to answer any questions you may 12 have in that regard. However, we feel that there is a tremendous 13 amount of work to be done in the subsequent parameters 14 15 and guidelines phase to follow. And this might take, of 16 course, work with many, many jurisdictions over some 17 period of time. But we like the endorsement, the green 18 light to start this long-delayed reimbursement program 19 this morning. 20 Thank you. 21 CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you. 22 Mr. Scott? 23 SERGEANT SCOTT: Good morning. My name is Dan I'm a sergeant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's 24 Scott.

Department, Special Victims Bureau. I have been with the

1 department 28 years, and have spent 20 years in the field 2 of child abuse -- 13 as a detective and seven as a 3 sergeant. 4 And the magnitude of this bill is extremely 5 important in that law enforcement get out to take a look 6 at these cases, something that is required to have by 7 law, and also to have a perspective from law enforcement, 8 not just the Department of Children and Family Services. 9 It's important that both entities take a look 10 at the protection of children from their respective 11 expertise. And law enforcement is unique in that we look 12 at these cases from a different perspective, as far as 13 the safety of the children, and to determine what should 14 proceed as far as if it's criminal or not. 15 About 30 percent of our cases actually go to criminal. But the majority of them are dealt with in a 16 17 manner that protects the children first. 18 CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, Mr. Scott. 19 The Department of Finance, would you like to 20 comment on this item? 21 MS. CASTAÑEDA: Carla Castañeda, Department of 22 Finance. We have no objections to the staff analysis 23 24 with the exception of the education components.

also will work with local agencies and Commission staff

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1	in developing the parameters and guidelines to
2	appropriately address the offsets as we asserted during
3	the staff analysis. The funding is provided through
4	social services.
5	CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, Carla.
6	Ms. Geanacou, did you have anything to add?
7	MS. GEANACOU: No, I don't.
8	Susan Geanacou, Department of Finance.
9	CHAIR SHEEHY: Are there any questions from the
10	members of the Commission or any further discussion on
11	this item that's desired at this time with the members?
12	(No response)
13	CHAIR SHEEHY: Very well. Do we have a motion?
14	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Chairman, I'd be glad to
15	move approval of the staff analysis.
16	MEMBER GLAAB: Second.
17	CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you.
18	Paula, could you please call the roll?
19	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Glaab?
20	MEMBER GLAAB: Aye.
21	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lujano?
22	MR. LUJANO: Aye.
23	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Olsen?
24	MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
25	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Worthley?

# Commission on State Mandates – December 6, 2007

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1	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Aye.
2	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Bryant?
3	MEMBER BRYANT: Aye.
4	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Chivaro?
5	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
6	MS. HIGASHI: And Mr. Sheehy?
7	CHAIR SHEEHY: Aye.
8	MS. HIGASHI: The motion is carried.
9	MR. KAYE: Thank you very much.
10	CHAIR SHEEHY: Ms. Tokarski will introduce
11	Item 4, the proposed Statement of Decision.
12	MS. TOKARSKI: The staff recommends the
13	Commission adopt the proposed Statement of Decision with
14	modifications reflecting today's hearing testimony, and
15	also limiting the analysis and conclusions to cities and
16	counties only. Staff will make such changes and
17	circulate the document to the parties before issuing the
18	final Statement of Decision.
19	CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, Katherine.
20	Is there a motion on Item Number 4?
21	MEMBER GLAAB: So moved.
22	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Second.
23	CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you.
24	Please call the roll.
25	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lujano?

# ${\bf Commission\ on\ State\ Mandates-December\ 6\ ,\ 2007}$

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1	MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.
2	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Olsen?
3	MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
4	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Worthley?
5	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Aye.
6	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Bryant?
7	MEMBER BRYANT: Aye.
8	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Chivaro?
9	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
10	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Glaab?
11	MEMBER GLAAB: Aye.
12	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sheehy?
13	CHAIR SHEEHY: Aye.
14	MS. HIGASHI: The motion is carried.
15	Now, you'll have to shift binders at this
16	point.
17	Items 5 and 6 are postponed.
18	Items 7 and 8 are postponed.
19	And this brings us now to the test claim, Item
20	Number 9, Senior Commission Counsel Deborah Borzelleri
21	will present Item 9, which is the Prevailing Wages test
22	claim.
23	MS. BORZELLERI: Thank you.
24	This test claim addresses changes to the
25	California prevailing-wage law, which was designed to

enforce prevailing-wage standards on projects funded in whole or in part with public funds.

Private contractors in public works projects are required to pay local prevailing wages to construction workers on any projects that exceed \$1,000. The requirement to pay prevailing wages does not apply to work carried out by a public agency with its own forces.

The test-claim statutes and regulations modified several provisions of the prevailing wage law and local agencies that contract out for public works projects are affected by these changes. But in order to determine whether those new Labor Code requirements are truly mandated by the state, the case law requires the analysis to focus on the nature of the claimant's participation in the underlying program, and whether the decision to participate triggers the new requirements.

If the test-claim statutes or other law required the underlying activity, that constitutes legal compulsion. Absent legal compulsion in some very narrow circumstances, the courts have found practical compulsion exists.

The Kern High School District case sets forth these narrow circumstances, that is, where the local agency would face penalties such as double taxation other severe consequences, leaving no reasonable alternative

but to participate in the underlying activity.

Here, the significant underlying decision is whether to undertake a public works project in the first place.

Public works includes a broad variety of projects from such things as construction and repair of buildings, to installing carpet. And the decision to undertake a public works project could be driven by any number of reasons, from a local administrative decision to a ballot initiative.

There is nothing in the test claim or elsewhere in law to indicate such projects are legally compelled by the state. Moreover, claimant has put no evidence into the record to demonstrate that public works projects are practically compelled. It is the claimant that is required to meet the burden of demonstrating the circumstances under which it is practically compelled to engage in the underlying activity. And here, that burden has not been met. Therefore, staff recommends the Commission adopt this analysis to deny the test claim.

Will the parties and witnesses please state your names for the record?

MS. GMUR: Juliana Gmur on behalf of the City of Newport Beach.

MR. BRINE: Tony Brine, City traffic engineer,

1	Newport Beach.
2	MR. EVERROAD: Glenn Everroad, City of Newport
3	Beach.
4	MR. MISCHEL: Anthony Mischel, Department of
5	Industrial Relations.
6	MR. O'MARA: Gary O'Mara with the Department of
7	Industrial Relations.
8	MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, Department of
9	Finance.
10	MS. CASTAÑEDA: Carla Castañeda, Department of
11	Finance.
12	CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you.
13	Ms. Gmur, would you like to open up with your
14	testimony?
15	MS. GMUR: Yes, I would. Thank you very much.
16	Good morning, Commissioners. This test claim
17	is regarding the expansion of the prevailing wage law.
18	We appreciate staff's thoughtful analysis on this matter,
19	and staff points to the decision that local governments
20	engage in to start a public works project as a voluntary
21	discretionary decision.
22	This is in line with the case law that we've
23	seen from the Department of Finance. But initially, the
24	first case was the City of Merced.
25	In the <i>City of Merced</i> case, we have a similar

1 fact pattern. The City of Merced opted, instead of in 2 this case to, say, perhaps build a building, they opted to acquire a building by eminent domain. And in so 3 4 doing, they put themselves into the position of having to 5 comply with the mandate. 6 The theory behind the City of Merced is that if 7 you don't make the decision -- that is, if you choose to 8 go into a particular direction -- and you run into the 9 statutes that create the mandate, you could have avoided 10 it; therefore, it is not a mandate. Staff says that it's a voluntary, discretionary 11 decision. But is it? When it comes to erecting a 12 building, perhaps that is the case. But when it concerns 13 health, safety, and welfare of the public, is it truly a 14 15 discretionary decision? 16 We have here today from the City of Newport Beach, Tony Brine, and he's going to talk to you about a 17 situation that the City is facing with regards to 18 19 maintenance of traffic signals. 20 Thank you. CHAIR SHEEHY: 21 Mr. Brine? MR. BRINE: Good morning. We have a contract 22 with a private contractor to do our annual maintenance of 23

signals in the city. And we pay that contractor wages to

traffic signals in Newport Beach. We have 112 traffic

24

do maintenance on a per-signal location.

We feel -- and I'm going to move ahead -- that this is a mandated type of maintenance work, because it's the type of work we need to do on a regular basis to make sure the signals are functional; that there are no safety issues related to, as an example, red light is no longer functioning or the traffic-signal controller is no longer functioning. If those issues arise, then it puts the traffic signal into a condition where it could be unsafe for the drivers. And there have been situations where there have been accidents related to poorly maintained traffic signals.

So we have to, and we have a responsibility to the residents and the drivers to maintain the traffic signals and to keep them functioning. And so for that purpose, then we believe this is not a discretionary action but, rather, it's a necessary, mandatory-type action.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you.

Mr. Everroad, do you -- does that conclude your testimony, Mr. Brine?

MR. BRINE: Yes.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Mr. Everroad -- maybe you could surrender your seat so Mr. Everroad could sit up. I think he would like to --

MR. EVERROAD: Actually, I would like to thank staff for their analysis, and would argue that, as Juliana has related, that we do have discretion in some situations. However, there's a legal compulsion and there's a practical compulsion as it relates to maintaining traffic signals, an activity that, prior to the statutes, may not have constituted or been defined as a public works project. These statutes redefine public works projects to include maintenance.

And in this particular agreement, our

And in this particular agreement, our contractor, the cost increased threefold as a result, in part, due to the prevailing-wage requirements associated with the statutes.

So we don't have discretion as it relates to traffic signals. We have a practical and -- I believe the California Vehicle Code also points to a legal requirement to maintain traffic signals. So I would just like to ask for your understanding about the differences between a practical compulsion and this discretionary act.

We don't have discretion as it relates to maintaining traffic signals, not practically and not lawfully.

Thank you.

MS. GMUR: And as a point in fact, Mr. Everroad

was referring to Vehicle Code 21351, which states that local authorities shall place and maintain or cause to be placed and maintain, such traffic lights, signals, and other traffic-control devices upon streets and highways as required hereunder.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Ms. Bryant?

MEMBER BRYANT: Is there anything that precludes -- I mean, I agree with you, you clearly have to have functioning traffic lights in Newport Beach. But is there anything that prevents you from training a city employee to perform that task and to maintain the streetlights for you?

MR. BRINE: I would say probably.

In our case, we have one traffic signal technician and one engineer as part of our staff. And they are responsible for the entire 112 signals, and reviewing that, and making sure they're operational on a daily basis.

So to add to their tasks, in addition, their regular maintenance and going in and actually, physically doing work on the intersections to maintain them, I think that goes beyond what we can do within the City in terms of going past operational issues to then include maintenance.

MEMBER BRYANT: So the City is making a choice

1 to have a contract to maintain the stoplights as opposed 2 to expanding City staff to perform that task? 3 MR. BRINE: We have in over a 30-year period 4 had contracts with consultants to do the work. 5 think it's worked in the best fashion for the City to do 6 that from a staffing standpoint and also from a cost 7 standpoint for the City to contract. 8 CHAIR SHEEHY: I'm sorry, I just want to make 9 sure I understand. So you think it's more cost-effective 10 for you to contract the work out than having City staff 11 do the work? 12 MR. BRINE: I personally do believe that. 13 CHAIR SHEEHY: I see. 14 MR. EVERROAD: If I might speak to the 15 Commissioner's question, with regards to whether or not 16 we decide to do this ourselves or contract out for that, 17 state law directs at least general law cities as to 18 whether or not they are obligated to contract out for 19 services after certain threshold amounts have been met. 20 Our traffic signal maintenance agreement annually is 21 \$210,000, well beyond what the statutory requirements are 22 for contracting this out. So we don't have the 23 discretion as it relates to maintaining traffic signals

MS. GMUR: And Mr. Everroad was referring to

with using City staff.

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1 the Public Contracts Code, which I believe was cited in 2 our comments to the draft staff analysis. 3 CHAIR SHEEHY: The Department of Finance -- I'm 4 sorry, the Department of Industrial Relations is here 5 this morning. 6 Did you have comments on this item? 7 MR. MISCHEL: Yes, we do. 8 CHAIR SHEEHY: Please proceed. 9 MR. MISCHEL: Yes, I would like to start -- I'm 10 sorry, again, my name is Anthony Mischel. 11 CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, Mr. Mischel. 12 MR. MISCHEL: I'd like to start with going back to the comment about what the City of Merced case really 13 14 says. 15 If you look at Merced, it does talk about the 16 fact that the City makes a decision first to take 17 property, and then it decides it's going to proceed by 18 eminent domain. And the Court just addressed the 19 question of whether the decision to proceed by eminent 20 domain was a discretionary act. But the Court 21 specifically said it was not addressing any of the other 22 issues that were actually unspecified because of the 23 result. And there's no indication in the record that the 24 Merced court thought that looking at the second

discretionary act as opposed to the first discretionary

act was of any significance.

It's also really important to see Merced in the context of the development of the law around state mandates. Remember, Merced was decided in 1984, very shortly after the Commission is, in fact, created. It's not the first case; it's one of the first cases.

And on Merced is then built a whole analysis about what is a discretionary act that really culminates in Kern County, the Kern School District case, in which the Court was extremely clear about what a mandate was.

So I think it's disingenuous to somehow parse Merced as carefully as the City has parsed it.

What you're looking at, I think after Kern, is whether or not there is state law requiring certain activities; and if not, whether state law creates such Draconian consequences that a city actually has no choice.

So the only example so far before you is the relatively small question of traffic signal maintenance. Whether all other construction is sort of per force no longer in this test claim or not, I don't know. I don't know what is in and what is out. It has been a problem, I think, from the beginning, I think, for us to respond.

And having not been aware of, or had the chance to look at the Vehicle Code or the Public Contracts Code

1 insofar as it applies to maintenance as opposed to the 2 more general questions of construction, I'm at a little 3 bit of a loss in terms of the very specific responses. 4 Mr. O'Mara, who has been with the Department 5 for decades and has been doing this work for virtually 6 his entire career, does have some comments about when 7 maintenance became - was considered to be a public work 8 or subject to the payment of prevailing wages under 1771. 9 And I'd like to turn this over to him to talk 10 about maintenance historically in terms of when it became 11 a requirement. 12 CHAIR SHEEHY: Mr. O'Mara, you have a green 13 light. 14 MR. O'MARA: Thank you, sir. 15 Maintenance was added to the statute in 1974, 16 at the same time that the Legislature codified the Bishop 17 decision from 1969, which excluded force account. 18 Maintenance was added -- overruled sub silentio, a 19 decision called Franklin vs. County of Riverside decided 20 in 1962 by the California Supreme Court, which excluded 21 maintenance from the statute. 22 So there has been a requirement for maintenance 23 as enacted since 1974. It's not a new requirement 24 post-Proposition 13. 25 So what this would mean is that MR. MISCHEL:

this wouldn't be a mandate. This would not be subject to subvention because this has been required all along.

I would also like to, as a final comment, go back to the comments we originally made about the Labor Code amendments. And I will really try to get through this part quickly, so as I don't get a red light from the chair.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Please continue.

MR. MISCHEL: Thank you.

But if you look at the kind of work that cities had to do before 1976, and the work that cities have to do now, they do less. They do less.

We have taken over -- the State has taken over responsibilities for setting the prevailing wage rate, setting the requirements for prevailing wage, enforcing the prevailing wage, adjudicating the prevailing wage.

And awarding bodies, local governments merely have to make sure that everybody knows to look to our Web site.

That if somebody raises a violation, they can't shield their eyes. And if the State says, "Don't pay the money until this is adjudicated," to hold onto the money.

And beyond that, there's not much left for the cities to do.

The real problem is, the cost of construction has gone up since 1976. But the bulk of the cost of that

increase is on private contractors, because it's on the 1 2 payment of the prevailing wage side. And that's not 3 subject to this test claim. What has resulted, they say, 4 is a minor increase in the administration of prevailing 5 wages. And we put it to you that that is not subject 6 7 to mandate for the variety of reasons from, maintenance 8 has been in the code since before 1976, and the cities 9 now do less in administering than they did before. 10 Thank you. 11 CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, Mr. Mischel. 12 The Department of Finance, do you have comments 13 on this item? MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, Department of 14 15 Finance. 16 We generally support the staff analysis and 17 urge its recommendation -- or its adoption, rather --18 today. I will note that I don't believe there's any 19 prior testimony or evidence in the record regarding the 20 21 traffic-signal issue raised here, nor the specific Vehicle Code section that I think was raised generally by 22 Mr. Everroad. So if we're asked to look at that 23 particular issue, I think we'd need more specifics in 24

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order to address it.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Yes, Ms. Gmur?

MS. GMUR: Yes. We were trying to find some way to put something specific to this so that we could look at an example that everyone is familiar with. And the issues were raised generally in the comments. But it's too easy to look at the concept of erecting a building and saying, "Well, you don't have to do that."

It's harder to look at things like traffic signals, repairing bridges, other things that are required under health and safety, welfare, police powers, those sorts of things that counties and cities exercise.

I would like to take a quick comment on the City of Merced. Although counsel has raised some excellent issues with regard to the application of the Labor Code sections and what exactly all of this means, we have a threshold issue, and that threshold issue is the application of City of Merced and this concept of voluntary. If we don't get over that threshold issue, it doesn't matter what the statutes say. If it's a voluntary decision, even if the application -- even if we have a much more complicated process, a much more costly process, it doesn't matter if it's still a process we walk into voluntarily.

Therefore, back on the City of Merced -- and I know I'm constantly in front of you talking about this.

You probably all sit around saying, "Oh, there she is, Ms. City-of-Merced."

But counsel pointed to the fact that the case came about early in the Commission's life in 1984. But counsel overlooks the fact that this Commission was preceded by the Board of Control. So although it is an early decision coming out of our appellate courts, it was not an early decision for this commission.

Counsel points to the Department of Finance case, which I'm certain you're all familiar with the language, we're looking at the issue of practical compulsion, are there draconian results — that one seems to kind of crop up — and double taxation, those are the terms that are used. But there's also another case out there, and that is the San Diego Unified case, which, again, I routinely bring up.

In that case, the Court, the California Supreme Court, went out of its way to make a point about the City of Merced. It is dicta, indeed. It is something that was not germane or relevant to the issue pending because it was not the basis upon which the decision was made.

However, I have seen it quoted by your staff in the past, and it is basically a caution, a caution as to how you apply the City of Merced.

You must look at the intent of the law, the

Commission on State Mandates – December 6, 2007 intent of the Legislature or the voters, and see if the 1 application of City of Merced defeats that intent. 2 3 The case that was cited by the Court at the time was 4 Carmel Valley which, as you all may recall, is the fire 5 protection safety. The Court pointed to the fact that 6 you could control your costs under the City of Merced 7 analysis by simply not hiring any firefighters. If you 8 don't hire firefighters, they don't need protective 9 clothing, and so you have solved your problem. 10 And the Court has said that that's an 11 inappropriate way to apply City of Merced. 12 So I just caution the Commission to look before 13 they leap; to go through the analysis to see if City of 14 Merced and its companion case, the Department of Finance, is the direction this Commission wants to go. 15 16 MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a

MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

CHAIR SHEEHY: Please.

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MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Mischel presented an argument which I really didn't see presented in the staff analysis, which is basically a statute of limitations argument, I believe. As I understood his statement, this is long-standing law; therefore, it's not really before the Commission today to examine, if I understood you correctly.

1	MR. MISCHEL: Actually, what I was trying to
2	I'm sorry, I wasn't clear.
3	MEMBER WORTHLEY: You were very clear, but I
4	probably just misunderstood it.
5	MR. MISCHEL: What I was trying to say is that
6	the maintenance provision in the Labor Code, in 1771,
7	preexists the operative date on which the the trigger
8	date for whether or not a change in the Labor Code
9	creates a mandate.
10	MEMBER WORTHLEY: So it is a statute of
11	limitations issue?
12	MR. MISCHEL: It is in that sense, yes. I
13	mean, there's all sorts of statute of limitations
14	questions because but I think they're sort of down the
15	line, if you go there, about how far back do you get to
16	go. I mean, they're talking about changes in the Labor
17	Code starting in 1977. And the claim is filed
18	twenty-some years later or whatever. But that's a
19	different question.
20	CHAIR SHEEHY: I'm sorry. Mr. Lujano, did you
21	want to ask a question?
22	MEMBER LUJANO: Yes, I'd like to hear from our
23	counsel on both issues of the contract.
24	MEMBER OLSEN: One of them is already done.
25	MS. BORZELLERI: Okay, the contracting issue

1 for the traffic-signal contract? 2 MEMBER LUJANO: Yes. MS. BORZELLERI: Well, I think Ms. Geanacou put 3 4 it very succinctly. I would need to go back and look at 5 what that Vehicle Code section says and what the 6 threshold limits are. But the Public Contract Code 7 sections, as you may have seen in the analysis, are very 8 convoluted. They say, "Up to this limit, you need to 9 contract out, but then if you're a city of this size or 10 if you're a charter city, different rules apply." 11 And then there also is a lot of discretion with regard to 12 accepting bids and rejecting bids. And you can go all 13 the way down the line. So we haven't had any specific situations to 14 look at. And so I would have a hard time answering your 15 16 question today. 17 MR. MISCHEL: May I make one comment just on 18 this point? 19 CHAIR SHEEHY: All right, well, why do we 20 let -- Mr. Mischel, why don't we let Deborah finish on the second, and Mr. Lujano had two questions, and she 21 22 answered the first. 23 MS. BORZELLERI: The second issue on the City of Merced? 24 25 MEMBER LUJANO: Yes.

MS. BORZELLERI: Well, it is our -- I mean, we 1 2 have looked at the San Diego case and the caution language that's in it; but, again, it did not overrule 3 4 the City of Merced. The cautionary discussion in San Diego Unified just says, "Well, you can't go quite 5 that far," as to looking at how many firefighters to 6 7 employ. 8 But we don't believe -- we believe that the 9 City of Merced is directly on point for this case, as far 10 as the voluntariness of the issue absent any other information brought into the record. 11 12 So does that answer your questions? MEMBER LUJANO: Yes. 13 14 MS. BORZELLERI: Okay, thank you. CHAIR SHEEHY: Mr. Mischel? 15 16 MR. MISCHEL: Thank you. 17 Early on in our comments back when we filed the 18 initial ones, one of the points we tried to make was that 19 the test claim was extremely unclear as to what activities -- what construction activities were being 20 claimed raised subvention issues. And we're here now 21 years later, and for the first time hearing about 22 23 traffic-signal maintenance. And I'm totally at a loss. I don't know 24 25 anything about that, other than the little piece that

Mr. O'Mara commented on.

So if you were going to use that as the basis for saying there's a mandate, I think it would only be fair to everyone, including staff, if the City were required to list the actual acts of construction that are subject to the Public Contracts Code in their experience.

I mean, even though the City of Newport Beach is a chartered city, it can exempt itself from all of the Public Contracts Code. So it doesn't get traffic signal maintenance as a mandate in they could just ignore the Public Contracts Code requirements and choose to either contract it out or not.

But for the general-law cities which are also before you sort of as a class, there may be issues; but you ought to know what the scope is and so the staff could look at it and say, "Is this in? Is this out?

Does this make a difference?" And if necessary, go on to the next steps.

But to do it here today, sort of without any ability for us to respond, I think is kind of unfair.

I do believe that you don't have sufficient evidence to say there is a mandate to contract out. But if you were inclined to think that, you're going to have to take more time to look at it.

But I think the City should present something

more concrete.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Ms. Shelton, did you want to add something?

MS. SHELTON: I do want to add a few things.

One, if you take a look, beginning on page 14 through I think about page 19 or 20, those are the list of activities that the claimant has requested reimbursement for. And they begin with activities of increased costs to pay the prevailing wages. They also ask for the increased cost of hauling refuse because the prevailing wages. So they're asking for not only the administrative activities to comply with any amendment made after '77, but also any increased costs in paying under their contract provisions for prevailing wage.

When we got this test claim, I agree with Mr. Mischel that this is -- it was a completely -- it's very broad. It asks for many things. It wasn't limited. There were no facts in this record, only conclusions that it should be reimbursable.

And as you can hear, there are many, many layers of decision-making, many, many layers of the type of entity and different laws applying with respect to different types of entities.

Today is the first time we've ever heard about the Vehicle Code.

I can tell you just from our review, we have pulled leg. history, we have pulled the Government Code, we've pulled the Constitution, the Public Contracts Code, the Labor Code. There are many provisions which have an impact on this law.

This analysis addresses the record that we had before us up until today. And this analysis addresses just the first threshold issue of whether there's a state-mandated program based on the test-claim statutes that were pled.

The test-claim statutes on their face do not require them to take on any public works projects.

The test-claim statutes on their face do not require them to contract out. And nothing has been put into the record to show that they have been practically compelled by the State to make those decisions, at least up until this point today.

If you want staff to go back and maybe take a look at some of the issues, we would request additional briefing from the claimants, from DIR, from the Department of Finance, and another round, if you're wanting us to go farther. But at this point, this record is so broad, and there was no evidence in the record suggesting any type of practical compulsion.

MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Chairman, may I ask

another question?

CHAIR SHEEHY: Please.

MEMBER WORTHLEY: My question really is related to more of a fundamental, broad question, and that is, I see a lot of focus here on the concepts of repairs and maintenance as being non-discretionary. And I'm very sympathetic with that, and I think Mr. Mischel has tried to point out, that's not really the issue before us today.

But I see a lot of our staff analysis which deals with that, and it doesn't really raise a statute of limitations argument.

But I think there's a good discussion that could be had about that particular issue, that of practical compulsion. I mean, it's one thing to say, "You decide whether or not you want to erect a building," it's quite another to say, "You'd better fix your roof, or the roof is going to fall in." And so you have to do that. That is a practical compulsion.

Is that before this commission today?

MS. SHELTON: Yes, but there has been no
evidence in the record; and as staff, we're not going to
make the claimant's case for them. They have not put any
evidence into the record, no suggestion of unwilling.

And let me just suggest, with maintenance

schedules, there has been no showing that the State has required a certain maintenance schedule.

We have a witness today that indicated that their maintenance schedule is decided by them on a contract basis. It's up to the local agency as just an owner of property to decide when to maintain their own property. You know, certainly there's common law principles of maintaining your own property; but they haven't pointed to any state legal requirement to maintain, except for maybe the Vehicle Code section, which we haven't looked at today.

MEMBER WORTHLEY: My argument -- I mean, my thought is not about compulsion in terms of maintenance, this talks about practical -- I mean, again, going to the concept of practical compulsion, practically speaking -- because the argument is made, it's discretionary to determine whether you want to elect to do a project.

And my thought would be, as a County Supervisor, I don't have an election to fix a roof that's leaking. I have to fix the roof. And if I have to spend \$100,000 to fix that, then I've got to spend \$100,000 to fix that.

That's a practical compulsion.

Now, because I have to do that, suddenly I come under the requirement of having to pay prevailing wage.

So in that situation, I mean, there could be a zillion

fact situations like that that could be presented.

MS. SHELTON: Right. And I'm not disagreeing with your statements, Mr. Worthley. I'm simply saying, nothing has been put into the record at all until maybe today. There's no factual allegation, nothing is in the record by the claimant. Counties, communities, cities, et cetera.

I did want to mention, you were mentioning the statute of limitations of the 1974 edition of maintenance and to prevailing wage. That may have a great impact on some of the activities requested by the claimants in their request.

We haven't done that analysis. It really is a new-program, higher-level-of-service analysis. You know, they have alleged statutes and regulations enacted after 1975. So those the Commission would definitely have jurisdiction over to determine whether or not those amendments added or created a higher level of service to that existing maintenance provision. And this analysis has not gone that far.

You have to do an analysis if the Commission were wanting to approve the test claim.

MS. GEANACOU: I have a question of --

MS. SHELTON: I'm sorry, I forgot one thing.

If we're talking about transportation, there's

1 also a funding issue, too, in there is a transportation 2 fund, and there probably are federal funds, state funds 3 that do pay for maintenance schedules of traffic signals. 4 We haven't done that analysis, either. 5 MS. GEANACOU: May I ask a question? 6 CHAIR SHEEHY: Ms. Geanacou? 7 MS. GEANACOU: Susan Geanacou, Department of 8 Finance. 9 I was hoping for clarification from the 10 claimants as to whether or not the traffic-signal issue 11 is an example of the types of things that would 12 precipitate your claim for reimbursement, or whether it's 13 a limitation on what you're seeking in your test claim? MS. GMUR: We were brought that as an example. 14 15 The problem with the prevailing wage -- here's 16 the issue: The prevailing wage, the definition of public 17 works got expanded, and the program as we see it -- I'm 18 certain the Department will disagree -- but as we see it, 19 it was expanded, bringing in more and more issues. 20 Things that you didn't have to do prevailing wage before, 21 you have to now. At the time that this was filed, this was filed 22 23 under the old commission rules, where a general allegation of a mandate existing was all that was 24 25 This is before the new specific pleading. necessary. So

they are quite correct, this is a bare-bones pleading.

After the draft analysis, I did additional research and we found the Public Contracting Code. So now you've got the prevailing wage issues and their expansions and where they apply and where they don't; and that is further complicated by the Public Contract Code, which has a zillion limitations, and even more exceptions to the rule. So the Department here was quite correct, charter cities, they go into prevailing wage voluntarily. So a charter city may not be an appropriate claimant if this is found to be a mandate.

I'm sorry, to further complicate all of this, because the "public works" definition is so broad, we've got everything, as counsel aptly pointed out, from building a building to laying carpet. We've got everything in there. And so in order to try to look just at that initial issue of voluntariness -- because that's our first hurdle right out of the gate -- if we don't get over that, this is a denial -- to focus in on something we're more familiar with. Because up until this point, when you say "public work," everyone says, "Erect a building."

The Department of Finance even cited in their comments "Oh, building a building." Everyone's talking about building a building. And it's too easy to look at

building a building and say, "Oh, that's voluntary, you don't need to build a building."

But it's harder to look at things, as

Commissioner Worthley said, "Fix the roof." The City had

come up with it, the traffic signals. This is something.

There are a myriad of things.

And as Ms. Shelton accurately pointed out, every time you're looking into one of these things, you've got Transportation Codes, there's health and safety codes, there's Vehicle Codes. There's everything out there that would impinge.

It is the Commission's pleasure as to whether they decide on the initial issue of voluntariness and practical compulsion or whether we bring this back for additional briefing, which I would be more than happy to do, to shed some light on this extremely complicated analysis on this.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, Ms. Gmur.

I'd like to hear from our executive director.

Do you have any recommendations at this point?

MS. HIGASHI: At this point, what is before you

22 is the staff analysis. And certainly you've heard

testimony, and there's been new information added to the

record. It's entirely up to you to determine whether or

not, one, you want to vote on the existing staff

analysis; two, you wish to modify it; or, three, if you wish to return it and to ask us to update it based on the testimony we've heard today; or, four, if you want to open it up completely and give everybody a chance to add more to the record.

Now, some of the issues that came up today seem to imply that perhaps there might be a need to add different test-claim statutes into the record. And I just state that as a caution because if the Commission acts today, based on the final staff analysis, then this matter would be completed as far as the Commission's work in terms of making a decision.

If the Commission keeps it open, then we have issues in terms of test-claim amendments and other things that could occur.

I don't know when that Vehicle Code statute on the traffic control signals was enacted. I've never seen a copy of it. I know the Commission has had traffic control signals before the Commission before.

And as Ms. Shelton pointed out, we know about the transportation fund and how that might apply.

So different issues were raised today, but they were not in the record that the Commission has before it, nor were they in the record that the Commission staff analyzed.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, Paula.

1	Well, I am concerned that we have so much new
2	information showing up today at the table, particularly
3	on this traffic-signal issue. And it's unfortunate that
4	this wasn't raised earlier so it could have been
5	addressed in the staff analysis. So I'd like to just
6	note for the record that I find that very concerning.
7	I'd like to hear from other members of the
8	Commission, if they have any comments at this time on
9	what is before us.
10	Ms. Bryant?
11	MEMBER BRYANT: I have a question.
12	So if we accept and adopt the staff analysis
13	today, where does that leave future can people come
14	back with a second test claim on it, or that's that for
15	these statutes?
16	MS. SHELTON: No, that would be it for these
17	statutes.
18	The test claim was the first filing, so that
19	would be ending the Commission's jurisdiction on these
20	statutes.
21	CHAIR SHEEHY: May I ask counsel, when was this
22	test claim filed?
23	MS. HIGASHI: Look on page 3.
24	MS. BORZELLERI: September 26th, '03.
25	MS. HIGASHI: September 26th, '03.

1 CHAIR SHEEHY: Okay, September 26th of '03. 2 MEMBER LUJANO: Mr. Chair? 3 CHAIR SHEEHY: Please. MEMBER LUJANO: Based on the new information, I 4 5 am really not prepared to vote on this item today. 6 think we should allow the claimants and the Department 7 and our Commission staff to add more information to the record and to give us a complete briefing on it. 8 9 CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, Mr. Lujano. Do I have any other comments from other members 10 11 of the Commission? MEMBER GLAAB: Yes, Mr. Chairman and Members, I 12 concur with Mr. Lujano. I think in view of the 13 additional information, I think that it would be good to 14 have the claimant come forward with the additional 15 information based upon the conversation, the testimony 16 17 that we've had here. 18 You know, as a city councilperson, I'm sensitive to the issue of traffic lights functioning 19 properly and having the latitude to get them fixed as 20 early as possible. Because without that, the big issue 21 is that on some of the labor compliance programs, you 22 know, cities can avoid prevailing wage under certain 23 conditions. So I do have a sensitivity with that. But I 24 think we should come back, requesting more information. 25

Thank you.

MEMBER BRYANT: I just would add that I think that there's maybe some very narrow issues in here that because of the way the City pled this, that we don't have the information in front of us. But for the most part, if we're going to go back and let staff revisit it, we need somehow or another -- I don't know how to do that exactly -- but narrow these issues. Because a lot of this, I think we can get rid of early on. But there might be an issue of practical compulsion as it relates to the public contracting code.

It doesn't sound like the Vehicle Code itself gets you there. Just because the Vehicle Code requires you to maintain your traffic lights, it certainly doesn't say anything about how you get that done, whether it's with a city employee or a contract employee. It seems like the issue might be somewhere in this Public Contracts Code.

But it looks like you went for the whole enchilada instead of really focusing on where you have a practical compulsion. Because, to me, you're not required -- I view -- just on the basis that there's no -- you know, when you read the record, there's no, like, rule that says you have to contract out. And now you're here, saying that you're forced to, in many

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     circumstances. And I don't know what the circumstances
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           But it needs to be -- I would never vote for this
     are.
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     unless it was very, very narrow in terms of creating a
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     mandate.
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               CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, Ms. Bryant.
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               Ms. Olsen?
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               MEMBER OLSEN: Well, I'm concerned because this
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     was filed in 2003.
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               Up until what point could the claim have been
10
     amended?
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               MS. HIGASHI: Up until the hearing.
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               MEMBER OLSEN: Well, that gives me my answer.
     You know, I think I actually am prepared to vote on it
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14
     today then, based on that.
               CHAIR SHEEHY: We haven't heard from
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16
     Mr. Chivaro.
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                Would you like to weigh in?
               MS. HIGASHI: Typically, when an amendment is
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     contemplated, there's a request to put over, postpone.
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     And the claimants have been on notice that we've been
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     working on this draft since spring.
                CHAIR SHEEHY: I'm sorry, I don't mean to put
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     Mr. Chivaro on the spot, but if you'd like to make any
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     comments.
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                MEMBER CHIVARO: No, I agree with Ms. Olsen.
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Commission on State Mandates – December 6, 2007 You know, this has been open for four years and it's kind of a last-minute request to ask us to reconsider or to take additional evidence on things that were not in the record, that they've had ample time to put into the record. So I'm also prepared to vote. CHAIR SHEEHY: I want to just add my agreement to the comments Mr. Chivaro just made. I had already expressed that I'm concerned that this is all coming to us for the first time today, when it could have come in anytime in the last four years. And I would also like to note that I think that if we were to go back and look at the different state funding streams for maintenance of local streets and roads, I'm quite convinced that the record would show that the state subvenes hundreds of millions of dollars

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And I would also like to note that I think that if we were to go back and look at the different state funding streams for maintenance of local streets and roads, I'm quite convinced that the record would show that the state subvenes hundreds of millions of dollars to cities and counties and other local government jurisdictions specifically for the purpose maintaining local streets and roads. I've realized that research is not before us today, but I'm quite confident that that's what the record would show.

I am prepared to vote on this matter today.

So I'm wondering if we have a motion?

MEMBER LUJANO: One more question.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Yes, Mr. Lujano?

MEMBER LUJANO: I would direct this to counsel.

In the past, have we allowed additional 1 2 informational to come during the hearing and held things 3 over? 4 MS. HIGASHI: Yes, we have. MEMBER LUJANO: And that's just my concern. 5 It's just if we vote on this and there are questions, you 6 7 know, how is it going to impact the claimants and if they 8 do -- well, I'd just leave it at that. 9 CHAIR SHEEHY: Mr. Worthley? MEMBER WORTHLEY: Mr. Chair, in listening to 10 all the comments, as I look at it, the issue here has to 11 do -- the heart of it really is this issue of the Merced 12 case and whether or not we have a practical compulsion 13 14 argument that would be made as it relates to maintenance 15 and repairs. 16 The streetlights is an example of that. there is a broad and generic question, and that was why 17 I asked the question: Is that properly before us today? 18 19 In the testimony I thought given by Mr. Mischel, I think 20 he made the comment that it was not. 21 And if it is, I'm prepared to vote on that issue today. 22 The specific examples of how that plays itself 23 out probably need to be worked out in the parameters and 24

guidelines or something like that. But I use the

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example -- I've thought of the example of, you know, is 1 it discretionary to rebuild a jail that burns down? Is 2 it discretionary to build a board of supervisors office 3 4 that burn down? Do you see what I'm saying? There are things 5 that are discretionary. There are other things which are 6 7 not really discretionary. They're discretionary in the fact that you have to get a building permit, you have to 8 meet zoning requirements; but the fact of the matter is, 9 from a practical standpoint, you have to do those things. 10 You have to fix roofs. You have to maintain roads, 11 surfaces. Those are things that you have to do. And 12 they're practical. 13 So if that's before us today, I could vote on 14 15 that. And the other part of what's an example of that 16 is another matter in my mind. 17 CHAIR SHEEHY: Ms. Shelton? 18 MS. SHELTON: Let me just say that those really 19 are not issues for parameters and guidelines. They 20 really would need to be decided at the test-claim phase 21 because they are questions of law. 22 The Statement of Decision has to decide, if

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reimbursable and under what scope. You've got to be able

there is an approved position, what activities are

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to define it so that you can put it over to P's and G's because the only authority really that the Commission has to add activities to the parameters and guidelines are only those that are reasonably necessary to carry out the mandated activity.

So even if you wanted to go in that direction, we would still need to take it back and parse those out.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Mr. Mischel?

MR. MISCHEL: I might just make one point because I didn't think the practical compulsion issue was really going to come up.

But at least the way I read the Kern School

District case, when the Supreme Court was talking about practical compulsion, it was really talking about a practical compulsion created and mandated by the State, that it still comes back to the State is telling you to do something.

And the City of Newport Beach in its comments to the staff analysis pointed out that local governments have to ensure the health and the safety and the protection of its populace. And I don't disagree. I mean, that is why government exists. But that doesn't create a state mandate, a state-mandated practical compulsion, which is I think what the Kern case was talking about. That is, it's either a state law or it is

something the State will do, which is so Draconian, that you really can't get out of complying with some policy.

And so the fact that, yes, if the roof is about to cave in, you have liability issues, you have responsibilities to your constituents, which you wouldn't be in government if you didn't want to fix it. But that's not the State telling you to fix it.

And I think that's the distinction you have to make when you get to the question of practical compulsion when it comes to maintenance, rebuilding, or whatever it may be.

CHAIR SHEEHY: Ms. Shelton, did you want to add something else?

MS. SHELTON: This is a very unsettled area of the law, and I know this is what Ms. Gmur is probably going to say, too.

That's true all about Kern, except that a year later the Supreme Court came out with the San Diego Unified School District decision. That decision was a little bit different in that it was dealing with -- certain portions of it were dealing with a school District's discretionary decision to expel a student for offenses such as -- let's see, possession of drugs, other explosives, assault and battery, and those types of criminal offenses.

And there, the Court did not answer the 1 question, but the Court did look at a constitutional 2 3 provision that requires schools to have a safe 4 environment for pupils and employees. 5 And a constitutional provision is -- that's all it says, you have to have a safe environment for pupils 6 7 and their employees. You know, the Court instructed -- not 8 9 instructed, but advised that we really need to take a 10 look at things like that. Now, that constitutional provision is not 11 something that was -- I don't remember if that was a 12 legislative initiative. 13 MS. HIGASHI: It was the Victim's Bill of 14 15 Rights, Prop. 8, many, many years ago. 16 MS. SHELTON: I don't right now remember if that was a legislative initiative or a voter initiative 17 to put into the Constitution. That may make a difference 18 with the argument. I don't remember at this point. 19 But what they were trying to get reimbursed for 20 21 were the downstream due-process requirements that were required by the State once you took on that discretionary 22 decision. 23 It is a complicated area of the law. 24 I do believe -- you have to have evidence in 25

that there's practical compulsion.

MEMBER BRYANT: May I ask one more question on that Public Contracts Code?

As I'm reading through the staff analysis, it appears to me that no matter -- you have to follow the Public Contracts Code and go through all these steps; but that at the end, the governing body of the city or county can vote by four-fifths vote and not -- and say something -- that they can do it a different way.

Am I reading that right?

MS. BORZELLERI: Yes, there are a lot of exceptions all the way through the Public Contract Code, depending on the type of agency that you're talking about. And each one would need to be looked at separately.

But, generally, for emergencies, which may take into account some of what Mr. Worthley is talking about, the governing body has a lot of discretion with regard to the Public Contract Code, because I think the state really was trying not to tie their hands when there was an emergency.

So we do show that in many instances, the Public Contract Code does not require them to contract out to do certain things.

1	So, yes, you're reading it correctly.
2	MEMBER LUJANO: I have a question.
3	CHAIR SHEEHY: Yes, Mr. Lujano?
4	MEMBER LUJANO: So when they talked about the
5	Public Contract Code, they had no discretion to hire more
6	staff, more public employees, they had to go out for
7	contract.
8	Do you agree with that or you have to look at
9	that?
10	MS. BORZELLERI: Well, I have to look at each
11	situation, because there are so many exceptions as we go
12	down the line, that we would need to know that.
13	Generally speaking, for cities, they are
14	required to contract out if the project is going to be
15	more than \$5,000. But then there are many exceptions
16	down the road that say they can use their own employees
17	if certain conditions are met and use a force account and
18	that sort of thing.
19	Maybe DIR can help us on this issue.
20	MEMBER LUJANO: Well, do you think that if they
21	don't have discretion, then that would compel them? That
22	it would
23	MS. BORZELLERI: That would constitute legal
24	compulsion, yes. If, for a particular instance, the
25	Public Contract Code covered it and they were required to

1	contract out by the Public Contract Code, and there
2	wasn't an exception down the road that you could find,
3	that would constitute legal compulsion.
4	MEMBER LUJANO: And that would change your
5	recommendation?
6	MS. SHELTON: Well, that's legal compulsion to
7	contract. But there's still another decision to make on
8	whose decision is it to even engage in the public works
9	project.
10	MS. BORZELLERI: Correct.
11	MS. SHELTON: So there's two aspects to it.
12	MEMBER LUJANO: So there's a questions again in
13	the record.
14	MS. SHELTON: Yes.
15	MEMBER LUJANO: See, that's what I'm struggling
16	with. There is still a question here.
17	Before, it was like, "Okay, if you're telling
18	me there's nothing in the record, okay. You've brought
19	it you up."
20	Now, there's a question I'm having
21	questions.
22	CHAIR SHEEHY: I'd like to make a comment.
23	It's a matter of record here that two members of the
24	Commission have asked that this item be put over.
25	However, I think we have a majority of the members of the

1 Commission that are prepared to vote on this today. 2 And I reiterate that I'm very concerned that this issue, 3 particularly the example that was used with the traffic 4 signals, was brought to us literally at the last minute 5 after the Commission meeting started. And that very much 6 concerns me. 7 So while I want to extend all courtesies to the 8 members of the Commission on putting an item over, I also 9 think that we have a majority of members that are 10 prepared to vote on this today. And that would be my 11 inclination. 12 Mr. Lujano? Two questions -- or one, just 13 MEMBER LUJANO: to remind the Commissioners that we've allowed 14 information to come in before. And two, if we are going 15 16 to vote on this, I'd request maybe a ten-minute recess if 17 possible. CHAIR SHEEHY: Certainly. 18 19 Mr. Glaab? 20 MEMBER GLAAB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and 21 Members. Commissioners Olsen and Bryant made some 22 comments that resonate with me. The one that 23 Commissioner Olsen said was that, you know, the claimant 24 knew that this was coming along and that it had been 25

That engaged in negotiations and discussions with staff. 1 clearly is the case here, and I see that. 2 3 Commissioner Bryant also made the point that this is extremely broad. I think the term used, it was 4 5 the whole enchilada; and I concur with that. My reasoning for suggesting or to be willing 6 to put this over would be to allow the claimant to take 7 those comments to heart; and possibly at that time come 8 9 back with a reduced scope, possibly, and the additional information. And this is out of a sensitivity to the 10 claimant, you know, Newport Beach, because they clearly 11 feel they have a case. 12 But those are my comments, and I offer them 13 only for the purposes of discussion. 14 15 Thank you. CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, Mr. Glaab. 16 MEMBER BRYANT: I think we should take 17 Mr. Lujano's suggestion of a ten-minute recess. I 18 wouldn't mind having a minute to read this again. 19 I concur with the recommendation 20 CHAIR SHEEHY: 21 of my colleague. The Commission on State Mandates will take a 22 23 ten-minute recess. (A recess from 11:06 a.m. to 11:15 a.m.) 24 CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. 25

The Commission on State Mandates meeting will come back to order.

I'd like to at this time ask our executive director to address several points that I just discussed with her.

Paula, could you please?

MS. HIGASHI: One of the questions that came up today is just the difference between testimony at the hearing and also amending a test claim and adding new statutes to a test claim filing. And what I just wanted to remind everyone of is the fact that you may recall at our last hearing, we had the test claim filed on LAFCO. And the week of the hearing, the claimants filed an amendment to that test claim, which I immediately severed from the pending test claim that was on the agenda, so we could proceed with that hearing.

And the claimants understood the regulations correctly. By filing it, they preserved their rights to be amending that old test claim and also to cover the issues that were related, that they felt were -- they realized at that time had not been addressed in that test claim filing.

And I just -- and Ms. Gmur and I had had discussions before that hearing so that she did get that filing in, preserved her filing date. And that amendment

was accepted.

There have been other hearings as well. And Mr. Lujano asked this question earlier, and I just wanted to expand that, yes, certainly we have taken testimony at hearings; yes, we have had to change staff analyses. But when that has occurred, typically, it's based on factual information of costs, information about funding. It's not necessarily been information where additional statutes are mentioned during the course of a hearing, statutes which are not pled, statutes which are not part of a record, and that are actually not before the Commission in terms of mandate determination, and the subject of the mandate determination.

Because if you just look at the face sheet for this test claim, it says, "Labor Code sections, and DIR regulations and executive orders." It doesn't say "Public Contracts Code," it doesn't say "Vehicle Code." But it's limited to the Labor Code and the prevailing wage statutes.

So the staff analysis before you addresses the Labor Code and what was actually pled.

 $\,$  And I just wanted to clarify that because I know there were some questions.

CHAIR SHEEHY: I just want to ask one question of Ms. Gmur.

1	MS. GMUR: Yes.
2	CHAIR SHEEHY: I just want to clarify you are
3	aware of the process for amending a test claim?
4	MS. GMUR: You know, I am, but
5	CHAIR SHEEHY: And you were also aware that
6	before this meeting started, that clock had stopped
7	running for you?
8	MS. GMUR: Yes, I am. And I'm not certain that
9	we should amend it.
10	CHAIR SHEEHY: Okay, very good.
11	Do we have any comments from members of the
12	Commission?
13	(No response)
14	CHAIR SHEEHY: Okay, the decision of the Chair
15	is, I would like to entertain a motion on the analysis
16	that's before us, that's dealing with Labor Code; it's
17	not dealing with the Public Contracting Code or the
18	Vehicle Code. If this test claim was to be amended, it
19	would have needed to have happened before today, before
20	this meeting was convened.
21	And since it didn't, the preference of the
22	Chair would be to see if we can take action on this item
23	today.
24	So having said that, do we have a motion from a
25	member of the Commission?

## Commission on State Mandates – December 6, 2007

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1		MEMBER OLSEN: I'll move adoption of the staff
2	analysis.	
3		CHAIR SHEEHY: Ms. Olsen moves adoption.
4		MEMBER CHIVARO: Second.
5		CHAIR SHEEHY: Mr. Chivaro is the second.
6		Paula, please call the roll.
7		MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Chivaro?
8		MR. CHIVARO: Aye.
9		MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Glaab?
10		MR. GLAAB: Aye.
11		MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lujano?
12		MEMBER LUJANO: Yes.
13		MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Olsen?
14		MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
15		MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Worthley?
16		MEMBER WORTHLEY: No.
17		MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Bryant?
18		MEMBER BRYANT: Aye.
19		MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sheehy?
20		CHAIR SHEEHY: Aye.
21		MS. HIGASHI: The motion is adopted.
22		CHAIR SHEEHY: Okay.
23		MS. HIGASHI: Item 10, Proposed Statement of
24	Decision.	
25		MS. BORZELLERI: The only issue before the
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## Commission on State Mandates - December 6, 2007

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1	Commission on this item is whether the Statement of
2	Decision accurately reflects the Commission's decision on
3	the previous item, Item 9.
4	Staff would make minor changes to the final
5	Statement of Decision to reflect witnesses, testimony,
6	and the vote count.
7	CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you.
8	Do we have a motion?
9	MEMBER OLSEN: So moved.
10	MEMBER CHIVARO: Second.
11	CHAIR SHEEHY: Paula, please call the roll.
12	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Bryant?
13	MEMBER BRYANT: Aye.
14	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Chivaro?
15	MEMBER CHIVARO: Aye.
16	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Glaab?
17	MEMBER GLAAB: Aye.
18	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lujano?
19	MEMBER LUJANO: Aye.
20	MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Olsen?
21	MEMBER OLSEN: Aye.
22	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Worthley?
23	MEMBER WORTHLEY: Aye.
24	MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sheehy?
25	CHAIR SHEEHY: Aye.
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1	MS. HIGASHI: The motion is adopted.
2	MS. GMUR: Thank you, Commissioners.
3	MR. MISCHEL: Thank you.
4	CHAIR SHEEHY: Thank you.
5	MS. HIGASHI: This brings us to the very end of
6	the binder, Item 17, Chief Counsel Camille Shelton's
7	report.
8	MS. SHELTON: I have nothing further to add to
9	this report, unless there are any questions.
10	CHAIR SHEEHY: Do we have any questions of
11	Ms. Shelton?
12	(No response)
13	CHAIR SHEEHY: Paula?
14	MS. HIGASHI: Item 18 is my report, an update
15	on the pending workload.
16	And I've given you a copy of the State
17	Controller's recent report to the State Legislature and
18	the Department of Finance on the accounts on mandate
19	reimbursement claims that are pending.
20	I've also given you a tentative set of agenda
21	items for the January and March hearings. And what
22	because of recent court dates that have been set, as well
23	as briefing dates, all of these test claims that are
24	currently listed are not going to be heard in January.
25	We are going to have to change the date and move them

forward because we have so much other work that's competing for our attention at the same time. However, we will have other agenda items.

And another item that we're going to place on the agenda is going to be what we're going to term as a "workshop on AB 1222." So at that time, we will cover the changes in the Government Code and how this affects the Commission's decision-making and go over exactly what staff is doing in the way of implementation.

Today, you adopted the first step in developing regulations to implement AB 1222. And if there's public testimony -- if a public hearing is requested on that regulation packet at the same time, we can also have that public hearing on the regulations.

So our focus for the next month and a half, two months, is very seriously on making sure we properly implement AB 1222, since the law takes effect.

And we also have one agenda item that we have to have in January, which is another one of the legislatively directed actions to amend parameters and guidelines. And this is a result of legislation.

We also have a couple of statewide cost estimates planned for January. And we hope to get the test claims that we're having to move from January on the March agenda.

1	So your workload continues. And all of the
2	coming agenda items, as you can see, we have prevailing
3	wage, disabled students, notice to students, expulsions.
4	They're all major agenda items in terms of complexity,
5	issues covered, and just size and breadth, and enormity
6	of the statutes that are being analyzed. So I just
7	wanted to point that out.
8	Are there any questions about that?
9	(No response)
10	MS. HIGASHI: Then that's all I have to say, if
11	you don't have any questions.
12	Ms. Patton, do you have any reminders about
13	lunch or announcements?
14	MS. PATTON: For those of you that are
15	attending our holiday lunch, it's at noon at Frank Fats
16	upstairs.
17	CHAIR SHEEHY: Great. Thank you, Ms. Patton.
18	Do we have any additional public comment?
19	Would anybody like to come forward and enter anything
20	into the record at this time?
21	(No response)
22	CHAIR SHEEHY: Okay. With no further
23	business to conduct today, I would entertain a motion to
24	adjourn.
25	MEMBER GLAAB: So moved.

## Commission on State Mandates - December 6, 2007

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MEMBER WORTHLEY:
                                    Second.
1
                                 Thank you.
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                CHAIR SHEEHY:
                The Commission on State Mandates meeting has
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     adjourned.
                 (The meeting concluded at 11:23 a.m.)
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## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were duly reported by me at the time and place herein specified;

That the proceedings were reported by me, a duly certified shorthand reporter and a disinterested person, and was thereafter transcribed into typewriting.

I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for either or any of the parties to said deposition, nor in any way interested in the outcome of the cause named in said caption.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand on December 20, 2007.

Daniel P. Feldhaus California CSR #6949

Registered Diplomate Reporter Certified Realtime Reporter