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Mandate Reimbursement Services

Exhibit E

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April 19, 2004

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COMMISSION ON
STATE MANDATES

Paula Higashi, Executive Director
Commission on State Mandates
U.S. Bank Plaza Building
980 Ninth Street, Suite 300
Sacramento, California 95814

Re: Test Claim 02-TC-25
Los Rios Community College District
Notice to Students

Dear Ms. Higashi:

I have received the comments of the Chancellor's Office of the California Community Colleges ("CCC") dated March 16, 2004, to which I now respond on behalf of the test claimant.

A. The Comments of CCC are Incompetent and Should be Excluded

Test claimant objects to the comments of CCC, in total, as being legally incompetent and move that they be excluded from the record. Title 2, California Code of Regulations, Section 1183.02(d) requires that any:

> "...written response, opposition, or recommendations and supporting documentation shall be signed at the end of the document, under penalty of perjury by an authorized representative of the state agency, with the declaration that it is true and complete to the best of the representative's personal knowledge or information or belief."

Furthermore, the test claimant objects to any and all assertions or representations of fact made in the response since CCC has failed to comply with Title 2, California Code of Regulations, Section 1183.02(c)(1) which requires:

> "If assertions or representations of fact are made (in a response), they must be supported by documentary evidence which shall be submitted with the state agency's response, opposition, or recommendations. All documentary evidence shall be authenticated by declarations under penalty of perjury signed by persons who are authorized and competent to do so and must be based on the declarant's personal knowledge or information or belief."

In addition, CCC has cited numerous federal statutes and regulations without attaching a copy thereof in violation of Title 2, California Code of Regulations Section 1183.02, subdivision (c)(2), which requires that written responses, opposition or recommendations on the test claim shall contain:

> "A copy of relevant portions of...federal statutes, and executive orders that may impact the alleged mandate...unless such authorities are also cited in the test claim. The specific chapters, articles, sections, or page numbers must be identified..."

The comments of CCC do not comply with these essential requirements. Since the Commission cannot use unsworn comments or comments unsupported by declarations, but must make conclusions based upon an analysis of the statutes and facts supported in the record, test claimant requests that the comments and assertions of CCC not be included in the Staff's analysis.

Part I
Education Code Sections

B. The Requirements of Education Code Section 66281.5 Create a New Program or Higher Level of Service

(1) The Requirements of Section 66281.5 Exceed the Requirements of Title IX and 34 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 106

CCC claims that the requirements of Education Code section 66281.5 "substantially reflect" the requirements of Title IX, a federal law that prohibits sex discrimination and sexual harassment and its implementing regulations appearing at 34, Code of Federal

Regulations, part 106, sections 106.1 through 106.71.[1] CCC claims that the existence of Title IX and its implementing regulations prohibit a finding that section 66281.5 creates a new program or higher level of service.

As authority for this claim, CCC cites subdivision (c) of Government Code section 17556, which provides:

> "The commission shall not find costs mandated by the state, as defined in Section 17514, in any claim submitted by a local agency or school district, if, after a hearing, the commission finds that:...
>
> (c) The statute or executive order implemented a federal law or regulation and resulted in costs mandated by the federal government, unless the statute or executive order mandates costs which exceed the mandate in that federal law or regulation." (Emphasis supplied)

CCC recites the patriotic purposes of Title IX, but does not direct the Commission to any specific part of Part 106 which establishes a federal requirement or duplicates any of the activities of Education Code Section 66281.5. A possible relevant citation might be section 106.9 of part 106 of 34 CFR where:

(a) Paragraph (a)(1) requires each recipient to implement specific and continuing steps to notify applicants for admission and employment (and others) that it does not discriminate on the basis of sex in educational programs or activities.

(b) Paragraph (a)(1) also requires that the notification shall contain such information, and be made in such manner, as the Assistant Secretary finds necessary to apprise such persons of the protections against discrimination assured them by title IX and this part.

(c) Paragraph (a)(2) requires each recipient to make the initial notification required by paragraph (a)(1) within 90 days of the effective or applicable date in newspapers or other written communications distributed to every student and employee.

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[1] Since CCC has not complied with the Title 2 Regulations that require a copy of these federal regulations be provided, a copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

(d) Paragraph (b)(1) requires each recipient to prominently include a statement of the policy described in paragraph (a)[2] to be prominently included in each announcement, bulletin, catalog, or application form which it makes available to any person of a type described in paragraph (a)[3], or which is otherwise used in connection with the recruitment of students or employees. (Emphasis supplied)

(e) Paragraph (c) requires each recipient to distribute each publication described in paragraph (b) and to apprise each of its admission and employment recruitment representatives of the policy and require such representatives to adhere to such policy.

In addition to these federal requirements, the test claim alleges[4] the following additional state activities relative to Education Code Section 66281.5:

(a) Establishing and implementing policies and procedures, and periodically updating those policies and procedures, for the notification of students pursuant to the Education Code and Title 5 Regulation sections.

(b) Pursuant to subdivision (b), adopting and implementing a written policy on sexual harassment, and including the policy in its regular policy statement.

(c) Pursuant to subdivision (c), including information in the written policy on where to obtain the rules and procedures for reporting sexual harassment charges and the available remedies.

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[2] Paragraph (a) describes a policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sex, but does not otherwise require it to be in writing or be adopted by the governing board.

[3] Paragraph (a) describes applicants for admission and employment, students and parents of elementary and secondary school students, employees, sources of referral of applicants for admission and employment, and all unions and professional organizations holding collective bargaining or professional agreements with the recipient.

[4] Test Claim, page 12, lines 2-17

(d) Pursuant to subdivision (d), displaying the written policy in a prominent location in the main administrative building or other area of the campus.

(e) Pursuant to subdivision (e), providing the written policy to new students as a part of any orientation program.

(f) Pursuant to subdivision (f), providing a copy of the written policy annually to each faculty member, administrative staff, all members of support staff, and to any newly hired employee.

(g) Pursuant to subdivision (g), publishing the written policy in any publication that sets forth the rules, regulations, procedures, and standards of conduct for the institution.

The activities alleged in the test claim exceed those required in part 106 of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations and fall within the exception of subdivision (c) of Government Code Section 17556, that is, when "the statute or executive order mandates costs which exceed the mandate in that federal law or regulation."

(2) The Requirements of Section 66281.5 Exceed the Few Requirements Found in the "Revised Guidance"

CCC also cites general provisions of "Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties," (hereinafter referred to as the "Revised Guidance") published in January 2001 by the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education.[5] Simply citing this additional publication does not resolve the issue of whether the activities alleged in the test claim exceed those required in the "Revised Guidance."

The "Revised Guidance" reaffirms the compliance standards that OCR applies in investigations and administrative enforcement of Title IX and provides the principles that a school should use to recognize and effectively respond to sexual harassment of students. ("Revised Guidance," Preamble, page i) The "Revised Guidance" provides many examples of "what to do," but provides very little requirements on "how to do"

[5] Since CCC has not complied with the Title 2 Regulations that require a copy of this Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance be provided, a copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "C".

(d) Pursuant to subdivision (d), displaying the written policy in a prominent location in the main administrative building or other area of the campus.

(e) Pursuant to subdivision (e), providing the written policy to new students as a part of any orientation program.

(f) Pursuant to subdivision (f), providing a copy of the written policy annually to each faculty member, administrative staff, all members of support staff, and to any newly hired employee.

(g) Pursuant to subdivision (g), publishing the written policy in any publication that sets forth the rules, regulations, procedures, and standards of conduct for the institution.

The activities alleged in the test claim exceed those required in part 106 of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations and fall within the exception of subdivision (c) of Government Code Section 17556, that is, when "the statute or executive order mandates costs which exceed the mandate in that federal law or regulation."

(2) The Requirements of Section 66281.5 Exceed the Few Requirements Found in the "Revised Guidance"

CCC also cites general provisions of "Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties," (hereinafter referred to as the "Revised Guidance") published in January 2001 by the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education.[5] Simply citing this additional publication does not resolve the issue of whether the activities alleged in the test claim exceed those required in the "Revised Guidance."

The "Revised Guidance" reaffirms the compliance standards that OCR applies in investigations and administrative enforcement of Title IX and provides the principles that a school should use to recognize and effectively respond to sexual harassment of students. ("Revised Guidance," Preamble, page i) The "Revised Guidance" provides many examples of "what to do," but provides very little directions on "how to do" them.

[5] Since CCC has not complied with the Title 2 Regulations that require a copy of this Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance be provided, a copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "C".

For example, CCC quotes from page 14:

> "Schools are required by the Title IX regulations to adopt and publish grievance procedures[6] providing for prompt and equitable resolution of sex discrimination complaints, including complaints of sexual harassment, and to disseminate a policy against sex discrimination." (Emphasis supplied)

The test claim does not allege any "grievance procedures." And, the specific test claim allegations summarized above at subparagraphs (a) through (g) of Education Code Section 66281.5, above, go far beyond the generalized requirement to "disseminate a policy."

CCC also cites pages 19-20 of the "Revised Guidance," from a section entitled "Prompt and Equitable Grievance Procedures." (Again, the test claim does not allege grievance procedure activities.) At page 19, the "Revised Guidance" states:

> "Schools are required by Title IX regulations to adopt and publish a policy against sex discrimination and grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of complaints of discrimination on the basis of sex."

Again, some "what to's" but no "how to's", and less than the specificity set forth in subparagraphs (a) through (g), above. The "Revised Guidance" continues to explain with lack of specificity:

> "Title IX does not require a school to adopt a policy specifically prohibiting sexual harassment or to provide separate grievance procedures for sexual harassment complaints. However, its nondiscrimination policy and grievance procedures for handling discrimination complaints must provide effective means for preventing and responding to sexual harassment." (Emphasis supplied)

Most importantly, the "Revised Guidance" states that the adoption of a policy prohibiting sexual harassment is not required. Again, lots of "what to's" (e.g., "provide

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[6] The "Revised Guidance" and CCC use the terms "grievance procedures" and "complaint procedures" interchangeably. Test claimant assumes that their use of "grievance procedures" does not refer to any collective bargaining process.

effective means") but no "how to's" (such as, "how" to provide "effective means"). At pages 19-20, the "Revised Guidance" does indicate:

> "...if, because of a lack of policy...specifically addressing sexual harassment, students are unaware of what kind of conduct constitutes sexual harassment or that such conduct is prohibited sex discrimination, a school's general policy and procedures relating to sex discrimination complaints will not be considered effective."

In other words, if it doesn't work, it's not good enough, but no required "how to's" are included to make it work. The only specificity put forth by OCR are several elements in evaluating whether a school's grievance procedures will not be considered effective, including an unspecific notice to students, parents and employees where complaints may be filed. This, of course, is different from the more specific requirements of subparagraph (c), above, which requires the inclusion of information in the written policy on where to obtain the rules and procedures for reporting sexual harassment charges and the available remedies.

Then, again, at page 20, OCR becomes non specific:

> "Procedures adopted by schools will vary considerably in detail, specificity, and components, reflecting differences in audiences, school sizes and administrative structures, State or local legal requirements, and past experience."

Finally, OCR concludes this discussion by commenting:

> "Many schools ensure adequate notice to students by having copies of the procedures available at various locations throughout the school or campus; publishing the procedures as a separate document; including a summary of the procedures in major publications issued by the school, such as handbooks and catalogs for students, ...faculty and staff; and identifying individuals who can explain how the procedures work."

This observation by OCR is no more than that, an observation, perhaps a suggestion. They are not executive orders. The activities of Education Code section 66281.5 mandate costs which exceed any suggestions found in the "Revised Guidance."

(3) <u>The Requirements of Section 66281.5 Exceed the Requirements of Title VII and 29 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1604</u>

Part 1604 of 29 Code of Federal Regulations[6] regulates employment discrimination on the basis of sex. CCC quotes a portion of 1604.11(f) which states in whole:

> "Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned." (Emphasis supplied)

The section does not contain any requirements of the federal government so as to include it within the provisions of subdivision (c) of Government Code Section 17556. Even if it could be so construed, the activities described in subparagraphs (a) through (g), above, are activities which exceed those activities in section 1604.11(f) of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

(4) Education Code Section 66281.5 is not a Law of General Application

At page 4 of its comments, CCC cites Government Code Section 12950[7], notes that it is part of the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") and concludes that "FEHA" has general application to nearly all California employers and does not impose unique requirements on local government agencies such as community college districts. CCC cites *County of Los Angeles v. State of California* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 56-57 as its authority.

CCC errs because the test must be applied to the test claim legislation, i.e., Education Code Section 66281.5 and not to "FEHA." The analysis of section 66281.5 describing its mandated activities in subparagraphs (a) through (g), above, show why it is not a law which applies generally to all residents and entities in the state.

The decision in *County of Los Angeles v. State of California* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 56

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[6] Since CCC has not complied with the Title 2 Regulations that require a copy of Part 1604 of 29 Code of Federal Regulations be provided, a copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "D".

[7] Under Government Code Section 12950, employers are required "to post" a poster provided by the Department of Fair Employment and Housing and "distribute" to its employees an information sheet supplied by the Department.

(hereinafter "*County of Los Angeles*) was further relied upon and explained in *City of Sacramento v. State of California* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51. (hereinafter "*Sacramento II*") There, the California Supreme Court explained its *County of Los Angeles* decision:

> "Most private employers in the state already were required to provide unemployment protection to their employees. Extension of this requirement to local governments, together with the state government and nonprofit corporations, merely makes the local agencies 'indistinguishable in this respect from private employers.'" (Opinion, at page 67)

The above analysis of section 66281.5, at subparagraphs (a) through (g), above, shows that community colleges, when complying with Education Code Section 66281.5 are, in fact, "distinguishable from private employers" when complying with "FEHA". The situation is similar to that discussed by the court in *Long Beach Unified School District v. State of California* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 172 where the court held that "although numerous private schools exist, education in our society is considered to be a peculiarly governmental function."

(5) Legal Compulsion is not Necessarily Required for a Finding of a Mandate

At page 4 of its response CCC states that Education Code Section 66281.5 applies only to a community college district that receives, or benefits from, state financial aid. CCC then cites *Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 727 ("*Kern*") and interprets *Kern* to hold that school districts are not entitled to reimbursement "where a district voluntarily participates in a program." This is not a correct interpretation of *Kern*. A finding of legal compulsion is not an absolute prerequisite to a finding of a reimbursable mandate. The controlling case law on the subject of legal compulsion *vis-a-vis* non-legal compulsion is still *Sacramento II*.

(a) *Sacramento II* Facts:

The adoption of the Social Security Act of 1935 provided for a Federal Unemployment Tax ("FUTA"). FUTA assesses an annual tax on the gross wages paid by covered private employers nationwide. However, employers in a state with a federally "certified" unemployment insurance program receive a "credit" against the federal tax in an amount determined as 90 percent of contributions made to the state system. A "certified" state program also qualifies for federal administrative funds.

California enacted its unemployment insurance system in 1935 and has sought to maintain federal compliance ever since.

In 1976, Congress enacted Public Law number 94-566 which amended FUTA to require, for the first time, that a "certified" state plan include coverage of public employees. States that did not alter their unemployment compensation laws accordingly faced a loss of both the federal tax credit and the administrative subsidy.

In response, the California Legislature adopted Chapter 2, Statutes of 1978 (hereinafter chapter 2/78), to conform to Public Law 94-566, and required the state and all local governments to participate in the state unemployment insurance system on behalf of their employees.

(b) *Sacramento I* Litigation

The City of Sacramento and the County of Los Angeles filed claims with the State Board of Control seeking state subvention of the costs imposed on them by chapter 2/78. The State Board denied the claim. On mandamus, the Sacramento Superior Court overruled the Board and found the costs to be reimbursable. In *City of Sacramento v. State of California* (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 182 (hereinafter *Sacramento I*) the Court of Appeal affirmed concluding, *inter alia*, that chapter 2/78 imposed state-mandated costs reimbursable under section 6 of article XIII B. It also held, however, that the potential loss of federal funds and tax credits did not render Public Law 94-566 so coercive as to constitute a "mandate of the federal government" under Section 9(b).[8]

In other words, *Sacramento I* concluded, *inter alia*, that the loss of federal funds and tax credits did not amount to "compulsion."

(c) *Sacramento II* Litigation

After remand, the case proceeded through the courts again. In *Sacramento II*, the Supreme Court held that the obligations imposed by chapter 2/78 failed to meet the "program" and "service" standards for mandatory subvention because it imposed no "unique" obligation on local governments, nor did it require them to provide new or increased governmental services to the public. The Court of Appeal decision, finding the expenses reimbursable, was overruled.

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[8] Section 1 of article XIII B limits annual "appropriations". Section 9(b) provides that "appropriations subject to limitation" do not include "appropriations required to comply with mandates of the courts or the federal government which, without discretion, require an expenditure for additional services or which unavoidably make the provision of existing services more costly."

However, the court also overruled that portion of *Sacramento I* which held that the loss of federal funds and tax credits did not amount to "compulsion."

(d) *Sacramento II* "Compulsion" Reasoning

Plaintiffs argued that the test claim legislation required a clear legal compulsion not present in Public Law 94-566. Defendants responded that the consequences of California's failure to comply with the federal "carrot and stick" scheme were so substantial that the state had no realistic "discretion" to refuse.

In disapproving *Sacramento I*, the court explained:

> "If California failed to conform its plan to new federal requirements as they arose, its businesses faced a new and serious penalty - full, double unemployment taxation by both state and federal governments." (Opinion, at page 74)

Plaintiffs argued that California was not compelled to comply because it could have chosen to terminate its own unemployment insurance system, leaving the state's employers faced only with the federal tax. The court replied to this suggestion:

> "However, we cannot imagine the drafters and adopters of article XIII B intended to force the state to such draconian ends. (¶) ...The alternatives were so far beyond the realm of practical reality that they left the state 'without discretion' to depart from federal standards." (Opinion, at page 74, emphasis supplied)

In other words, terminating its own system was not an acceptable option because it was so far beyond the realm of practical reality so as to be a draconian response, leaving the state without discretion. The only reasonable alternative was to comply with the new legislation, since the state was practically "without discretion" to do otherwise.

The Supreme Court in *Sacramento II* concluded by stating that there is no final test for a determination of "mandatory" versus "optional":

> "Given the variety of cooperative federal-state-local programs, we here attempt no final test for 'mandatory' versus 'optional' compliance with federal law. A determination in each case must depend on such factors as the nature and purpose of the federal program; whether its design suggests an intent to coerce; when state and/or local participation began;

the penalties, if any, assessed for withdrawal or refusal to participate or comply; and any other legal and practical consequences of nonparticipation, noncompliance, or withdrawal." (Opinion, at page 76)

(e) The "Kern" Case Did Not Change the Standard

In *Kern*, at page 736, the Supreme Court first made it clear that the decision did not hold that legal compulsion was necessary in order to find a reimbursable mandate:

> "For the reasons explained below, although we shall analyze the legal compulsion issue, we find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether a finding of legal compulsion is *necessary* in order to establish a right to reimbursement under article XIII B, section 6,[9] because we conclude that even if there are some circumstances in which a state mandate may be found in the absence of legal compulsion, the circumstances presented in this case do not constitute such a mandate." (Emphasis in the original, underlining supplied)

After concluding that the facts in *Kern* did not rise to the standard of non-legal compulsion, the court reaffirmed that either double taxation or other draconian consequences could result in non-legal compulsion:

> "In sum, the circumstances presented *in the case before us* do not constitute the type of non-legal compulsion that reasonably could constitute, in claimants' phrasing, a 'de facto' reimbursable state mandate. Contrary to the situation that we described in (*Sacramento II*), a claimant that elects to discontinue participation in one of the programs *here at issue* does not face 'certain and severe...penalties' such as 'double...taxation' or other 'draconian' consequences (citation), but simply must adjust to the withdrawal of grant money along with the lifting of program obligations." (Opinion, at page 754, emphasis supplied to illustrate holding is limited to facts presented)

The test for determining the existence of a mandate is whether compliance with the test

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[9] This *Kern* disclaimer that "we find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether a finding of legal compulsion is *necessary* in order to establish a right to reimbursement" refutes CCC's interpretation that legal compulsion is always necessary for a finding of a mandate.

claim legislation is a matter of true choice, that is, whether participation is truly voluntary. *Hayes v. Commission on State Mandates*, (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1582 Under the "carrot and stick" analysis of both *Kern* and *Hayes*, community college districts' acceptance of state aid is not truly voluntary, the carrot is too large and the stick is too short.

(6) Educating California Students is not an Option

When CCC argues that accepting state aid to educate students is a discretionary act, implying that community colleges are not required to educate students, it ignores a Constitutional mandate to do so.

Since its admission to the Union, California has assumed specific responsibility for a statewide public education system open on equal terms to all. The Constitution in 1849 directed the Legislature to "provide for a system of common schools[10], by which a school shall be kept up and supported in each district." That constitutional command, with the additional proviso that the school maintained by each district be "free" has persisted to the present day. *Butt v. State of California*[11] (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 680 The California Constitution requires the education of community college students. In *Butt* the court explained:

"Accordingly, California courts have adhered to the following principles: Public education is an obligation which the State assumed by the adoption of the Constitution. (Citations) The system of public schools, although administered through local districts created by the Legislature, is 'one system...applicable to all the common schools...' (Citation) In view of the importance of education to society and to the individual child, the opportunity to receive the schooling furnished by the state must be made available to all on an equal basis. (Citation) 'Management and control of the public schools [is] a matter of state[, not local,] care and supervision...' (citations) The Legislature's 'plenary' power over public education is subject only to constitutional restrictions.

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[10] The California Community Colleges are postsecondary schools and shall continue to be part of the public school system of this state. Education Code Section 66700 Education in our society is considered to be a peculiarly governmental function administered by local agencies to provide service to the public. *Long Beach Unified School District v. State of California* (supra, at 172)

[11] Pursuant to Title 2, California Code of Regulations, Section 1183.03(2), a copy of Butt v. State of California is attached hereto as Exhibit "E".

(Citations) Local districts are the State's agents for local operation of the common school system (Citations), and the State's ultimate responsibility for public education cannot be delegated to any other entity. (citation)" (Opinion, at pages 680-681)

Then after the court reminded us that, in *Serrano I*[12], the court had struck down the then existing State public school financing scheme, which caused the amount of basic revenues per pupil to vary substantially among the respective districts depending on their taxable property values (Opinion, at page 683), the Supreme Court concluded:

> "It therefore appears well settled that the California Constitution makes public education uniquely a fundamental concern of the State and prohibits maintenance and operation of the common public school system in a way which denies basic educational equality to the students of particular districts. The State itself bears the ultimate authority and responsibility to ensure that its district-based system of common schools provides basic equality of educational opportunity. (¶)...Whatever the requirements of the free school guaranty, the equal protection clause precludes the State from maintaining its common school system in a manner that denies the students of one district an education basically equivalent to that provided elsewhere throughout the State." (Opinion, at page 685)

CCC's argument that community college districts need not accept state funding is tantamount to saying that each district is "on its own" when it comes to funding. Since the quality of the education provided by each community college district would then depend on the wealth of each individual district, CCC's argument also violates the equal protection laws of the State constitution. (Article I, §7, subdivisions (a), (b); Article IV, §16, subdivision (a))

C. The Requirements of Education Code Section 66721.5 are a New Program or a Higher Level of Service

(1) The Mandated Activities of Education Code Section 66721.5 Constitute a "Program"

CCC concurs, at page 5 of its comments, that Education Code Section 66721.5 is "new" in that it was added to the Education Code in 2000. It questions whether the

[12] *Serrano v. Priest* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584

activities required (providing and distributing copies of a district's current transfer core curriculum) are a "program," citing *County of Los Angeles v. Department of Industrial Relations* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1538. (hereinafter *Los Angeles v. DIR*),

In *Los Angeles v. DIR*, OSHA added or amended elevator fire and earthquake safety measures in Title 8 Regulations which applied to all elevators, whether publicly or privately owned. (Opinion, at pages 1540-1541) The court first held that the elevator safety regulations did not satisfy the second prong requirement of *County of Los Angeles* in that they applied to all elevators, not just those which were publicly owned and, therefore, did not impose unique requirements that did not apply to all residents and entities in the state. (Opinion, at page 1545)

Having lost this argument, the county then urged the court that the regulations satisfied the first prong of the test in that the regulations were programs that carried out the governmental function of providing services to the public. To buttress this theory, the county offered a declaration which offered the opinion of a declarant that "without those elevators no peculiarly governmental functions and no purposes mandated on County by State Law could be performed in those County buildings." After questioning the sincerity of the declaration[13], the court concluded:

> "County has missed the point. The regulations at issue do not mandate elevator service; they simply establish safety measures....Providing elevators equipped with fire and earthquake safety features simply is not 'a governmental function of providing services to the public'." (Opinion, at page 1546)

The court affirmed the superior court's order granting a motion for summary judgment because "[T]he regulations at issue (did) not mandate elevator service..."

CCC argues disingenuously, at page 5, that providing and distributing copies of a district's current transfer core curriculum "are more akin to the elevators that provide a means of obtaining the program services" and therefore "do not constitute a program or increased services within an existing program and that there is no basis for reimbursement."

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[13] "These thoughts had occurred to counsel only shortly before County's opposition to the summary judgment motion was due to be filed." (Opinion, at page 1545)

Education Code Section 66720 requires the development, maintenance, and dissemination of a common core curriculum for the purposes of transfer which, upon completion will be deemed to have thereby completed all lower division general education requirements of the University of California and the California State University. Section 66721 requires the common core curriculum to be published and distributed. It is essential to, and part of, the education of California's students that they are informed and know which courses must be completed to fulfill the lower division general education requirements of the University of California and the California State University. Otherwise, it would result in education without direction and students would be denied transfers to the University of California and the California State Universities.

It is not necessary to further argue the ups and downs of CCC's "elevator" argument. *County of Los Angeles* (supra, at 56) held that "programs" *either* carry out the governmental function of providing services to the public, *or*, are laws which, to implement a state policy, impose unique requirements on local governments and do not apply generally to all residents and entities in the state. Only one of these findings is necessary to trigger reimbursement. *Carmel Valley Fire Protection District V. State of California* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 537 (hereinafter "*Carmel*")

Providing and distributing copies of a district's current transfer core curriculum is required by a law, to implement a state policy, which imposes on community college districts a unique requirement that does not apply generally to all residents and entities in the state. Having satisfied this one prong of the test, it is not necessary to satisfy the other.

(2) The Test Claim Alleges Sufficient Costs Which are not Required to be Paid From Other District Funds

CCC notes that in *Kern*, the court found the costs to be "modest" and that "nothing . . . prevents Claimant from using some of the funds it has already received from the state to satisfy the costs . . . " What CCC neglects to note is that the funds "already received" in *Kern* were funds received from underlying school-related educational programs. Where CCC's argument fails, is that the general fund balances of community college districts are not additional revenues generated by the same statute and specifically intended to fund the costs of the state mandate, as required by Government Code Section 17556(e).

> "...we have found nothing to suggest that a school district is precluded from using a portion of the funds obtained from the state for the

> implementation of the underlying funded program to pay the associated notice and agenda costs." (*Kern* opinion, at page 747, emphasis supplied)

Education Code Section 66721.5 provides no additional revenues specifically intended to fund the costs of the test claim legislation.

Part II
Title 5 Regulations

D. CCC Exculpatory Comments Repeated in Response to Title 5 Regulations

In its comments to the Title 5 Regulations alleged in the test claim, CCC repeats several issues in its response to one or more regulations. This Part D will respond to each of those issues only once.

(1) Insufficient Time to Research

Test Claimant also notes the excuse of CCC, initially appearing at page 11 of its comments, relative to the addition and effective dates of several Title 5 Regulations:

> "We cannot verify that information at the present time. (¶) The resources of our legal office have been severely curtailed at the same time that its workload has increased. It may be that previous versions of some of the regulations at issue in this Claim existed prior to the dates cited by Claimant because renumbering of sections occurred at various times. That renumbering can give the appearance that a section has been newly adopted when it has simply been assigned a new section number."

CCC then suggests that the Commission (meaning Commission staff) thoroughly review the regulatory history.

The instant test claim was filed on June 5, 2003. The Commission's letter inviting comments was dated June 19, 2003. The CCC finally submitted its comments on March 16, 2004. Test claimant suggests that if CCC cannot find contradictory evidence of the filing of its own regulations in nearly nine months, perhaps it does not exist.

On several other occasions, CCC offers its unverified and unsworn statement that the Board of Governors submitted similar regulations to the Office of the Administrative

Procedure for publication in 1969 and "believes" these other regulations were published. No other proof is offered other than these unverified and unsworn statements. What CCC has not offered is any admissible statement that the Office of Administrative Procedure did, in fact, follow prerequisites for publication or that the "similar regulations" were ever published. Test claimant has attached to the test claim as Exhibit 4, official copies of the regulations as published in cited Registers and on cited dates. This is not only the best evidence before the Commission, it is the only competent evidence before the Commission.

This rebuttal, by this reference, is made again whenever this issue is repeated by CCC.

(2) CCC Misconstrues the Attorney General Opinion

Before embarking on a discussion of the opinion of the Attorney General, test claimant must remind the Commission that such an opinion is subject to three rules of interpretation.

1. Although an opinion of the California Attorney General is entitled to considerable weight, it is not binding.
2. The opinion will be found unpersuasive where the Attorney General has aligned himself with one of the parties.[14]
3. Dissimilar facts are another basis to conclude the opinion to be unpersuasive.

People ex rel. Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Duque (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 259, 267-268

CCC cites an Opinion of the California Attorney General (83 Opinions of the California Attorney General 111 (2000)) and makes a quantum leap to conclude that the minimum standards of the Board of Governors do not constitute either a new program or a higher level of service so long as the Board was obligated to set minimum standards in those areas prior to 1975. As will be shown, this misconstrues the Attorney General Opinion.

The facts presented to the Attorney General related to Welfare & Institutions Code Sections 210 and 210.2. Section 210 provided:

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[14] In this regard, test claimant requests the Commission to take notice of the fact that the Attorney General, at the time of its opinion, and now, often represents the Department of Finance in matters opposing the adoption of test claims.

> "The Board of Corrections shall adopt minimum standards for the operation and maintenance of juvenile halls for the confinement of minors."

The Attorney General was asked for an opinion as to two questions, the second of which was:

> "When a local agency brings a particular juvenile facility into compliance with the minimum standards established by the Board of Corrections, is the state required to reimburse the local agency for the costs incurred in meeting the standards?" (AG Opinion, at page 111)

At page 119 of the opinion, the Attorney General noted that:

> "Counties have been required to maintain a 'suitable' place for the detention of minors since at least 1915 (citations) Setting the minimum standards for what is 'suitable' does not create a 'higher' level of service – it has long been the level of service required of local agencies."

Stated more succinctly, prior to 1975, local agencies were required to provide a "suitable" place for the detention of juveniles. Therefore, any regulations establishing what constitutes "suitable" are not new.

Contrary to the interpretation of CCC, the opinion only went so far as to determine the effect of minimum standards for suitability, it did not render an opinion on minimum standards for every other conceivable activity of the juvenile court system. It certainly did not opine that regulations issued pursuant to a pre-1975 general authority of a state agency to set minimum standards could never constitute either a new program or a higher level of service.

This rebuttal, by this reference, is made again whenever this issue is repeated by CCC.

(3) Education Code Section 66700 Does Not Bar a Finding of a Mandate

CCC cites Education Code Section 66700:

> "The California Community Colleges are postsecondary schools and shall continue to be a part of the public school system of this state. The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall prescribe minimum standards for the formation and operation of the California

> Community Colleges and exercise general supervision over the California Community Colleges."

Launching from its incorrect conclusion relative to the Attorney General's Opinion as to the statutory requirement to establish minimum standards for suitability, CCC then argues that, since Education Code Section 66700 requires the Board of Governors to prescribe minimum standards for the formation and operation of, and to exercise general supervision over, the community colleges, that means that any regulation made by the Board of Governors on any subject does not create a reimbursable mandate because the regulation was made pursuant to the general authority of the Board of Governors to prescribe minimum standards and exercise general supervision. That is not the law. "Costs mandated by the state" means any increased costs which a local agency or school district is required to incur as a result of any statute or any executive order implementing any statute which mandates a new program or higher level of service of an existing program within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution. Government Code Section 17514

This rebuttal, by this reference, is made again whenever this issue is repeated by CCC.

(4) Minimum Standards are No Longer a "Condition" for State Aid

Immediately prior to 1975, former Education Code Section 25510 (as amended by Chapter 989, Statutes of 1974, Section 23[15]) read:

> "The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges will adopt rules and regulations fixing minimum standards entitling districts to receive state aid for the support of community colleges."

Former Education Code Section 25510 was recodified and renumbered as section 71025 by Chapter Chapter 1010, Statutes of 1976, Section 2, Statutes of 1976, section 2[16]. As recodified, section 71025 read:

> "The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall

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[15] A copy of Chapter 989, Statutes of 1974, Section 23 is attached hereto in Exhibit "A".

[16] A copy of Chapter 1010, Statutes of 1976, Section 2, which includes Education Code Section 71025 is attached hereto in Exhibit "A".

adopt rules and regulations fixing minimum standards entitling districts to receive state aid for the support of community colleges."

Former Section 71025 was repealed by Chapter 973, Statutes of 1988, section 12.1. It was reenacted as Section 70901, by Chapter 973, Statutes of 1988, section 8[17, 18]. As

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[17] A copy of Chapter 973, Statutes of 1988, Section 8, is attached hereto in Exhibit "A".

[18] Education Code Section 70901, added by Chapter 973, Statutes of 1988, Section 8, as amended by Chapter 1023, Statutes of 1998, Section 1:

"(a) The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall provide leadership and direction in the continuing development of the California Community Colleges as an integral and effective element in the structure of public higher education in the state. The work of the board of governors shall at all times be directed to maintaining and continuing, to the maximum degree permissible, local authority and control in the administration of the California Community Colleges.

(b) Subject to, and in furtherance of, subdivision (a), and in consultation with community college districts and other interested parties as specified in subdivision (e), the board of governors shall provide general supervision over community college districts, and shall, in furtherance thereof, perform the following functions:

(1) Establish minimum standards as required by law, including, but not limited to, the following:

(A) Minimum standards to govern student academic standards relating to graduation requirements and probation, dismissal, and readmission policies.

(B) Minimum standards for the employment of academic and administrative staff in community colleges.

(C) Minimum standards for the formation of community colleges and districts.

(D) Minimum standards for credit and noncredit classes.

(E) Minimum standards governing procedures established by governing boards of community college districts to ensure faculty, staff, and students the right to participate effectively in district and college governance, and the opportunity to express their opinions at the campus level and to ensure that these opinions are given every reasonable consideration, and the right of academic senates to assume primary responsibility for making recommendations in the areas of curriculum and

academic standards.

(2) Evaluate and issue annual reports on the fiscal and educational effectiveness of community college districts according to outcome measures cooperatively developed with those districts, and provide assistance when districts encounter severe management difficulties.

(3) Conduct necessary systemwide research on community colleges and provide appropriate information services, including, but not limited to, definitions for the purpose of uniform reporting, collection, compilation, and analysis of data for effective planning and coordination, and dissemination of information.

(4) Provide representation, advocacy, and accountability for the California Community Colleges before state and national legislative and executive agencies.

(5) Administer state support programs, both operational and capital outlay, and those federally supported programs for which the board of governors has responsibility pursuant to state or federal law. In so doing, the board of governors shall do the following:

(A) Annually prepare and adopt a proposed budget for the California Community Colleges. The proposed budget shall, at a minimum, identify the total revenue needs for serving educational needs within the mission, the amount to be expended for the state general apportionment, the amounts requested for various categorical programs established by law, the amounts requested for new programs and budget improvements, and the amount requested for systemwide administration.

The proposed budget for the California Community Colleges shall be submitted to the Department of Finance in accordance with established timelines for development of the annual Budget Bill.

(B) To the extent authorized by law, establish the method for determining and allocating the state general apportionment.

(C) Establish space and utilization standards for facility planning in order to determine eligibility for state funds for construction purposes.

(6) Establish minimum conditions entitling districts to receive state aid for support of community colleges. In so doing, the board of governors shall establish and carry out a periodic review of each community college district to determine whether it has met the minimum conditions prescribed by the board of governors.

(7) Coordinate and encourage interdistrict, regional, and statewide development of community college programs, facilities, and services.

(8) Facilitate articulation with other segments of higher education with

enacted, the new section 70901 is greatly expanded and different from its pre-1975

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secondary education.

(9) Review and approve comprehensive plans for each community college district. The plans shall be submitted to the board of governors by the governing board of each community college district.

(10) Review and approve all educational programs offered by community college districts, and all courses that are not offered as part of an educational program approved by the board of governors.

(11) Exercise general supervision over the formation of new community college districts and the reorganization of existing community college districts, including the approval or disapproval of plans therefor.

(12) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, be solely responsible for establishing, maintaining, revising, and updating, as necessary, the uniform budgeting and accounting structures and procedures for the California Community Colleges.

(13) Establish policies regarding interdistrict attendance of students.

(14) Advise and assist governing boards of community college districts on the implementation and interpretation of state and federal laws affecting community colleges.

(15) Carry out other functions as expressly provided by law.

(c) Subject to, and in furtherance of, subdivision (a), the board of governors shall have full authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary and proper to execute the functions specified in this section as well as other functions that the board of governors is expressly authorized by statute to regulate.

(d) Wherever in this section or any other statute a power is vested in the board of governors, the board of governors, by a majority vote, may adopt a rule delegating that power to the chancellor, or any officer, employee, or committee of the California Community Colleges, or community college district, as the board of governors may designate. However, the board of governors shall not delegate any power that is expressly made nondelegable by statute. Any rule delegating authority shall prescribe the limits of delegation.

(e) In performing the functions specified in this section, the board of governors shall establish and carry out a process for consultation with institutional representatives of community college districts so as to ensure their participation in the development and review of policy proposals. The consultation process shall also afford community college organizations, as well as interested individuals and parties, an opportunity to review and comment on proposed policy before it is adopted by the board of governors."

predecessor[19]. CCC has overlooked this important change. Without discussing the entire statute, the following relevant observations are made:

The "minimum standards" language is now found in subdivision (b)(1):

> "(b) Subject to, and in furtherance of, subdivision (a), and in consultation with community college districts and other interested parties as specified in subdivision (e), the board of governors shall provide general supervision over community college districts, and will, in furtherance thereof, perform the following functions:
> (1) Establish minimum standards as required by law, including, but not limited to, the following:..." (emphasis supplied)

but, these "minimum standards" are only applicable to:

> "(A) Minimum standards to govern student academic standards relating to graduation requirements and probation, dismissal, and readmission policies.
> (B) Minimum standards for the employment of academic and administrative staff in community colleges.
> (C) Minimum standards for the formation of community colleges and districts.
> (D) Minimum standards for credit and noncredit classes.
> (E) Minimum standards governing procedures established by governing boards of community college districts to ensure faculty, staff, and students the right to participate effectively in district and college governance, and the opportunity to express their opinions at the campus level and to ensure that these opinions are given every reasonable consideration, and the right of academic senates to assume primary responsibility for making recommendations in the areas of curriculum and academic standards"

and, the regulations alleged in the test claim do not encompass any of these subjects, i.e., they do not allege activities relative to student academic standards, employment of academic and administrative staff, formation of districts, credit and noncredit classes or

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[19] Section 70901 was amended again by Chapter 1023, Statutes of 1998, Section 1, to add a new subdivision (b)(15) which allows contracting for the procurement of goods and services, which is not relevant to this test claim. The chapter also renumbered former subdivision (b)(15) as (b)(16).

shared governance. Therefore, the test claim regulations are not part of "minimum standards", as set forth in Education Code Section 70901.

The language concerning "state aid" has now been shifted to subdivision (b)(6) and is subject to minimum conditions, not minimum standards.

> "(6) Establish minimum conditions entitling districts to receive state aid for support of community colleges. In so doing, the board of governors shall establish and carry out a periodic review of each community college district to determine whether it has met the minimum conditions prescribed by the board of governors." (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, when discussing "minimum standards," minimum standards are limited to those found in Education Code Section 70901, subdivisions (b)(1)(A) through (E), none of which are applicable to this test claim.

It would appear that CCC has seriously confused "minimum standards" providing general supervision with "minimum conditions" for state aid, where the only similarity is the use of the word "minimum."

This rebuttal, by this reference, is made again whenever this issue is repeated by CCC.

(5) Any Discussion of Academic Standards is Irrelevant

Commencing at page 8 to page 9, CCC sets forth a lengthy discussion of the requirement of Education Code Section 70901, subdivision (b)(1)(A) to:

> "Establish minimum standards to govern student academic standards relating to graduation requirements and probation, dismissal, and readmission policies." (Emphasis supplied)

Since the test claim does not seek reimbursement for any activities relating to student academic standards relating to graduation requirements, probation, dismissal, and readmission policies, any discussion of those standards are irrelevant to this test claim.

This rebuttal, by this reference, is made again whenever this issue is repeated by CCC.

(6) There are no Optional Programs - None of the Regulations are Minimum Standards for the Receipt of State Aid

Arguing that some of the Title 5 regulation requirements apply only to a community college district that receives state financial assistance, it cites *Kern* again for the proposition that if districts choose to offer programs, but are not compelled to do so, those costs are never mandated for purposes of reimbursement.

As for the "optional" argument, see prior discussion above in part B(5), commencing at page 9, especially the *Kern* quotation on page 12, to the effect that the court found it unnecessary to decide whether a finding of legal compulsion is necessary in order to establish a right to reimbursement.

As for the argument that some of the regulations reflect minimum standards for the receipt of state aid, see prior discussion above in part D(3), commencing at page 20, where it is pointed out that the reference to state aid is now found in Education Code Section 70901, subdivision (b)(6), subject to the minimum conditions of Title 5 regulation sections 51000 through 51102 which are not alleged in the test claim; and especially at page 21-25, where it is pointed out that minimum standards are now set forth in Education Code Section 70901, subdivision (b)(1)(A) through (b)(1)(E), describing activities none of which are alleged in the test claim.

This rebuttal, by this reference, is made again whenever this issue is repeated by CCC.

(7) Educating Students is not a Discretionary Act

Again with reference to the Title 5 regulations, at page 10 of its comments, CCC renews its argument that "[A]lthough nearly all districts receive state aid, usually in the form of apportionment, there is no mandate that they do so."

As for the argument that receiving state aid is discretionary, and the implication that the education of students is a discretionary act, see prior discussion above in part B(6), commencing at page 13, especially the observation that such a suggestion, if followed, would result in a violation of the equal protection laws of the California Constitution, article I, §7, subdivisions (a), (b) and article IV, §16, subdivision (a).

This rebuttal, by this reference, is made again whenever this issue is repeated by CCC.

(8) Publication of Information About Education is an Integral Part of Education

At page 10 of its comments, referring now to the Title 5 regulations, CCC again argues that "[T]he publication of information or notices, however, is not the same as public education."

As for the "elevator" argument of CCC with its interpretation of *Los Angeles v. DIR*, see prior discussion above in part C(1), commencing at page 15, especially the citation to *Carmel*, at page 16, which holds that only one of two *County of Los Angeles* findings is necessary. The Title 5 regulations alleged in the test claim are regulations which, to implement a state policy, impose unique requirements on community college districts that do not apply generally to all residents and entities in the state. As such, the regulations are "programs" as defined in *County of Los Angeles*.

This rebuttal, by this reference, is made again whenever this issue is repeated by CCC.

E. Comments on Section-Specific Title 5 Regulations

(1) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 51006

Section 51006 refers to open classes. For its initial comment, CCC creates a "blue sky" argument. CCC refers to prior statutes which related to reports of average daily attendance for purposes of apportionment and classes for adults. Since this prior statute has nothing to do with open classes, CCC needed a bridge, so, at page 12, it created one:

> "'Classes for adults' generally means noncredit classes. We have not located a similar pre-1975 requirement that credit courses be open, but given the public nature of the entire system, and the origination of the system within the public school system, we contend that open courses has always been the standard." (Emphasis supplied)

Since the argument is admittedly contrived, it is "blue sky" and nothing more.

(2) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 54805

Section 54805 requires district governing boards to include in materials given to each student at registration, information pertaining to the student representation fee.

CCC argues that section 54805 merely implements Education Code Section 76060.5. CCC overlooks the superseding intervening events contained therein.

Section 76060.5 provides that the governing body of the association may (or may not) order that an election be held for the purpose of establishing a student representation fee. The section further provides that the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the students

voting in the election shall be required and that the election shall not be sufficient unless the number of students who vote in the election equals or exceeds the average of the number of students who voted in the previous three student body association elections. Therefore, whether or not an election is held, and whether or not a sufficient percentage of students voting approves the fee, and whether or not the number of students voting meets a numerical minimum, is so far beyond the ability of a community college district to control, there is no longer any discretion left to the district.

As for the reference to subdivision (d) of Education Code Section 17556, that subdivision provides:

> "The commission shall not find costs mandated by the state, as defined in Section 17514, in any claim submitted by a local agency or school district, if, after a hearing, the commission finds that:...
>
> (d) The local agency or school district has the authority to levy service charges, fees, or assessments sufficient to pay for the mandated program or increased level of service...."

Since there is no admissible evidence before the Commission that the 7 percent (maximum) of the student representation fee collected is sufficient to pay for the mandated program or increased level of service, it is not a bar to a finding of a mandate. Any fees collected would be an offset to the costs of providing the service.

(3) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55005

CCC offers its unverified and unsworn statement that the Board of Governors submitted similar regulations to the Office of Administrative Procedure for publication in 1969 and believes this unverified and unsworn statement "is a sufficient showing of earlier and on-going obligations..." What CCC has not offered is any statement that the Office of Administrative Procedure did, in fact, follow the prerequisites for publication or that the "similar regulations" were ever published. Test claimant has attached to the test claim, as Exhibit 4, at page 404, an official copy of the regulations as published in Register 95, Nos. 19-20, on May 19, 1995. This not only the best evidence before the Commission, it is the only competent evidence before the Commission.

(4) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55202

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(5) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55530

CCC attempts to obfuscate the activities alleged, first with an argument applied to the entire section, and then pleading foul because of a "drafting construction error." Then, by tying the error to Education Code Section 78218 which limits the activities related to the entire matriculation process to only when such funding is received.

First of all, the claim of a "drafting construction error" (existing uncorrected for 14 years) is made by unverified and unsworn comment. Secondly, there is nothing in the record to support that assertion. For example, subdivision (a) of section 55530 uses the word "Subchapter", so the argument that the Board of Governors mistakenly used the word "Chapter" in subdivision (b) appears to be specious.

Finally, Education Code Section 78218 provides that the article shall be operative only if funds are specifically appropriated for the purposes of the article. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the funds, if and when appropriated, are sufficient, to cover notice costs.

(6) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55534

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(7) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55750

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(8) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55752

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(9) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55753

CCC argues that the Chancellor's Office "has determined" that because credit by examination is optional, an optional service fee may be imposed on students. CCC cites no statute, no regulation or no executive order in support of this naked assertion. It totally lacks foundation.

CCC cites subdivision (d) of Government Code Section 17556 as its statutory authority that the collection of these fees defeat a determination of a state mandate. Subdivision (d) provides:

> "The commission shall not find costs mandated by the state, as defined in

> Section 17514, in any claim submitted by a local agency or school district, if, after a hearing, the commission finds that:...
> (d) The local agency or school district has the authority to levy service charges, fees, or assessments sufficient to pay for the mandated program or increased level of service...."

CCC's argument fails because there is no competent evidence before the Commission that districts have the authority to levy a fee, and there is no evidence before the Commission that the authorized fees are in an amount sufficient to pay for the mandated program.

(10) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55758

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(11) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55759

CCC argues that since section 55759 "merely" requires districts to make "reasonable efforts" for student notifications, "no quantifiable mandates are included." Does that mean that CCC is telling its community college districts that no effort is required because it is not possible to measure "reasonable?" Not only is that argument unreasonable, it lacks credulity.

(12) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55760

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(13) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55761

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(14) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55762

CCC argues that the actions of maintaining a student's academic record and otherwise recording course repetition are customary actions that are foundational to district operations. CCC goes on to state "We *believe* they are subsumed in the basic authority to maintain a college." (Emphasis supplied) CCC concludes:

> "To assert a claim on the basis of having to maintain student records is akin to asserting a claim for having to open the doors to buildings to allow

students to enter."

The legal response to this "belief" is that it is not one of the legal objections set forth in Government Code Section 17556. The factual response is that opening doors would be a reimbursable expense if it was mandated by statute or regulation adopted after 1974.

(15) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55764

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(16) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 55765

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(17) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 58102

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(18) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 58104

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

(19) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 59404

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

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(20) Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 59410

No new arguments are presented in response to this section.

CERTIFICATION

I certify by my signature below, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the statements made in this document are true and complete to the best of my own personal knowledge or information or belief.

Sincerely,

Keith B. Petersen

C: Per Mailing List Attached

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

RE: Notice to Students 02-TC-25
CLAIMANT: Los Rios Community College District

I declare:

I am employed in the office of SixTen and Associates, which is the appointed representative of the above named claimant(s). I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to the within entitled matter.

On the date indicated below, I served the attached: letter of April 19, 2004 , addressed as follows:

Paula Higashi
Executive Director
Commission on State Mandates
980 Ninth Street, Suite 300
Sacramento, CA 95814

FAX: (916) 445-0278

AND per mailing list attached

☒ **U.S. MAIL:** I am familiar with the business practice at SixTen and Associates for the collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at SixTen and Associates is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.

☐ **OTHER SERVICE:** I caused such envelope(s) to be delivered to the office of the addressee(s) listed above by:

____(Describe)

☐ **FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION:** On the date below from facsimile machine number (858) 514-8645, I personally transmitted to the above-named person(s) to the facsimile number(s) shown above, pursuant to California Rules of Court 2003-2008. A true copy of the above-described document(s) was(were) transmitted by facsimile transmission and the transmission was reported as complete and without error.

☐ A copy of the transmission report issued by the transmitting machine is attached to this proof of service.

☐ **PERSONAL SERVICE:** By causing a true copy of the above-described document(s) to be hand delivered to the office(s) of the addressee(s).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on 4/20/04___, at San Diego, California.

D J Bramwell
Diane Bramwell

Commission on State Mandates

Original List Date: 6/19/2003
Last Updated: 6/19/2003
List Print Date: 10/17/2003
Claim Number: 02-TC-25
Issue: Notice to Students

Mailing Information: Other

Mailing List

TO ALL PARTIES AND INTERESTED PARTIES:

Each commission mailing list is continuously updated as requests are received to include or remove any party or person on the mailing list. A current mailing list is provided with commission correspondence, and a copy of the current mailing list is available upon request at any time. Except as provided otherwise by commission rule, when a party or interested party files any written material with the commission concerning a claim, it shall simultaneously serve a copy of the written material on the parties and interested parties to the claim identified on the mailing list provided by the commission. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 1181.2.)

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EXHIBIT 'A'

ADDITIONAL STATUTES CITED

electors of the district to authorize the issuance of bonds for such purpose at an election held for such purpose and if the district is unable to obtain adequate facilities within the district with the funds available to the district for such purpose.

SEC. 21. Section 25509.5 of the Education Code is amended to read:

25509.5. The governing board of a community college district may establish and maintain community college classes outside of the state, comprising a part of an aircraft pilot training program conducted by the district under an agreement with the federal government or any agency thereof, during the time that it is unlawful by reason of any law or order of the federal government or any agency thereof for such classes to be maintained within the district.

The governing board may make such expenditures and do such things in connection with the establishment and maintenance of classes under this section as it could do were the classes established and maintained within the district.

SEC. 22. Section 25509.6 of the Education Code is amended to read:

25509.6. The governing board of a community college district may enter into a contract on a full-cost basis with the federal government or any agency of the federal government to provide community college courses and classes to persons in the military service of the United States at any military camp, post, installation, base, vessel, or location, whether within or outside the district or the state.

SEC. 23. Section 25510 of the Education Code is amended to read:

25510. The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall adopt rules and regulations fixing minimum standards entitling districts to receive state aid for the support of community colleges.

SEC. 24. Section 25510.5 of the Education Code is amended to read:

25510.5. The chancellor's office shall annually investigate each community college to determine whether it has met the standards. As part of such investigation, representatives of the chancellor's office may participate in the accreditation visits conducted by the regional accrediting agency, and one representative of the chancellor's office, who may be appointed by the chancellor, may serve as a member of the accrediting commission which accredits the public community colleges.

SEC. 25. Section 25511 of the Education Code is amended to read:

25511. The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall establish criteria and standards for graded classes in grades 13 and 14.

SEC. 26. Section 25513 of the Education Code is amended to read:

25513. The president of any two-year community college may admit 11th and 12th grade students to vocational education classes

section and who are employed by the trustees prior to July 1, 1962, shall be provided with personnel rights and benefits at least equal to those accumulated by them as employees of such state agencies.

CHAPTER 9. COMMUNITY COLLEGES

66700. The public community colleges are secondary schools and shall continue to be a part of the public school system of this state. The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall prescribe minimum standards for the formation and operation of public community colleges and exercise general supervision over public community colleges.

66701. Public community colleges shall offer instruction through but not beyond the second year of college. These institutions may grant the associate in arts and the associate in science degree. Their program may include but shall not be limited to: standard collegiate courses for transfer to other institutions; vocational and technical fields leading to employment; general or liberal arts courses; and community services.

CHAPTER 10. INTERSTATE ATTENDANCE AGREEMENTS

66800. The Legislature recognizes that existing community colleges in California may benefit from larger and more heterogeneous enrollment in certain curricula and that additional enrollment may often be added with little or no increase in the total operational cost of a given curriculum. It also recognizes that California residents can be provided more complete and more useful curricula in many cases if the curricula is planned and offered on the basis of the needs of an entire region.

The Legislature encourages California community college districts and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges to include the educational needs of, and facilities available in, territory adjacent to California in their planning and to make use of those needs and facilities to the extent possible in the conduct of community college education in California.

66801. The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges is authorized to enter into an interstate attendance agreement with any statewide public agency of another state, which is responsible for public schools providing instruction in grades 13 and 14 and which is an agency of a state which is a party to the Western Interstate Compact for Higher Education, for the exchange of residents, on a one-for-one basis, for the purposes of instruction. The agreement shall contain such terms as the board of governors may adopt and which are consistent with the authority and responsibility of California community college districts and the community colleges they maintain. In no event shall such an agreement permit or require the entry of California residents into institutions in another state on terms substantially different from

may exclude from any such meeting, whether public or closed to the public, during the examination of a witness, any or all other witnesses in the matter being investigated.

71023. It is the intent of the Legislature that the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall provide leadership and direction in the continuing development of community colleges as an integral and effective element in the structure of public higher education in the state. The work of the board shall at all times be directed to maintaining and continuing, to the maximum degree permissible, local autonomy and control in the administration of the community colleges.

71024. The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges has the duties, powers, purposes, responsibilities, and jurisdiction heretofore vested in the State Board of Education, Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Department of Education, and the Director of Education with respect to the management, administration, and control of the community colleges.

Whenever in any law other than a provision of the Education Code, enacted prior to January 1, 1977, relating to the management, administration and control of the community colleges reference is made to the State Board of Education, Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Department of Education, or the Director of Education, such reference shall be deemed to mean the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges.

71025. The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall adopt rules and regulations fixing minimum standards entitling districts to receive state aid for the support of community colleges.

71026. The chancellor's office shall annually investigate each community college to determine whether it has met the standards prescribed pursuant to Section 71025. As part of such investigation, representatives of the chancellor's office may participate in the accreditation visits conducted by the regional accrediting agency, and one representative of the chancellor's office, who may be appointed by the chancellor, may serve as a member of the accrediting commission which accredits the public community colleges.

71027. The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall establish criteria and standards for graded classes in grades 13 and 14.

71028. The board of governors shall review and approve academic master plans and master plans for facilities for each community college district. Such plans shall be submitted to the board of governors by the local governing board of each community college district. Master plans for facilities submitted pursuant to Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 81800) of Part 49 of Division 7 of this title shall satisfy the requirements of this section in relation to master plans for facilities. Each district shall annually submit changes in its approved academic master plan for approval by the

(b) Whether the program provides preventative, proactive, social, or educational services.

(c) Whether there is a need to expand the program to a statewide basis, and whether the services provided by the program are duplicative of other state or local services.

(d) The direct and indirect program benefits to the parents and children who are participants in the program.

(e) The effectiveness of the program in preventing family crises, child abuse, and neglect.

(f) The characteristics of the targeted service population.

8219. This article shall become inoperative on June 30, 1992, and, as of January 1, 1993, is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which becomes effective on or before January 1, 1993, deletes or extends the dates on which it becomes inoperative and is repealed.

SEC. 2. The sum of thirty-seven thousand five hundred dollars ($37,500) is hereby appropriated from the General Fund to the State Department of Education for the purposes of Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 8216) of Chapter 2 of Part 6 of the Education Code for the period of January 1, 1989, to June 30, 1989, inclusive. It is the intent of the Legislature that funds necessary in future years for the purpose of the Parent-Child Information Pilot Project as added to Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 8216) of Chapter 2 of Part 6 of the Education Code, be appropriated in the Budget Act of subsequent fiscal years.

SEC. 3. This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The facts constituting the necessity are:

In order to initiate the system provided for under Section 1 of this act in response to current critical needs related to child care and development, it is necessary that this act take effect immediately.

CHAPTER 973

An act to amend Sections 66701, 71000, 71001, 78205, 84381, 84713, 87102, 87104, 87454, 87457, 87602, 87663, and 87743 of, to add Sections 71020.5, 71090.5, 78212.5, 84750, 84755, 87001, 87107, 87482.6, 87608.5, 87610.1, 87615, 87743.1, 87743.2, 87743.3, 87743.4, and 87743.5 to, to add Article 5 (commencing with Section 87150) to Chapter 1 of Part 51 of, to add Chapter 9.2 (commencing with Section 66720) to Part 40 of, and Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 87350) to Part 51 of, to add Part 43.5 (commencing with Section 70900) to Division 7 of, to repeal and add Sections 71020, 72411.5, 87458, 87605, 87608, 87609, 87610, and 87611 of, to repeal Sections 71023, 71025, 71026, 71027, 71028, 71062, 71063, 71064, 71066, 71068, 71069, 71070, 71071, 71072, 71073, 71075, 71076, 71079, 71080, 71091, 72201, 72230, 72231.5, 72233, 72282, 72284, 72285, 72286, 72287, 72288, 72289, 72290, 72291, 72292,

72300, 78200, 87455, and 87456 of, and to repeal Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 87200) of Part 51 of, the Education Code, relating to community colleges, and making an appropriation therefor.

[Approved by Governor September 19, 1988. Filed with Secretary of State September 19, 1988.]

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares as follows, with regard to the general background and intent of this act:

(a) The California Community Colleges face an unprecedented challenge in the coming two decades, as California undergoes a major demographic, social, and economic transformation. The community colleges are at the center of this change, and the state's future as a healthy and free, diverse, and creative society depends in major part upon the commitments expressed through and in the community colleges.

(b) The community colleges educate hundreds of thousands of Californians every year, are the route to higher education for the majority of our people, provide access to language and citizenship for tens of thousands of immigrants annually, retrain workers in an economy changing more rapidly than any in history, and are the last hope for older citizens seeking skills and involvement in their communities. To do these things well, to bring excitement and power into the lives of students so diverse and needing so much, to serve the economy and society through its service of these students, requires a deep commitment from all who teach and learn, from those who administer and counsel, from those who fund and regulate.

(c) The community colleges embody an historic commitment to provide an opportunity for college instruction for all Californians capable of benefiting from instruction. The community colleges have historically found their mission in the statewide scheme for higher education, the Master Plan for Higher Education, and in local commitments to meet the needs of different communities—urban and rural, middle class and poor. From these sources have come the conviction, and the fact, that the community colleges ought to provide high quality lower division instruction for purposes of transfer to baccalaureate institutions, and a wide range of courses and programs to meet vocational and basic education needs. The community colleges have been notable because they are local and accessible, diverse in their responsiveness to local needs, and yet have maintained standards capable of placing students in any of the state's universities or in any of the state's industries.

(d) Since the development of the original master plan, there has been a significant change in the populations served by the community colleges, and in the anticipated needs of the state as we

Trustees of the California State University, with appropriate consultation with the Academic Senates of the respective segments, shall jointly develop, maintain, and disseminate a common core curriculum in general education courses for the purposes of transfer. Any person who has successfully completed the transfer core curriculum, shall be deemed to have thereby completed all lower division general education requirements for the University of California and the California State University.

66721. Upon development of the transfer core curriculum pursuant to Section 66720, and upon any subsequent joint revision of that curriculum, the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges, the Regents of the University of California, and the Trustees of the California State University shall jointly cause the curriculum to be published and distributed to each public school in this state that provides instruction in any of the grades 7 to 12, inclusive, and to each community college in this state, with an emphasis on the communication of that information to each school or college having a high proportion of students who are members of one or more ethnic minorities. In addition, the Board of Governors shall distribute that transfer core curriculum to the State Board of Education, which shall apply that information to ensure, through its curriculum development activities, that public school pupils enrolled in any of the grades 9 to 12, inclusive, are aware of the academic requirements for preparation for higher education and may receive any necessary academic remediation in a timely manner.

66723. No provision of this chapter shall apply to the University of California except to the extent that the Regents of the University of California, by appropriate resolution, makes that provision applicable.

SEC. 8. Part 43.5 (commencing with Section 70900) is added to Division 7 of the Education Code, to read:

PART 43.5. THE CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGES

70900. There is hereby created the California Community Colleges, a postsecondary education system consisting of community college districts heretofore and hereafter established pursuant to law and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges. The board of governors shall carry out the functions specified in Section 70901 and local districts shall carry out the functions specified in Section 70902.

70901. (a) The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall provide leadership and direction in the continuing development of the California Community Colleges as an integral and effective element in the structure of public higher education in the state. The work of the board of governors shall at all times be directed to maintaining and continuing, to the maximum degree permissible, local authority and control in the administration of the California Community Colleges.

(b) Subject to, and in furtherance of, subdivision (a), and in consultation with community college districts and other interested parties as specified in subdivision (e), the board of governors shall provide general supervision over community college districts, and shall, in furtherance thereof, perform the following functions:

(1) Establish minimum standards as required by law, including, but not limited to, the following:

(A) Minimum standards to govern student academic standards relating to graduation requirements and probation, dismissal, and readmission policies.

(B) Minimum standards for the employment of academic and administrative staff in community colleges.

(C) Minimum standards for the formation of community colleges and districts.

(D) Minimum standards for credit and noncredit classes.

(E) Minimum standards governing procedures established by governing boards of community college districts to ensure faculty, staff, and students the right to participate effectively in district and college governance, and the opportunity to express their opinions at the campus level and to ensure that these opinions are given every reasonable consideration, and the right of academic senates to assume primary responsibility for making recommendations in the areas of curriculum and academic standards.

(2) Evaluate and issue annual reports on the fiscal and educational effectiveness of community college districts according to outcome measures cooperatively developed with those districts, and provide assistance when districts encounter severe management difficulties.

(3) Conduct necessary systemwide research on community colleges and provide appropriate information services, including, but not limited to, definitions for the purpose of uniform reporting, collection, compilation, and analysis of data for effective planning and coordination, and dissemination of information.

(4) Provide representation, advocacy, and accountability for the California Community Colleges before state and national legislative and executive agencies.

(5) Administer state support programs, both operational and capital outlay, and those federally supported programs for which the board of governors has responsibility pursuant to state or federal law. In so doing, the board of governors shall do the following:

(A) Annually prepare and adopt a proposed budget for the California Community Colleges. The proposed budget shall, at a minimum, identify the total revenue needs for serving educational needs within the mission, the amount to be expended for the state general apportionment, the amounts requested for various categorical programs established by law, the amounts requested for new programs and budget improvements, and the amount requested for systemwide administration.

The proposed budget for the California Community Colleges shall be submitted to the Department of Finance in accordance with

established timelines for development of the annual Budget Bill.

(B) To the extent authorized by law, establish the method for determining and allocating the state general apportionment.

(C) Establish space and utilization standards for facility planning in order to determine eligibility for state funds for construction purposes.

(6) Establish minimum conditions entitling districts to receive state aid for support of community colleges. In so doing, the board of governors shall establish and carry out a periodic review of each community college district to determine whether it has met the minimum conditions prescribed by the board of governors.

(7) Coordinate and encourage interdistrict, regional, and statewide development of community college programs, facilities, and services.

(8) Facilitate articulation with other segments of higher education with secondary education.

(9) Review and approve comprehensive plans for each community college district. The plans shall be submitted to the board of governors by the governing board of each community college district.

(10) Review and approve all educational programs offered by community college districts, and all courses that are not offered as part of an educational program approved by the board of governors.

(11) Exercise general supervision over the formation of new community college districts and the reorganization of existing community college districts, including the approval or disapproval of plans therefor.

(12) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, be solely responsible for establishing, maintaining, revising, and updating, as necessary, the uniform budgeting and accounting structures and procedures for the California Community Colleges.

(13) Establish policies regarding interdistrict attendance of students.

(14) Advise and assist governing boards of community college districts on the implementation and interpretation of state and federal laws affecting community colleges.

(15) Carry out other functions as expressly provided by law.

(c) Subject to, and in furtherance of, subdivision (a), the board of governors shall have full authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary and proper to execute the functions specified in this section as well as other functions that the board of governors is expressly authorized by statute to regulate.

(d) Wherever in this section or any other statute a power is vested in the board of governors, the board of governors, by a majority vote, may adopt a rule delegating that power to the chancellor, or any officer, employee, or committee of the California Community Colleges, or community college district, as the board of governors may designate. However, the board of governors shall not delegate any power that is expressly made nondelegable by statute. Any rule

delegating authority shall prescribe the limits of delegation.

(e) In performing the functions specified in this section, the board of governors shall establish and carry out a process for consultation with institutional representatives of community college districts so as to ensure their participation in the development and review of policy proposals. The consultation process shall also afford community college organizations, as well as interested individuals and parties, an opportunity to review and comment on proposed policy before it is adopted by the board of governors.

70901.5. (a) The board of governors shall establish procedures for the adoption of rules and regulations governing the California Community Colleges. Among other matters, the procedures shall implement the following requirements:

(1) Written notice of a proposed action shall be provided to each community college district and to all other interested parties and individuals, including the educational policy and fiscal committees of the Legislature and the Department of Finance, at least 45 days in advance of adoption. The regulations shall become effective no earlier than 30 days after adoption.

(2) The proposed regulations shall be accompanied by an estimate, prepared in accordance with instructions adopted by the Department of Finance, of the effect of the proposed regulations with regard to the costs or savings to any state agency, the cost of any state-mandated local program as governed by Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code, any other costs or savings of local agencies, and the costs or savings in federal funding provided to state agencies.

(3) The board of governors shall ensure that all proposed regulations of the board meet the standards of "necessity," "authority," "clarity," "consistency," "reference," and "nonduplication," as those terms are defined in Section 11349 of the Government Code. A district governing board or any other interested party may challenge any proposed regulatory action regarding the application of these standards.

(4) Prior to the adoption of regulations, the board of governors shall consider and respond to all written and oral comments received during the comment period.

(5) The effective date for a regulation shall be suspended if, within 30 days after adoption by the board of governors, at least two-thirds of all governing boards vote, in open session, to disapprove the regulation. With respect to any regulation so disapproved, the board of governors shall provide at least 45 additional days for review, comment, and hearing, including at least one hearing before the board itself. After the additional period of review, comment, and hearing, the board may do any of the following:

(A) Reject or withdraw the regulation.

(B) Substantially amend the regulation to address the concerns raised during the additional review period, and then adopt the revised regulation. The regulation shall be treated as a newly

adopted regulation, and shall go into effect in accordance with those procedures.

(C) Readopt the regulation as originally adopted, or with those nonsubstantive, technical amendments deemed necessary to clarify the intent of the original regulation. If the board of governors decides to readopt a regulation, with or without technical amendments, it shall also adopt a written declaration and determination regarding the specific state interests it has found necessary to protect by means of the specific language or requirements of the regulation. A readopted regulation may then be challenged pursuant to existing law in a court of competent jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to any further appeal within the California Community Colleges.

(6) As to any regulation which the Department of Finance determines would create a state-mandated local program cost, the board of governors shall not adopt the regulation until the Department of Finance has certified to the board of governors and to the Legislature that a source of funds is available to reimburse that cost.

(7) Any district or other interested party may propose a new regulation or challenge any existing regulation.

(b) Except as expressly provided by this section, and except as provided by resolution of the board of governors, the provisions of Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 11340) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code shall not apply to regulations adopted by the board of governors.

70902. (a) Every community college district shall be under the control of a board of trustees, which is referred to herein as the "governing board." The governing board of each community college district shall establish, maintain, operate, and govern one or more community colleges in accordance with law. In so doing, the governing board may initiate and carry on any program, activity, or may otherwise act in any manner that is not in conflict with or inconsistent with, or preempted by, any law and that is not in conflict with the purposes for which community college districts are established.

The governing board of each community college district shall establish rules and regulations not inconsistent with the regulations of the board of governors and the laws of this state for the government and operation of one or more community colleges in the district.

(b) In furtherance of the provisions of subdivision (a), the governing board of each community college district shall do all of the following:

(1) Establish policies for, and approve, current and long-range academic and facilities plans and programs and promote orderly growth and development of the community colleges within the district. In so doing, the governing board shall, as required by law, establish policies for, develop, and approve, comprehensive plans. The governing board shall submit the comprehensive plans to the

board of governors for review and approval.

(2) Establish policies for and approve courses of instruction and educational programs. The educational programs shall be submitted to the board of governors for approval. Courses of instruction that are not offered in approved educational programs shall be submitted to the board of governors for approval. The governing board shall establish policies for, and approve, individual courses that are offered in approved educational programs without referral to the board of governors.

(3) Establish academic standards, probation and dismissal and readmission policies, and graduation requirements not inconsistent with the minimum standards adopted by the board of governors.

(4) Employ and assign all personnel not inconsistent with the minimum standards adopted by the board of governors and establish employment practices, salaries, and benefits for all employees not inconsistent with the laws of this state.

(5) To the extent authorized by law, determine and control the district's operational and capital outlay budgets. The district governing board shall determine the need for elections for override tax levies and bond measures and request that those elections be called.

(6) Manage and control district property. The governing board may contract for the procurement of goods and services as authorized by law.

(7) Establish procedures not inconsistent with minimum standards established by the board of governors to ensure faculty, staff, and students the opportunity to express their opinions at the campus level and to ensure that these opinions are given every reasonable consideration, and the right to participate effectively in district and college governance, and the right of academic senates to assume primary responsibility for making recommendations in the areas of curriculum and academic standards.

(8) Establish rules and regulations governing student conduct.

(9) Establish student fees as it is required to establish by law, and, in its discretion, fees as it is authorized to establish by law.

(10) In its discretion, receive and administer gifts, grants, and scholarships.

(11) Provide auxiliary services as deemed necessary to achieve the purposes of the community college.

(12) Within the framework provided by law, determine the district's academic calendar, including the holidays it will observe.

(13) Hold and convey property for the use and benefit of the district. The governing board may acquire by eminent domain any property necessary to carry out the powers or functions of the district.

(14) Participate in the consultation process established by the board of governors for the development and review of policy proposals.

(c) In carrying out the powers and duties specified in subdivision

(b) or other provisions of statute, the governing board of each community college district shall have full authority to adopt rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the regulations of the board of governors and the laws of this state, that are necessary and proper to executing these prescribed functions.

(d) Wherever in this section or any other statute a power is vested in the governing board, the governing board of a community college district, by majority vote, may adopt a rule delegating the power to the district's chief executive officer or any other employee or committee as the governing board may designate; provided, however, that the governing board shall not delegate any power that is expressly made nondelegable by statute. Any rule delegating authority shall prescribe the limits of the delegation.

SEC. 9. Section 71000 of the Education Code is amended to read:

71000. There is in the state government a Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges, consisting of all of the following:

(a) Thirteen members, who are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Of the members appointed by the Governor, two shall be current or former elected members of local community college district governing boards. The Governor shall appoint the current or former members of the governing board of a community college district for staggered six-year terms. The voting members who are current or former members of the governing board of a community college district shall first be appointed no later than January 15, 1990, and January 15, 1992, respectively.

(b) One voting student who is enrolled in a community college with a minimum of five semester units, or its equivalent, at the time of the appointment and throughout the period of his or her term of appointment, or until a replacement has been named. A student member shall be enrolled in a community college at least one semester prior to his or her appointment and shall meet and maintain the minimum standards of scholarship prescribed for community college students. The student member shall be appointed by the Governor for a one-year term commencing on June 1.

(c) Two voting tenured faculty members from a community college, who shall be appointed by the Governor for two-year terms. The Governor shall appoint each faculty member from a list of names of at least three persons furnished by the Academic Senate of the California Community Colleges. The first voting tenured faculty member appointed to the board shall occupy the seat on the board that is made available by the next full-term vacancy of a four-year term that exists after January 1, 1984. The first voting tenured faculty member appointed to the additional voting tenured faculty member seat on the board provided by the amendments to this section enacted by the Statutes of 1987 shall occupy the second seat on the board that is made available by the next full-term vacancies that exist after January 1, 1988. Thereafter, each seat shall be designated as a

	the Education Code, the adoption of regulations as required by Sections 70901.5, 87356, 87359, 87107, and 87482.6 of the Education Code and Section 69 of this act, the development of a list of disciplines, as required by Section 87357 of the Education Code, and the review required by Section 87359.5 of the Education Code	$300,000
(d)	For purposes of commencing implementation of Section 84750 of the Education Code, during the period of January 1, 1989, through June 30, 1990	$300,000
(e)	For purposes of subdivision (b) of Section 87104 of the Education Code	$300,000
(f)	For purposes of Section 71020.5 of the Education Code	$150,000
(g)	To the Community College Fund for instructional improvement pursuant to Section 84381 of the Education Code	$200,000

CHAPTER 974

An act to amend and supplement Section 2.00 of the Budget Act of 1988 by augmenting Items 0540-001-001, 2200-001-001, 2240-001-001, 3360-001-465, 3720-001-001, 4170-101-001, 4200-101-001, 4260-101-001, 4260-111-001, 4260-121-001, 4440-101-001, 4440-111-001, 5240-001-001, 5450-001-001, 5460-001-001, 7980-111-001, 7980-121-001, 8260-001-001, 8300-001-001, 8570-001-001, 9800-001-001, 9800-001-494, and 9800-001-988 thereof, amending Items 6440-025-001 and 6610-025-001 thereof, and adding Items 0820-301-001, 2200-001-036, 2200-101-036, and 9210-102-001 thereto, relating to the support of the State of California, and making an appropriation therefor, to take effect immediately, usual current expenses.

[Approved by Governor September 19, 1988. Filed with Secretary of State September 19, 1988.]

I am deleting the $3 million transfer to the General Fund contained in Section 17 of Assembly Bill No. 1903. This action is necessary due to the lack of funds in the Special Account for Capital Outlay.

With this deletion, I approve Assembly Bill No. 1903.

GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Item 0820-301-001 is added to Section 2.00 of the Budget Act of 1988, to read:

Community Colleges As Part of Public School System; Duties of State Board of Education

22650. The public community colleges are secondary schools and shall continue to be a part of the public school system of this state. The State Board of Education shall prescribe minimum standards for the formation and operation of public community colleges and exercise general supervision over public community colleges.

(Amended by Stats. 1970, Ch. 102.)

Scope of Instruction by Community Colleges

22651. Public community colleges shall offer instruction through but not beyond the 14th grade level, which instruction may include, but shall not be limited to, programs in one or more of the following categories: (1) standard collegiate courses for transfer to higher institutions; (2) vocational and technical fields leading to employment; and (3) general or liberal arts courses. Studies in these fields may lead to the associate in arts or associate in science degree.

(Amended by Stats. 1970, Ch. 102.)

CHAPTER 5. CO-ORDINATING COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

(Chapter 5 repealed by Stats. 1973, Ch. 1187. Operative April 1, 1974. See note following Section 22710)

22700–22705. (Repealed by Stats. 1973, Ch. 1187. Operative April 1, 1974. See note following Section 22710.)

Note: Chapter 5, consisting of Sections 22700–22705, effective until April 1, 1974, reads as follows:

CHAPTER 5. CO-ORDINATING COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

22700. (a) There is hereby created an advisory body, the Coordinating Council for Higher Education, to be composed of one representative each of the University of California, the California State Colleges, the public community colleges, the private colleges and universities in the state, one nonvoting ex officio member of the State Board of Education, and six representatives of the general public. The university shall be represented by a person appointed by the regents. The California State Colleges shall be represented by a person appointed by the trustees. The public community colleges shall be represented by a person appointed by the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges. The private colleges and universities shall be represented by a person appointed by the Governor after consideration of a list or lists of not less than three persons submitted to him by an association or associations of such institutions and subject to confirmation by the Senate. The State Board of Education shall be represented by a board member appointed by the president of the board. The general public shall be represented by six members appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the Senate. The terms of the appointments made pursuant to this section shall be as follows:

(1) The representative appointed by the regents shall serve a one-year term.

(2) The representative appointed by the trustees shall serve a one-year term.

(3) The representative appointed by the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall serve a one-year term.

tenance of classes under this section as it could do were the classes established and maintained within the district.

(Amended by Stats. 1970, Ch. 102.)

Contract With Federal Government to Provide Classes and Courses for Servicemen

25509.6. The governing board of any school district maintaining a community college may enter into a contract on a full-cost basis with the federal government or any agency of the federal government to provide community college courses and classes to persons in the military service of the United States at any military camp, post, installation, base, vessel, or location, whether within or outside the district or the state.

(Added by Stats. 1971, Ch. 1153.)

Adoption of Minimum Standards for Receipt of State Aid

25510. The State Board of Education shall adopt rules and regulations fixing minimum standards entitling districts to receive state aid for the support of community colleges.

(Amended by Stats. 1970, Ch. 102.)

Annual Investigation to Determine if Standards Are Met

25510.5. The State Department of Education shall annually investigate each community college to determine whether it has met the standards. As part of such investigation, representatives of the department may participate in the accreditation visits conducted by the regional accrediting agency, and one representative of the department, who may be appointed by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, may serve as a member of the accrediting commission which accredits the public community colleges.

(Amended by Stats. 1970, Ch. 102.)

Standards for Graded Classes in Grades 13 and 14

25511. The State Board of Education shall establish criteria and standards for graded classes in grades 13 and 14.

(Added by Stats. 1963, Ch. 100.)

Maintenance of Summer School; "Academic Year" Defined

25511.5. The governing board of a district maintaining one or more community colleges may maintain a summer school at any of such community colleges during the period between the close of one academic year and the beginning of the succeeding academic year in accordance with rules and regulations of the State Board of Education and with the prior written approval of the Superintendent of Public Instruction.

The term "academic year" as used in this section means that portion of the school year during which the regular day community college is maintained, which period must include not less than the number of days of teaching required to entitle the district to apportionments of state funds.

(Amended by Stats. 1970, Ch. 102.)

(c) The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall appoint an advisory committee to assist with the development of the data collection instrument, the review of the data collected, and continued improvement of the data collection system. The committee shall consist of at least one representative each from the Department of Finance, the office of the Legislative Analyst, the statewide associations representing continuation high schools, independent study, school administrators, and teachers. Members of the advisory committee shall serve without compensation, but the State Department of Education shall reimburse members for travel expenses.

(d) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2002, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2002, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 2. The sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) is hereby appropriated from the General Fund for the 1998–99 fiscal year to the State Department of Education for the purposes of Section 33319.6 of the Education Code.

SEC. 3. This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The facts constituting the necessity are:

So that data collection and reporting required by this act may take place as soon as possible, it is necessary that this act take effect immediately.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS—COMMUNITY COLLEGES—BOARD OF GOVERNORS

CHAPTER 1023

A.B. No. 2329

AN ACT to amend Section 70901 of the Education Code, and to amend Sections 10295, 10430, 12100.5, and 12120 of, and to add Sections 20661 and 20662 to, the Public Contract Code, relating to community colleges.

[Approved by Governor September 30, 1998.]

[Filed with Secretary of State September 30, 1998.]

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 2329, Firestone. Community colleges: contracts.

Under existing law, the Regents of the University of California and the Trustees of the California State University are not subject to laws governing contracts for the state procurement of materials, goods, supplies, or services, or for the acquisition of electronic data-processing and telecommunications goods and services, with certain exceptions. Under existing law, the trustees are required to develop policies and procedures that further expressed legislative policies for procurement without the involvement of the Department of Finance or the Department of General Services.

This bill would provide that the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges is not subject to the laws described above, but would require the board to develop policies and procedures that further express legislative policies for procurement without the involvement of the Department of Finance or the Department of General Services.

Under existing law, Section 8 of Article XVI of the California Constitution (Proposition 98) sets forth a formula for computing the minimum amount of General Fund revenues that the state is required to appropriate for the support of school districts, as defined, and community college districts for each fiscal year.

The bill would authorize the Chancellor of the California Community Colleges to enter into a contract on behalf of one or more community college districts, subject to certain restrictions. The bill would require the chancellor to report to the Legislature and the Governor by

January 1, 2001, on contracts entered into pursuant to these provisions and any resultant cost savings. The bill would authorize the chancellor to enter into a contract with a community college district whereby the district performs services or acts as a fiscal agent on behalf of the California Community Colleges when the funds for the contract or agreement are in satisfaction of the state obligation to provide funding pursuant to Section 8 of Article XVI of the California Constitution. The bill would authorize the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges to adopt regulations to implement the provisions of this paragraph.

This bill would incorporate additional changes in Section 10430 of the Public Contract Code proposed by SB 412, to be operative if SB 412 and this bill are both enacted and become effective on or before January 1, 1999, and this bill is enacted last.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Section 70901 of the Education Code is amended to read:

70901. (a) The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall provide leadership and direction in the continuing development of the California Community Colleges as an integral and effective element in the structure of public higher education in the state. The work of the board of governors shall at all times be directed to maintaining and continuing, to the maximum degree permissible, local authority and control in the administration of the California Community Colleges.

(b) Subject to, and in furtherance of, subdivision (a), and in consultation with community college districts and other interested parties as specified in subdivision (e), the board of governors shall provide general supervision over community college districts, and shall, in furtherance thereof, perform the following functions:

(1) Establish minimum standards as required by law, including, but not limited to, the following:

(A) Minimum standards to govern student academic standards relating to graduation requirements and probation, dismissal, and readmission policies.

(B) Minimum standards for the employment of academic and administrative staff in community colleges.

(C) Minimum standards for the formation of community colleges and districts.

(D) Minimum standards for credit and noncredit classes.

(E) Minimum standards governing procedures established by governing boards of community college districts to ensure faculty, staff, and students the right to participate effectively in district and college governance, and the opportunity to express their opinions at the campus level and to ensure that these opinions are given every reasonable consideration, and the right of academic senates to assume primary responsibility for making recommendations in the areas of curriculum and academic standards.

(2) Evaluate and issue annual reports on the fiscal and educational effectiveness of community college districts according to outcome measures cooperatively developed with those districts, and provide assistance when districts encounter severe management difficulties.

(3) Conduct necessary systemwide research on community colleges and provide appropriate information services, including, but not limited to, definitions for the purpose of uniform reporting, collection, compilation, and analysis of data for effective planning and coordination, and dissemination of information.

(4) Provide representation, advocacy, and accountability for the California Community Colleges before state and national legislative and executive agencies.

(5) Administer state support programs, both operational and capital outlay, and those federally supported programs for which the board of governors has responsibility pursuant to state or federal law. In so doing, the board of governors shall do the following:

(A) Annually prepare and adopt a proposed budget for the California Community Colleges. The proposed budget shall, at a minimum, identify the total revenue needs for serving educational needs within the mission, the amount to be expended for the state general

apportionment, the amounts requested for various categorical programs established by law, the amounts requested for new programs and budget improvements, and the amount requested for systemwide administration.

The proposed budget for the California Community Colleges shall be submitted to the Department of Finance in accordance with established timelines for development of the annual Budget Bill.

(B) To the extent authorized by law, establish the method for determining and allocating the state general apportionment.

(C) Establish space and utilization standards for facility planning in order to determine eligibility for state funds for construction purposes.

(6) Establish minimum conditions entitling districts to receive state aid for support of community colleges. In so doing, the board of governors shall establish and carry out a periodic review of each community college district to determine whether it has met the minimum conditions prescribed by the board of governors.

(7) Coordinate and encourage interdistrict, regional, and statewide development of community college programs, facilities, and services.

(8) Facilitate articulation with other segments of higher education with secondary education.

(9) Review and approve comprehensive plans for each community college district. The plans shall be submitted to the board of governors by the governing board of each community college district.

(10) Review and approve all educational programs offered by community college districts, and all courses that are not offered as part of an educational program approved by the board of governors.

(11) Exercise general supervision over the formation of new community college districts and the reorganization of existing community college districts, including the approval or disapproval of plans therefor.

(12) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, be solely responsible for establishing, maintaining, revising, and updating, as necessary, the uniform budgeting and accounting structures and procedures for the California Community Colleges.

(13) Establish policies regarding interdistrict attendance of students.

(14) Advise and assist governing boards of community college districts on the implementation and interpretation of state and federal laws affecting community colleges.

(15) Contract for the procurement of goods and services, as necessary.

(16) Carry out other functions as expressly provided by law.

(c) Subject to, and in furtherance of, subdivision (a), the board of governors shall have full authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary and proper to execute the functions specified in this section as well as other functions that the board of governors is expressly authorized by statute to regulate.

(d) Wherever in this section or any other statute a power is vested in the board of governors, the board of governors, by a majority vote, may adopt a rule delegating that power to the chancellor, or any officer, employee, or committee of the California Community Colleges, or community college district, as the board of governors may designate. However, the board of governors shall not delegate any power that is expressly made nondelegable by statute. Any rule delegating authority shall prescribe the limits of delegation.

(e) In performing the functions specified in this section, the board of governors shall establish and carry out a process for consultation with institutional representatives of community college districts so as to ensure their participation in the development and review of policy proposals. The consultation process shall also afford community college organizations, as well as interested individuals and parties, an opportunity to review and comment on proposed policy before it is adopted by the board of governors.

SEC. 2. Section 10295 of the Public Contract Code, as amended by Chapter 88 of the Statutes of 1998, is amended to read:

10295. All contracts entered into by any state agency for (a) the hiring or purchase of equipment, supplies, materials, or elementary school textbooks, (b) services, whether or not the services involve the furnishing or use of equipment, materials or supplies or are performed by an independent contractor, (c) the construction, alteration, improvement, repair or maintenance of property, real or personal, or (d) the performance of work or services by the state agency for or in cooperation with any person, or public body, are void unless and until approved by the department. Every such contract shall be transmitted with all papers, estimates, and recommendations concerning it to the department and, if approved by the department, shall be effective from the date of the approval. This section applies to any state agency that by general or specific statute is expressly or impliedly authorized to enter into transactions referred to in this section. This section does not apply to any transaction entered into by the Trustees of the California State University, by the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges, or by a department under the State Contract Act or the California State University Contract Law, any contract of a type specifically mentioned and authorized to be entered into by the Department of Transportation under Section 14035 or 14035.5 of the Government Code, Sections 99316 to 99319, inclusive, of the Public Utilities Code, or the Streets and Highways Code, any contract entered into by the Department of Transportation that is not funded by money derived by state tax sources but, rather, is funded by money derived from federal or local tax sources, any contract entered into by the Department of Personnel Administration for state employees in State Bargaining Unit 16 for employee benefits, occupational health and safety, training services, or combination thereof any contract let by the Legislature, or any contract entered into under the authority of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 11770) of Part 3 of Division 2 of the Insurance Code.

SEC. 3. Section 10430 of the Public Contract Code, as amended by Section 72 of Chapter 88 of the Statutes of 1998, is amended to read:

10430. This chapter does not apply to any of the following:

(a) The Regents of the University of California.

(b) Transactions covered under Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 12100).

(c) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any entity exempted from the provisions of Section 10295 or 10295.1. However, the Trustees of the California State University and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall be governed by this chapter except with regard to transactions covered under the California State University and Colleges Contract Law, and except as provided in Sections 10295, 10335, 10356, and 10389.

(d) Transactions covered under Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 4525) of Division 5 of Title 1 of the Government Code.

(e) Except as provided for in subdivision (c), members of boards or commissions who receive no payment other than payment for each meeting of the board or commission, payment for preparatory time, and payment for per diem.

(f) The emergency purchase of protective vests for correctional peace officers whose duties require routine contact with state prison inmates. This subdivision shall remain operative only until January 1, 1987.

(g) Spouses of state officers or employees and individuals and entities that employ spouses of state officers and employees, that are vendored to provide services to regional center clients pursuant to Section 4648 of the Welfare and Institutions Code if the vendor of services, in that capacity, does not receive any material financial benefit, distinguishable from the benefit to the public generally, from any governmental decision made by the state officer or employee.

SEC. 3.5. Section 10430 of the Public Contract Code, as amended by Section 72 of Chapter 88 of the Statutes of 1998, is amended to read:

10430. This chapter does not apply to any of the following:

(a) The Regents of the University of California.

(b)(1) Transactions covered under Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 12100), except that Sections 10365.5, 10410, and 10411 shall apply to all individuals, companies, corporations, or other entities that bid on or are awarded contracts, either as contractors or subcontractors, pursuant to that chapter.

(2) The changes made to this subdivision during the 1998 portion of the 1997–98 Regular Session shall not be construed to have retroactive effect on any pending action, arbitration, or administrative proceeding, but shall only apply to an action, arbitration, or administrative proceeding, at law or in equity, that is commenced on or after January 1, 1999.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any entity exempted from the provisions of Section 10295 or 10295.1. However, the Trustees of the California State University and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall be governed by this chapter except with regard to transactions covered under the California State University and Colleges Contract Law, and except as provided in Sections 10295, 10335, 10356, and 10389.

(d) Transactions covered under Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 4525) of Division 5 of Title 1 of the Government Code.

(e) Except as provided for in subdivision (c), members of boards or commissions who receive no payment other than payment for each meeting of the board or commission, payment for preparatory time, and payment for per diem.

(f) The emergency purchase of protective vests for correctional peace officers whose duties require routine contact with state prison inmates. This subdivision shall remain operative only until January 1, 1987.

(g) Spouses of state officers or employees and individuals and entities that employ spouses of state officers and employees, that are vendored to provide services to regional center clients pursuant to Section 4648 of the Welfare and Institutions Code if the vendor of services, in that capacity, does not receive any material financial benefit, distinguishable from the benefit to the public generally, from any governmental decision made by the state officer or employee.

SEC. 4. Section 12100.5 of the Public Contract Code is amended to read:

12100.5. The Regents of the University of California, the Trustees of the California State University, and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall not be subject to this chapter except that the trustees shall develop policies and procedures maintained in its state university administrative manual and the board shall adopt policies and procedures maintained in its administrative manual that further the legislative policies for procurement expressed in this chapter but without the involvement of the Director of Finance and the Director of General Services or the Department of Finance and the Department of General Services.

SEC. 5. Section 12120 of the Public Contract Code is amended to read:

12120. The Legislature finds and declares that, with the advent of deregulation in the telecommunications industry, substantial cost savings can be realized by the state through the specialized evaluation and procurement of alternative telecommunications systems. All contracts for the acquisition of telecommunications services and all contracts for the acquisition of telecommunications goods, whether by lease or purchase, shall be made by, or under the supervision of, the Department of General Services. All procurements shall be accomplished in accordance with Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 12100), relating to the acquisition of electronic data-processing goods and services, except to the extent any directive or provision is uniquely applicable to electronic data-processing acquisitions. The Department of General Services shall have responsibility for the establishment of policy and procedures for telecommunications. The Department of General Services shall have responsibility for the establishment of tactical policy and procedures for data-processing acquisitions consistent with statewide strategic policy as established by the Department of Finance. The Department of Finance shall have review and approval responsibility of data-processing information and telecommunication acquisitions to assure consistency with budgetary objectives. The Trustees of the California State University and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall assume the functions of the Department of Finance and the Department of General Services with regard to procurement of telecommunication goods and services by the California State University and the California Community Colleges respectively. The trustees and the board shall each grant to the Department of General Services, Division of Telecommunications, an opportunity to bid whenever the university or the college system solicits bids for telecommunications goods and services.

SEC. 6. Section 20661 is added to the Public Contract Code, to read:

20661. (a) The Chancellor of the California Community Colleges is authorized to enter into a contract on behalf of one or more community college districts, subject to the following restrictions:

(1) No district may be required to participate in any contract entered into pursuant to this section.

(2) The cost to each district that is a party to or a beneficiary of a contract entered into pursuant to this section must be lower than the cost the district could obtain through its standard contracting procedures. No contract for the procurement of goods or services may be made when a bid has been received by a participating district for the procurement of the same goods or services unless the contract would result in a lower price for the goods or services upon the same terms, conditions, and specifications.

(3) The state shall not incur any financial responsibility in connection with a contract entered into pursuant to this section.

(b) The Chancellor of the California Community Colleges is authorized to charge a fee, commission, or other charge to either or both of the following:

(1) Each provider of goods or services under a contract entered into pursuant to this section.

(2) Each community college district that the chancellor enters into a contract on behalf of pursuant to this section.

(c) On or before January 1, 2001, the Chancellor of the California Community Colleges shall report to the Legislature and the Governor on contracts entered into pursuant to this section and any resultant cost savings.

(d) The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall adopt regulations to implement this section.

SEC. 7. Section 20662 is added to the Public Contract Code, to read:

20662. The Chancellor of the California Community Colleges is authorized to enter into a contract or other agreement with the governing board of any community college district whereby the district performs services or acts as a fiscal agent on behalf of the California Community colleges. This section shall apply only when the funds for the contract or agreement are in satisfaction of the state obligation to provide funding pursuant to Section 8 of Article XVI of the California Constitution.

SEC. 7.5. (a) Article 4 (commencing with Section 19130) of Chapter 5 of Part 2 of Division 5 of Title 2 of the Government Code applies to the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges and to the Chancellor's Office of the California Community Colleges. The Legislature finds and declares that this subdivision is declaratory of existing law.

(b) Nothing in this act shall be construed to provide any exemption from Article 4 (commencing with Section 19130) of Chapter 5 of Part 2 of Division 5 of Title 2 of the Government Code for the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges or the Chancellor's Office of the California Community Colleges.

SEC. 8. It is the intent of the Legislature that this act will result in greater efficiency in the operation of the California Community Colleges.

SEC. 9. Section 3.5 of this bill incorporates amendments to Section 10430 of the Public Contract Code proposed by both this bill and SB 412. It shall only become operative if (1) both bills are enacted and become effective on or before January 1, 1999, (2) each bill amends Section 10430 of the Public Contract Code, and (3) this bill is enacted after SB 412, in which case Section 3 of this bill shall not become operative.

SEC. 320. Section 22635 of the Education Code is amended to read:

22635. The Regents of the University of California, the Trustees of the California State Colleges, and the governing board of every community college or school district maintaining a community college, shall adopt or provide for the adoption of specific rules and regulations governing student behavior along with applicable penalties for violation of such rules and regulations. Every student at such institutions of higher education shall, at the time of registration for a semester or quarter, as the case may be, at such institutions, be provided with a copy of such rules and regulations together with a statement of the applicable penalties which may be incurred by violation thereof. The Regents of the University of California, the Trustees of the California State Colleges, and the governing board of every community college or school district maintaining a community college shall provide for the distribution of any revision of such rules and regulations to students enrolled in such institutions.

SEC. 321. The heading of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 22650) of Division 16.5 of the Education Code is amended to read:

CHAPTER 4. COMMUNITY COLLEGES

SEC. 322. Section 22650 of the Education Code is amended to read:

22650. The public community colleges are secondary schools and shall continue to be a part of the public school system of this state. The State Board of Education shall prescribe minimum standards for the formation and operation of public community colleges and exercise general supervision over public community colleges.

SEC. 323. Section 22651 of the Education Code is amended to read:

22651. Public community colleges shall offer instruction through but not beyond the 14th grade level, which instruction may include, but shall not be limited to, programs in one or more of the following categories: (1) standard collegiate courses for transfer to higher institutions; (2) vocational and technical fields leading to employment; and (3) general or liberal arts courses. Studies in these fields may lead to the associate in arts or associate in science degree.

SEC. 324. Section 22700 of the Education Code is amended to read:

22700. There is hereby created an advisory body, the Coordinating Council for Higher Education, to be composed of three representatives each of the University of California, the California State Colleges, the public community colleges, the private colleges and universities in the state, and six representatives of the general public. The university shall be represented by the president and two regents appointed by the

and the Regents of the University of California.

SEC. 210. Section 66017 of the Education Code is amended to read:

66017. The respective governing boards of the California Community Colleges, the California State University, or the University of California shall adopt appropriate procedures and designate appropriate persons to take disciplinary action against any student, member of the faculty, member of the support staff, or member of the administration of the community college, state college, or state university who, after a prompt hearing by a campus body, has been found to have willfully disrupted the orderly operation of the campus. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit, where an immediate suspension is required in order to protect lives or property and to ensure the maintenance of order, interim suspension pending a hearing; provided that a reasonable opportunity be afforded the suspended person for a hearing within 10 days. The disciplinary action may include, but need not be limited to, suspension, dismissal, or expulsion. Sections 89538 to 89540, inclusive, shall be applicable to any state university or college employee dismissed pursuant to this section.

SEC. 211. Section 66021 of the Education Code is amended to read:

66021. It is the intent of the Legislature that the Budget Act for each fiscal year provide sufficient funding for financial aid for students with demonstrated financial need at the University of California, the California State University, and the California Community Colleges to offset increases in student charges at those institutions. The Legislature intends that funds for increased student financial aid be provided from sources other than student fees.

SEC. 213. Section 66101 of the Education Code is repealed.

SEC. 214. Section 66102 of the Education Code is repealed.

SEC. 215. Section 66200 of the Education Code is repealed.

SEC. 219. Section 66700 of the Education Code is amended to read:

66700. The California Community Colleges are postsecondary schools and shall continue to be a part of the public school system of this state. The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges shall prescribe minimum standards for the formation and operation of the California Community Colleges and exercise general supervision over the California Community Colleges.

SEC. 220. Section 66700.5 of the Education Code is repealed.

SEC. 222. Section 66902.5 of the Education Code is repealed.

SEC. 224. Section 67007 of the Education Code is repealed.

SEC. 225. Section 68010 of the Education Code is repealed.

SEC. 226. Section 68011 of the Education Code is amended to read:

68011. "Institution" means the University of California, the California State University, the California Maritime Academy, or a college of the California Community Colleges.

EXHIBIT 'B'

34 CFR PART 106

and operation of the conducted program or activity and must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion.

(4) If an action required to comply with this section would result in that alteration or those burdens, the Department shall take any other action that would not result in the alteration or burdens but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, individuals with handicaps receive the benefits and services of the program or activity.

§ 105.41 Compliance procedures.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this section applies to all allegations of discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs and activities conducted by the Department.

(b) As provided in § 105.30, the Department shall process complaints alleging violations of section 504 with respect to employment according to the procedures established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 29 CFR part 1613 pursuant to section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791).

(c) The Deputy Under Secretary for Management is responsible for coordinating implementation of this section. Complaints may be sent to the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Management, Federal Building No. 6, 400 Maryland Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20202.

(d) The Department shall accept and investigate all complete complaints for which it has jurisdiction. All complete complaints must be filed within 180 days of the alleged act of discrimination. The Department may extend this time period for good cause.

(e) If the Department receives a complaint over which it does not have jurisdiction, it shall promptly notify the complainant and shall make reasonable efforts to refer the complaint to the appropriate government entity.

(f) The Department shall notify the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board upon receipt of any complaint alleging that a building or facility that is subject to the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4151–4157) is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with handicaps.

(g) Within 180 days of the receipt of a complete complaint for which it has jurisdiction, the Department shall notify the complainant of the results of the investigation in a letter containing—

(1) Findings of fact and conclusions of law;

(2) A description of a remedy for each violation found; and

(3) A notice of the right to appeal.

(h) Appeals of the findings of fact and conclusions of law or remedies must be filed by the complainant within 90 days of receipt from the Department of the letter required by § 105.41(g). The Department may extend this time for good cause.

(i) Timely appeals shall be accepted and processed by the Secretary.

(j) If the Secretary determines that additional information is needed for the complainant, he or she shall notify the complainant of the additional information needed to make his or her determination on the appeal.

(k) The Secretary shall notify the complainant of the results of the appeal.

(l) The time limit in paragraph (g) of this section may be extended by the Secretary.

(m) The Secretary may delegate the authority for conducting complaint investigations to other Federal agencies, except that the authority for making the final determination may not be delegated.

§ 105.42 Effective date.

The effective date of this part is October 9, 1990.

PART 106—NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX IN EDUCATION PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

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SUBJECT INDEX TO TITLE IX PREAMBLE AND REGULATION
APPENDIX A—GUIDELINES FOR ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION AND DENIAL OF SERVICES ON THE BASIS OF RACE, COLOR, NATIONAL ORIGIN, SEX, AND HANDICAP IN VOCATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS [NOTE]

AUTHORITY: 20 U.S.C. 1681 *et seq.*, unless otherwise noted.

SOURCE: 45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, unless otherwise noted.

Subpart A—Introduction

§ 106.1 Purpose and effective date.

The purpose of this part is to effectuate title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended by Pub. L. 93–568, 88 Stat. 1855 (except sections 904 and 906 of those Amendments) which is designed to eliminate (with certain exceptions) discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, whether or not such program or activity is offered or sponsored by an educational institution as defined in this part. This part is also intended to effectuate section 844 of the Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93–380, 88 Stat. 484. The effective date of this part shall be July 21, 1975.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682, as amended by Pub. L. 93–568, 88 Stat. 1855, and sec. 844, Education Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 484, Pub. L. 93–380)

§ 106.2 Definitions.

As used in this part, the term:

(a) *Title IX* means title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92–318, as amended by section 3 of Pub. L. 93–568, 88 Stat. 1855, except sections 904 and 906 thereof; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682, 1683, 1685, 1686.

(b) *Department* means the Department of Education.

(c) *Secretary* means the Secretary of Education.

(d) *Assistant Secretary* means the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights of the Department.

(e) *Reviewing Authority* means that component of the Department delegated authority by the Secretary to appoint, and to review the decisions of, administrative law judges in cases arising under this part.

(f) *Administrative law judge* means a person appointed by the reviewing authority to preside over a hearing held under this part.

(g) *Federal financial assistance* means any of the following, when authorized or extended under a law administered by the Department:

(1) A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, including funds made available for:

(i) The acquisition, construction, renovation, restoration, or repair of a building or facility or any portion thereof; and

(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any entity for payment to or on behalf of students admitted to that entity, or extended directly to such students for payment to that entity.

(2) A grant of Federal real or personal property or any interest therein, including surplus property, and the proceeds of the sale or transfer of such property, if the Federal share of the fair market value of the property is not, upon such sale or transfer, properly accounted for to the Federal Government.

(3) Provision of the services of Federal personnel.

(4) Sale or lease of Federal property or any interest therein at nominal consideration, or at consideration reduced for the purpose of assisting the recipient or in recognition of public interest to be served thereby, or permission to use Federal property or any interest therein without consideration.

(5) Any other contract, agreement, or arrangement which has as one of its purposes the provision of assistance to any education program or activity, except a contract of insurance or guaranty.

(h) *Program or activity* and *program* means all of the operations of—

(1)(i) A department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or local government; or

(ii) The entity of a State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government;

(2)(i) A college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education; or

(ii) A local educational agency (as defined in 20 U.S.C. 8801), system of vocational education, or other school system;

(3)(i) An entire corporation, partnership, other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship—

(A) If assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or

(B) Which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation; or

(ii) The entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to which Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship; or

(4) Any other entity that is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph (h)(1), (2), or (3) of this section; any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.

(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1687)

(i) *Recipient* means any State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of a State or political subdivision thereof, any public or private agency, institution, or organization, or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which operates an education program or activity which receives such assistance, including any subunit, successor, assignee, or transferee thereof.

(j) *Applicant* means one who submits an application, request, or plan required to be approved by a Department official, or by a recipient, as a condition to becoming a recipient.

(k) *Educational institution* means a local educational agency (LEA) as defined by section 1001(f) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 3381), a preschool, a private elementary or secondary school, or an applicant or recipient of the type

defined by paragraph (l), (m), (n), or (o) of this section.

(l) *Institution of graduate higher education* means an institution which:

(1) Offers academic study beyond the bachelor of arts or bachelor of science degree, whether or not leading to a certificate of any higher degree in the liberal arts and sciences; or

(2) Awards any degree in a professional field beyond the first professional degree (regardless of whether the first professional degree in such field is awarded by an institution of undergraduate higher education or professional education); or

(3) Awards no degree and offers no further academic study, but operates ordinarily for the purpose of facilitating research by persons who have received the highest graduate degree in any field of study.

(m) *Institution of undergraduate higher education* means:

(1) An institution offering at least two but less than four years of college level study beyond the high school level, leading to a diploma or an associate degree, or wholly or principally creditable toward a baccalaureate degree; or

(2) An institution offering academic study leading to a baccalaureate degree; or

(3) An agency or body which certifies credentials or offers degrees, but which may or may not offer academic study.

(n) *Institution of professional education* means an institution (except any institution of undergraduate higher education) which offers a program of academic study that leads to a first professional degree in a field for which there is a national specialized accrediting agency recognized by the Secretary.

(o) *Institution of vocational education* means a school or institution (except an institution of professional or graduate or undergraduate higher education) which has as its primary purpose preparation of students to pursue a technical, skilled, or semiskilled occupation or trade, or to pursue study in a technical field, whether or not the school or institution offers certificates, diplomas, or degrees and whether or not it offers fulltime study.

(p) *Administratively separate unit* means a school, department or college of an educational institution (other than a local educational agency) admission to which is independent of admission to any other component of such institution.

(q) *Admission* means selection for part-time, full-time, special, associate, transfer, exchange, or any other enrollment, membership, or matriculation in or at an education program or activity operated by a recipient.

(r) *Student* means a person who has gained admission.

(s) *Transition plan* means a plan subject to the approval of the Secretary pursuant to section 901(a)(2) of the Education Amendments of 1972, under which an educational institution operates in making the transition from being an educational institution which admits only students of one sex to being one which admits students of both sexes without discrimination.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

[45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980; 45 FR 37426, June 3, 1980, as amended at 65 FR 68056, Nov. 13, 2000]

§ 106.3 Remedial and affirmative action and self-evaluation.

(a) *Remedial action.* If the Assistant Secretary finds that a recipient has discriminated against persons on the basis of sex in an education program or activity, such recipient shall take such remedial action as the Assistant Secretary deems necessary to overcome the effects of such discrimination.

(b) *Affirmative action.* In the absence of a finding of discrimination on the basis of sex in an education program or activity, a recipient may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limited participation therein by persons of a particular sex. Nothing herein shall be interpreted to alter any affirmative action obligations which a recipient may have under Executive Order 11246.

(c) *Self-evaluation.* Each recipient education institution shall, within one year of the effective date of this part:

(1) Evaluate, in terms of the requirements of this part, its current policies and practices and the effects thereof concerning admission of students,

treatment of students, and employment of both academic and non-academic personnel working in connection with the recipient's education program or activity;

(2) Modify any of these policies and practices which do not or may not meet the requirements of this part; and

(3) Take appropriate remedial steps to eliminate the effects of any discrimination which resulted or may have resulted from adherence to these policies and practices.

(d) *Availability of self-evaluation and related materials.* Recipients shall maintain on file for at least three years following completion of the evaluation required under paragraph (c) of this section, and shall provide to the Assistant Secretary upon request, a description of any modifications made pursuant to paragraph (c)(ii) of this section and of any remedial steps taken pursuant to paragraph (c)(iii) of this section.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.4 Assurance required.

(a) *General.* Every application for Federal financial assistance shall as condition of its approval contain or be accompanied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary, that the education program or activity operated by the applicant or recipient and to which this part applies will be operated in compliance with this part. An assurance of compliance with this part shall not be satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary if the applicant or recipient to whom such assurance applies fails to commit itself to take whatever remedial action is necessary in accordance with § 106.3(a) to eliminate existing discrimination on the basis of sex or to eliminate the effects of past discrimination whether occurring prior or subsequent to the submission to the Assistant Secretary of such assurance.

(b) *Duration of obligation.* (1) In the case of Federal financial assistance extended to provide real property or structures thereon, such assurance shall obligate the recipient or, in the case of a subsequent transfer, the transferee, for the period during which the real property or structures are used to provide an education program or activity.

(2) In the case of Federal financial assistance extended to provide personal property, such assurance shall obligate the recipient for the period during which it retains ownership or possession of the property.

(3) In all other cases such assurance shall obligate the recipient for the period during which Federal financial assistance is extended.

(c) *Form.* The Director will specify the form of the assurances required by paragraph (a) of this section and the extent to which such assurances will be required of the applicant's or recipient's subgrantees, contractors, subcontractors, transferees, or successors in interest.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

[45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, as amended at 45 FR 86298, Dec. 30, 1980; 65 FR 68056, Nov. 13, 2000]

§ 106.5 Transfers of property.

If a recipient sells or otherwise transfers property financed in whole or in part with Federal financial assistance to a transferee which operates any education program or activity, and the Federal share of the fair market value of the property is not upon such sale or transfer properly accounted for to the Federal Government both the transferor and the transferee shall be deemed to be recipients, subject to the provisions of subpart B of this part.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.6 Effect of other requirements.

(a) *Effect of other Federal provisions.* The obligations imposed by this part are independent of, and do not alter, obligations not to discriminate on the basis of sex imposed by Executive Order 11246, as amended; sections 704 and 855 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 292d and 298b-2); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e *et seq.*); the Equal Pay Act

(29 U.S.C. 206 and 206(d)); and any other Act of Congress or Federal regulation.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, 905, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374, 375; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682, 1685)

(b) *Effect of State or local law or other requirements.* The obligation to comply with this part is not obviated or alleviated by any State or local law or other requirement which would render any applicant or student ineligible, or limit the eligibility of any applicant or student, on the basis of sex, to practice any occupation or profession.

(c) *Effect of rules or regulations of private organizations.* The obligation to comply with this part is not obviated or alleviated by any rule or regulation of any organization, club, athletic or other league, or association which would render any applicant or student ineligible to participate or limit the eligibility or participation of any applicant or student, on the basis of sex, in any education program or activity operated by a recipient and which receives Federal financial assistance.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

[45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, as amended at 65 FR 68056, Nov. 13, 2000]

§ 106.7 Effect of employment opportunities.

The obligation to comply with this part is not obviated or alleviated because employment opportunities in any occupation or profession are or may be more limited for members of one sex than for members of the other sex.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.8 Designation of responsible employee and adoption of grievance procedures.

(a) *Designation of responsible employee.* Each recipient shall designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its responsibilities under this part, including any investigation of any complaint communicated to such recipient alleging its noncompliance with this part or alleging any actions which would be prohibited by this part. The recipient shall notify all its students and employees of the name, office address and telephone number of the employee or employees appointed pursuant to this paragraph.

(b) *Complaint procedure of recipient.* A recipient shall adopt and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action which would be prohibited by this part.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.9 Dissemination of policy.

(a) *Notification of policy.* (1) Each recipient shall implement specific and continuing steps to notify applicants for admission and employment, students and parents of elementary and secondary school students, employees, sources of referral of applicants for admission and employment, and all unions or professional organizations holding collective bargaining or professional agreements with the recipient, that it does not discriminate on the basis of sex in the educational program or activity which it operates, and that it is required by title IX and this part not to discriminate in such a manner. Such notification shall contain such information, and be made in such manner, as the Assistant Secretary finds necessary to apprise such persons of the protections against discrimination assured them by title IX and this part, but shall state at least that the requirement not to discriminate in the education program or activity extends to employment therein, and to admission thereto unless Subpart C does not apply to the recipient, and that inquiries concerning the application of title IX and this part to such recipient may be referred to the employee designated pursuant to § 106.8, or to the Assistant Secretary.

(2) Each recipient shall make the initial notification required by paragraph (a)(1) of this section within 90 days of the effective date of this part or of the date this part first applies to such recipient, whichever comes later, which notification shall include publication in:

(i) Local newspapers;

(ii) Newspapers and magazines operated by such recipient or by student, alumnae, or alumni groups for or in connection with such recipient; and

(iii) Memoranda or other written communications distributed to every student and employee of such recipient.

(b) *Publications.* (1) Each recipient shall prominently include a statement of the policy described in paragraph (a) of this section in each announcement, bulletin, catalog, or application form which it makes available to any person of a type, described in paragraph (a) of this section, or which is otherwise used in connection with the recruitment of students or employees.

(2) A recipient shall not use or distribute a publication of the type described in this paragraph which suggests, by text or illustration, that such recipient treats applicants, students, or employees differently on the basis of sex except as such treatment is permitted by this part.

(c) *Distribution.* Each recipient shall distribute without discrimination on the basis of sex each publication described in paragraph (b) of this section, and shall apprise each of its admission and employment recruitment representatives of the policy of nondiscrimination described in paragraph (a) of this section, and require such representatives to adhere to such policy.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

[45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, as amended at 65 FR 68056, Nov. 13, 2000]

Subpart B—Coverage

§ 106.11 Application.

Except as provided in this subpart, this part 106 applies to every recipient and to the education program or activity operated by such recipient which receives Federal financial assistance.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

[45 FR 86298, Dec. 30, 1980, as amended at 65 FR 68056, Nov. 13, 2000]

§ 106.12 Educational institutions controlled by religious organizations.

(a) *Application.* This part does not apply to an educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization to the extent application of this part would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization.

(b) *Exemption.* An educational institution which wishes to claim the exemption set forth in paragraph (a) of this section, shall do so by submitting in writing to the Assistant Secretary a statement by the highest ranking official of the institution, identifying the provisions of this part which conflict with a specific tenet of the religious organization.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.13 Military and merchant marine educational institutions.

This part does not apply to an educational institution whose primary purpose is the training of individuals for a military service of the United States or for the merchant marine.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.14 Membership practices of certain organizations.

(a) *Social fraternities and sororities.* This part does not apply to the membership practices of social fraternities and sororities which are exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the active membership of which consists primarily of students in attendance at institutions of higher education.

(b) *YMCA, YWCA, Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts and Camp Fire Girls.* This part does not apply to the membership practices of the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, the Girl Scouts, the Boy Scouts and Camp Fire Girls.

(c) *Voluntary youth service organizations.* This part does not apply to the membership practices of voluntary youth service organizations which are exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of

1954 and the membership of which has been traditionally limited to members of one sex and principally to persons of less than nineteen years of age.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682; sec. 3(a) of P.L. 93-568, 88 Stat. 1862 amending Sec. 901)

§ 106.15 Admissions.

(a) Admissions to educational institutions prior to June 24, 1973, are not covered by this part.

(b) *Administratively separate units.* For the purposes only of this section, §§ 106.16 and 106.17, and subpart C, each administratively separate unit shall be deemed to be an educational institution.

(c) *Application of subpart C.* Except as provided in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, subpart C applies to each recipient. A recipient to which subpart C applies shall not discriminate on the basis of sex in admission or recruitment in violation of that subpart.

(d) *Educational institutions.* Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section as to recipients which are educational institutions, subpart C applies only to institutions of vocational education, professional education, graduate higher education, and public institutions of undergraduate higher education.

(e) *Public institutions of undergraduate higher education.* Subpart C does not apply to any public institution of undergraduate higher education which traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of one sex.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

[45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, as amended at 45 FR 86298, Dec. 30, 1980]

§ 106.16 Educational institutions eligible to submit transition plans.

(a) *Application.* This section applies to each educational institution to which subpart C applies which:

(1) Admitted only students of one sex as regular students as of June 23, 1972; or

(2) Admitted only students of one sex as regular students as of June 23, 1965, but thereafter admitted as regular students, students of the sex not admitted prior to June 23, 1965.

(b) *Provision for transition plans.* An educational institution to which this section applies shall not discriminate on the basis of sex in admission or recruitment in violation of subpart C unless it is carrying out a transition plan approved by the Secretary as described in § 106.17, which plan provides for the elimination of such discrimination by the earliest practicable date but in no event later than June 23, 1979.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.17 Transition plans.

(a) *Submission of plans.* An institution to which § 106.16 applies and which is composed of more than one administratively separate unit may submit either a single transition plan applicable to all such units, or a separate transition plan applicable to each such unit.

(b) *Content of plans.* In order to be approved by the Secretary a transition plan shall:

(1) State the name, address, and Federal Interagency Committee on Education (FICE) Code of the educational institution submitting such plan, the administratively separate units to which the plan is applicable, and the name, address, and telephone number of the person to whom questions concerning the plan may be addressed. The person who submits the plan shall be the chief administrator or president of the institution, or another individual legally authorized to bind the institution to all actions set forth in the plan.

(2) State whether the educational institution or administratively separate unit admits students of both sexes, as regular students and, if so, when it began to do so.

(3) Identify and describe with respect to the educational institution or administratively separate unit any obstacles to admitting students without discrimination on the basis of sex.

(4) Describe in detail the steps necessary to eliminate as soon as practicable each obstacle so identified and indicate the schedule for taking these steps and the individual directly responsible for their implementation.

(5) Include estimates of the number of students, by sex, expected to apply for, be admitted to, and enter each class during the period covered by the plan.

(c) *Nondiscrimination.* No policy or practice of a recipient to which § 106.16 applies shall result in treatment of applicants to or students of such recipient in violation of subpart C unless such treatment is necessitated by an obstacle identified in paragraph (b) (3) of this section and a schedule for eliminating that obstacle has been provided as required by paragraph (b) (4) of this section.

(d) *Effects of past exclusion.* To overcome the effects of past exclusion of students on the basis of sex, each educational institution to which § 106.16 applies shall include in its transition plan, and shall implement, specific steps designed to encourage individuals of the previously excluded sex to apply for admission to such institution. Such steps shall include instituting recruitment which emphasizes the institution's commitment to enrolling students of the sex previously excluded.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

[45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, as amended at 65 FR 68056, Nov. 13, 2000]

Subpart C—Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in Admission and Recruitment Prohibited

§ 106.21 Admission.

(a) *General.* No person shall, on the basis of sex, be denied admission, or be subjected to discrimination in admission, by any recipient to which this subpart applies, except as provided in §§ 106.16 and 106.17.

(b) *Specific prohibitions.* (1) In determining whether a person satisfies any policy or criterion for admission, or in making any offer of admission, a recipient to which this subpart applies shall not:

(i) Give preference to one person over another on the basis of sex, by ranking applicants separately on such basis, or otherwise;

(ii) Apply numerical limitations upon the number or proportion of persons of either sex who may be admitted; or

(iii) Otherwise treat one individual differently from another on the basis of sex.

(2) A recipient shall not administer or operate any test or other criterion for admission which has a disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the basis of sex unless the use of such test or criterion is shown to predict validly success in the education program or activity in question and alternative tests or criteria which do not have such a disproportionately adverse effect are shown to be unavailable.

(c) *Prohibitions relating to marital or parental status.* In determining whether a person satisfies any policy or criterion for admission, or in making any offer of admission, a recipient to which this subpart applies:

(1) Shall not apply any rule concerning the actual or potential parental, family, or marital status of a student or applicant which treats persons differently on the basis of sex;

(2) Shall not discriminate against or exclude any person on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, termination of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom, or establish or follow any rule or practice which so discriminates or excludes;

(3) Shall treat disabilities related to pregnancy, childbirth, termination of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom in the same manner and under the same policies as any other temporary disability or physical condition; and

(4) Shall not make pre-admission inquiry as to the marital status of an applicant for admission, including whether such applicant is "Miss" or "Mrs." A recipient may make pre-admission inquiry as to the sex of an applicant for admision, but only if such inquiry is made equally of such applicants of both sexes and if the results of such inquiry are not used in connection with discrimination prohibited by this part.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.22 Preference in admission.

A recipient to which this subpart applies shall not give preference to applicants for admission, on the basis of attendance at any educational institution or other school or entity which admits as students only or predominantly members of one sex, if the giving of such preference has the effect of discriminating on the basis of sex in violation of this subpart.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.23 Recruitment.

(a) *Nondiscriminatory recruitment.* A recipient to which this subpart applies shall not discriminate on the basis of sex in the recruitment and admission of students. A recipient may be required to undertake additional recruitment efforts for one sex as remedial action pursuant to § 106.3(a), and may choose to undertake such efforts as affirmative action pursuant to § 106.3(b).

(b) *Recruitment at certain institutions.* A recipient to which this subpart applies shall not recruit primarily or exclusively at educational institutions, schools or entities which admit as students only or predominantly members of one sex, if such actions have the effect of discriminating on the basis of sex in violation of this subpart.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

Subpart D—Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Prohibited

§ 106.31 Education programs or activities.

(a) *General.* Except as provided elsewhere in this part, no person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any academic, extracurricular, research, occupational training, or other education program or activity operated by a recipient which receives Federal financial assistance. This subpart does not apply to actions of a recipient in connection with admission of its students to an education program or activity of (1) a recipient to which subpart C does not apply, or (2) an entity, not a recipient, to which subpart C would not apply if the entity were a recipient.

(b) *Specific prohibitions.* Except as provided in this subpart, in providing any aid, benefit, or service to a student, a recipient shall not, on the basis of sex:

(1) Treat one person differently from another in determining whether such person satisfies any requirement or condition for the provision of such aid, benefit, or service;

(2) Provide different aid, benefits, or services or provide aid, benefits, or services in a different manner;

(3) Deny any person any such aid, benefit, or service;

(4) Subject any person to separate or different rules of behavior, sanctions, or other treatment;

(5) Apply any rule concerning the domicile or residence of a student or applicant, including eligibility for in-state fees and tuition;

(6) Aid or perpetuate discrimination against any person by providing significant assistance to any agency, organization, or person which discriminates on the basis of sex in providing any aid, benefit or service to students or employees;

(7) Otherwise limit any person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity.

(c) *Assistance administered by a recipient educational institution to study at a foreign institution.* A recipient educational institution may administer or assist in the administration of scholarships, fellowships, or other awards established by foreign or domestic wills, trusts, or similar legal instruments, or by acts of foreign governments and restricted to members of one sex, which are designed to provide opportunities to study abroad, and which are awarded to students who are already matriculating at or who are graduates of the recipient institution; *Provided,* a recipient educational institution which administers or assists in the administration of such scholarships, fellowships, or other awards which are restricted to

members of one sex provides, or otherwise makes available reasonable opportunities for similar studies for members of the other sex. Such opportunities may be derived from either domestic or foreign sources.

(d) *Aid, benefits or services not provided by recipient.* (1) This paragraph applies to any recipient which requires participation by any applicant, student, or employee in any education program or activity not operated wholly by such recipient, or which facilitates, permits, or considers such participation as part of or equivalent to an education program or activity operated by such recipient, including participation in educational consortia and cooperative employment and student-teaching assignments.

(2) Such recipient:

(i) Shall develop and implement a procedure designed to assure itself that the operator or sponsor of such other education program or activity takes no action affecting any applicant, student, or employee of such recipient which this part would prohibit such recipient from taking; and

(ii) Shall not facilitate, require, permit, or consider such participation if such action occurs.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

[45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, as amended at 47 FR 32527, July 28, 1982; 65 FR 68056, Nov. 13, 2000]

§ 106.32 Housing.

(a) *Generally.* A recipient shall not, on the basis of sex, apply different rules or regulations, impose different fees or requirements, or offer different services or benefits related to housing, except as provided in this section (including housing provided only to married students).

(b) *Housing provided by recipient.* (1) A recipient may provide separate housing on the basis of sex.

(2) Housing provided by a recipient to students of one sex, when compared to that provided to students of the other sex, shall be as a whole:

(i) Proportionate in quantity to the number of students of that sex applying for such housing; and

(ii) Comparable in quality and cost to the student.

(c) *Other housing.* (1) A recipient shall not, on the basis of sex, administer different policies or practices concerning occupancy by its students of housing other than provided by such recipient.

(2) A recipient which, through solicitation, listing, approval of housing, or otherwise, assists any agency, organization, or person in making housing available to any of its students, shall take such reasonable action as may be necessary to assure itself that such housing as is provided to students of one sex, when compared to that provided to students of the other sex, is as a whole:

(i) Proportionate in quantity and

(ii) Comparable in quality and cost to the student.

A recipient may render such assistance to any agency, organization, or person which provides all or part of such housing to students only of one sex.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, 907, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374, 375; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682, 1686)

§ 106.33 Comparable facilities.

A recipient may provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students of the other sex.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374)

§ 106.34 Access to course offerings.

A recipient shall not provide any course or otherwise carry out any of its education program or activity separately on the basis of sex, or require or refuse participation therein by any of its students on such basis, including health, physical education, industrial, business, vocational, technical, home economics, music, and adult education courses.

(a) With respect to classes and activities in physical education at the elementary school level, the recipient shall comply fully with this section as expeditiously as possible but in no event later than one year from the effective date of this regulation. With respect to physical education classes and

activities at the secondary and post-secondary levels, the recipient shall comply fully with this section as expeditiously as possible but in no event later than three years from the effective date of this regulation.

(b) This section does not prohibit grouping of students in physical education classes and activities by ability as assessed by objective standards of individual performance developed and applied without regard to sex.

(c) This section does not prohibit separation of students by sex within physical education classes or activities during participation in wrestling, boxing, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.

(d) Where use of a single standard of measuring skill or progress in a physical education class has an adverse effect on members of one sex, the recipient shall use appropriate standards which do not have such effect.

(e) Portions of classes in elementary and secondary schools which deal exclusively with human sexuality may be conducted in separate sessions for boys and girls.

(f) Recipients may make requirements based on vocal range or quality which may result in a chorus or choruses of one or predominantly one sex.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.35 Access to schools operated by LEAs.

A recipient which is a local educational agency shall not, on the basis of sex, exclude any person from admission to:

(a) Any institution of vocational education operated by such recipient; or

(b) Any other school or educational unit operated by such recipient, unless such recipient otherwise makes available to such person, pursuant to the same policies and criteria of admission, courses, services, and facilities comparable to each course, service, and facility offered in or through such schools.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.36 Counseling and use of appraisal and counseling materials.

(a) *Counseling.* A recipient shall not discriminate against any person on the basis of sex in the counseling or guidance of students or applicants for admission.

(b) *Use of appraisal and counseling materials.* A recipient which uses testing or other materials for appraising or counseling students shall not use different materials for students on the basis of their sex or use materials which permit or require different treatment of students on such basis unless such different materials cover the same occupations and interest areas and the use of such different materials is shown to be essential to eliminate sex bias. Recipients shall develop and use internal procedures for ensuring that such materials do not discriminate on the basis of sex. Where the use of a counseling test or other instrument results in a substantially disproportionate number of members of one sex in any particular course of study or classification, the recipient shall take such action as is necessary to assure itself that such disproportion is not the result of discrimination in the instrument or its application.

(c) *Disproportion in classes.* Where a recipient finds that a particular class contains a substantially disproportionate number of individuals of one sex, the recipient shall take such action as is necessary to assure itself that such disproportion is not the result of discrimination on the basis of sex in counseling or appraisal materials or by counselors.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.37 Financial assistance.

(a) *General.* Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, in providing financial assistance to any of its students, a recipient shall not:

(1) On the basis of sex, provide different amount or types of such assistance, limit eligibility for such assistance which is of any particular type or source, apply different criteria, or otherwise discriminate;

(2) Through solicitation, listing, approval, provision of facilities or other

services, assist any foundation, trust, agency, organization, or person which provides assistance to any of such recipient's students in a manner which discriminates on the basis of sex; or

(3) Apply any rule or assist in application of any rule concerning eligibility for such assistance which treats persons of one sex differently from persons of the other sex with regard to marital or parental status.

(b) *Financial aid established by certain legal instruments.* (1) A recipient may administer or assist in the administration of scholarships, fellowships, or other forms of financial assistance established pursuant to domestic or foreign wills, trusts, bequests, or similar legal instruments or by acts of a foreign government which requires that awards be made to members of a particular sex specified therein; *Provided,* That the overall effect of the award of such sex-restricted scholarships, fellowships, and other forms of financial assistance does not discriminate on the basis of sex.

(2) To ensure nondiscriminatory awards of assistance as required in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, recipients shall develop and use procedures under which:

(i) Students are selected for award of financial assistance on the basis of nondiscriminatory criteria and not on the basis of availability of funds restricted to members of a particular sex;

(ii) An appropriate sex-restricted scholarship, fellowship, or other form of financial assistance is allocated to each student selected under paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section; and

(iii) No student is denied the award for which he or she was selected under paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section because of the absence of a scholarship, fellowship, or other form of financial assistance designated for a member of that student's sex.

(c) *Athletic scholarships.* (1) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of each sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics.

(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for members of each sex may be provided as part of separate athletic teams for members of each sex to the extent consistent with this paragraph and § 106.41.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682; and Sec. 844, Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484)

§ 106.38 Employment assistance to students.

(a) *Assistance by recipient in making available outside employment.* A recipient which assists any agency, organization or person in making employment available to any of its students:

(1) Shall assure itself that such employment is made available without discrimination on the basis of sex; and

(2) Shall not render such services to any agency, organization, or person which discriminates on the basis of sex in its employment practices.

(b) *Employment of students by recipients.* A recipient which employs any of its students shall not do so in a manner which violates subpart E of this part.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.39 Health and insurance benefits and services.

In providing a medical, hospital, accident, or life insurance benefit, service, policy, or plan to any of its students, a recipient shall not discriminate on the basis of sex, or provide such benefit, service, policy, or plan in a manner which would violate Subpart E of this part if it were provided to employees of the recipient. This section shall not prohibit a recipient from providing any benefit or service which may be used by a different proportion of students of one sex than of the other, including family planning services. However, any recipient which provides full coverage health service shall provide gynecological care.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.40 Marital or parental status.

(a) *Status generally.* A recipient shall not apply any rule concerning a student's actual or potential parental,

family, or marital status which treats students differently on the basis of sex.

(b) *Pregnancy and related conditions.* (1) A recipient shall not discriminate against any student, or exclude any student from its education program or activity, including any class or extracurricular activity, on the basis of such student's pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy or recovery therefrom, unless the student requests voluntarily to participate in a separate portion of the program or activity of the recipient.

(2) A recipient may require such a student to obtain the certification of a physician that the student is physically and emotionally able to continue participation so long as such a certification is required of all students for other physical or emotional conditions requiring the attention of a physician.

(3) A recipient which operates a portion of its education program or activity separately for pregnant students, admittance to which is completely voluntary on the part of the student as provided in paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall ensure that the separate portion is comparable to that offered to non-pregnant students.

(4) A recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy and recovery therefrom in the same manner and under the same policies as any other temporary disability with respect to any medical or hospital benefit, service, plan or policy which such recipient administers, operates, offers, or participates in with respect to students admitted to the recipient's educational program or activity.

(5) In the case of a recipient which does not maintain a leave policy for its students, or in the case of a student who does not otherwise qualify for leave under such a policy, a recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy and recovery therefrom as a justification for a leave of absence for so long a period of time as is deemed medically necessary by the student's physician, at the conclusion of which the student shall be reinstated to the status which she held when the leave began.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

[45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, as amended at 65 FR 68056, Nov. 13, 2000]

§ 106.41 Athletics.

(a) *General.* No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.

(b) *Separate teams.* Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.

(c) *Equal opportunity.* A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are available the Director will consider, among other factors:

(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;

(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;

(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;

(4) Travel and per diem allowance;

(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;

(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;

(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;

(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;

(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;

(10) Publicity.

Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex.

(d) *Adjustment period.* A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics at the elementary school level shall comply fully with this section as expeditiously as possible but in no event later than one year from the effective date of this regulation. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics at the secondary or post-secondary school level shall comply fully with this section as expeditiously as possible but in no event later than three years from the effective date of this regulation.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682; and Sec. 844, Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484)

§ 106.42 Textbooks and curricular material.

Nothing in this regulation shall be interpreted as requiring or prohibiting or abridging in any way the use of particular textbooks or curricular materials.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

Subpart E—Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in Employment in Education Programs or Activities Prohibited

§ 106.51 Employment.

(a) *General.* (1) No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consideration, or selection therefor, whether full-time or part-time, under any education program or activity operated by a recipient which receives Federal financial assistance.

(2) A recipient shall make all employment decisions in any education program or activity operated by such recipient in a nondiscriminatory manner and shall not limit, segregate, or classify applicants or employees in any way which could adversely affect any applicant's or employee's employment opportunities or status because of sex.

(3) A recipient shall not enter into any contractual or other relationship which directly or indirectly has the effect of subjecting employees or students to discrimination prohibited by this subpart, including relationships with employment and referral agencies, with labor unions, and with organizations providing or administering fringe benefits to employees of the recipient.

(4) A recipient shall not grant preferences to applicants for employment on the basis of attendance at any educational institution or entity which admits as students only or predominantly members of one sex, if the giving of such preferences has the effect of discriminating on the basis of sex in violation of this part.

(b) *Application.* The provisions of this subpart apply to:

(1) Recruitment, advertising, and the process of application for employment;

(2) Hiring, upgrading, promotion, consideration for and award of tenure, demotion, transfer, layoff, termination, application of nepotism policies, right of return from layoff, and rehiring;

(3) Rates of pay or any other form of compensation, and changes in compensation;

(4) Job assignments, classifications and structure, including position descriptions, lines of progression, and seniority lists;

(5) The terms of any collective bargaining agreement;

(6) Granting and return from leaves of absence, leave for pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy, leave for persons of either sex to care for children or dependents, or any other leave;

(7) Fringe benefits available by virtue of employment, whether or not administered by the recipient;

(8) Selection and financial support for training, including apprenticeship, professional meetings, conferences, and other related activities, selection for tuition assistance, selection for sabbaticals and leaves of absence to pursue training;

(9) Employer-sponsored activities, including those that are social or recreational; and

(10) Any other term, condition, or privilege of employment.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

[45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, as amended at 65 FR 68056, Nov. 13, 2000]

§ 106.52 Employment criteria.

A recipient shall not administer or operate any test or other criterion for any employment opportunity which has a disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the basis of sex unless:

(a) Use of such test or other criterion is shown to predict validly successful performance in the position in question; and

(b) Alternative tests or criteria for such purpose, which do not have such disproportionately adverse effect, are shown to be unavailable.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.53 Recruitment.

(a) *Nondiscriminatory recruitment and hiring.* A recipient shall not discriminate on the basis of sex in the recruitment and hiring of employees. Where a recipient has been found to be presently discriminating on the basis of sex in the recruitment or hiring of employees, or has been found to have in the past so discriminated, the recipient shall recruit members of the sex so discriminated against so as to overcome the effects of such past or present discrimination.

(b) *Recruitment patterns.* A recipient shall not recruit primarily or exclusively at entities which furnish as applicants only or predominantly members of one sex if such actions have the effect of discriminating on the basis of sex in violation of this subpart.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.54 Compensation.

A recipient shall not make or enforce any policy or practice which, on the basis of sex:

(a) Makes distinctions in rates of pay or other compensation;

(b) Results in the payment of wages to employees of one sex at a rate less than that paid to employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.55 Job classification and structure.

A recipient shall not:

(a) Classify a job as being for males or for females;

(b) Maintain or establish separate lines of progression, seniority lists, career ladders, or tenure systems based on sex; or

(c) Maintain or establish separate lines of progression, seniority systems, career ladders, or tenure systems for similar jobs, position descriptions, or job requirements which classify persons on the basis of sex, unless sex is a bona-fide occupational qualification for the positions in question as set forth in § 106.61.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.56 Fringe benefits.

(a) *Fringe benefits defined.* For purposes of this part, *fringe benefits* means: Any medical, hospital, accident, life insurance or retirement benefit, service, policy or plan, any profit-sharing or bonus plan, leave, and any other benefit or service of employment not subject to the provision of § 106.54.

(b) *Prohibitions.* A recipient shall not:

(1) Discriminate on the basis of sex with regard to making fringe benefits available to employees or make fringe benefits available to spouses, families, or dependents of employees differently upon the basis of the employee's sex;

(2) Administer, operate, offer, or participate in a fringe benefit plan which does not provide either for equal periodic benefits for members of each sex, or for equal contributions to the plan by such recipient for members of each sex; or

(3) Administer, operate, offer, or participate in a pension or retirement plan which establishes different optional or compulsory retirement ages based on sex or which otherwise discriminates in benefits on the basis of sex.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.57 Marital or parental status.

(a) *General.* A recipient shall not apply any policy or take any employment action:

(1) Concerning the potential marital, parental, or family status of an employee or applicant for employment which treats persons differently on the basis of sex; or

(2) Which is based upon whether an employee or applicant for employment is the head of household or principal wage earner in such employee's or applicant's family unit.

(b) *Pregnancy.* A recipient shall not discriminate against or exclude from employment any employee or applicant for employment on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom.

(c) *Pregnancy as a temporary disability.* A recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy, and recovery therefrom and any temporary disability resulting therefrom as any other temporary disability for all job related purposes, including commencement, duration and extensions of leave, payment of disability income, accrual of seniority and any other benefit or service, and reinstatement, and under any fringe benefit offered to employees by virtue of employment.

(d) *Pregnancy leave.* In the case of a recipient which does not maintain a leave policy for its employees, or in the case of an employee with insufficient leave or accrued employment time to qualify for leave under such a policy, a recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy and recovery therefrom as a justification for a leave of absence without pay for a reasonable period of time, at the conclusion of which the employee shall be reinstated to the status which she held when the leave began or to a comparable position, without decrease in rate of compensation or loss of promotional opportunities, or any other right or privilege of employment.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.58 Effect of State or local law or other requirements.

(a) *Prohibitory requirements.* The obligation to comply with this subpart is not obviated or alleviated by the existence of any State or local law or other requirement which imposes prohibitions or limits upon employment of members of one sex which are not imposed upon members of the other sex.

(b) *Benefits.* A recipient which provides any compensation, service, or benefit to members of one sex pursuant to a State or local law or other requirement shall provide the same compensation, service, or benefit to members of the other sex.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.59 Advertising.

A recipient shall not in any advertising related to employment indicate preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex unless sex

is a *bona-fide* occupational qualification for the particular job in question.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.60 Pre-employment inquiries.

(a) *Marital status.* A recipient shall not make pre-employment inquiry as to the marital status of an applicant for employment, including whether such applicant is "Miss or Mrs."

(b) *Sex.* A recipient may make pre-employment inquiry as to the sex of an applicant for employment, but only if such inquiry is made equally of such applicants of both sexes and if the results of such inquiry are not used in connection with discrimination prohibited by this part.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

§ 106.61 Sex as a bona-fide occupational qualification.

A recipient may take action otherwise prohibited by this subpart provided it is shown that sex is a bona-fide occupational qualification for that action, such that consideration of sex with regard to such action is essential to successful operation of the employment function concerned. A recipient shall not take action pursuant to this section which is based upon alleged comparative employment characteristics or stereotyped characterizations of one or the other sex, or upon preference based on sex of the recipient, employees, students, or other persons, but nothing contained in this section shall prevent a recipient from considering an employee's sex in relation to employment in a locker room or toilet facility used only by members of one sex.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682

Subpart F—Procedures [Interim]

§ 106.71 Procedures.

The procedural provisions applicable to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are hereby adopted and incorporated herein by reference. These procedures may be found at 34 CFR 100.6–100.11 and 34 CFR, part 101.

(Authority: Secs. 901, 902, Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374; 20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682)

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EXHIBIT 'C'

REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE

OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS - JANUARY 2001

REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES

TITLE IX

January 2001

U.S. Department of Education
Office for Civil Rights

PREAMBLE

Summary

The Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education (Department), issues a new document (revised guidance) that replaces the 1997 document entitled "Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties," issued by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) on March 13, 1997 (1997 guidance). We revised the guidance in limited respects in light of subsequent Supreme Court cases relating to sexual harassment in schools.

The revised guidance reaffirms the compliance standards that OCR applies in investigations and administrative enforcement of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) regarding sexual harassment. The revised guidance re-grounds these standards in the Title IX regulations, distinguishing them from the standards applicable to private litigation for money damages and clarifying their regulatory basis as distinct from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) agency law. In most other respects the revised guidance is identical to the 1997 guidance. Thus, we intend the revised guidance to serve the same purpose as the 1997 guidance. It continues to provide the principles that a school[1] should use to recognize and effectively respond to sexual harassment of students in its program as a condition of receiving Federal financial assistance.

Purpose and Scope of the Revised Guidance

In March 1997, we published in the Federal Register "Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties." 62 FR 12034. We issued the guidance pursuant to our authority under Title IX, and our Title IX implementing regulations, to eliminate discrimination based on sex in education programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance. It was grounded in longstanding legal authority establishing that sexual harassment of students can be a form of sex discrimination covered by Title IX. The guidance was the product of extensive consultation with interested parties, including students, teachers, school administrators, and researchers. We also made the document available for public comment.

Since the issuance of the 1997 guidance, the Supreme Court (Court) has issued several important decisions in sexual harassment cases, including two decisions specifically addressing sexual harassment of students under Title IX: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District (Gebser), 524 U.S. 274 (1998), and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education (Davis), 526 U.S. 629 (1999). The Court held in Gebser that a school can be liable for monetary damages if a teacher sexually harasses a student, an

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[1] As in the 1997 guidance, the revised guidance uses the term "school" to refer to all schools, colleges, universities, and other educational institutions that receive Federal funds from the Department.

official who has authority to address the harassment has actual knowledge of the harassment, and that official is deliberately indifferent in responding to the harassment. In Davis, the Court announced that a school also may be liable for monetary damages if one student sexually harasses another student in the school's program and the conditions of Gebser are met.

The Court was explicit in Gebser and Davis that the liability standards established in those cases are limited to private actions for monetary damages. See, e.g., Gebser, 524 U.S. 283, and Davis, 526 U.S. at 639. The Court acknowledged, by contrast, the power of Federal agencies, such as the Department, to "promulgate and enforce requirements that effectuate [Title IX's] nondiscrimination mandate," even in circumstances that would not give rise to a claim for money damages. See, Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292.

In an August 1998 letter to school superintendents and a January 1999 letter to college and university presidents, the Secretary of Education informed school officials that the Gebser decision did not change a school's obligations to take reasonable steps under Title IX and the regulations to prevent and eliminate sexual harassment as a condition of its receipt of Federal funding. The Department also determined that, although in most important respects the substance of the 1997 guidance was reaffirmed in Gebser and Davis, certain areas of the 1997 guidance could be strengthened by further clarification and explanation of the Title IX regulatory basis for the guidance.

On November 2, 2000, we published in the Federal Register a notice requesting comments on the proposed revised guidance (62 FR 66092). A detailed explanation of the Gebser and Davis decisions, and an explanation of the proposed changes in the guidance, can be found in the preamble to the proposed revised guidance. In those decisions and a third opinion, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (Oncale), 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (a sexual harassment case decided under Title VII), the Supreme Court confirmed several fundamental principles we articulated in the 1997 guidance. In these areas, no changes in the guidance were necessary. A notice regarding the availability of this final document appeared in the Federal Register on January 19, 2001.

Enduring Principles from the 1997 Guidance

It continues to be the case that a significant number of students, both male and female, have experienced sexual harassment, which can interfere with a student's academic performance and emotional and physical well-being. Preventing and remedying sexual harassment in schools is essential to ensuring a safe environment in which students can learn. As with the 1997 guidance, the revised guidance applies to students at every level of education. School personnel who understand their obligations under Title IX, e.g., understand that sexual harassment can be sex discrimination in violation of Title IX, are in the best position to prevent harassment and to lessen the harm to students if, despite their best efforts, harassment occurs.

One of the fundamental aims of both the 1997 guidance and the revised guidance has been to emphasize that, in addressing allegations of sexual harassment, the good judgment and common sense of teachers and school administrators are important elements of a response that meets the requirements of Title IX.

A critical issue under Title IX is whether the school recognized that sexual harassment has occurred and took prompt and effective action calculated to end the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects. If harassment has occurred, doing nothing is always the wrong response. However, depending on the circumstances, there may be more than one right way to respond. The important thing is for school employees or officials to pay attention to the school environment and not to hesitate to respond to sexual harassment in the same reasonable, commonsense manner as they would to other types of serious misconduct.

It is also important that schools not overreact to behavior that does not rise to the level of sexual harassment. As the Department stated in the 1997 guidance, a kiss on the cheek by a first grader does not constitute sexual harassment. School personnel should consider the age and maturity of students in responding to allegations of sexual harassment.

Finally, we reiterate the importance of having well- publicized and effective grievance procedures in place to handle complaints of sex discrimination, including sexual harassment complaints. Nondiscrimination policies and procedures are required by the Title IX regulations. In fact, the Supreme Court in Gebser specifically affirmed the Department's authority to enforce this requirement administratively in order to carry out Title IX's nondiscrimination mandate. 524 U.S. at 292. Strong policies and effective grievance procedures are essential to let students and employees know that sexual harassment will not be tolerated and to ensure that they know how to report it.

Analysis of Comments Received Concerning the Proposed Revised Guidance and the Resulting Changes

In response to the Assistant Secretary's invitation to comment, OCR received approximately 11 comments representing approximately 15 organizations and individuals. Commenters provided specific suggestions regarding how the revised guidance could be clarified. Many of these suggested changes have been incorporated. Significant and recurring issues are grouped by subject and discussed in the following sections:

Distinction Between Administrative Enforcement and Private Litigation for Monetary Damages

In Gebser and Davis, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the appropriate standards for determining when a school district is liable under Title IX for money damages in a private lawsuit brought by or on behalf of a student who has been sexually harassed. As explained in the preamble to the proposed revised guidance, the Court was explicit in Gebser and Davis that the liability standards established in these cases are limited to private actions for monetary damages. See, e.g., Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283, and Davis, 526 U.S. at 639. The Gebser Court recognized and contrasted lawsuits for money damages with the incremental nature of administrative enforcement of Title IX. In Gebser, the Court was concerned with the possibility of a money damages award against a school for harassment about which it had not known. In contrast, the process of administrative enforcement requires enforcement agencies such as OCR to make schools

aware of potential Title IX violations and to seek voluntary corrective action before pursuing fund termination or other enforcement mechanisms.

Commenters uniformly agreed with OCR that the Court limited the liability standards established in Gebser and Davis to private actions for monetary damages. See, e.g., Gebser, 524 U.S. 283, and Davis, 526 U.S. at 639. Commenters also agreed that the administrative enforcement standards reflected in the 1997 guidance remain valid in OCR enforcement actions.[2] Finally, commenters agreed that the proposed revisions provided important clarification to schools regarding the standards that OCR will use and that schools should use to determine compliance with Title IX as a condition of the receipt of Federal financial assistance in light of Gebser and Davis.

Harassment by Teachers and Other School Personnel

Most commenters agreed with OCR's interpretation of its regulations regarding a school's responsibility for harassment of students by teachers and other school employees. These commenters agreed that Title IX's prohibitions against discrimination are not limited to official policies and practices governing school programs and activities. A school also engages in sex-based discrimination if its employees, in the context of carrying out their day-to-day job responsibilities for providing aid, benefits, or services to students (such as teaching, counseling, supervising, and advising students) deny or limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the schools program on the basis of sex. Under the Title IX regulations, the school is responsible for discrimination in these cases, whether or not it knew or should have known about it, because the discrimination occurred as part of the school's undertaking to provide nondiscriminatory aid, benefits, and services to students. The revised guidance distinguishes these cases from employee harassment that, although taking place in a school's program, occurs outside of the context of the employee's provision of aid, benefits, and services to students. In these latter cases, the school's responsibilities are not triggered until the school knew or should have known about the harassment.

One commenter expressed concern that it was inappropriate ever to find a school out of compliance for harassment about which it knew nothing. We reiterate that, although a school may in some cases be responsible for harassment caused by an employee that occurred before other responsible employees of the school knew or should have known about it, OCR always provides the school with actual notice and the opportunity to take appropriate corrective action before issuing a finding of violation. This is consistent with the Court's underlying concern in Gebser and Davis.

Most commenters acknowledged that OCR has provided useful factors to determine whether harassing conduct took place "in the context of providing aid, benefits, or services." However, some commenters stated that additional clarity and examples regarding the issue were needed. Commenters also suggested clarifying

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[2] It is the position of the United States that the standards set out in OCR's guidance for finding a violation and seeking voluntary corrective action also would apply to private actions for injunctive and other equitable relief. See brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Davis v. Monroe County.

references to quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment as these two concepts, though useful, do not determine the issue of whether the school itself is considered responsible for the harassment. We agree with these concerns and have made significant revisions to the sections "Harassment that Denies or Limits a Student's Ability to Participate in or Benefit from the Education Program" and "Harassment by Teachers and Other Employees" to clarify the guidance in these respects.

Gender-based Harassment, Including Harassment Predicated on Sex-stereotyping

Several commenters requested that we expand the discussion and include examples of gender-based harassment predicated on sex stereotyping. Some commenters also argued that gender-based harassment should be considered sexual harassment, and that we have "artificially" restricted the guidance only to harassment in the form of conduct of a sexual nature, thus, implying that gender-based harassment is of less concern and should be evaluated differently.

We have not further expanded this section because, while we are also concerned with the important issue of gender-based harassment, we believe that harassment of a sexual nature raises unique and sufficiently important issues that distinguish it from other types of gender-based harassment and warrants its own guidance.

Nevertheless, we have clarified this section of the guidance in several ways. The guidance clarifies that gender-based harassment, including that predicated on sex-stereotyping, is covered by Title IX if it is sufficiently serious to deny or limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the program. Thus, it can be discrimination on the basis of sex to harass a student on the basis of the victim's failure to conform to stereotyped notions of masculinity and femininity. Although this type of harassment is not covered by the guidance, if it is sufficiently serious, gender-based harassment is a school's responsibility, and the same standards generally will apply. We have also added an endnote regarding Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that sex stereotyping can constitute sex discrimination.

Several commenters also suggested that we state that sexual and non-sexual (but gender-based) harassment should not be evaluated separately in determining whether a hostile environment exists. We note that both the proposed revised guidance and the final revised guidance indicate in several places that incidents of sexual harassment and non-sexual, gender-based harassment can be combined to determine whether a hostile environment has been created. We also note that sufficiently serious harassment of a sexual nature remains covered by Title IX, as explained in the guidance, even though the hostile environment may also include taunts based on sexual orientation.

Definition of Harassment

One commenter urged OCR to provide distinct definitions of sexual harassment to be used in administrative enforcement as distinguished from criteria used to maintain private actions for monetary damages. We disagree. First, as discussed in the preamble to the proposed revised guidance, the definition of hostile environment sexual harassment used by the Court in Davis is consistent with the definition found in the proposed guidance. Although the terms used by the Court in Davis are in some ways different from

the words used to define hostile environment harassment in the 1997 guidance (see, e.g., 62 FR 12041, "conduct of a sexual nature is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the education program, or to create a hostile or abusive educational environment"), the definitions are consistent. Both the Court's and the Department's definitions are contextual descriptions intended to capture the same concept -- that under Title IX, the conduct must be sufficiently serious that it adversely affects a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program. In determining whether harassment is actionable, both Davis and the Department tell schools to look at the "constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships" (526 U.S. at 651 (citing Oncale)), and the Davis Court cited approvingly to the underlying core factors described in the 1997 guidance for evaluating the context of the harassment. Second, schools benefit from consistency and simplicity in understanding what is sexual harassment for which the school must take responsive action. A multiplicity of definitions would not serve this purpose.

Several commenters suggested that we develop a unique Title IX definition of harassment that does not rely on Title VII and that takes into account the special relationship of schools to students. Other commenters, by contrast, commended OCR for recognizing that Gebser and Davis did not alter the definition of hostile environment sexual harassment found in OCR's 1997 guidance, which derives from Title VII caselaw, and asked us to strengthen the point. While Gebser and Davis made clear that Title VII agency principles do not apply in determining liability for money damages under Title IX, the Davis Court also indicated, through its specific references to Title VII caselaw, that Title VII remains relevant in determining what constitutes hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX. We also believe that the factors described in both the 1997 guidance and the revised guidance to determine whether sexual harassment has occurred provide the necessary flexibility for taking into consideration the age and maturity of the students involved and the nature of the school environment.

Effective Response

One commenter suggested that the change in the guidance from "appropriate response" to "effective response" implies a change in OCR policy that requires omniscience of schools. We disagree. Effectiveness has always been the measure of an adequate response under Title IX. This does not mean a school must overreact out of fear of being judged inadequate. Effectiveness is measured based on a reasonableness standard. Schools do not have to know beforehand that their response will be effective. However, if their initial steps are ineffective in stopping the harassment, reasonableness may require a series of escalating steps.

The Relationship Between FERPA and Title IX

In the development of both the 1997 guidance and the current revisions to the guidance, commenters raised concerns about the interrelation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. 1232g, and Title IX. The concerns relate to two issues: (1) the harassed student's right to information about the outcome of a sexual harassment complaint against another student, including information about sanctions imposed on a student found guilty of harassment; and (2) the due process rights of

individuals, including teachers, accused of sexual harassment by a student, to obtain information about the identity of the complainant and the nature of the allegations.

FERPA generally forbids disclosure of information from a student's "education record" without the consent of the student (or the student's parent). Thus, FERPA may be relevant when the person found to have engaged in harassment is another student, because written information about the complaint, investigation, and outcome is part of the harassing student's education record. Title IX is also relevant because it is an important part of taking effective responsive action for the school to inform the harassed student of the results of its investigation and whether it counseled, disciplined, or otherwise sanctioned the harasser. This information can assure the harassed student that the school has taken the student's complaint seriously and has taken steps to eliminate the hostile environment and prevent the harassment from recurring.

The Department currently interprets FERPA as not conflicting with the Title IX requirement that the school notify the harassed student of the outcome of its investigation, i.e., whether or not harassment was found to have occurred, because this information directly relates to the victim. It has been the Department's position that there is a potential conflict between FERPA and Title IX regarding disclosure of sanctions, and that FERPA generally prevents a school from disclosing to a student who complained of harassment information about the sanction or discipline imposed upon a student who was found to have engaged in that harassment.[3]

There is, however, an additional statutory provision that may apply to this situation. In 1994, as part of the Improving America's Schools Act, Congress amended the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) — of which FERPA is a part — to state that nothing in GEPA "shall be construed to affect the applicability of ... title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972...."[4] The Department interprets this provision to mean that FERPA continues to apply in the context of Title IX enforcement, but if there is a direct conflict between requirements of FERPA and requirements of Title IX, such that enforcement of FERPA would interfere with the primary purpose of Title IX to eliminate sex-based discrimination in schools, the requirements of Title IX override any conflicting FERPA provisions. The Department is in the process of developing a consistent approach and specific factors for implementing this provision. OCR and the Department's Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO) intend to issue joint guidance, discussing specific areas of potential conflict between FERPA and Title IX.

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[3] Exceptions include the case of a sanction that directly relates to the person who was harassed (e.g., an order that the harasser stay away from the harassed student), or sanctions related to offenses for which there is a statutory exception, such as crimes of violence or certain sex offenses in postsecondary institutions.

[4] 20 U.S.C. 1221(d). A similar amendment was originally passed in 1974 but applied only to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (prohibiting race discrimination by recipients). The 1994 amendments also extended 20 U.S.C. 1221(d) to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (prohibiting disability-based discrimination by recipients) and to the Age Discrimination Act.

FERPA is also relevant when a student accuses a teacher or other employee of sexual harassment, because written information about the allegations is contained in the student's education record. The potential conflict arises because, while FERPA protects the privacy of the student accuser, the accused individual may need the name of the accuser and information regarding the nature of the allegations in order to defend against the charges. The 1997 guidance made clear that neither FERPA nor Title IX override any federally protected due process rights of a school employee accused of sexual harassment.

Several commenters urged the Department to expand and strengthen this discussion. They argue that in many instances a school's failure to provide information about the name of the student accuser and the nature of the allegations seriously undermines the fairness of the investigative and adjudicative process. They also urge the Department to include a discussion of the need for confidentiality as to the identity of the individual accused of harassment because of the significant harm that can be caused by false accusations. We have made several changes to the guidance, including an additional discussion regarding the confidentiality of a person accused of harassment and a new heading entitled "Due Process Rights of the Accused," to address these concerns.

REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS[1] BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES

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I. Introduction

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) and the Department of Education's (Department) implementing regulations prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in federally assisted education programs and activities.[2] The Supreme Court, Congress, and Federal executive departments and agencies, including the Department, have recognized that sexual harassment of students can constitute discrimination prohibited by Title IX.[3] This guidance focuses on a school's[4] fundamental compliance responsibilities under Title IX and the Title IX regulations to address sexual harassment of students as a condition of continued receipt of Federal funding. It describes the regulatory basis for a school's compliance responsibilities under Title IX, outlines the circumstances under which sexual harassment may constitute discrimination prohibited by the statute and regulations, and provides information about actions that schools should take to prevent sexual harassment or to address it effectively if it does occur.[5]

II. Sexual Harassment

Sexual harassment is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature. Sexual harassment can include unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature.[6] Sexual harassment of a student can deny or limit, on the basis of sex, the student's ability to participate in or to receive benefits, services, or opportunities in the school's program. Sexual harassment of students is, therefore, a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX under the circumstances described in this guidance.

It is important to recognize that Title IX's prohibition against sexual harassment does not extend to legitimate nonsexual touching or other nonsexual conduct. For example, a high school athletic coach hugging a student who made a goal or a kindergarten teacher's consoling hug for a child with a skinned knee will not be considered sexual harassment.[7] Similarly, one student's demonstration of a sports maneuver or technique requiring contact with another student will not be considered sexual harassment. However, in some circumstances, nonsexual conduct may take on sexual connotations and rise to the level of sexual harassment. For example, a teacher's repeatedly hugging and putting his or her arms around students under inappropriate circumstances could create a hostile environment.

III. Applicability of Title IX

Title IX applies to all public and private educational institutions that receive Federal funds, i.e., recipients, including, but not limited to, elementary and secondary schools, school districts, proprietary schools, colleges, and universities. The guidance uses the terms "recipients" and "schools" interchangeably to refer to all of those institutions. The "education program or activity" of a school includes all of the school's operations.[8] This means that Title IX protects students in connection with all of the academic, educational, extra-curricular, athletic, and other programs of the school,

whether they take place in the facilities of the school, on a school bus, at a class or training program sponsored by the school at another location, or elsewhere.

A student may be sexually harassed by a school employee,[9] another student, or a non-employee third party (e.g., a visiting speaker or visiting athletes). Title IX protects any "person" from sex discrimination. Accordingly, both male and female students are protected from sexual harassment[10] engaged in by a school's employees, other students, or third parties. Moreover, Title IX prohibits sexual harassment regardless of the sex of the harasser, i.e., even if the harasser and the person being harassed are members of the same sex.[11] An example would be a campaign of sexually explicit graffiti directed at a particular girl by other girls.[12]

Although Title IX does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,[13] sexual harassment directed at gay or lesbian students that is sufficiently serious to limit or deny a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program constitutes sexual harassment prohibited by Title IX under the circumstances described in this guidance.[14] For example, if a male student or a group of male students target a gay student for physical sexual advances, serious enough to deny or limit the victim's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program, the school would need to respond promptly and effectively, as described in this guidance, just as it would if the victim were heterosexual. On the other hand, if students heckle another student with comments based on the student's sexual orientation (e.g., "gay students are not welcome at this table in the cafeteria"), but their actions do not involve conduct of a sexual nature, their actions would not be sexual harassment covered by Title IX.[15]

Though beyond the scope of this guidance, gender-based harassment, which may include acts of verbal, nonverbal, or physical aggression, intimidation, or hostility based on sex or sex-stereotyping,[16] but not involving conduct of a sexual nature, is also a form of sex discrimination to which a school must respond, if it rises to a level that denies or limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the educational program.[17] For example, the repeated sabotaging of female graduate students' laboratory experiments by male students in the class could be the basis of a violation of Title IX. A school must respond to such harassment in accordance with the standards and procedures described in this guidance.[18] In assessing all related circumstances to determine whether a hostile environment exists, incidents of gender-based harassment combined with incidents of sexual harassment could create a hostile environment, even if neither the gender-based harassment alone nor the sexual harassment alone would be sufficient to do so.[19]

IV. Title IX Regulatory Compliance Responsibilities

As a condition of receiving funds from the Department, a school is required to comply with Title IX and the Department's Title IX regulations, which spell out prohibitions against sex discrimination. The law is clear that sexual harassment may constitute sex discrimination under Title IX.[20]

Recipients specifically agree, as a condition for receiving Federal financial assistance from the Department, to comply with Title IX and the Department's Title IX regulations. The regulatory provision requiring this agreement, known as an assurance of

compliance, specifies that recipients must agree that education programs or activities operated by the recipient will be operated in compliance with the Title IX regulations, including taking any action necessary to remedy its discrimination or the effects of its discrimination in its programs.[21]

The regulations set out the basic Title IX responsibilities a recipient undertakes when it accepts Federal financial assistance, including the following specific obligations.[22] A recipient agrees that, in providing any aid, benefit, or service to students, it will not, on the basis of sex—

- Treat one student differently from another in determining whether the student satisfies any requirement or condition for the provision of any aid, benefit, or service;[23]
- Provide different aid, benefits, or services or provide aid, benefits, or services in a different manner;[24]
- Deny any student any such aid, benefit, or service;[25]
- Subject students to separate or different rules of behavior, sanctions, or other treatment;[26]
- Aid or perpetuate discrimination against a student by providing significant assistance to any agency, organization, or person that discriminates on the basis of sex in providing any aid, benefit, or service to students;[27] and
- Otherwise limit any student in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity.[28]

For the purposes of brevity and clarity, this guidance generally summarizes this comprehensive list by referring to a school's obligation to ensure that a student is not denied or limited in the ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program on the basis of sex.

The regulations also specify that, if a recipient discriminates on the basis of sex, the school must take remedial action to overcome the effects of the discrimination.[29]

In addition, the regulations establish procedural requirements that are important for the prevention or correction of sex discrimination, including sexual harassment. These requirements include issuance of a policy against sex discrimination[30] and adoption and publication of grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of complaints of sex discrimination.[31] The regulations also require that recipients designate at least one employee to coordinate compliance with the regulations, including coordination of investigations of complaints alleging noncompliance.[32]

To comply with these regulatory requirements, schools need to recognize and respond to sexual harassment of students by teachers and other employees, by other students, and by third parties. This guidance explains how the requirements of the Title IX regulations apply to situations involving sexual harassment of a student and outlines measures that schools should take to ensure compliance.

V. Determining a School's Responsibilities

In assessing sexually harassing conduct, it is important for schools to recognize that two distinct issues are considered. The first issue is whether, considering the types of harassment discussed in the following section, the conduct denies or limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the program based on sex. If it does, the second issue is the nature of the school's responsibility to address that conduct. As discussed in a following section, this issue depends in part on the identity of the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred.

A. Harassment that Denies or Limits a Student's Ability to Participate in or Benefit from the Education Program

This guidance moves away from specific labels for types of sexual harassment.[33] In each case, the issue is whether the harassment rises to a level that it denies or limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program based on sex. However, an understanding of the different types of sexual harassment can help schools determine whether or not harassment has occurred that triggers a school's responsibilities under, or violates, Title IX or its regulations.

The type of harassment traditionally referred to as quid pro quo harassment occurs if a teacher or other employee conditions an educational decision or benefit on the student's submission to unwelcome sexual conduct.[34] Whether the student resists and suffers the threatened harm or submits and avoids the threatened harm, the student has been treated differently, or the student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program has been denied or limited, on the basis of sex in violation of the Title IX regulations.[35]

By contrast, sexual harassment can occur that does not explicitly or implicitly condition a decision or benefit on submission to sexual conduct. Harassment of this type is generally referred to as hostile environment harassment.[36] This type of harassing conduct requires a further assessment of whether or not the conduct is sufficiently serious to deny or limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program based on sex.[37]

Teachers and other employees can engage in either type of harassment. Students and third parties are not generally given responsibility over other students and, thus, generally can only engage in hostile environment harassment.

1. Factors Used to Evaluate Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment

As outlined in the following paragraphs, OCR considers a variety of related factors to determine if a hostile environment has been created, i.e., if sexually harassing conduct by an employee, another student, or a third party is sufficiently serious that it denies or limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program based on sex. OCR considers the conduct from both a subjective[38] and objective[39] perspective. In evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct, OCR considers all relevant circumstances, i.e., "the constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships."[40] Schools should also use these factors to evaluate conduct in order to draw commonsense distinctions between conduct that constitutes

sexual harassment and conduct that does not rise to that level. Relevant factors include the following:

- The degree to which the conduct affected one or more students' education. OCR assesses the effect of the harassment on the student to determine whether it has denied or limited the student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program. For example, a student's grades may go down or the student may be forced to withdraw from school because of the harassing behavior.[41] A student may also suffer physical injuries or mental or emotional distress.[42] In another situation, a student may have been able to keep up his or her grades and continue to attend school even though it was very difficult for him or her to do so because of the teacher's repeated sexual advances. Similarly, a student may be able to remain on a sports team, despite experiencing great difficulty performing at practices and games from the humiliation and anger caused by repeated sexual advances and intimidation by several team members that create a hostile environment. Harassing conduct in these examples would alter a reasonable student's educational environment and adversely affect the student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program on the basis of sex.

  A hostile environment can occur even if the harassment is not targeted specifically at the individual complainant.[43] For example, if a student, group of students, or a teacher regularly directs sexual comments toward a particular student, a hostile environment may be created not only for the targeted student, but also for others who witness the conduct.

- The type, frequency, and duration of the conduct. In most cases, a hostile environment will exist if there is a pattern or practice of harassment, or if the harassment is sustained and nontrivial.[44] For instance, if a young woman is taunted by one or more young men about her breasts or genital area or both, OCR may find that a hostile environment has been created, particularly if the conduct has gone on for some time, or takes place throughout the school, or if the taunts are made by a number of students. The more severe the conduct, the less the need to show a repetitive series of incidents; this is particularly true if the harassment is physical. For instance, if the conduct is more severe, e.g., attempts to grab a female student's breasts or attempts to grab any student's genital area or buttocks, it need not be as persistent to create a hostile environment. Indeed, a single or isolated incident of sexual harassment may, if sufficiently severe, create a hostile environment.[45] On the other hand, conduct that is not severe will not create a hostile environment, e.g., a comment by one student to another student that she has a nice figure. Indeed, depending on the circumstances, this may not even be conduct of a sexual nature.[46] Similarly, because students date one another, a request for a date or a gift of flowers, even if unwelcome, would not create a hostile environment. However, there may be circumstances in which repeated, unwelcome requests for dates or similar conduct could create a hostile environment. For example, a person, who has been refused previously, may request dates in an intimidating or threatening manner.

- The identity of and relationship between the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of the harassment. A factor to be considered, especially in cases involving allegations of sexual harassment of a student by a school employee, is the identity of

and relationship between the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of the harassment. For example, due to the power a professor or teacher has over a student, sexually based conduct by that person toward a student is more likely to create a hostile environment than similar conduct by another student.[47]

- The number of individuals involved. Sexual harassment may be committed by an individual or a group. In some cases, verbal comments or other conduct from one person might not be sufficient to create a hostile environment, but could be if done by a group. Similarly, while harassment can be directed toward an individual or a group,[48] the effect of the conduct toward a group may vary, depending on the type of conduct and the context. For certain types of conduct, there may be "safety in numbers." For example, following an individual student and making sexual taunts to him or her may be very intimidating to that student, but, in certain circumstances, less so to a group of students. On the other hand, persistent unwelcome sexual conduct still may create a hostile environment if directed toward a group.

- The age and sex of the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of the harassment. For example, in the case of younger students, sexually harassing conduct is more likely to be intimidating if coming from an older student.[49]

- The size of the school, location of the incidents, and context in which they occurred. Depending on the circumstances of a particular case, fewer incidents may have a greater effect at a small college than at a large university campus. Harassing conduct occurring on a school bus may be more intimidating than similar conduct on a school playground because the restricted area makes it impossible for students to avoid their harassers.[50] Harassing conduct in a personal or secluded area, such as a dormitory room or residence hall, can have a greater effect (e.g., be seen as more threatening) than would similar conduct in a more public area. On the other hand, harassing conduct in a public place may be more humiliating. Each incident must be judged individually.

- Other incidents at the school. A series of incidents at the school, not involving the same students, could — taken together — create a hostile environment, even if each by itself would not be sufficient.[51]

- Incidents of gender-based, but nonsexual harassment. Acts of verbal, nonverbal or physical aggression, intimidation or hostility based on sex, but not involving sexual activity or language, can be combined with incidents of sexual harassment to determine if the incidents of sexual harassment are sufficiently serious to create a sexually hostile environment.[52]

It is the totality of the circumstances in which the behavior occurs that is critical in determining whether a hostile environment exists. Consequently, in using the factors discussed previously to evaluate incidents of alleged harassment, it is always important to use common sense and reasonable judgement in determining whether a sexually hostile environment has been created.

2. Welcomeness

The section entitled "Sexual Harassment" explains that in order for conduct of a sexual nature to be sexual harassment, it must be unwelcome. Conduct is unwelcome if

the student did not request or invite it and "regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."[53] Acquiescence in the conduct or the failure to complain does not always mean that the conduct was welcome.[54] For example, a student may decide not to resist sexual advances of another student or may not file a complaint out of fear. In addition, a student may not object to a pattern of demeaning comments directed at him or her by a group of students out of a concern that objections might cause the harassers to make more comments. The fact that a student may have accepted the conduct does not mean that he or she welcomed it.[55] Also, the fact that a student willingly participated in conduct on one occasion does not prevent him or her from indicating that the same conduct has become unwelcome on a subsequent occasion. On the other hand, if a student actively participates in sexual banter and discussions and gives no indication that he or she objects, then the evidence generally will not support a conclusion that the conduct was unwelcome.[56]

If younger children are involved, it may be necessary to determine the degree to which they are able to recognize that certain sexual conduct is conduct to which they can or should reasonably object and the degree to which they can articulate an objection. Accordingly, OCR will consider the age of the student, the nature of the conduct involved, and other relevant factors in determining whether a student had the capacity to welcome sexual conduct.

Schools should be particularly concerned about the issue of welcomeness if the harasser is in a position of authority. For instance, because students may be encouraged to believe that a teacher has absolute authority over the operation of his or her classroom, a student may not object to a teacher's sexually harassing comments during class; however, this does not necessarily mean that the conduct was welcome. Instead, the student may believe that any objections would be ineffective in stopping the harassment or may fear that by making objections he or she will be singled out for harassing comments or other retaliation.

In addition, OCR must consider particular issues of welcomeness if the alleged harassment relates to alleged "consensual" sexual relationships between a school's adult employees and its students. If elementary students are involved, welcomeness will not be an issue: OCR will never view sexual conduct between an adult school employee and an elementary school student as consensual. In cases involving secondary students, there will be a strong presumption that sexual conduct between an adult school employee and a student is not consensual. In cases involving older secondary students, subject to the presumption,[57] OCR will consider a number of factors in determining whether a school employee's sexual advances or other sexual conduct could be considered welcome.[58] In addition, OCR will consider these factors in all cases involving postsecondary students in making those determinations.[59] The factors include the following:

- The nature of the conduct and the relationship of the school employee to the student, including the degree of influence (which could, at least in part, be affected by the student's age), authority, or control the employee has over the student.
- Whether the student was legally or practically unable to consent to the sexual conduct in question. For example, a student's age could affect his or her ability to do so. Similarly, certain types of disabilities could affect a student's ability to do so.

If there is a dispute about whether harassment occurred or whether it was welcome — in a case in which it is appropriate to consider whether the conduct would be welcome — determinations should be made based on the totality of the circumstances. The following types of information may be helpful in resolving the dispute:

- Statements by any witnesses to the alleged incident.
- Evidence about the relative credibility of the allegedly harassed student and the alleged harasser. For example, the level of detail and consistency of each person's account should be compared in an attempt to determine who is telling the truth. Another way to assess credibility is to see if corroborative evidence is lacking where it should logically exist. However, the absence of witnesses may indicate only the unwillingness of others to step forward, perhaps due to fear of the harasser or a desire not to get involved.
- Evidence that the alleged harasser has been found to have harassed others may support the credibility of the student claiming the harassment; conversely, the student's claim will be weakened if he or she has been found to have made false allegations against other individuals.
- Evidence of the allegedly harassed student's reaction or behavior after the alleged harassment. For example, were there witnesses who saw the student immediately after the alleged incident who say that the student appeared to be upset? However, it is important to note that some students may respond to harassment in ways that do not manifest themselves right away, but may surface several days or weeks after the harassment. For example, a student may initially show no signs of having been harassed, but several weeks after the harassment, there may be significant changes in the student's behavior, including difficulty concentrating on academic work, symptoms of depression, and a desire to avoid certain individuals and places at school.
- Evidence about whether the student claiming harassment filed a complaint or took other action to protest the conduct soon after the alleged incident occurred. However, failure to immediately complain may merely reflect a fear of retaliation or a fear that the complainant may not be believed rather than that the alleged harassment did not occur.
- Other contemporaneous evidence. For example, did the student claiming harassment write about the conduct and his or her reaction to it soon after it occurred (e.g., in a diary or letter)? Did the student tell others (friends, parents) about the conduct (and his or her reaction to it) soon after it occurred?

B. Nature of the School's Responsibility to Address Sexual Harassment

A school has a responsibility to respond promptly and effectively to sexual harassment. In the case of harassment by teachers or other employees, the nature of this responsibility depends in part on whether the harassment occurred in the context of the employee's provision of aid, benefits, or services to students.

1. Harassment by Teachers and Other Employees

Sexual harassment of a student by a teacher or other school employee can be discrimination in violation of Title IX.[60] Schools are responsible for taking prompt and effective action to stop the harassment and prevent its recurrence. A school also may be responsible for remedying the effects of the harassment on the student who was harassed. The extent of a recipient's responsibilities if an employee sexually harasses a student is determined by whether or not the harassment occurred in the context of the employee's provision of aid, benefits, or services to students.

A recipient is responsible under the Title IX regulations for the nondiscriminatory provision of aid, benefits, and services to students. Recipients generally provide aid, benefits, and services to students through the responsibilities they give to employees. If an employee who is acting (or who reasonably appears to be acting) in the context of carrying out these responsibilities over students engages in sexual harassment – generally this means harassment that is carried out during an employee's performance of his or her responsibilities in relation to students, including teaching, counseling, supervising, advising, and transporting students – and the harassment denies or limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from a school program on the basis of sex,[61] the recipient is responsible for the discriminatory conduct.[62] The recipient is, therefore, also responsible for remedying any effects of the harassment on the victim, as well as for ending the harassment and preventing its recurrence. This is true whether or not the recipient has "notice" of the harassment. (As explained in the section on "Notice of Employee, Peer, or Third Party Harassment," for purposes of this guidance, a school has notice of harassment if a responsible school employee actually knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known about the harassment.) Of course, under OCR's administrative enforcement, recipients always receive actual notice and the opportunity to take appropriate corrective action before any finding of violation or possible loss of federal funds.

Whether or not sexual harassment of a student occurred within the context of an employee's responsibilities for providing aid, benefits, or services is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a variety of factors. If an employee conditions the provision of an aid, benefit, or service that the employee is responsible for providing on a student's submission to sexual conduct, i.e., conduct traditionally referred to as quid pro quo harassment, the harassment is clearly taking place in the context of the employee's responsibilities to provide aid, benefits, or services. In other situations, i.e., when an employee has created a hostile environment, OCR will consider the following factors in determining whether or not the harassment has taken place in this context, including:

- The type and degree of responsibility given to the employee, including both formal and informal authority, to provide aids, benefits, or services to students, to direct and control student conduct, or to discipline students generally;
- the degree of influence the employee has over the particular student involved, including in the circumstances in which the harassment took place;
- where and when the harassment occurred;
- the age and educational level of the student involved; and

- as applicable, whether, in light of the student's age and educational level and the way the school is run, it would be reasonable for the student to believe that the employee was in a position of responsibility over the student, even if the employee was not.

These factors are applicable to all recipient educational institutions, including elementary and secondary schools, colleges, and universities. Elementary and secondary schools, however, are typically run in a way that gives teachers, school officials, and other school employees a substantial degree of supervision, control, and disciplinary authority over the conduct of students.[63] Therefore, in cases involving allegations of harassment of elementary and secondary school-age students by a teacher or school administrator during any school activity,[64] consideration of these factors will generally lead to a conclusion that the harassment occurred in the context of the employee's provision of aid, benefits, or services.

For example, a teacher sexually harasses an eighth- grade student in a school hallway. Even if the student is not in any of the teacher's classes and even if the teacher is not designated as a hall monitor, given the age and educational level of the student and the status and degree of influence of teachers in elementary and secondary schools, it would be reasonable for the student to believe that the teacher had at least informal disciplinary authority over students in the hallways. Thus, OCR would consider this an example of conduct that is occurring in the context of the employee's responsibilities to provide aid, benefits, or services.

Other examples of sexual harassment of a student occurring in the context of an employee's responsibilities for providing aid, benefits, or services include, but are not limited to -- a faculty member at a university's medical school conditions an intern's evaluation on submission to his sexual advances and then gives her a poor evaluation for rejecting the advances; a high school drama instructor does not give a student a part in a play because she has not responded to sexual overtures from the instructor; a faculty member withdraws approval of research funds for her assistant because he has rebuffed her advances; a journalism professor who supervises a college newspaper continually and inappropriately touches a student editor in a sexual manner, causing the student to resign from the newspaper staff; and a teacher repeatedly asks a ninth grade student to stay after class and attempts to engage her in discussions about sex and her personal experiences while they are alone in the classroom, causing the student to stop coming to class. In each of these cases, the school is responsible for the discriminatory conduct, including taking prompt and effective action to end the harassment, prevent it from recurring, and remedy the effects of the harassment on the victim.

Sometimes harassment of a student by an employee in the school's program does not take place in the context of the employee's provision of aid, benefits, or services, but nevertheless is sufficiently serious to create a hostile educational environment. An example of this conduct might occur if a faculty member in the history department at a university, over the course of several weeks, repeatedly touches and makes sexually suggestive remarks to a graduate engineering student while waiting at a stop for the university shuttle bus, riding on the bus, and upon exiting the bus. As a result, the student stops using the campus shuttle and walks the very long distances between her classes. In this case, the school is not directly responsible for the harassing conduct because it did not occur in the context of the employee's responsibilities for the provision

of aid, benefits, or services to students. However, the conduct is sufficiently serious to deny or limit the student in her ability to participate in or benefit from the recipient's program. Thus, the school has a duty, upon notice of the harassment,[65] to take prompt and effective action to stop the harassment and prevent its recurrence.

If the school takes these steps, it has avoided violating Title IX. If the school fails to take the necessary steps, however, its failure to act has allowed the student to continue to be subjected to a hostile environment that denies or limits the student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program. The school, therefore, has engaged in its own discrimination. It then becomes responsible, not just for stopping the conduct and preventing it from happening again, but for remedying the effects of the harassment on the student that could reasonably have been prevented if the school had responded promptly and effectively. (For related issues, see the sections on "OCR Case Resolution" and "Recipient's Response.")

2. Harassment by Other Students or Third Parties

If a student sexually harasses another student and the harassing conduct is sufficiently serious to deny or limit the student's ability to participate in or benefit from the program, and if the school knows or reasonably should know[66] about the harassment, the school is responsible for taking immediate effective action to eliminate the hostile environment and prevent its recurrence.[67] As long as the school, upon notice of the harassment, responds by taking prompt and effective action to end the harassment and prevent its recurrence, the school has carried out its responsibility under the Title IX regulations. On the other hand, if, upon notice, the school fails to take prompt, effective action, the school's own inaction has permitted the student to be subjected to a hostile environment that denies or limits the student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program on the basis of sex.[68] In this case, the school is responsible for taking effective corrective actions to stop the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and remedy the effects on the victim that could reasonably have been prevented had it responded promptly and effectively.

Similarly, sexually harassing conduct by third parties, who are not themselves employees or students at the school (e.g., a visiting speaker or members of a visiting athletic team), may also be of a sufficiently serious nature to deny or limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the education program. As previously outlined in connection with peer harassment, if the school knows or should know[69] of the harassment, the school is responsible for taking prompt and effective action to eliminate the hostile environment and prevent its recurrence.

The type of appropriate steps that the school should take will differ depending on the level of control that the school has over the third party harasser.[70] For example, if athletes from a visiting team harass the home school's students, the home school may not be able to discipline the athletes. However, it could encourage the other school to take appropriate action to prevent further incidents; if necessary, the home school may choose not to invite the other school back. (This issue is discussed more fully in the section on "Recipient's Response.")

If, upon notice, the school fails to take prompt and effective corrective action, its own failure has permitted the student to be subjected to a hostile environment that limits

the student's ability to participate in or benefit from the education program.[71] In this case, the school is responsible for taking corrective actions to stop the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and remedy the effects on the victim that could reasonably have been prevented had the school responded promptly and effectively.

C. Notice of Employee, Peer, or Third Party Harassment

As described in the section on "Harassment by Teachers and Other Employees," schools may be responsible for certain types of employee harassment that occurred before the school otherwise had notice of the harassment. On the other hand, as described in that section and the section on "Harassment by Other Students or Third Parties," in situations involving certain other types of employee harassment, or harassment by peers or third parties, a school will be in violation of the Title IX regulations if the school "has notice" of a sexually hostile environment and fails to take immediate and effective corrective action.[72]

A school has notice if a responsible employee "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known," about the harassment.[73] A responsible employee would include any employee who has the authority to take action to redress the harassment, who has the duty to report to appropriate school officials sexual harassment or any other misconduct by students or employees, or an individual who a student could reasonably believe has this authority or responsibility.[74] Accordingly, schools need to ensure that employees are trained so that those with authority to address harassment know how to respond appropriately, and other responsible employees know that they are obligated to report harassment to appropriate school officials. Training for employees should include practical information about how to identify harassment and, as applicable, the person to whom it should be reported.

A school can receive notice of harassment in many different ways. A student may have filed a grievance with the Title IX coordinator[75] or complained to a teacher or other responsible employee about fellow students harassing him or her. A student, parent, or other individual may have contacted other appropriate personnel, such as a principal, campus security, bus driver, teacher, affirmative action officer, or staff in the office of student affairs. A teacher or other responsible employee of the school may have witnessed the harassment. The school may receive notice about harassment in an indirect manner, from sources such as a member of the school staff, a member of the educational or local community, or the media. The school also may have learned about the harassment from flyers about the incident distributed at the school or posted around the school. For the purposes of compliance with the Title IX regulations, a school has a duty to respond to harassment about which it reasonably should have known, i.e., if it would have learned of the harassment if it had exercised reasonable care or made a "reasonably diligent inquiry."[76]

For example, in some situations if the school knows of incidents of harassment, the exercise of reasonable care should trigger an investigation that would lead to a discovery of additional incidents.[77] In other cases, the pervasiveness of the harassment may be enough to conclude that the school should have known of the hostile environment — if the harassment is widespread, openly practiced, or well-known to students and staff

(such as sexual harassment occurring in the hallways, graffiti in public areas, or harassment occurring during recess under a teacher's supervision.)[78]

If a school otherwise knows or reasonably should know of a hostile environment and fails to take prompt and effective corrective action, a school has violated Title IX even if the student has failed to use the school's existing grievance procedures or otherwise inform the school of the harassment.

D. The Role of Grievance Procedures

Schools are required by the Title IX regulations to adopt and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of sex discrimination complaints, including complaints of sexual harassment, and to disseminate a policy against sex discrimination.[79] (These issues are discussed in the section on "Prompt and Equitable Grievance Procedures.") These procedures provide a school with a mechanism for discovering sexual harassment as early as possible and for effectively correcting problems, as required by the Title IX regulations. By having a strong policy against sex discrimination and accessible, effective, and fairly applied grievance procedures, a school is telling its students that it does not tolerate sexual harassment and that students can report it without fear of adverse consequences.

Without a disseminated policy and procedure, a student does not know either of the school's policy against and obligation to address this form of discrimination, or how to report harassment so that it can be remedied. If the alleged harassment is sufficiently serious to create a hostile environment and it is the school's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the Title IX regulations that hampers early notification and intervention and permits sexual harassment to deny or limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program on the basis of sex,[80] the school will be responsible under the Title IX regulations, once informed of the harassment, to take corrective action, including stopping the harassment, preventing its recurrence, and remedying the effects of the harassment on the victim that could reasonably have been prevented if the school's failure to comply with the procedural requirements had not hampered early notification.

VI. OCR Case Resolution

If OCR is asked to investigate or otherwise resolve incidents of sexual harassment of students, including incidents caused by employees, other students, or third parties, OCR will consider whether — (1) the school has a disseminated policy prohibiting sex discrimination under Title IX[81] and effective grievance procedures;[82] (2) the school appropriately investigated or otherwise responded to allegations of sexual harassment;[83] and (3) the school has taken immediate and effective corrective action responsive to the harassment, including effective actions to end the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects.[84] (Issues related to appropriate investigative and corrective actions are discussed in detail in the section on "Recipient's Response.")

If the school has taken, or agrees to take, each of these steps, OCR will consider the case against the school resolved and will take no further action, other than monitoring compliance with an agreement, if any, between the school and OCR. This is true in cases

in which the school was in violation of the Title IX regulations (e.g., a teacher sexually harassed a student in the context ofproviding aid, benefits, or services to students), as well as those in which there has been no violation of the regulations (e.g., in a peer sexual harassment situation in which the school took immediate, reasonable steps to end the harassment and prevent its recurrence). This is because, even if OCR identifies a violation, Title IX requires OCR to attempt to secure voluntary compliance.[85] Thus, because a school will have the opportunity to take reasonable corrective action before OCR issues a formal finding of violation, a school does not risk losing its Federal funding solely because discrimination occurred.

VII. Recipient's Response

Once a school has notice of possible sexual harassment of students — whether carried out by employees, other students, or third parties — it should take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred and take prompt and effective steps

reasonably calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent harassment from occurring again. These steps are the school's responsibility whether or not the student who was harassed makes a complaint or otherwise asks the school to take action.[86] As described in the next section, in appropriate circumstances the school will also be responsible for taking steps to remedy the effects of the harassment on the individual student or students who were harassed. What constitutes a reasonable response to information about possible sexual harassment will differ depending upon the circumstances.

A. Response to Student or Parent Reports of Harassment; Response to Direct Observation of Harassment by a Responsible Employee

If a student or the parent of an elementary or secondary student provides information or complains about sexual harassment of the student, the school should initially discuss what actions the student or parent is seeking in response to the harassment. The school should explain the avenues for informal and formal action, including a description of the grievance procedure that is available for sexual harassment complaints and an explanation of how the procedure works. If a responsible school employee has directly observed sexual harassment of a student, the school should contact the student who was harassed (or the parent, depending upon the age of the student),[87] explain that the school is responsible for taking steps to correct the harassment, and provide the same information described in the previous sentence.

Regardless of whether the student who was harassed, or his or her parent, decides to file a formal complaint or otherwise request action on the student's behalf (including in cases involving direct observation by a responsible employee), the school must promptly investigate to determine what occurred and then take appropriate steps to resolve the situation. The specific steps in an investigation will vary depending upon the nature of the allegations, the source of the complaint, the age of the student or students involved, the size and administrative structure of the school, and other factors. However, in all cases the inquiry must be prompt, thorough, and impartial. (Requests by the student who

was harassed for confidentiality or for no action to be taken, responding to notice of harassment from other sources, and the components of a prompt and equitable grievance procedure are discussed in subsequent sections of this guidance.)

It may be appropriate for a school to take interim measures during the investigation of a complaint. For instance, if a student alleges that he or she has been sexually assaulted by another student, the school may decide to place the students immediately in separate classes or in different housing arrangements on a campus, pending the results of the school's investigation. Similarly, if the alleged harasser is a teacher, allowing the student to transfer to a different class may be appropriate. In cases involving potential criminal conduct, school personnel should determine whether appropriate law enforcement authorities should be notified. In all cases, schools should make every effort to prevent disclosure of the names of all parties involved -- the complainant, the witnesses, and the accused -- except to the extent necessary to carry out an investigation.

If a school determines that sexual harassment has occurred, it should take reasonable, timely, age-appropriate, and effective corrective action, including steps tailored to the specific situation.[88] Appropriate steps should be taken to end the harassment. For example, school personnel may need to counsel, warn, or take disciplinary action against the harasser, based on the severity of the harassment or any record of prior incidents or both.[89] A series of escalating consequences may be necessary if the initial steps are ineffective in stopping the harassment.[90] In some cases, it may be appropriate to further separate the harassed student and the harasser, e.g., by changing housing arrangements[91] or directing the harasser to have no further contact with the harassed student. Responsive measures of this type should be designed to minimize, as much as possible, the burden on the student who was harassed. If the alleged harasser is not a student or employee of the recipient, OCR will consider the level of control the school has over the harasser in determining what response would be appropriate.[92]

Steps should also be taken to eliminate any hostile environment that has been created. For example, if a female student has been subjected to harassment by a group of other students in a class, the school may need to deliver special training or other interventions for that class to repair the educational environment. If the school offers the student the option of withdrawing from a class in which a hostile environment occurred, the school should assist the student in making program or schedule changes and ensure that none of the changes adversely affect the student's academic record. Other measures may include, if appropriate, directing a harasser to apologize to the harassed student. If a hostile environment has affected an entire school or campus, an effective response may need to include dissemination of information, the issuance of new policy statements, or other steps that are designed to clearly communicate the message that the school does not tolerate harassment and will be responsive to any student who reports that conduct.

In some situations, a school may be required to provide other services to the student who was harassed if necessary to address the effects of the harassment on that student.[93] For example, if an instructor gives a student a low grade because the student failed to respond to his sexual advances, the school may be required to make arrangements for an independent reassessment of the student's work, if feasible, and change the grade accordingly; make arrangements for the student to take the course again

with a different instructor; provide tutoring; make tuition adjustments; offer reimbursement for professional counseling; or take other measures that are appropriate to the circumstances. As another example, if a school delays responding or responds inappropriately to information about harassment, such as a case in which the school ignores complaints by a student that he or she is being sexually harassed by a classmate, the school will be required to remedy the effects of the harassment that could have been prevented had the school responded promptly and effectively.

Finally, a school should take steps to prevent any further harassment[94] and to prevent any retaliation against the student who made the complaint (or was the subject of the harassment), against the person who filed a complaint on behalf of a student, or against those who provided information as witnesses.[95] At a minimum, this includes making sure that the harassed students and their parents know how to report any subsequent problems and making follow-up inquiries to see if there have been any new incidents or any retaliation. To prevent recurrences, counseling for the harasser may be appropriate to ensure that he or she understands what constitutes harassment and the effects it can have. In addition, depending on how widespread the harassment was and whether there have been any prior incidents, the school may need to provide training for the larger school community to ensure that students, parents, and teachers can recognize harassment if it recurs and know how to respond.[96]

B. Confidentiality

The scope of a reasonable response also may depend upon whether a student, or parent of a minor student, reporting harassment asks that the student's name not be disclosed to the harasser or that nothing be done about the alleged harassment. In all cases, a school should discuss confidentiality standards and concerns with the complainant initially. The school should inform the student that a confidentiality request may limit the school's ability to respond. The school also should tell the student that Title IX prohibits retaliation and that, if he or she is afraid of reprisals from the alleged harasser, the school will take steps to prevent retaliation and will take strong responsive actions if retaliation occurs. If the student continues to ask that his or her name not be revealed, the school should take all reasonable steps to investigate and respond to the complaint consistent with the student's request as long as doing so does not prevent the school from responding effectively to the harassment and preventing harassment of other students.

OCR enforces Title IX consistent with the federally protected due process rights of public school students and employees. Thus, for example, if a student, who was the only student harassed, insists that his or her name not be revealed, and the alleged harasser could not respond to the charges of sexual harassment without that information, in evaluating the school's response, OCR would not expect disciplinary action against an alleged harasser.

At the same time, a school should evaluate the confidentiality request in the context of its responsibility to provide a safe and nondiscriminatory environment for all students. The factors that a school may consider in this regard include the seriousness of the alleged harassment, the age of the student harassed, whether there have been other complaints or reports of harassment against the alleged harasser, and the rights of the

accused individual to receive information about the accuser and the allegations if a formal proceeding with sanctions may result.[97]

Similarly, a school should be aware of the confidentiality concerns of an accused employee or student. Publicized accusations of sexual harassment, if ultimately found to be false, may nevertheless irreparably damage the reputation of the accused. The accused individual's need for confidentiality must, of course, also be evaluated based on the factors discussed in the preceding paragraph in the context of the school's responsibility to ensure a safe environment for students.

Although a student's request to have his or her name withheld may limit the school's ability to respond fully to an individual complaint of harassment, other means may be available to address the harassment. There are steps a recipient can take to limit the effects of the alleged harassment and prevent its recurrence without initiating formal action against the alleged harasser or revealing the identity of the complainant. Examples include conducting sexual harassment training for the school site or academic department where the problem occurred, taking a student survey concerning any problems with harassment, or implementing other systemic measures at the site or department where the alleged harassment has occurred.

In addition, by investigating the complaint to the extent possible — including by reporting it to the Title IX coordinator or other responsible school employee designated pursuant to Title IX — the school may learn about or be able to confirm a pattern of harassment based on claims by different students that they were harassed by the same individual. In some situations there may be prior reports by former students who now might be willing to come forward and be identified, thus providing a basis for further corrective action. In instances affecting a number of students (for example, a report from a student that an instructor has repeatedly made sexually explicit remarks about his or her personal life in front of an entire class), an individual can be put on notice of allegations of harassing behavior and counseled appropriately without revealing, even indirectly, the identity of the student who notified the school. Those steps can be very effective in preventing further harassment.

C. Response to Other Types of Notice

The previous two sections deal with situations in which a student or parent of a student who was harassed reports or complains of harassment or in which a responsible school employee directly observes sexual harassment of a student. If a school learns of harassment through other means, for example, if information about harassment is received from a third party (such as from a witness to an incident or an anonymous letter or telephone call), different factors will affect the school's response. These factors include the source and nature of the information; the seriousness of the alleged incident; the specificity of the information; the objectivity and credibility of the source of the report; whether any individuals can be identified who were subjected to the alleged harassment; and whether those individuals want to pursue the matter. If, based on these factors, it is reasonable for the school to investigate and it can confirm the allegations, the considerations described in the previous sections concerning interim measures and appropriate responsive action will apply.

For example, if a parent visiting a school observes a student repeatedly harassing a group of female students and reports this to school officials, school personnel can speak with the female students to confirm whether that conduct has occurred and whether they view it as unwelcome. If the school determines that the conduct created a hostile environment, it can take reasonable, age-appropriate steps to address the situation. If on the other hand, the students in this example were to ask that their names not be disclosed or indicate that they do not want to pursue the matter, the considerations described in the previous section related to requests for confidentiality will shape the school's response.

In a contrasting example, a student newspaper at a large university may print an anonymous letter claiming that a professor is sexually harassing students in class on a daily basis, but the letter provides no clue as to the identity of the professor or the department in which the conduct is allegedly taking place. Due to the anonymous source and lack of specificity of the information, a school would not reasonably be able to investigate and confirm these allegations. However, in response to the anonymous letter, the school could submit a letter or article to the newspaper reiterating its policy against sexual harassment, encouraging persons who believe that they have been sexually harassed to come forward, and explaining how its grievance procedures work.

VIII. Prevention

A policy specifically prohibiting sexual harassment and separate grievance procedures for violations of that policy can help ensure that all students and employees understand the nature of sexual harassment and that the school will not tolerate it. Indeed, they might even bring conduct of a sexual nature to the school's attention so that the school can address it before it becomes sufficiently serious as to create a hostile environment. Further, training for administrators, teachers, and staff and age-appropriate classroom information for students can help to ensure that they understand what types of conduct can cause sexual harassment and that they know how to respond.

IX. Prompt and Equitable Grievance Procedures

Schools are required by the Title IX regulations to adopt and publish a policy against sex discrimination and grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of complaints of discrimination on the basis of sex.[98] Accordingly, regardless of whether harassment occurred, a school violates this requirement of the Title IX regulations if it does not have those procedures and policy in place.[99]

A school's sex discrimination grievance procedures must apply to complaints of sex discrimination in the school's education programs and activities filed by students against school employees, other students, or third parties.[100] Title IX does not require a school to adopt a policy specifically prohibiting sexual harassment or to provide separate grievance procedures for sexual harassment complaints. However, its nondiscrimination policy and grievance procedures for handling discrimination complaints must provide effective means for preventing and responding to sexual harassment. Thus, if, because of the lack of a policy or procedure specifically addressing sexual harassment, students are unaware of what kind of conduct constitutes sexual harassment or that such conduct is

prohibited sex discrimination, a school's general policy and procedures relating to sex discrimination complaints will not be considered effective.[101]

OCR has identified a number of elements in evaluating whether a school's grievance procedures are prompt and equitable, including whether the procedures provide for —

- Notice to students, parents of elementary and secondary students, and employees of the procedure, including where complaints may be filed;
- Application of the procedure to complaints alleging harassment carried out by employees, other students, or third parties;
- Adequate, reliable, and impartial investigation of complaints, including the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence;
- Designated and reasonably prompt timeframes for the major stages of the complaint process;
- Notice to the parties of the outcome of the complaint;[102] and
- An assurance that the school will take steps to prevent recurrence of any harassment and to correct its discriminatory effects on the complainant and others, if appropriate.[103]

Many schools also provide an opportunity to appeal the findings or remedy, or both. In addition, because retaliation is prohibited by Title IX, schools may want to include a provision in their procedures prohibiting retaliation against any individual who files a complaint or participates in a harassment inquiry.

Procedures adopted by schools will vary considerably in detail, specificity, and components, reflecting differences in audiences, school sizes and administrative structures, State or local legal requirements, and past experience. In addition, whether complaint resolutions are timely will vary depending on the complexity of the investigation and the severity and extent of the harassment. During the investigation it is a good practice for schools to inform students who have alleged harassment about the status of the investigation on a periodic basis.

A grievance procedure applicable to sexual harassment complaints cannot be prompt or equitable unless students know it exists, how it works, and how to file a complaint. Thus, the procedures should be written in language appropriate to the age of the school's students, easily understood, and widely disseminated. Distributing the procedures to administrators, or including them in the school's administrative or policy manual, may not by itself be an effective way of providing notice, as these publications are usually not widely circulated to and understood by all members of the school community. Many schools ensure adequate notice to students by having copies of the procedures available at various locations throughout the school or campus; publishing the procedures as a separate document; including a summary of the procedures in major publications issued by the school, such as handbooks and catalogs for students, parents of elementary and secondary students, faculty, and staff; and identifying individuals who can explain how the procedures work.

A school must designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its Title IX responsibilities.[104] The school must notify all of its students and employees of the name, office address, and telephone number of the employee or employees designated.[105] Because it is possible that an employee designated to handle Title IX complaints may himself or herself engage in harassment, a school may want to designate more than one employee to be responsible for handling complaints in order to ensure that students have an effective means of reporting harassment.[106] While a school may choose to have a number of employees responsible for Title IX matters, it is also advisable to give one official responsibility for overall coordination and oversight of all sexual harassment complaints to ensure consistent practices and standards in handling complaints. Coordination of recordkeeping (for instance, in a confidential log maintained by the Title IX coordinator) will also ensure that the school can and will resolve recurring problems and identify students or employees who have multiple complaints filed against them.[107] Finally, the school must make sure that all designated employees have adequate training as to what conduct constitutes sexual harassment and are able to explain how the grievance procedure operates.[108]

Grievance procedures may include informal mechanisms for resolving sexual harassment complaints to be used if the parties agree to do so.[109] OCR has frequently advised schools, however, that it is not appropriate for a student who is complaining of harassment to be required to work out the problem directly with the individual alleged to be harassing him or her, and certainly not without appropriate involvement by the school (e.g., participation by a counselor, trained mediator, or, if appropriate, a teacher or administrator). In addition, the complainant must be notified of the right to end the informal process at any time and begin the formal stage of the complaint process. In some cases, such as alleged sexual assaults, mediation will not be appropriate even on a voluntary basis. Title IX also permits the use of a student disciplinary procedure not designed specifically for Title IX grievances to resolve sex discrimination complaints, as long as the procedure meets the requirement of affording a complainant a "prompt and equitable" resolution of the complaint.

In some instances, a complainant may allege harassing conduct that constitutes both sex discrimination and possible criminal conduct. Police investigations or reports may be useful in terms of fact gathering. However, because legal standards for criminal investigations are different, police investigations or reports may not be determinative of whether harassment occurred under Title IX and do not relieve the school of its duty to respond promptly and effectively.[110] Similarly, schools are cautioned about using the results of insurance company investigations of sexual harassment allegations. The purpose of an insurance investigation is to assess liability under the insurance policy, and the applicable standards may well be different from those under Title IX. In addition, a school is not relieved of its responsibility to respond to a sexual harassment complaint filed under its grievance procedure by the fact that a complaint has been filed with OCR.[111]

X. Due Process Rights of the Accused

A public school's employees have certain due process rights under the United States Constitution. The Constitution also guarantees due process to students in public and State-supported schools who are accused of certain types of infractions. The rights established under Title IX must be interpreted consistent with any federally guaranteed due process rights involved in a complaint proceeding. Furthermore, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) does not override federally protected due process rights of persons accused of sexual harassment. Procedures that ensure the Title IX rights of the complainant, while at the same time according due process to both parties involved, will lead to sound and supportable decisions. Of course, schools should ensure that steps to accord due process rights do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the protections provided by Title IX to the complainant. In both public and private schools, additional or separate rights may be created for employees or students by State law, institutional regulations and policies, such as faculty or student handbooks, and collective bargaining agreements. Schools should be aware of these rights and their legal responsibilities to individuals accused of harassment.

XI. First Amendment

In cases of alleged harassment, the protections of the First Amendment must be considered if issues of speech or expression are involved.[112] Free speech rights apply in the classroom (e.g., classroom lectures and discussions)[113] and in all other education programs and activities of public schools (e.g., public meetings and speakers on campus; campus debates, school plays and other cultural events[114]; and student newspapers, journals, and other publications[115]). In addition, First Amendment rights apply to the speech of students and teachers.[116]

Title IX is intended to protect students from sex discrimination, not to regulate the content of speech. OCR recognizes that the offensiveness of a particular expression as perceived by some students, standing alone, is not a legally sufficient basis to establish a sexually hostile environment under Title IX.[117] In order to establish a violation of Title IX, the harassment must be sufficiently serious to deny or limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the education program.[118]

Moreover, in regulating the conduct of its students and its faculty to prevent or redress discrimination prohibited by Title IX (e.g., in responding to harassment that is sufficiently serious as to create a hostile environment), a school must formulate, interpret, and apply its rules so as to protect academic freedom and free speech rights. For instance, while the First Amendment may prohibit a school from restricting the right of students to express opinions about one sex that may be considered derogatory, the school can take steps to denounce those opinions and ensure that competing views are heard. The age of the students involved and the location or forum may affect how the school can respond consistently with the First Amendment.[119] As an example of the application of free speech rights to allegations of sexual harassment, consider the following:

Example 1: In a college level creative writing class, a professor's required reading list includes excerpts from literary classics that contain descriptions of explicit

sexual conduct, including scenes that depict women in submissive and demeaning roles. The professor also assigns students to write their own materials, which are read in class. Some of the student essays contain sexually derogatory themes about women. Several female students complain to the Dean of Students that the materials and related classroom discussion have created a sexually hostile environment for women in the class. What must the school do in response?

Answer: Academic discourse in this example is protected by the First Amendment even if it is offensive to individuals. Thus, Title IX would not require the school to discipline the professor or to censor the reading list or related class discussion.

Example 2: A group of male students repeatedly targets a female student for harassment during the bus ride home from school, including making explicit sexual comments about her body, passing around drawings that depict her engaging in sexual conduct, and, on several occasions, attempting to follow her home off the bus. The female student and her parents complain to the principal that the male students' conduct has created a hostile environment for girls on the bus and that they fear for their daughter's safety. What must a school do in response?

Answer: Threatening and intimidating actions targeted at a particular student or group of students, even though they contain elements of speech, are not protected by the First Amendment. The school must take prompt and effective actions, including disciplinary action if necessary, to stop the harassment and prevent future harassment.

Endnotes

[1] This guidance does not address sexual harassment of employees, although that conduct may be prohibited by Title IX. 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.; 34 CFR part 106, subpart E. If employees file Title IX sexual harassment complaints with OCR, the complaints will be processed pursuant to the Procedures for Complaints of Employment Discrimination Filed Against Recipients of Federal Financial Assistance. 28 CFR 42.604. Employees are also protected from discrimination on the basis of sex, including sexual harassment, by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For information about Title VII and sexual harassment, see the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC's) Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 CFR 1604.11, for information about filing a Title VII charge with the EEOC, see 29 CFR 1601.7–1607.13, or see the EEOC's website at www.eeoc.gov.

[2] 20 U.S.C. 1681; 34 CFR part 106.

[3] See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992); S. REP. NO. 100-64, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1987); Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties (1997 guidance), 62 FR 12034 (1997).

[4] As described in the section on "Applicability," this guidance applies to all levels of education.

[5] For practical information about steps that schools can take to prevent and remedy all types of harassment, including sexual harassment, see "Protecting Students from Harassment and Hate Crime, A Guide for Schools," which we issued jointly with the National Association of Attorneys General. This Guide is available at our web site at: www.ed.gov/pubs/Harassment.

[6] See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (alleged conduct of a sexual nature that would support a sexual harassment claim included verbal harassment and "numerous acts of objectively offensive touching;" Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63 (conduct of a sexual nature found to support a sexual harassment claim under Title IX included kissing, sexual intercourse); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1986) (demands for sexual favors, sexual advances, fondling, indecent exposure, sexual intercourse, rape, sufficient to raise hostile environment claim under Title VII); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 873-74, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (allegations sufficient to state sexual harassment claim under Title VII included repeated requests for dates, letters making explicit references to sex and describing the harasser's feelings for plaintiff); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 904-5 (1st Cir. 1988) (sexually derogatory comments, posting of sexually explicit drawing of plaintiff, sexual advances may support sexual harassment claim); Kadiki v. Virginia Commonwealth University, 892 F.Supp. 746, 751 (E.D. Va. 1995)

(professor's spanking of university student may constitute sexual conduct under Title IX); Doe v. Petaluma, 830 F.Supp. 1560, 1564-65 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (sexually derogatory taunts and innuendo can be the basis of a harassment claim); Denver School Dist. #2, OCR Case No. 08-92-1007 (same to allegations of vulgar language and obscenities, pictures of nude women on office walls and desks, unwelcome touching, sexually offensive jokes, bribery to perform sexual acts, indecent exposure); Nashoba Regional High School, OCR Case No. 01-92-1377 (same as to year-long campaign of derogatory, sexually explicit graffiti and remarks directed at one student.

[7] See also Shoreline School Dist., OCR Case No. 10-92-1002 (a teacher's patting a student on the arm, shoulder, and back, and restraining the student when he was out of control, not conduct of a sexual nature); Dartmouth Public Schools, OCR Case No. 01-90-1058 (same as to contact between high school coach and students); San Francisco State University, OCR Case No. 09-94-2038 (same as to faculty advisor placing her arm around a graduate student's shoulder in posing for a picture); Analy Union High School Dist., OCR Case No. 09-92-1249 (same as to drama instructor who put his arms around both male and female students who confided in him).

[8] 20 U.S.C. 1687 (codification of the amendment to Title IX regarding scope of jurisdiction, enacted by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987). See 65 FR 68049 (November 13, 2000) (Department's amendment of the Title IX regulations to incorporate the statutory definition of "program or activity").

[9] If a school contracts with persons or organizations to provide benefits, services, or opportunities to students as part of the school's program, and those persons or employees of those organizations sexually harass students, OCR will consider the harassing individual in the same manner that it considers the school's employees, as described in this guidance. (See section on "Harassment by Teachers and Other Employees.") See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Products, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995) (Title IX sexual harassment claim brought for school's role in permitting contract consultant hired by it to create allegedly hostile environment).

In addition, if a student engages in sexual harassment as an employee of the school, OCR will consider the harassment under the standards described for employees. (See section on "Harassment by Teachers and Other Employees.") For example, OCR would consider it harassment by an employee if a student teaching assistant who is responsible for assigning grades in a course, i.e., for providing aid, benefits, or services to students under the recipient's program, required a student in his or her class to submit to sexual advances in order to obtain a certain grade in the class.

[10] Cf. John Does 1 v. Covington County Sch. Bd., 884 F.Supp. 462, 464-65 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (male students alleging that a teacher sexually harassed and abused them stated cause of action under Title IX).

[11] Title IX and the regulations implementing it prohibit discrimination "on the basis of sex;" they do not restrict protection from sexual harassment to those circumstances in

which the harasser only harasses members of the opposite sex. See 34 CFR 106.31. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. the Supreme Court held unanimously that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment can violate Title VII's prohibition against discrimination because of sex. 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). The Supreme Court's holding in Oncale is consistent with OCR policy, originally stated in its 1997 guidance, that Title IX prohibits sexual harassment regardless of whether the harasser and the person being harassed are members of the same sex. 62 FR 12039. See also Kinman v. Omaha Public School Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 171 F.3d 607 (1999) (female student's allegation of sexual harassment by female teacher sufficient to raise a claim under Title IX); Doe v. Petaluma, 830 F.Supp. 1560, 1564-65, 1575 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (female junior high student alleging sexual harassment by other students, including both boys and girls, sufficient to raise a claim under Title IX); John Does 1, 884 F.Supp. at 465 (same as to male students' allegations of sexual harassment and abuse by a male teacher.) It can also occur in certain situations if the harassment is directed at students of both sexes. Chiapuzo v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F.Supp. 1334, 1337 (D.Wyo. 1993) (court found that if males and females were subject to harassment, but harassment was based on sex, it could violate Title VII); but see Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 2000) (if male and female both subjected to requests for sex, court found it could not violate Title VII).

In many circumstances, harassing conduct will be on the basis of sex because the student would not have been subjected to it at all had he or she been a member of the opposite sex; e.g., if a female student is repeatedly propositioned by a male student or employee (or, for that matter, if a male student is repeatedly propositioned by a male student or employee.) In other circumstances, harassing conduct will be on the basis of sex if the student would not have been affected by it in the same way or to the same extent had he or she been a member of the opposite sex; e.g, pornography and sexually explicit jokes in a mostly male shop class are likely to affect the few girls in the class more than it will most of the boys.

In yet other circumstances, the conduct will be on the basis of sex in that the student's sex was a factor in or affected the nature of the harasser's conduct or both. Thus, in Chiapuzo, a supervisor made demeaning remarks to both partners of a married couple working for him, e.g., as to sexual acts he wanted to engage in with the wife and how he would be a better lover than the husband. In both cases, according to the court, the remarks were based on sex in that they were made with an intent to demean each member of the couple because of his or her respective sex. 826 F.Supp. at 1337. See also Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 733 (1995); but see Holman, 211 F.3d at 405 (finding that if male and female both subjected to requests for sex, Title VII could not be violated).

[12] Nashoba Regional High School, OCR Case No. 01-92-1397. In Conejo Valley School Dist., OCR Case No. 09-93-1305, female students allegedly taunted another female student about engaging in sexual activity; OCR found that the alleged comments were sexually explicit and, if true, would be sufficiently severe, persistent, and pervasive to create a hostile environment.

[13] See Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989, cert. denied 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979)(same); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)(same).

[14] It should be noted that some State and local laws may prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Also, under certain circumstances, courts may permit redress for harassment on the basis of sexual orientation under other Federal legal authority. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 460 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a gay student could maintain claims alleging discrimination based on both gender and sexual orientation under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution in a case in which a school district failed to protect the student to the same extent that other students were protected from harassment and harm by other students due to the student's gender and sexual orientation).

[15] However, sufficiently serious sexual harassment is covered by Title IX even if the hostile environment also includes taunts based on sexual orientation.

[16] See also, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) (where an accounting firm denied partnership to a female candidate, the Supreme Court found Title VII prohibits an employer from evaluating employees by assuming or insisting that they match the stereotype associated with their sex).

[17] See generally Gebser; Davis; See also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., 510 U.S. 14, 22 (1993); see also Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987) (concluding that harassment based on sex may be discrimination whether or not it is sexual in nature); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (physical, but nonsexual, assault could be sex-based harassment if shown to be unequal treatment that would not have taken place but for the employee's sex); Cline v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 757 F.Supp. 923, 932-33 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

[18] See, e.g., sections on "Harassment by Teachers and Other Employees," "Harassment by Other Students or Third Parties," "Notice of Employee, Peer, or Third Party Harassment," "Factors Used to Evaluate a Hostile Environment," "Recipient's Response," and "Prompt and Equitable Grievance Procedures."

[19] See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 903-905 (general antagonism toward women, including stated goal of eliminating women from surgical program, statements that women shouldn't be in the program, and assignment of menial tasks, combined with overt sexual harassment); Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485-86 (3rd Cir. 1990) (court directed trial court to consider sexual conduct as well as theft of female employees' files and work, destruction of property, and anonymous phone calls in determining if there had been sex discrimination); see also Hall v. Gus Construction Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming that harassment due to the employee's sex

may be actionable even if the harassment is not sexual in nature); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1415; Eden Prairie Schools, Dist. #272, OCR Case No. 05-92-1174 (the boys made lewd comments about male anatomy and tormented the girls by pretending to stab them with rubber knives; while the stabbing was not sexual conduct, it was directed at them because of their sex, i.e., because they were girls).

[20] Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 ("Having previously determined that 'sexual harassment' is 'discrimination' in the school context under Title IX, we are constrained to conclude that student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe, can likewise rise to the level of discrimination actionable under the statute."); Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 ("Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the [school] the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and 'when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor "discriminate[s]" on the basis of sex.' ... We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student." (citation omitted)).

OCR's longstanding interpretation of its regulations is that sexual harassment may constitute a violation. 34 CFR 106.31; See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 FR 12034 (1997). When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 to amend Title IX to restore institution-wide coverage over federally assisted education programs and activities, the legislative history indicated not only that Congress was aware that OCR interpreted its Title IX regulations to prohibit sexual harassment, but also that one of the reasons for passing the Restoration Act was to enable OCR to investigate and resolve cases involving allegations of sexual harassment. S. REP. NO. 64, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. at 12 (1987). The examples of discrimination that Congress intended to be remedied by its statutory change included sexual harassment of students by professors, id. at 14, and these examples demonstrate congressional recognition that discrimination in violation of Title IX can be carried out by school employees who are providing aid, benefits, or services to students. Congress also intended that if discrimination occurred, recipients needed to implement effective remedies. S. REP. NO. 64 at 5.

[21] 34 CFR 106.4.

[22] These are the basic regulatory requirements. 34 CFR 106.31(a)(b). Depending upon the facts, sexual harassment may also be prohibited by more specific regulatory prohibitions. For example, if a college financial aid director told a student that she would not get the student financial assistance for which she qualified unless she slept with him, that also would be covered by the regulatory provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in financial assistance, 34 CFR 106.37(a).

[23] 34 CFR 106.31(b)(1).

[24] 34 CFR 106.31(b)(2).

[25] 34 CFR 106.31(b)(3).

[26] 34 CFR 106.31(b)(4).

[27] 34 CFR 106.31(b)(6).

[28] 34 CFR 106.31(b)(7).

[29] 34 CFR 106.3(a).

[30] 34 CFR 106.9.

[31] 34 CFR 106.8(b).

[32] 34 CFR 106.8(a).

[33] The 1997 guidance referred to quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment. 62 FR 12038–40.

[34] See Alexander v. Yale University, 459 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1980)(stating that a claim "that academic advancement was conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes [a claim of] sex discrimination in education..."); Crandell v. New York College, Osteopathic Medicine, 87 F.Supp.2d 304, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that allegations that a supervisory physician demanded that a student physician spend time with him and have lunch with him or receive a poor evaluation, in light of the totality of his alleged sexual comments and other inappropriate behavior, constituted a claim of quid pro quo harassment); Kadiki, 892 F.Supp. at 752 (reexamination in a course conditioned on college student's agreeing to be spanked should she not attain a certain grade may constitute quid pro quo harassment).

[35] 34 CFR 106.31(b).

[36] Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (confirming, by citing approvingly both to Title VII cases (Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,67 (1986) (finding that hostile environment claims are cognizable under Title VII), and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)) and OCR's 1997 guidance, 62 FR at 12041-42, that determinations under Title IX as to what conduct constitutes hostile environment sexual harassment may continue to rely on Title VII caselaw).

[37] 34 CFR 106.31(b). See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (concluding that allegations of student-on-student sexual harassment that is "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits" supports a claim for money damages in an implied right of action).

[38] In Harris, the Supreme Court explained the requirement for considering the "subjective perspective" when determining the existence of a hostile environment. The Court stated– – "... if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the

conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation." 510 U.S. at 21-22.

[39] See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (conduct must be "objectively offensive" to trigger liability for money damages); Elgamil v. Syracuse University, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12598 at 17 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Harris); Booher v. Board of Regents, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11404 at 25 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (same). See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81, in which the Court "emphasized ... that the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the [victim's] position, considering 'all the circumstances,'" and citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 20, in which the Court indicated that a "reasonable person" standard should be used to determine whether sexual conduct constituted harassment. This standard has been applied under Title VII to take into account the sex of the subject of the harassment, see, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79 (applying a "reasonable woman" standard to sexual harassment), and has been adapted to sexual harassment in education under Title IX, Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified School Dist., 830 F.Supp. 1288, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (adopting a "reasonable victim" standard and referring to OCR's use of it).

[40] See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651, citing both Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82, and OCR's 1997 guidance (62 FR 12041-12042).

[41] See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 634 (as a result of the harassment, student's grades dropped and she wrote a suicide note); Doe v. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1566 (student so upset about harassment by other students that she was forced to transfer several times, including finally to a private school); Modesto City Schools, OCR Case No. 09-93-1391 (evidence showed that one girl's grades dropped while the harassment was occurring); Weaverville Elementary School, OCR Case No. 09-91-1116 (students left school due to the harassment). Compare with College of Alameda, OCR Case No. 09-90-2104 (student not in instructor's class and no evidence of any effect on student's educational benefits or service, so no hostile environment).

[42] Doe v. Petaluma, 830 F.Supp. at 1566.

[43] See Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that although not specifically directed at the plaintiff, sexually explicit graffiti on the walls was "relevant to her claim"); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School, 158 F.3d 1022, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1998) (Title VI racial harassment case, citing Waltman; see also Hall, 842 F. 2d at 1015 (evidence of sexual harassment directed at others is relevant to show hostile environment under Title VII).

[44] See, e.g., Elgmil 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 19 ("in order to be actionable, the incidents of harassment must occur in concert or with a regularity that can reasonably be termed pervasive"); Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484 ("Harassment is pervasive when 'incidents of harassment occur either in concert or with regularity'"); Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986).

[45] 34 CFR 106.31(b). See Vance v. Spencer County Public School District, 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000); Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F.Supp.2d 57, 62 (D. Me. 1999). See also statement of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC): "The Commission will presume that the unwelcome, intentional touching of [an employee's] intimate body areas is sufficiently offensive to alter the conditions of her working environment and constitute a violation of Title VII. More so than in the case of verbal advances or remarks, a single unwelcome physical advance can seriously poison the victim's working environment." EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, 17. Barrett v. Omaha National Bank, 584 F. Supp. 22, 30 (D. Neb. 1983), aff'd, 726 F. 2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that hostile environment was created under Title VII by isolated events, i.e., occurring while traveling to and during a two-day conference, including the co-worker's talking to plaintiff about sexual activities and touching her in an offensive manner while they were inside a vehicle from which she could not escape).

[46] See also Ursuline College, OCR Case No. 05-91-2068 (a single incident of comments on a male student's muscles arguably not sexual; however, assuming they were, not severe enough to create a hostile environment).

[47] Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 ("The relationship between the harasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent to which the misconduct can be said to breach Title IX's guarantee of equal access to educational benefits and to have a systemic effect on a program or activity. Peer harassment, in particular, is less likely to satisfy these requirements than is teacher student harassment."); Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1297 (stating that the "grave disparity in age and power" between teacher and student contributed to the creation of a hostile environment); Summerfield Schools, OCR Case No. 15-92-1929 ("impact of the ... remarks was heightened by the fact that the coach is an adult in a position of authority"); cf. Doe v. Taylor I.S.D., 15 F.3d 443, 460 (5th Cir. 1994) (Sec. 1983 case; taking into consideration the influence that the teacher had over the student by virtue of his position of authority to find that a sexual relationship between a high school teacher and a student was unlawful).

[48] See, e.g., McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138-49; Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991).

[49] Cf. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1297.

[50] See, e.g., Barrett, 584 F. Supp. at 30 (finding harassment occurring in a car from which the victim could not escape particularly severe).

[51] See Hall, 842 F. 2d at 1015 (stating that "evidence of sexual harassment directed at employees other than the plaintiff is relevant to show a hostile environment") (citing Hicks, 833 F. 2d, 1415-16). Cf. Midwest City-Del City Public Schools, OCR Case No. 06-92-1012 (finding of racially hostile environment based in part on several racial incidents at school shortly before incidents in complaint, a number of which involved the same student involved in the complaint).

[52] In addition, incidents of racial or national origin harassment directed at a particular individual may also be aggregated with incidents of sexual or gender harassment directed at that individual in determining the existence of a hostile environment. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416; Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).

[53] Does v. Covington Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F.Supp. 554, 569 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).

[54] See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 68. "[T]he fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII.... The correct inquiry is whether [the subject of the harassment] by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary."

[55] Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898 (while, in some instances, a person may have the responsibility for telling the harasser "directly" that the conduct is unwelcome, in other cases a "consistent failure to respond to suggestive comments or gestures may be sufficient...."); Danna v. New York Tel. Co., 752 F.Supp. 594, 612 (despite a female employee's own foul language and participation in graffiti writing, her complaints to management indicated that the harassment was not welcome); see also Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div. GMC., 32 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that cursing and dirty jokes by a female employee did not show that she welcomed the sexual harassment, given her frequent complaints about it: "Even if ... [the employee's] testimony that she talked and acted as she did [only] in an effort to be one of the boys is ... discounted, her words and conduct cannot be compared to those of the men and used to justify their conduct.... The asymmetry of positions must be considered. She was one woman; they were many men. Her use of [vulgar] terms ... could not be deeply threatening....").

[56] See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486-87, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1991) (no harassment found under Title VII in a case in which a female employee not only tolerated, but also instigated the suggestive joking activities about which she was now complaining); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F.Supp. 1559, 1563-64 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (same, in case in which general shop banter was full of vulgarity and sexual innuendo by men and women alike, and plaintiff contributed her share to this atmosphere.) However, even if a student participates in the sexual banter, OCR may in certain circumstances find that the conduct was nevertheless unwelcome if, for example, a teacher took an active role in the sexual banter and a student reasonably perceived that the teacher expected him or her to participate.

[57] The school bears the burden of rebutting the presumption.

[58] Of course, nothing in Title IX would prohibit a school from implementing policies prohibiting sexual conduct or sexual relationships between students and adult employees.

[59] See note 58.

[60] Gebser, 524 U.S. at 281 ('Franklin ... establishes that a school district can be held liable in damages [in an implied action under Title IX] in cases involving a teacher's sexual harassment of a student...."; 34 CFR 106.31; See 1997 Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 FR 12034.

[61] See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (stating that harassment of a student by a teacher is more likely than harassment by a fellow student to constitute the type of effective denial of equal access to educational benefits that can breach the requirements of Title IX).

[62] 34 CFR 106.31(b). Cf. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-84 (Court recognized in an implied right of action for money damages for teacher sexual harassment of a student that the question of whether a violation of Title IX occurred is a separate question from the scope of appropriate remedies for a violation).

[63] Davis, 526 U.S. at 646.

[64] See section on "Applicability of Title IX" for scope of coverage.

[65] See section on "Notice of Employee, Peer, or Third Party Harassment."

[66] See section on "Notice of Employee, Peer, or Third Party Harassment."

[67] 34 CFR 106.31(b).

[68] 34 CFR 106.31(b).

[69] See section on "Notice of Employee, Peer, or Third Party Harassment."

[70] Cf. Davis, 526 U.S. at 646.

[71] 34 CFR 106.31(b).

[72] 34 CFR 106.31(b).

[73] Consistent with its obligation under Title IX to protect students, cf. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287, OCR interprets its regulations to ensure that recipients take reasonable action to address, rather than neglect, reasonably obvious discrimination. Cf. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287-88; Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (actual notice standard for obtaining money damages in private lawsuit).

[74] Whether an employee is a responsible employee or whether it would be reasonable for a student to believe the employee is, even if the employee is not, will vary depending on

factors such as the age and education level of the student, the type of position held by the employee, and school practices and procedures, both formal and informal.
The Supreme Court held that a school will only be liable for money damages in a private lawsuit where there is actual notice to a school official with the authority to address the alleged discrimination and take corrective action. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290, and Davis, 526 U.S. at 642. The concept of a "responsible employee" under our guidance is broader. That is, even if a responsible employee does not have the authority to address the discrimination and take corrective action, he or she does have the obligation to report it to appropriate school officials.

[75] The Title IX regulations require that recipients designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its responsibilities under the regulations, including complaint investigations. 34 CFR 106.8(a).

[76] 34 CFR 106.31. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983).

[77] For example, a substantiated report indicating that a high school coach has engaged in inappropriate physical conduct of a sexual nature in several instances with different students may suggest a pattern of conduct that should trigger an inquiry as to whether other students have been sexually harassed by that coach. See also Doe v. School Administrative Dist. No. 19, 66 F.Supp.2d 57, 63-64 and n.6 (D.Me. 1999) (in a private lawsuit for money damages under Title IX in which a high school principal had notice that a teacher may be engaging in a sexual relationship with one underage student and did not investigate, and then the same teacher allegedly engaged in sexual intercourse with another student, who did not report the incident, the court indicated that the school's knowledge of the first relationship may be sufficient to serve as actual notice of the second incident).

[78] Cf. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256 (finding that the employer "should have been aware of the problem both because of its pervasive character and because of [the employee's] specific complaints ..."); Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F.Supp. 283, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1991), reconsideration denied, 785 F.Supp. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1992) "where the harassment is apparent to all others in the work place, supervisors and coworkers, this may be sufficient to put the employer on notice of the sexual harassment" under Title VII); Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F.Supp. 847, 887 (D.Minn. 1993); "[s]exual harassment ... was so pervasive that an inference of knowledge arises .... The acts of sexual harassment detailed herein were too common and continuous to have escaped Eveleth Mines had its management been reasonably alert."); Cummings v. Walsh Construction Co., 561 F.Supp. 872, 878 (S.D. Ga. 1983) ("... allegations not only of the [employee] registering her complaints with her foreman ... but also that sexual harassment was so widespread that defendant had constructive notice of it" under Title VII); but see Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 250-51 (2nd Cir. 1995) (concluding that other students' knowledge of the conduct was not enough to charge the school with notice, particularly because these students may not have been aware that the conduct was offensive or abusive).

[79] 34 CFR 106.9 and 106.8(b).

[80] 34 CFR 106.8(b) and 106.31(b).

[81] 34 CFR 106.9.

[82] 34 CFR 106.8(b).

[83] 34 CFR 106.31.

[84] 34 CFR 106.31 and 106.3. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288 ("In the event of a violation, [under OCR's administrative enforcement scheme] a funding recipient may be required to take 'such remedial action as [is] deem[ed] necessary to overcome the effects of [the] discrimination.' §106.3.").

[85] 20 U.S.C. 1682. In the event that OCR determines that voluntary compliance cannot be secured, OCR may take steps that may result in termination of Federal funding through administrative enforcement, or, alternatively, OCR may refer the case to the Department of Justice for judicial enforcement.

[86] Schools have an obligation to ensure that the educational environment is free of discrimination and cannot fulfill this obligation without determining if sexual harassment complaints have merit.

[87] In some situations, for example, if a playground supervisor observes a young student repeatedly engaging in conduct toward other students that is clearly unacceptable under the school's policies, it may be appropriate for the school to intervene without contacting the other students. It still may be necessary for the school to talk with the students (and parents of elementary and secondary students) afterwards, e.g., to determine the extent of the harassment and how it affected them.

[88] Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (employers should take corrective and preventive measures under Title VII); accord, Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-720 (5th Cir. 1986) (employer should take prompt remedial action under Title VII).

[89] See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Waltman); Waltman, 875 F.2d at 479 (appropriateness of employer's remedial action under Title VII will depend on the "severity and persistence of the harassment and the effectiveness of any initial remedial steps"); Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309-10 (5th Cir. 1987); holding that a company's quick decision to remove the harasser from the victim was adequate remedial action).

[90] See Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 779-780 (9th Cir. 1992)(holding that the employer's response was insufficient and that more severe disciplinary action was

necessary in situations in which counseling, separating the parties, and warnings of possible discipline were ineffective in ending the harassing behavior).

[91] Offering assistance in changing living arrangements is one of the actions required of colleges and universities by the Campus Security Act in cases of rape and sexual assault. See 20 U.S.C. 1092(f).

[92] See section on "Harassment by Other Students or Third Parties."

[93] University of California at Santa Cruz, OCR Case No. 09-93-2141 (extensive individual and group counseling); Eden Prairie Schools, Dist. #272, OCR Case No. 05-92-1174 (counseling).

[94] Even if the harassment stops without the school's involvement, the school may still need to take steps to prevent or deter any future harassment — to inform the school community that harassment will not be tolerated. Wills v. Brown University, 184 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1999) (difficult problems are posed in balancing a student's request for anonymity or limited disclosure against the need to prevent future harassment); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1995) (Title VII case).

[95] 34 CFR 106.8(b) and 106.71, incorporating by reference 34 CFR 100.7(e). The Title IX regulations prohibit intimidation, threats, coercion, or discrimination against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by Title IX.

[96] Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, OCR Case No. 10-94-1079 (due to the large number of students harassed by an employee, the extended period of time over which the harassment occurred, and the failure of several of the students to report the harassment, the school committed as part of corrective action plan to providing training for students); Los Medanos College, OCR Case No. 09-84-2092 (as part of corrective action plan, school committed to providing sexual harassment seminar for campus employees); Sacramento City Unified School Dist., OCR Case No. 09-83-1063 (same as to workshops for management and administrative personnel and in-service training for non-management personnel).

[97] In addition, if information about the incident is contained in an "education record" of the student alleging the harassment, as defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. 1232g, the school should consider whether FERPA would prohibit the school from disclosing information without the student's consent. Id. In evaluating whether FERPA would limit disclosure, the Department does not interpret FERPA to override any federally protected due process rights of a school employee accused of harassment.

[98] 34 CFR 106.8(b). This requirement has been part of the Title IX regulations since their inception in 1975. Thus, schools have been required to have these procedures in place since that time. At the elementary and secondary level, this responsibility generally lies

with the school district. At the postsecondary level, there may be a procedure for a particular campus or college or for an entire university system.

[99] Fenton Community High School Dist. #100, OCR Case 05-92-1104.

[100] While a school is required to have a grievance procedure under which complaints of sex discrimination (including sexual harassment) can be filed, the same procedure may also be used to address other forms of discrimination.

[101] See generally Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73 (holding that "mere existence of a grievance procedure" for discrimination does not shield an employer from a sexual harassment claim).

[102] The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) does not prohibit a student from learning the outcome of her complaint, i.e., whether the complaint was found to be credible and whether harassment was found to have occurred. It is the Department's current position under FERPA that a school cannot release information to a complainant regarding disciplinary action imposed on a student found guilty of harassment if that information is contained in a student's education record unless — (1) the information directly relates to the complainant (e.g., an order requiring the student harasser not to have contact with the complainant); or (2) the harassment involves a crime of violence or a sex offense in a postsecondary institution. See note 97. If the alleged harasser is a teacher, administrator, or other non-student employee, FERPA would not limit the school's ability to inform the complainant of any disciplinary action taken.

[103] The section in the guidance on "Recipient's Response" provides examples of reasonable and appropriate corrective action.

[104] 34 CFR 106.8(a).

[105] Id.

[106] See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73.

[107] University of California, Santa Cruz, OCR Case No. 09-93-2131. This is true for formal as well as informal complaints. See University of Maine at Machias, OCR Case No. 01-94-6001 (school's new procedures not found in violation of Title IX in part because they require written records for informal as well as formal resolutions). These records need not be kept in a student's or employee's individual file, but instead may be kept in a central confidential location.

[108] For example, in Cape Cod Community College, OCR Case No. 01-93-2047, the College was found to have violated Title IX in part because the person identified by the school as the Title IX coordinator was unfamiliar with Title IX, had no training, and did not even realize he was the coordinator.

[109] Indeed, in University of Maine at Machias, OCR Case No. 01-94-6001, OCR found the school's procedures to be inadequate because only formal complaints were investigated. While a school isn't required to have an established procedure for resolving informal complaints, they nevertheless must be addressed in some way. However, if there are indications that the same individual may be harassing others, then it may not be appropriate to resolve an informal complaint without taking steps to address the entire situation.

[110] Academy School Dist. No 20, OCR Case No. 08-93-1023 (school's response determined to be insufficient in a case in which it stopped its investigation after complaint filed with police); Mills Public School Dist., OCR Case No. 01-93-1123, (not sufficient for school to wait until end of police investigation).

[111] Cf. EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, 957 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 906 (1992).

[112] The First Amendment applies to entities and individuals that are State actors. The receipt of Federal funds by private schools does not directly subject those schools to the U.S. Constitution. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982). However, all actions taken by OCR must comport with First Amendment principles, even in cases involving private schools that are not directly subject to the First Amendment.

[113] See, e.g., George Mason University, OCR Case No. 03-94-2086 (law professor's use of a racially derogatory word, as part of an instructional hypothetical regarding verbal torts, did not constitute racial harassment); Portland School Dist. 1J, OCR Case No. 10-94-1117 (reading teacher's choice to substitute a less offensive term for a racial slur when reading an historical novel aloud in class constituted an academic decision on presentation of curriculum, not racial harassment).

[114] See Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993) (fraternity skit in which white male student dressed as an offensive caricature of a black female constituted student expression).

[115] See Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, OCR Case No. 04-92-2054 (no discrimination in case in which campus newspaper, which welcomed individual opinions of all sorts, printed article expressing one student's viewpoint on white students on campus.)

[116] Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (neither students nor teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gates); Cf. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a college professor could not be punished for his longstanding teaching methods, which included discussion of controversial subjects such as obscenity and consensual sex with children, under an unconstitutionally vague sexual harassment policy); George Mason University, OCR Case No. 03-94-2086 (law professor's use of a

racially derogatory word, as part of an instructional hypothetical regarding verbal torts, did not constitute racial harassment.)

[117] See, e.g., University of Illinois, OCR Case No. 05-94-2104 (fact that university's use of Native American symbols was offensive to some Native American students and employees was not dispositive, in and of itself, in assessing a racially hostile environment claim under Title VI.)

[118] See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (the "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" would not affect the conditions of employment to a sufficient degree to violate Title VII), quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904; cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (citing with approval EEOC's sexual harassment guidelines); Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1032-34 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing with approval OCR's racial harassment investigative guidance).

[119] Compare Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (Court upheld discipline of high school student for making lewd speech to student assembly, noting that "[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial issues in schools must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."), with Iota Xi, 993 F.2d 386 (holding that, notwithstanding a university's mission to create a culturally diverse learning environment and its substantial interest in maintaining a campus free of discrimination, it could not punish students who engaged in an offensive skit with racist and sexist overtones).

EXHIBIT 'D'

29 CFR PART 1604

GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX

(b) When an administrative law judge certifies a matter for interlocutory review under § 1603.213, the Commission may, in its discretion, issue a decision on the matter or send the matter back to the administrative law judge without decision.

(c) The Commission will not accept or consider new evidence on appeal unless the Commission, in its discretion, reopens the record on appeal.

(d) The decision of the Commission on appeal shall be its final order and shall be served on all parties.

(e) In the absence of a timely appeal under § 1603.302, the decision of the administrative law judge under § 1603.217 or a dismissal under § 1603.107 shall become the final order of the Commission. A final order under this paragraph shall not have precedential significance.

§ 1603.305 Modification or withdrawal of Commission decision.

At any time, the Commission may modify or withdraw a decision for any reason provided that no petition for review in a United States Court of Appeals has been filed.

§ 1603.306 Judicial review.

Any party to a complaint who is aggrieved by a final decision under § 1603.304 may obtain a review of such final decision under chapter 158 of title 28 of the United States Code by filing a petition for review with a United States Court of Appeals within 60 days after issuance of the final decision. Such petition for review should be filed in the judicial circuit in which the petitioner resides, or has its principal office, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

PART 1604—GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX

Sec.

1604.1 General principles.
1604.2 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.
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1604.4 Discrimination against married women.
1604.5 Job opportunities advertising.
1604.6 Employment agencies.
1604.7 Pre-employment inquiries as to sex.
1604.8 Relationship of title VII to the Equal Pay Act.
1604.9 Fringe benefits.
1604.10 Employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth.
1604.11 Sexual harassment.
APPENDIX TO PART 1604—QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT, PUBLIC LAW 95-555, 92 STAT. 2076 (1978).

AUTHORITY: Sec. 713(b), 78 Stat. 265, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-12.

SOURCE: 37 FR 6836, April 5, 1972, unless otherwise noted.

§ 1604.1 General principles.

(a) References to "employer" or "employers" in this part 1604 state principles that are applicable not only to employers but also to labor organizations and to employment agencies insofar as their action or inaction may adversely affect employment opportunities.

(b) To the extent that the views expressed in prior Commission pronouncements are inconsistent with the views expressed herein, such prior views are hereby overruled.

(c) The Commission will continue to consider particular problems relating to sex discrimination on a case-by-case basis.

§ 1604.2 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.

(a) The commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Label—"Men's jobs" and "Women's jobs"—tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the other.

(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception:

(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For example, the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher than among men.

(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable of assembling intricate equipment;

that women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group.

(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in paragraph (a)(2) of this section.

(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress.

(b) Effect of sex-oriented State employment legislation.

(1) Many States have enacted laws or promulgated administrative regulations with respect to the employment of females. Among these laws are those which prohibit or limit the employment of females, e.g., the employment of females in certain occupations, in jobs requiring the lifting or carrying of weights exceeding certain prescribed limits, during certain hours of the night, for more than a specified number of hours per day or per week, and for certain periods of time before and after childbirth. The Commission has found that such laws and regulations do not take into account the capacities, preferences, and abilities of individual females and, therefore, discriminate on the basis of sex. The Commission has concluded that such laws and regulations conflict with and are superseded by title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, such laws will not be considered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a basis for the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception.

(2) The Commission has concluded that State laws and regulations which discriminate on the basis of sex with regard to the employment of minors are in conflict with and are superseded by title VII to the extent that such laws are more restrictive for one sex. Accordingly, restrictions on the employment of minors of one sex over and above those imposed on minors of the other sex will not be considered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a basis for the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception.

(3) A number of States require that minimum wage and premium pay for overtime be provided for female employees. An employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if:

(i) It refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects the employment opportunities of female applicants or employees in order to avoid the payment of minimum wages or overtime pay required by State law; or

(ii) It does not provide the same benefits for male employees.

(4) As to other kinds of sex-oriented State employment laws, such as those requiring special rest and meal periods or physical facilities for women, provision of these benefits to one sex only will be a violation of title VII. An employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if:

(i) It refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects the employment opportunities of female applicants or employees in order to avoid the provision of such benefits; or

(ii) It does not provide the same benefits for male employees. If the employer can prove that business necessity precludes providing these benefits to both men and women, then the State law is in conflict with and superseded by title VII as to this employer. In this situation, the employer shall not provide such benefits to members of either sex.

(5) Some States require that separate restrooms be provided for employees of each sex. An employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if it refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects the employment opportunities of applicants or employees in order to avoid the provision of such restrooms for persons of that sex.

§ 1604.3 Separate lines of progression and seniority systems.

(a) It is an unlawful employment practice to classify a job as "male" or "female" or to maintain separate lines of progression or separate seniority

lists based on sex where this would adversely affect any employee unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for that job. Accordingly, employment practices are unlawful which arbitrarily classify jobs so that:

(1) A female is prohibited from applying for a job labeled "male," or for a job in a "male" line of progression; and vice versa.

(2) A male scheduled for layoff is prohibited from displacing a less senior female on a "female" seniority list; and vice versa.

(b) A Seniority system or line of progression which distinguishes between "light" and "heavy" jobs constitutes an unlawful employment practice if it operates as a disguised form of classification by sex, or creates unreasonable obstacles to the advancement by members of either sex into jobs which members of that sex would reasonably be expected to perform.

§ 1604.4 Discrimination against married women.

(a) The Commission has determined that an employer's rule which forbids or restricts the employment of married women and which is not applicable to married men is a discrimination based on sex prohibited by title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It does not seem to us relevant that the rule is not directed against all females, but only against married females, for so long as sex is a factor in the application of the rule, such application involves a discrimination based on sex.

(b) It may be that under certain circumstances, such a rule could be justified within the meaning of section 703(e)(1) of title VII. We express no opinion on this question at this time except to point out that sex as a bona fide occupational qualification must be justified in terms of the peculiar requirements of the particular job and not on the basis of a general principle such as the desirability of spreading work.

§ 1604.5 Job opportunities advertising.

It is a violation of title VII for a help-wanted advertisement to indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the particular job involved. The placement of an advertisement in columns classified by publishers on the basis of sex, such as columns headed "Male" or "Female," will be considered an expression of a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex.

§ 1604.6 Employment agencies.

(a) Section 703(b) of the Civil Rights Act specifically states that it shall be unlawful for an employment agency to discriminate against any individual because of sex. The Commission has determined that private employment agencies which deal exclusively with one sex are engaged in an unlawful employment practice, except to the extent that such agencies limit their services to furnishing employees for particular jobs for which sex is a bona fide occupational qualification.

(b) An employment agency that receives a job order containing an unlawful sex specification will share responsibility with the employer placing the job order if the agency fills the order knowing that the sex specification is not based upon a bona fide occupational qualification. However, an employment agency will not be deemed to be in violation of the law, regardless of the determination as to the employer, if the agency does not have reason to believe that the employer's claim of bona fide occupations qualification is without substance and the agency makes and maintains a written record available to the Commission of each such job order. Such record shall include the name of the employer, the description of the job and the basis for the employer's claim of bona fide occupational qualification.

(c) It is the responsibility of employment agencies to keep informed of opinions and decisions of the Commission on sex discrimination.

§ 1604.7 Pre-employment inquiries as to sex.

A pre-employment inquiry may ask "Male....., Female....."; or "Mr. Mrs. Miss," provided that the inquiry is made in good faith for a nondiscriminatory purpose. Any pre-employment inquiry in connection with prospective employment which expresses directly

or indirectly any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.

§ 1604.8 Relationship of title VII to the Equal Pay Act.

(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrimination based on sex contained in title VII is coextensive with that of the other prohibitions contained in title VII and is not limited by section 703(h) to those employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

(b) By virtue of section 703(h), a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may be raised in a proceeding under title VII.

(c) Where such a defense is raised the Commission will give appropriate consideration to the interpretations of the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor, but will not be bound thereby.

§ 1604.9 Fringe benefits.

(a) "Fringe benefits," as used herein, includes medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.

(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate between men and women with regard to fringe benefits.

(c) Where an employer conditions benefits available to employees and their spouses and families on whether the employee is the "head of the household" or "principal wage earner" in the family unit, the benefits tend to be available only to male employees and their families. Due to the fact that such conditioning discriminatorily affects the rights of women employees, and that "head of household" or "principal wage earner" status bears no relationship to job performance, benefits which are so conditioned will be found a prima facie violation of the prohibitions against sex discrimination contained in the act.

(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to make available benefits for the wives and families of male employees where the same benefits are not made available for the husbands and families of female employees; or to make available benefits for the wives of male employees which are not made available for female employees; or to make available benefits to the husbands of female employees which are not made available for male employees. An example of such an unlawful employment practice is a situation in which wives of male employees receive maternity benefits while female employees receive no such benefits.

(e) It shall not be a defense under title VIII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other.

(f) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to have a pension or retirement plan which establishes different optional or compulsory retirement ages based on sex, or which differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex. A statement of the General Counsel of September 13, 1968, providing for a phasing out of differentials with regard to optional retirement age for certain incumbent employees is hereby withdrawn.

§ 1604.10 Employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth.

(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions is in prima facie violation of title VII.

(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, for all job-related purposes, shall be treated the same as disabilities caused or contributed to by other medical conditions, under any health or disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. Written or unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions on the same terms

and conditions as they are applied to other disabilities. Health insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term or where medical complications have arisen from an abortion, are not required to be paid by an employer; nothing herein, however, precludes an employer from providing abortion benefits or otherwise affects bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.

(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity.

(d)(1) Any fringe benefit program, or fund, or insurance program which is in effect on October 31, 1978, which does not treat women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions the same as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, must be in compliance with the provisions of § 1604.10(b) by April 29, 1979. In order to come into compliance with the provisions of 1604.10(b), there can be no reduction of benefits or compensation which were in effect on October 31, 1978, before October 31, 1979 or the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement in effect on October 31, 1978, whichever is later.

(2) Any fringe benefit program implemented after October 31, 1978, must comply with the provisions of § 1604.10(b) upon implementation.

[44 FR 23805, Apr. 20, 1979]

§ 1604.11 Sexual harassment.

(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII.[1] Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.

(c) [Reserved]

(d) With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.

(e) An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employees.

(f) Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.

(g) Other related practices: Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or requests for sexual favors,

[1] The principles involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion or national origin.

the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or benefit.

APPENDIX A TO § 1604.11—BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Commission has rescinded § 1604.11(c) of the Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, which set forth the standard of employer liability for harassment by supervisors. That section is no longer valid, in light of the Supreme Court decisions in *Burlington Industries, Inc.* v. *Ellerth*, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and *Faragher* v. *City of Boca Raton*, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The Commission has issued a policy document that examines the Faragher and Ellerth decisions and provides detailed guidance on the issue of vicarious liability for harassment by supervisors. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (6/18/99), EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA), N:4075 [Binder 3]; also available through EEOC's web site, at www.eeoc.gov., or by calling the EEOC Publications Distribution Center, at 1-800-669-3362 (voice), 1-800-800-3302 (TTY).

(Title VII, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (42 U.S.C. 2000e *et seq.*))

[45 FR 74677, Nov. 10, 1980, as amended at 64 FR 58334, Oct. 29, 1999]

APPENDIX TO PART 1604—QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT, PUBLIC LAW 95-555, 92 STAT. 2076 (1978)

INTRODUCTION

On October 31, 1978, President Carter signed into law the *Pregnancy Discrimination Act* (Pub. L. 95-955). The Act is an amendment to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits, among other things, discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. The *Pregnancy Discrimination Act* makes it clear that "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex", as used in title VII, includes "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions." Therefore, title VII prohibits discrimination in employment against women affected by pregnancy or related conditions.

The basic principle of the Act is that women affected by pregnancy and related conditions must be treated the same as other applicants and employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work. A woman is therefore protected against such practices as being fired, or refused a job or promotion, merely because she is pregnant or has had an abortion. She usually cannot be forced to go on leave as long as she can still work. If other employees who take disability leave are entitled to get their jobs back when they are able to work again, so are women who have been unable to work because of pregnancy.

In the area of fringe benefits, such as disability benefits, sick leave and health insurance, the same principle applies. A woman unable to work for pregnancy-related reasons is entitled to disability benefits or sick leave on the same basis as employees unable to work for other medical reasons. Also, any health insurance provided must cover expenses for pregnancy-related conditions on the same basis as expenses for other medical conditions. However, health insurance for expenses arising from abortion is not required except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or where medical complications have arisen from an abortion.

Some questions and answers about the *Pregnancy Discrimination Act* follow. Although the questions and answers often use only the term "employer," the Act—and these questions and answers—apply also to unions and other entities covered by title VII.

1. Q. What is the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act?

A. The Act became effective on October 31, 1978, except that with respect to fringe benefit programs in effect on that date, the Act will take effect 180 days thereafter, that is, April 29, 1979.

To the extent that title VII already required employers to treat persons affected by pregnancy-related conditions the same as persons affected by other medical conditions, the Act does not change employee rights arising prior to October 31, 1978, or April 29, 1979. Most employment practices relating to pregnancy, childbirth and related conditions—whether concerning fringe benefits or other practices—were already controlled by title VII prior to this Act. For example, title VII has always prohibited an employer from firing, or refusing to hire or promote, a woman because of pregnancy or related conditions, and from failing to accord a woman on pregnancy-related leave the same seniority retention and accrual accorded those on other disability leaves.

2. Q. If an employer had a sick leave policy in effect on October 31, 1978, by what date must the employer bring its policy into compliance with the Act?

A. With respect to payment of benefits, an employer has until April 29, 1979, to bring into compliance any fringe benefit or insurance program, including a sick leave policy, which was in effect on October 31, 1978. However, any such policy or program created after October 31, 1978, must be in compliance when created.

With respect to all aspects of sick leave policy other than payment of benefits, such

EXHIBIT 'E'

BUTT V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

4 Cal.4th 668; 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 480; 842 P.2d 1240

[No. S020835. Dec. 31, 1992.]

THOMAS K. BUTT et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

SUMMARY

Parents of school children enrolled in a unified school district filed a class action for injunctive relief against the state and the district's board of education, seeking to prevent the district from closing its schools six weeks before the official end of the school year due to a projected revenue shortfall. After granting plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to include the state Superintendent of Public Instruction and the state Controller as defendants, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering the state and the superintendent to ensure that the schools remained open until the end of the school year or to provide the students with a substantially equivalent educational opportunity. The court subsequently issued another order, pursuant to the superintendent's plan, authorizing the Controller to disburse an emergency loan to the district from unspent portions of appropriations for the Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program and another unified school district, and authorizing the superintendent to relieve the present board, and to develop recovery and repayment plans. The state's appeal from the trial court's orders was transferred from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court. (Superior Court of Contra Costa County, No. C91-01645, Ellen Sickles James, Judge.)

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's second order insofar as it approved funding of an emergency loan from appropriations for the GAIN program and the other school district; in all other respects, the court affirmed the orders, and directed the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. The court held that the trial court, in deciding the propriety of a preliminary injunction, did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was a reasonable probability that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their case, since the early closure of the district's schools would have deprived the students of their fundamental right to basic equality in public education, and the state was required to intervene to prevent a deprivation of that right. The court also held that the trial court properly found that denial of the preliminary injunction would have caused students and their parents substantial and irreparable harm greater than that which defendants would suffer if the injunction were granted. The court held that

the trial court acted within its equitable powers in ordering the superintendent to displace the board, operate the district, and impose a plan for the district's permanent financial recovery, but that it was improper for the trial court to order the state to extend the loan by using unspent funds from appropriations for the GAIN program and the other school district, since those funds were not "reasonably available" for that purpose. (Opinion by Baxter, J., with Panelli, Arabian and George, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring and dissenting opinions by Lucas, C. J., Mosk and Kennard, JJ.)

HEADNOTES

Classified to California Digest of Official Reports

(1) **Appellate Review § 119—Dismissal—Grounds—Mootness—Exception for Matters of Public Interest—Issues Concerning Injunction Requiring Emergency State Loan to Fund School District.**—On the state's appeal from a preliminary injunction requiring it to extend an emergency loan to a school district so that it could keep its schools open until the end of the school year despite revenue shortfalls, and to implement a recovery plan for the district, some issues were moot due to the fact that a plan had already been implemented and the state did not seek rescission of the loan. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had discretion to decide the issues, which included whether the state was responsible to ensure the students' fundamental right to basic educational equality and whether the trial court had authority to order a loan from funds the Legislature had appropriated for other purposes, since those issues involved potentially recurring questions of public importance. As to the appropriations issue, there was a substantial possibility that similar crises would produce similar emergency orders in the future, thus favoring review. Moreover, the state had fully litigated the issue, and any mootness stemmed from the Supreme Court's denial of the state's request for a stay pending appeal.

(2) **Injunctions § 21—Preliminary Injunctions—Appeal—Scope of Review.**—Appellate review of a trial court's decision as to whether to issue a preliminary injunction is limited to whether the decision was an abuse of discretion. In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court must weigh two "interrelated" factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties resulting from the issuance or nonissuance of the injunction. The trial court's determination must be guided by a "mix" of the two factors, and the greater the

plaintiff's showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction. The scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at a trial on the merits, and the trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim. Thus, unless the potential merit of the claim is conceded, the appellate court must address that issue when reviewing an order granting a preliminary injunction.

(3a-3c) **Schools § 4—School Districts; Financing; Funds—Shortening School Year on Emergency Basis Due to Budget Shortfall—State's Obligation.**—In an action for injunctive relief by parents against the state, two state officials, and the board of education of a school district, seeking to prevent the district from ending the school year six weeks early due to a budget shortfall, the trial court, in granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was a reasonable probability that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their case. Basic equality in public education for all students, regardless of the district in which they reside, is a fundamental right under the California Constitution, and denials of that right are subject to strict scrutiny. The state has the ultimate responsibility for assuring equal operation of the public school system, and is obliged to intervene when a local district's fiscal problems prevent its students from receiving basic educational equality. Moreover, there was no state policy of local autonomy and accountability at the district level that was compelling enough to justify the state's tolerance of the extreme and unprecedented educational deprivation that would have resulted from the early closure of the district's schools.

[See **Cal.Jur.3d,** Schools, §§ 291, 299.]

(4) **Schools § 1—Legislature's Nondelegable Responsibility Over Public School System.**—Public education is an obligation that the state assumed by adoption of the state Constitution. The public school system, although administered through local districts created by the Legislature, is one system applicable to all of the common schools. In view of the importance of education to society and to the individual child, the opportunity to receive the schooling furnished by the state must be made available to all on an equal basis. The Legislature's "plenary" power over public education is subject only to constitutional restrictions. Local districts are the state's agents for local operation of the common school system, and the state's ultimate responsibility for public education cannot be delegated to any other entity.

(5) **Constitutional Law § 87.2—Equal Protection—Classification—Judicial Review—Strict Standard of Review for Suspect Classifications or Classifications Touching on Fundamental Interests—Right to Education.**—Under the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions, heightened judicial scrutiny applies to state-maintained discrimination whenever the disfavored class is suspect or the disparate treatment has a real and appreciable impact on a fundamental right or interest. Education is such a fundamental interest for purposes of equal protection analysis under the California Constitution.

(6) **Schools § 4—School Districts; Financing; Funds—Shortening School Year on Emergency Basis Due to Budget Shortfall—Preliminary Injunction Against State—Balancing Harm to Parents and Students Against Harm to District.**—In an action for injunctive relief by parents against the state, two state officials, and the board of education of a school district to prevent closure of the district's schools six weeks early due to a budget shortfall, the trial court properly found that denial of the parents' motion for a preliminary injunction would have caused district students and their parents substantial and irreparable harm that was greater than that which defendants would suffer if the injunction were granted. Plaintiffs' declarations suggested that the district's inability to complete the school year arose from its ever-worsening fiscal condition and the deterioration of negotiations for emergency aid, and that the teachers' lesson plans did not provide for the contingency of early closure. They also detailed the difficulties of maintaining the educational progress of over 31,000 suddenly displaced students. While plaintiffs may not have demonstrated that "irreparable" harm to students was unavoidable by other means, the trial court's findings both that plaintiffs had a reasonable probability of success on the merits and that they would suffer more harm if an injunction were denied than the state would suffer if it were granted fully justified its decision to grant the preliminary injunction.

(7a, 7b) **Schools § 4—School Districts; Financing; Funds—District in Financial Distress Due to Mismanagement—Trial Court's Equitable Power to Grant Relief—Ordering Superintendent of Public Instruction to Assume Management.**—In an action for injunctive relief by parents against the state, the state Superintendent of Public Instruction, the state Controller, and the board of education of a school district, seeking to prevent the school district from ending the school year six weeks early due to a budget shortfall, the trial court did not exceed its powers in issuing an order, based on a plan submitted by the superintendent and the Controller, authorizing the superintendent to

displace the board, operate the district, and impose a plan for the district's permanent financial recovery. Although no statute gave the superintendent such authority, the takeover order was within the trial court's inherent equitable power to enforce the state's constitutional obligations in light of the unique situation. The state was justified in satisfying its duty by extending a loan with conditions to ensure appropriate use of the funds and minimize the risk of default, especially since the district's ability to administer the loan under its existing systems and managers was uniquely suspect.

(8) **Constitutional Law § 40—Distribution of Governmental Powers—Between Branches of Government—Judicial Power—To Order Discretionary Acts By Executive or Legislature.**—In general, courts have equitable authority to enforce their constitutional judgments. Principles of comity and separation of powers, however, place significant restraints on the authority of courts to order or ratify acts that are normally committed to the discretion of other branches or officials. In particular, the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3) obliges the judiciary to respect the separate constitutional roles of the Executive and the Legislature. Moreover, a judicial remedy must be tailored to the harm at issue. A court should always strive for the least disruptive remedy that is adequate to its legitimate task.

(9) **Constitutional Law § 40—Distribution of Governmental Powers—Between Branches of Government—Judicial Power—To Order Spending of Legislative Appropriations—Ordering Emergency Loan to School District From Funds Appropriated for Other Educational Purposes.**—In an action for injunctive relief by parents against the state, two state officials, and the board of education of a school district, seeking to prevent the school district from ending the school year six weeks early due to a budget shortfall, the trial court improperly ordered the state to extend the district an emergency loan of $19 million out of unspent funds appropriated for the Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program and for an emergency loan to another school district. The appropriations did not make funds "reasonably available" for the purpose of financing the remainder of the district's school term. GAIN's purpose is to provide employment, adult education, and job training to recipients of public aid. The GAIN appropriation was expressly designated for that program alone, and was not intended to fund the needs of non-GAIN students. Similarly, the emergency loan to the other district was specifically appropriated for that district, with conditions addressed to the circumstances of that case. The funding of the remainder of the district's term was clearly

outside the particular purposes for which the appropriations were reserved.

[See 7 **Witkin,** Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, §§ 112, 115.]

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Robert J. Bezemek as Amicus Curiae.

OPINION

BAXTER. J.—In late April 1991, after a period of mounting deficits, the Richmond Unified School District (District) announced it lacked funds to complete the final six weeks of its 1990-1991 school term. The District proposed to close its doors on May 1, 1991. The Superior Court of Contra Costa County issued a preliminary injunction directing the State of California (State), its Controller, and its Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) to ensure that the District's students would receive a full school term or its equivalent. The court approved the SPI's plan for an emergency State loan, and for appointment by the SPI of an administrator to take temporary charge of the District's operation.

We declined to stay implementation of the plan pending the State's appeal. However, we transferred the appeal here in order to decide an important issue of first impression: Whether the State has a constitutional duty, aside from the equal allocation of educational funds, to prevent the budgetary problems of a particular school district from depriving its students of "basic" educational equality.

We affirm the trial court's determination that such a duty exists under the California Constitution. Further, the court did not err in concluding, on the basis of the plaintiffs' preliminary showing, that the particular circumstances of this case demanded immediate State intervention. However, the court exceeded its judicial powers by approving the diversion of emergency loan funds from appropriations clearly intended by the Legislature for other purposes.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY[1]

On April 17, 1991, Thomas K. Butt and other named District parents filed a class action for temporary and permanent injunctive relief against the State and the District's board of education (Board).[2] The complaint alleged as follows: The State is responsible for educating all California children, and the Board is the State's agent for carrying out this responsibility in the District. The scheduled final day of the District's 1990-1991 school term was June 14, 1991, but the District had announced that its 44 elementary, secondary, and adult schools would close on May 1, 1991. The resulting loss of six weeks of instruction would cause serious, irreparable harm to the District's 31,500 students and would deny them their "fundamental right to an effective public education" under the California Constitution. Moreover, as an unjustified discrimination against District students compared to those elsewhere in California, the closure would violate equal protection guarantees of the California and United States Constitutions. Therefore, defendants should be enjoined from closing the District's schools before the scheduled end of the scholastic term.

On April 22, 1991, plaintiffs noticed a motion for preliminary injunction. In an attached declaration, Frank R. Calton, a member of the Board, stated

[1]The State, as appellant, has elected to proceed by way of an appendix in lieu of the clerk's transcript, as permitted by rule 5.1 of the California Rules of Court. Some of the documents contained in the appendix, though they include handwritten filing dates, bear no official file stamps and have no proofs of service attached. However, rule 5.1 expressly allows the use of unofficial conformed copies (subd. (c)(1)) and provides that the filing of an appendix "constitutes a representation by counsel that the appendix consists of true and correct copies of the papers in the superior court file" (subd. (i)(1)). No party having urged otherwise, we adopt that assumption for purposes of this opinion.

[2]The named plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves, their children, and other parents and students of the District.

that the District projected a revenue shortfall of $23 million for the 1990-1991 academic year and only had sufficient funds to pay its employees through April 1991. Calton declared the District would have to close at the end of April unless new funds were obtained or employees agreed to work for registered warrants in lieu of paychecks. He indicated that the District's efforts to obtain an emergency loan from the State had not yet succeeded, and the District was preparing to file for bankruptcy.

Plaintiffs' motion papers also included declarations by District teachers, academicians in the field of education, and members of the Contra Costa County board of education. These statements detailed the serious disruptive effect the proposed closure would have upon the educational process in the District and upon the quality of education afforded its students.

The motion was heard on April 29, 1991. The Attorney General represented the State in opposition. Counsel for the District represented that the Board's appearance was precluded by an automatic bankruptcy stay. The trial court granted plaintiffs' unopposed motion for amendment of the complaint to include the SPI and the Controller as defendants. Pending applications for intervention and amicus curiae status were not formally granted,[3] but as stipulated by the parties, the court heard argument from the applicants and agreed to consider their briefs.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled orally that under the California Constitution, the State itself is responsible for the "fundamental" educational rights of California students and must remedy a local district's inability to provide its students an education "basically equivalent" to that provided elsewhere in the State. Concluding that the threatened closure would deny the District's students a "constitutionally [equal] education," the court ordered the State and the SPI to act as "they deem appropriate" to ensure that District schools remained open until June 14, 1991, or to provide District students a "substantially equivalent educational opportunity" within the statutory school year ending June 30, 1991.

This oral decision was followed by two written orders filed May 2. One of these, drafted by plaintiffs' counsel, purported to formalize the April 29 ruling. It made findings that closure of District schools by May 1 would cause District students irreparable harm, that the balance of harm favored a preliminary injunction, that education is a "fundamental right" in California,

[3]Applications to appear as amici curiae were submitted by the Richmond Federation of Teachers (RFT) and jointly by the Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute, the National Lawyers Guild, and Multi-Cultural Education, Training, and Advocacy, Inc. (collectively Meiklejohn). Complaints in intervention and/or applications for leave to intervene were submitted by the Oakland Unified School District (OUSD), RFT, and United Teachers of Richmond (UTR).

that no "compelling interest" justified denying District students six weeks of instruction available to "every other child in the State," and that plaintiffs' ultimate success on the merits was reasonably probable. The State and its agents again were directed to act "as . . . appropriate" to ensure District students, within the school year ending June 30, 1991, an education "equivalent basically" to that provided elsewhere in California for a full school term. The Controller was added as a State official expressly bound by the court's commands.

On the same day, May 2, the SPI and the Controller submitted their plan for compliance with the preliminary injunction. With counsel for all interested parties present, the court took evidence indicating that uncommitted funds exceeding the estimated $19 million necessary to complete the District's school year were available from existing State appropriations to the Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program and for emergency assistance to the OUSD. Counsel for the OUSD stipulated that his client had "no objection" to use of the $10 million OUSD appropriation for purposes of an emergency loan to the District.

Accordingly, the court executed an order, drafted by counsel for the SPI, approving in principle the submitted plan.[4] The order authorized the Controller to disburse an emergency loan to the District from unspent portions of the GAIN and OUSD appropriations. (See Stats. 1989, ch. 93, § 22.00; Stats. 1989, ch. 1438, § 1 et seq.) Meanwhile, the SPI, by virtue of the State's "ultimate responsibility" for equal education and his own statutory obligation to "superintend the schools of this state" (Ed. Code, § 33112, subd. (a)),[5] would have authority to "relieve the . . . [B]oard of its legal duties and powers, appoint a trustee, develop a recovery plan and, subject to the approval of the Controller, [develop] a repayment plan on the [D]istrict's behalf as necessary" to ensure completion of the school term, the District's financial recovery, and the protection of the loaned funds.[6]

The Attorney General timely noticed appeals from the April 29 and May 2 orders on behalf of the State. Defendants SPI and Controller did not

[4]Though the court's order recites that the SPI and the Controller "presented . . . , after notice to all parties, an agreement" to provide an emergency loan, neither the agreement itself, nor a description of its precise terms, has been made part of the record on appeal.

[5]All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise indicated.

[6]The preliminary injunction motion was litigated with understandable haste, and evidence of the causes of the District's apparent insolvency was not presented below. On appeal, the SPI invites us to take judicial notice of grand jury findings on this subject which were released after the preliminary injunction was granted. (See The Financial Affairs of the Richmond Unified School District, Rep. of 1990-1991 Contra Costa County Grand Jury (May 29, 1991) [hereafter Report].) Without objection, we may note the Report's contents. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c), (d), 455, 459; see *People* v. *Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1259, fn. 54 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) Of course, we cannot accept its findings as evidence or its criticisms of the District and the Board as conclusively founded. We are

appeal. The State immediately requested transfer of the appeal from the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, to this court (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 20) and also asked that we stay enforcement of the trial court's orders pending appeal. (1)(See fn. 7.) The SPI and the Controller opposed a stay but supported transfer of the appeal to this court. We granted the transfer request but denied a stay.[7]

DISCUSSION

1. *Standard of review.*

(2) In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must weigh two "interrelated" factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party

particularly loath to do so when the District and the Board were disabled below from defending against claims of mismanagement and, except for a special appearance at oral argument, have not participated in the appeal.

Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the grand jury's assessment that despite repeated warnings, an earnest but financially inexperienced Board permitted massive, accelerating deficit spending over a period of several years to expand staff, boost salaries and benefits, and support innovative programs installed by the District's former superintendent. (Report, pp. 3-5.) According to the Report, the resulting deficit for the years 1986-1990 was $29.5 million, with an $18.1 million deficit for 1990 alone. (*Id.*, at p. 4.) In 1990, the District had received a State emergency loan exceeding $9 million, in consequence of which a limited-powers trustee appointed by the SPI was overseeing District financial affairs during the 1990-1991 school term. (*Id.*, at p. 5.)

[7]Our denial of a stay allowed implementation of the plan approved by the trial court, and the District's school year was completed. Though the State vigorously contends the court lacked power to invade the GAIN and OUSD appropriations, it does not demand actual rescission of the court-approved loan. Moreover, we judicially notice without objection that in June 1992, the SPI approved a repayment and recovery plan adopted by the District, restored the Board's powers, and terminated the court-authorized appointment of the State administrator. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c), (h), 455, 459.) Although portions of the appeal may therefore be technically moot, we have discretion to decide the issues presented as potentially recurring questions of public importance. (E.g., *O'Hare* v. *Superior Court* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 86, 91, fn. 1 [233 Cal.Rptr. 332, 729 P.2d 766]; *DiGiorgio Fruit Corp.* v. *Dept. of Employment* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 54, 58 [13 Cal.Rptr. 663, 362 P.2d 487]; *People* v. *West Coast Shows, Inc.* (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 462, 468 [89 Cal.Rptr. 290].)

The Chief Justice objects in particular that we neither must nor should address whether the sources of funding approved by the trial court were proper. However, he fails to indicate why this important and sensitive issue is any more moot, or any less worthy of consideration, than other portions of the trial court's order which have also been irretrievably implemented. Indeed, in these uncertain times, the substantial possibility arises that similar future crises will produce similar emergency orders for immediate diversion of State funds from expedient sources. Hence, contrary to the Chief Justice's suggestion, the issue is one capable of repetition but difficult to review, and this concern favors its prompt consideration under the "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine. (*DiGiorgio Fruit Corp.*, *supra*, 56 Cal.2d at p. 58.) Moreover, the State has fully litigated the merits of the appropriations issue throughout, and any mootness in this or other aspects of the injunction stems from our denial of the State's request for a stay pending appeal. Under these circumstances, the State should not be penalized on appeal for conceding that State funds already expended by the District cannot practicably be recovered.

will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction. (*Common Cause* v. *Board of Supervisors* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 441-442 [261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610].) Appellate review is limited to whether the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion. (*Cohen* v. *Board of Supervisors* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286 [219 Cal.Rptr. 467, 707 P.2d 840].)

The trial court's determination must be guided by a "mix" of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff's showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction. (*King* v. *Meese* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1227-1228 [240 Cal.Rptr. 829, 743 P.2d 889].) Of course, "[t]he scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at trial on the merits." (*Common Cause*, *supra*, 49 Cal.3d at p. 442.) A trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim. (*Id.*, at pp. 442-443.) Unless potential merit is conceded, an appellate court must therefore address that issue when reviewing an order granting a preliminary injunction.

Here, the trial court found that plaintiffs' constitutional demand for State intervention had potential merit, and that the balance of interim harm justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the State. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that each of these determinations was within the court's discretion.[8]

2. *Merits of plaintiffs' claims.*

(3a) The trial court expressly found "[t]here is a reasonable probability that plaintiffs will succeed on the merits of their case." The court agreed with plaintiffs' claim that the equal protection guaranties of the California Constitution (art. I, § 7, subds. (a), (b); art. IV, § 16, subd. (a)) require State intervention to ensure that fiscal problems do not deprive a local district's

[8]The State insists that under the circumstances of this case, appellate review should not be limited to whether the trial court "abused its discretion" when weighing "interim" harm and "probable" merit. The State stresses that the unstayed injunction, though preliminary in form, was both final and unprecedented in fact. Accordingly, the State suggests, we must decide, as on appeal from a final judgment, whether plaintiffs were entitled to the relief they received.

We disagree. The abuse-of-discretion standard acknowledges that the propriety of preliminary relief turns upon difficult estimates and predictions from a record which is necessarily truncated and incomplete. Here, the urgency of the situation forced plaintiffs to produce, and the State to rebut, a hasty tentative showing of constitutional necessity. The evidence on which the trial court was forced to act may thus be significantly different from that which would be available after a trial on the merits. Neither the trial court nor this court could undertake a final adjudication of plaintiffs' lawsuit under such circumstances.

students of basic educational equality.[9] The court also accepted plaintiffs' preliminary showing that the effect of the District's crisis on its students' educational rights was serious enough to trigger the State's constitutional duty. The State, supported by amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation (Pacific),[10] assails these conclusions on multiple grounds.

At the outset, the State does not claim it lacks any and all constitutional role in local educational affairs. Instead, its reasoning proceeds as follows: The State fulfills its financial responsibility for educational equality by subjecting all local districts, rich and poor, to an equalized statewide revenue base.[11] Unless a district fails to provide the minimum six-month school term set forth in the "free school" clause (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5),[12] the State has no duty to ensure prudent use of the equalized funds by local administrators. Even if local mismanagement causes one district's services to fall seriously below prevailing statewide standards, the resulting educational inequality is

[9]Article I, section 7, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part that "[a] person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the laws. . . ." Article I, section 7, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part that "[a] citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens. . . ." Article IV, section 16, subdivision (a) provides that "[a]ll laws of a general nature have uniform operation."

[10]The positions adopted by the various parties and numerous amici curiae in this appeal are diverse. The Attorney General, representing the State as defendant and appellant, opposes all aspects of the trial court orders. Though they were joined as defendants below, the SPI and the Controller, deeming themselves "respondents" on appeal, support plaintiffs' view that the orders were proper in all respects. Amicus curiae Pacific supports the State's position. Amici curiae RFT and UTR approve State financial aid but object to displacement of the local governing board by a State administrator. Amici curiae Frank R. Calton and Howard P. Abelson urge that the Board acted correctly by deciding to close District schools and should not have been displaced. Calton and Abelson also suggest the injunction was improper because the Board had no opportunity to appear and defend against claims of mismanagement. Amici curiae Mario Diaz and Rebecca Hazlewood Bezemek (Diaz and Bezemek) take no position on State financial assistance but argue that the SPI's takeover of District government was improper. Amicus curiae briefs in support of plaintiffs have been filed by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Human Rights Advocates, and Meiklejohn.

[11]The funding scheme for public education is complex, but no party disputes the summary description provided in the State's brief: "The Legislature has attempted to equalize school district funding . . . by the use of a 'base revenue limit' for each district. Each district is classified by size and type. ([Ed.] Code, [§] 42238.) Based upon this classification scheme, each district has a 'base revenue limit' per unit of average daily attendance. The base revenue limit for any district includes the amount of property tax revenues a district can raise, with other specific local revenues, coupled with an equalization payment by the State, thus bringing each district into a rough equivalency of revenues. (Compare [Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, [§] 15371, *et seq.*[; Ed.] Code [§] 42238 et seq.) [¶] Because the student population is so diverse, the Legislature had to supplement the base revenue limit with specific augmentations targeted for categories of children with needs that require special attention. These supplements are designated as 'categorical' aid. . . ."

[12]Article IX, section 5 provides: "The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year, after the first year in which a school has been established."

not grounded in district wealth, nor does it involve a "suspect classification" such as race. Thus, "strict scrutiny" of the disparity is not required, and the State's refusal to intervene must be upheld as rationally related to its policy of local control and accountability. Even if strict scrutiny is appropriate, the local-control policy is "compelling" enough to justify the State's inaction.

Under the unprecedented circumstances of this case, we cannot accept the State's contentions. We set forth our reasons in detail.

Since its admission to the Union, California has assumed specific responsibility for a statewide public education system open on equal terms to all. The Constitution of 1849 directed the Legislature to "provide for a system of common schools, by which a school shall be kept up and supported in each district . . . ." (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. IX, § 3.) That constitutional command, with the additional proviso that the school maintained by each district be "free," has persisted to the present day. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5.)

In furtherance of the State system of free public education, the Constitution also creates State and county educational offices, including a Superintendent of Public Instruction and a State Board of Education. (Cal. Const., art. IX, §§ 2-3.3, 7.) It authorizes the formation of local school districts (*id.*, §§ 6½, 14), requires that all public elementary and secondary schools be administered within the Public School System (*id.*, § 6), establishes a State School Fund (Fund) (*id.*, § 4), reserves a minimum portion of State revenues for allocation to the Fund (*id.*, art. XVI, §§ 8, 8.5), guarantees minimum allocations from the Fund for each public school (*id.*, art. IX, § 6), specifies minimum salaries for public school teachers (*ibid.*), authorizes the State Board of Education to approve public school textbooks (*id.*, § 7.5), and permits the Legislature to grant local districts such authority over their affairs as does not "conflict with the laws and purposes for which school districts are established" (*id.*, § 14).

(4) Accordingly, California courts have adhered to the following principles: Public education is an obligation which the State assumed by the adoption of the Constitution. (*San Francisco Unified School Dist.* v. *Johnson* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937, 951-952 [92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669]; *Piper* v. *Big Pine School Dist.* (1924) 193 Cal. 664, 669 [226 P. 926].) The system of public schools, although administered through local districts created by the Legislature, is "*one* system . . . applicable to all the common schools . . . ." (*Kennedy* v. *Miller* (1893) 97 Cal. 429, 432 [32 P. 558], italics in original.) ". . . In view of the importance of education to society and to the individual child, the opportunity to receive the schooling furnished by the state must be made available to all on an equal basis. . . ." (*Jackson* v.

Pasadena City School Dist. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 876, 880 [31 Cal.Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878].) "[M]anagement and control of the public schools [is] a matter of state[, not local,] care and supervision. . . ." (*Kennedy* v. *Miller*, *supra*, 97 Cal. at p. 431; see also *Hall* v. *City of Taft* (1956) 47 Cal.2d 177, 181 [302 P.2d 574]; *California Teachers Assn.* v. *Huff* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1523-1524 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 699].) The Legislature's "plenary" power over public education is subject only to constitutional restrictions. (*Hall* v. *City of Taft*, *supra*, at pp. 180-181 [302 P.2d 574]; *Tinsley* v. *Palo Alto Unified School Dist.* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 871, 903-904 [154 Cal.Rptr. 591].) Local districts are the State's agents for local operation of the common school system (*Hall* v. *City of Taft*, *supra*, at p. 181; *San Francisco Unified School Dist.* v. *Johnson*, *supra*, 3 Cal.3d at p. 952; *California Teachers Assn.*, *supra*), and the State's ultimate responsibility for public education cannot be delegated to any other entity (*Hall* v. *City of Taft*, *supra*; *Piper* v. *Big Pine School Dist.*, *supra*, 193 Cal. at p. 669).

(3b) It is true that the Legislature has assigned much of the governance of the public schools to the local districts (e.g., §§ 14000, 35160 et seq., 35160.1), which operate under officials who are locally elected and appointed (§§ 35020, 35100 et seq.). The districts are separate political entities for some purposes. (E.g., *Johnson* v. *San Diego Unified School Dist.* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 698-700 [266 Cal.Rptr. 187] [general theory of respondeat superior does not make State liable for torts of local district or its employees]; *Gonzales* v. *State of California* (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 585, 590-592 [105 Cal.Rptr. 804] [same]; *First Interstate Bank* v. *State of California* (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 627, 633-634 [243 Cal.Rptr. 8] [State not vicariously liable for district's breach of contract]; *Board of Education* v. *Calderon* (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 490, 496 [110 Cal.Rptr. 916] [local district is not the "state" or the "People," so as to be civilly bound in dismissal proceedings by teacher's acquittal of criminal sex offense under principles of res judicata].)

Yet the existence of this local-district system has not prevented recognition that the State itself has broad responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the California Constitution. Because access to a public education is a uniquely fundamental personal interest in California, our courts have consistently found that the State charter accords broader rights against State-maintained educational discrimination than does federal law. Despite contrary federal authority, California constitutional principles require State assistance to correct basic "interdistrict" disparities in the system of common schools, even when the discriminatory effect was not produced by the purposeful conduct of the State or its agents.

In *Serrano* v. *Priest* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 41 A.L.R.3d 1187] (*Serrano I*), this court struck down the existing State

public school financing scheme, which caused the amount of basic revenues per pupil to vary substantially among the respective districts depending on their taxable property values. *Serrano I* concluded at length that such a scheme violated both state and federal equal protection guaranties because it discriminated against a fundamental interest—education—on the basis of a suspect classification—district wealth—and could not be justified by a compelling state interest under the strict scrutiny test thus applicable. (Pp. 596-619.) As the court concluded, "where fundamental rights *or* suspect classifications are at stake, a state's general freedom to discriminate on a geographical basis will be significantly curtailed by the equal protection clause. [Citation.]" (P. 612, italics added.)

Among other things, *Serrano I* rejected a claim that the wealth-based financing scheme was immune from challenge because the interdistrict revenue disparities it produced were not de jure, but merely de facto. Our opinion detailed the purposeful state legislative action which had produced the geographically based wealth classifications. It also made clear, however, that under California principles developed in cases involving school racial segregation, the absence of purposeful conduct by the State would not prevent a finding that the State system for funding public education had produced unconstitutional results. (*Serrano I*, *supra*, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 603-604, citing *Jackson* v. *Pasadena City School Dist.*, *supra*, 59 Cal.2d 876, 881.)

Serrano I also discussed two groups of federal cases suggesting that place of residence was an impermissible basis for State discrimination in the quality of education. *Serrano I* cited with approval *Hall* v. *St. Helena Parish School Board* (E.D.La. 1961) 197 F.Supp. 649. This federal decision struck down a Louisiana statute permitting local parishes to close their schools rather than integrate them. As *Serrano I* noted, *Hall* v. *St. Helena Parish* found an equal protection violation not only because of the statute's racial consequences, but also " 'because its application in one parish, while the state provides public schools elsewhere, would unfairly discriminate against the residents of that parish, irrespective of race. . . . [A]bsent a reasonable basis for so classifying, a state cannot close the public schools in one area while, at the same time, it maintains schools elsewhere with public funds.' " (*Serrano I*, *supra*, 5 Cal.3d at p. 612, quoting *Hall* v. *St. Helena Parish*, *supra*, 197 F. Supp. at pp. 651, 656.)

Serrano I further noted a "second group of cases, dealing with apportionment [of votes], [in which] the high court has held that accidents of geography and arbitrary boundary lines of local government can afford no ground for discrimination among a state's citizens. [Citation.] . . . If a voter's address may not determine the weight to which his ballot is entitled,

surely it should not determine the quality of his child's education. [Fn.]" (*Serrano I*, *supra*, 5 Cal.3d at p. 613.)

Finally, *Serrano I* rejected the State's claim that plaintiffs' wealth-discrimination theory would apply equally, and with disastrous effect, to all public services dependent in part on local property taxes. "[W]e are satisfied," the majority concluded, that whatever the status of other public services, "its uniqueness among public activities clearly demonstrates that *education* must respond to the command of the equal protection clause." (*Serrano I*, *supra*, 5 Cal.3d at p. 614, italics in original.)

In *San Antonio School District* v. *Rodriguez* (1973) 411 U.S. 1 [36 L.Ed.2d 16, 93 S.Ct. 1278], decided after *Serrano I*, the United States Supreme Court declined to subject Texas's similar local-property-tax based school financing scheme to heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. The *Rodriguez* majority concluded that a school finance scheme dependent on district tax values does not discriminate against the poor as a distinct class; in any event, the majority observed, wealth alone had never been deemed a suspect classification for federal purposes. Moreover, the majority reasoned, education is not a fundamental interest protected by the federal Constitution. Therefore finding the strict scrutiny standard of review inapplicable, the majority upheld Texas's system as rationally related to that state's policy of local control of schools. (411 U.S. at pp. 18-55.)

Nonetheless, in *Serrano* v. *Priest* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728 [135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929] (*Serrano II*), this court reaffirmed the reasoning and result of *Serrano I* as required by the separate equal protection guaranties of the California Constitution. (*Serrano II*, *supra*, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 760-768.) Among other things, *Serrano II* reiterated that for California purposes, education remains a fundamental interest "which [lies] at the core of our free and representative form of government [fn.] . . . ." (*Id.*, at pp. 767-768.)

Hence, *Serrano II* declared, "[i]n applying our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws we shall continue to apply strict and searching judicial scrutiny" to claims of discriminatory educational classifications. (*Serrano II*, *supra*, at p. 767.) More recent cases confirm that education is a fundamental interest under the California equal protection guaranties (e.g., *Steffes* v. *California Interscholastic Federation* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 739, 746 [222 Cal.Rptr. 355]) and that the unique importance of public education in California's constitutional scheme requires careful scrutiny of state interference with basic educational rights (see, e.g., *Hartzell* v. *Connell* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 899, 906-909 [201 Cal.Rptr. 601, 679 P.2d 35] [scope of free school guarantee]).

In *Tinsley* v. *Palo Alto Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 91 Cal.App.3d 871, parents sought mandate requiring several neighboring San Mateo and Santa Clara County school districts, the State, and certain State school officials, to submit a plan for the redress of interdistrict racial segregation in the affected locality. The petitioners declined to allege any specific acts committed by State or local parties as the cause of the interdistrict imbalance.

The State respondents answered the petition, but the districts successfully demurred, and the petition was dismissed as to them. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the California Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart as construed in *Milliken* v. *Bradley* (1974) 418 U.S. 717 [41 L.Ed.2d 1069, 94 S.Ct. 3112], contemplates interdistrict relief to remedy mere de facto racial imbalance which extends across district lines. (*Tinsley*, *supra*, 91 Cal.App.3d at pp. 899-907.) Several aspects of the *Tinsley* decision emphasize the State's ultimate responsibility for maintaining a nondiscriminatory common school system.

At the outset, the districts asserted that an appeal was premature under the "one final judgment" rule, because as mere agencies of the State, which had not demurred, they had no separate legal interests which an appeal from their dismissal could finally resolve. The Court of Appeal observed that if the districts' claim of mere agency was correct, any relief ordered against the State would necessarily affect them, and the judgment dismissing them from the action should therefore be reversed. In any event, the court concluded, the premise of identical interests did not bear scrutiny, because while "[t]he local districts, as agents, may have limited powers in interdistrict affairs, . . . the state . . . has plenary powers in all school district affairs. . . ." (*Tinsley*, *supra*, 91 Cal.App.3d at pp. 880-881.)

Turning to the merits, *Tinsley* dismissed the majority reasoning in *Milliken* insofar as based on the federal rule, long rejected in California (see *Crawford* v. *Board of Education* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 280 [130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28]; *Jackson* v. *Pasadena City School Dist.*, *supra*, 59 Cal.2d 876), that only de jure racial segregation is a constitutional violation. (*Tinsley*, *supra*, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 903.) *Tinsley* also distinguished the *Milliken* majority's concern that it "would disrupt and alter" Michigan's entrenched system of local control of schools to impose an interdistrict remedy for Detroit city school segregation without proof that the state or affected suburban districts had engaged in intentional segregative conduct. The *Tinsley* court noted, among other things, that in California, the State shares responsibility with "the local entities it has created" to provide "equal educational opportunity

to the youth of the state" and "has a duty to intervene to prevent unconstitutional discrimination" in its schools. (*Id.*, at pp. 903-904.)[13]

It therefore appears well settled that the California Constitution makes public education uniquely a fundamental concern of the State and prohibits maintenance and operation of the common public school system in a way which denies basic educational equality to the students of particular districts. The State itself bears the ultimate authority and responsibility to ensure that its district-based system of common schools provides basic equality of educational opportunity.

The State claims it need only ensure the six-month minimum term guaranteed by the free school clause (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5). This contention, however, misconstrues the basis of the trial court's decision. Whatever the requirements of the free school guaranty, the equal protection clause precludes the State from maintaining its common school system in a manner that denies the students of one district an education basically equivalent to that provided elsewhere throughout the State.

The State argues that even if the District's fiscal problems threatened its students' basic educational equality, any State duty to redress the discrimination must be judged under the most lenient standard of equal protection review. The State reasons as follows: Plaintiffs do not claim discrimination on the suspect basis of race. Nor is wealth-based discrimination at issue; as all parties concede, the District received the full benefit of the equalized funding system mandated by our *Serrano* decisions. At most, plaintiffs assert that a misuse of equalized funds by the District's officials caused a geographical disparity in service. Because residence and geography are not suspect classifications, the State's failure to prevent educational discrimination on those grounds is not subject to strict scrutiny. Rather, State inaction must be accepted as rationally related to the legitimate State policy of local control of schools.

(5) However, both federal and California decisions make clear that heightened scrutiny applies to State-maintained discrimination whenever the

[13]In November 1979, the voters adopted a Senate amendment to the California Constitution's equal protection clause, article I, section 7, subdivision (a). The amendment declares that nothing in the California Constitution imposes upon the State, or any local district or official, any obligations beyond those imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution "with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation." The amendment further forbids California courts from imposing any school-assignment or pupil-transportation obligation except when a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment has occurred, and unless a federal court could impose such a remedy for the violation. Whatever effect this amendment may have on *Tinsley*'s result, it does not affect consistent interpretations of the California equal protection guaranty where, as here, assignment or transportation of students is not at issue.

disfavored class is suspect *or* the disparate treatment has a real and appreciable impact on a fundamental right or interest. (*Plyler* v. *Doe* (1982) 457 U.S. 202, 216-217 [72 L.Ed.2d 786, 102 S.Ct. 2382]; *Shapiro* v. *Thompson* (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 634 [22 L.Ed.2d 600, 614-615, 89 S.Ct. 1322]; *Darces* v. *Woods* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 871, 885, 888 [201 Cal.Rptr. 807, 679 P.2d 458]; *Fair Political Practices Com.* v. *Superior Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 47 [157 Cal.Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46]; *Serrano II*, *supra*, 18 Cal.3d 728, 761, 767-768; *Weber* v. *City Council* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 950, 959 [109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 513 P.2d 601]; *Serrano I*, *supra*, 5 Cal.3d 584, 597; *Westbrook* v. *Mihaly* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 784-785 [87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487].) As we have seen, education is such a fundamental interest for purposes of equal protection analysis under the California Constitution.

(3c) The State suggests there was no showing that the impact of the threatened closure on District students' fundamental right to basic educational equality was real and appreciable. Of course, the Constitution does not prohibit all disparities in educational quality or service. Despite extensive State regulation and standardization (see discussion, *post*), the experience offered by our vast and diverse public school system undoubtedly differs to a considerable degree among districts, schools, and individual students. These distinctions arise from inevitable variances in local programs, philosophies, and conditions. "[A] requirement that [the State] provide [strictly] 'equal' educational opportunities would thus seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons. . . ." (*Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed.* v. *Rowley* (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 198 [73 L.Ed.2d 690, 707, 102 S.Ct. 3034].) Moreover, principles of equal protection have never required the State to remedy all ills or eliminate all variances in service.

Accordingly, the California Constitution does not guarantee uniformity of term length for its own sake. While the current statutory system for allocating State educational funds strongly encourages a term of at least 175 days (see fn. 14, *post*, at p. 687), that system is not constitutionally based and is subject to change. In an uncertain future, local districts, faced with mounting fiscal pressures, may be forced to seek creative ways to gain maximum educational benefit from limited resources. In such circumstances, a planned reduction of overall term length might be compensated by other means, such as extended daily hours, more intensive lesson plans, summer sessions, volunteer programs, and the like. An individual district's efforts in this regard are entitled to considerable deference.

Even unplanned truncation of the intended school term will not necessarily constitute a denial of "basic" educational equality. A finding of constitutional disparity depends on the individual facts. Unless the actual quality

of the district's program, viewed as a whole, falls fundamentally below prevailing statewide standards, no constitutional violation occurs.

Here, however, plaintiffs' preliminary showing suggested that closure of the District's schools on May 1, 1991, would cause an extreme and unprecedented disparity in educational service and progress. District students faced the sudden loss of the final six weeks, or almost one-fifth, of the standard school term originally intended by the District and provided everywhere else in California.[14] The record indicates that the decision to close early was a desperate, unplanned response to the District's impending insolvency and the impasse in negotiations for further emergency State aid.[15] Several District teachers declared that they were operating on standard-term lesson schedules made at the beginning of the school year. These declarants outlined in detail how the proposed early closure would prevent them from completing instruction and grading essential for academic promotion, high school graduation, and college entrance.[16] Faced with evidence of such extensive educational disruption, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

[14]The trial court record contains no evidence of the prevailing term length in California, but the parties assumed below that a minimum term of 175 days prevails, and no dispute has arisen on the issue here. The statutes provide that an established local district may not receive any part of its annual apportionment from the State School Fund if it failed to remain in session at least 175 days during the most recent fiscal year, unless specified circumstances excusing the failure are established to the satisfaction of the SPI. (§§ 41420, subd. (a), 41422.) In an appendix to his brief, the SPI provides copies of local district certifications, submitted to the SPI as a condition of funding under section 41420, which indicate that virtually every established school district in California operated for at least 175 days during the 1990-1991 school year. The SPI asks us to take judicial notice of this information. Having received no objection, we do so. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c), (h), 455, 459.)

[15]The declaration of Board member Calton, dated April 12, 1991, detailed the District's growing financial woes and stated the following: ". . . The District has only enough money to pay its employees through April 1991 [even under the most favorable accounting assumptions]. . . . Unless (a) additional funds are received, or (b) employees are willing to work for registered warrants, not redeemable checks, the District will have no alternative but to close all of its public schools at the end of April 1991. [¶] . . . The District has applied to the State of California for a loan, but that request has not been approved. It is my understanding that [collective bargaining concessions demanded by the State] have not been made, although negotiations are continuing. The District has retained bankruptcy counsel, . . . and is preparing to file for bankruptcy prior to April 30, 1991, if necessary."

[16]For example, John Enos, a high school government/economics teacher, stated that early termination of his required senior government class would eliminate intended lessons covering the State's executive and judicial branches, and county and local government. Geoffrey Cantrell, a high school mathematics teacher, stated that if the District closed early, Algebra I students would miss essential instruction in quadratic equations; Algebra II students would miss essential instruction in trigonometry; and geometry students would miss lessons in coordinate systems, logical proof, and trigonometric ratios. Craig Brammer, another high school mathematics teacher who also teaches a preparatory course for the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), opined that loss of six weeks' instruction would severely impair his students' chances on the mathematics portion of the SAT. Betty Jean Crenshaw, a teacher of first-year languages, declared that early closure would prevent students from learning vocabulary and

by concluding that the proposed closure would have a real and appreciable impact on the affected students' fundamental California right to basic educational equality.

The State asserts that its financial obligation to equal education is limited to the equalized system of interdistrict funding required by our *Serrano* decisions. Once revenues are fairly apportioned at the beginning of each school year, the State insists, it cannot be constitutionally liable for how local officials manage the funds.

Nothing in the *Serrano* cases themselves, or in other California decisions, supports the State's argument. On the contrary, the cases suggest that the State's responsibility for basic equality in its system of common schools extends beyond the detached role of fair funder or fair legislator. In extreme circumstances at least, the State "has a duty to intervene to prevent unconstitutional discrimination" at the local level. (*Tinsley*, *supra*, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 904.)

The State's most vigorous contention is that its nonintervention should have been upheld even under the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis. Allowing the District's students to absorb the consequences of District mismanagement, the State urges, was necessary to preserve the State's compelling educational policy of local autonomy and accountability. However, the State fails to demonstrate a policy of local control so compelling as to justify State tolerance of the extreme local educational deprivation at issue here.

In the first place, the local-district system of school administration, though recognized by the Constitution and deeply rooted in tradition, is not a constitutional mandate, but a legislative choice. (See Cal. Const., art. IX, §§ 6½, 14.) The Constitution has always vested "plenary" power over education not in the districts, but in the State, through its Legislature, which may create, dissolve, combine, modify, and regulate local districts at pleasure. (See *Tinsley*, *supra*, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 904.) The legislative decision

grammar necessary for advancement to second-year courses. Amy Shinsako, a first grade teacher, stated that early closure would prevent instruction in phonics, reading comprehension, creative writing, handwriting skills, two-digit addition and subtraction, and addition with three addends, all necessary for advancement to the second grade. Several declarants noted that failure to complete the term would prevent the scheduling of final examinations and other term-end projects crucial to the assignment of final grades. Other declarants detailed the difficulties District students would face if forced to transfer to other districts to complete the year's studies. They also noted that unless graduating seniors completed required courses and received final grades, the District might not be able to award high school diplomas, any diplomas awarded would be "stigmatized," and the ability of departing seniors to qualify for college admission might be seriously compromised.

to emphasize local administration does not end the State's constitutional responsibility for basic equality in the operation of its common school system. Nor does disagreement with the fiscal practices of a local district outweigh the rights of its blameless students to basic educational equality.

Moreover, though the Constitution and statutes encourage maximum local program and spending authority consistent with State law (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 14; Ed. Code, §§ 14000, 35160, 35160.1), the degree of supervision voluntarily retained by the State over the common school system is high indeed. The volume and scope of State regulation indicate the pervasive role the State itself has chosen to assume in order to ensure a fair, high quality public education for all California students.

School finance aside, the statutes address at length such matters as county and district organization, elections, and governance (§§ 4000-5450, 35000-35780); educational programs, instructional materials, and proficiency testing (§§ 51000-62008); sex discrimination and affirmative action (§§ 40-41, 200-263, 44100-44105); admission standards (§§ 48000-48053); compulsory attendance (§§ 48200-48416); school facilities (§§ 39000-40048); rights and responsibilities of students and parents (§§ 48900-49079); holidays (§§ 37220-37223); school health, safety, and nutrition (§§ 32000-32254, 49300-49570); teacher credentialing and certification (§§ 44200-44481); rights and duties of public school employees (§§ 44000-44104, 44800-45460; see also Gov. Code §§ 3540-3549.3 [organizational and bargaining rights]); and the pension system for public school teachers (§§ 22000-24924). The statutory scheme has spawned further voluminous regulations administered by the State's Department of Education and the SPI. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, §§ 1-23005.) This long-established level of State involvement in the public education system undermines any claim that local control is a paramount and compelling State policy for all purposes.

Nor is there any indication that the State has had a compelling policy of absolute budgetary freedom and responsibility for local districts. On the contrary, during the years in which the District's deficit developed, districts were required to adopt budgets meeting State standards, and to submit them for oversight and approval by county and State authorities. (§§ 33127, former §§ 42120-42129.) Failure to adopt a conforming budget precluded State or county funding of the district (former § 42128), and a district was required to operate under its most recent approved budget (former § 42127.4).

The State argues that by saddling the District with long-term debt to cover short-term operations, the trial court's orders undermine the District's future

financial health and compromise its ability to provide basic educational equivalency in years to come. The State also urges that other districts will feel free to overspend if encouraged to believe in the availability of State relief.

These are indeed troubling concerns, but we cannot accept the implication that the State deems them compelling. In fact, the State itself has endorsed a policy of emergency conditional loan assistance to districts in financial difficulty.

Under statutes in effect since 1977, distressed districts may, through the SPI, seek specific legislative apportionments for emergency loans. (§§ 41310, 41310.5, 41320 et seq.) As a condition of such aid, a district must prepare a financial recovery plan and obtain approval of the plan from the county superintendent and the SPI. (§ 41320.) The district must also accept a temporary SPI-appointed trustee with veto power over financially significant actions of the local governing board. (§ 41320.1.)

The District itself had received a $9,525,000 conditional State loan under this program in spring 1990 (Stats. 1990, ch. 171, § 3), and its operations were already being monitored by a State trustee at the time closure of District schools was threatened in April 1991. The 1989 Legislature had also appropriated $10 million for a similar emergency loan-with-trustee to the OUSD. (Stats. 1989, ch. 1438, §§ 1-11.) Under these circumstances, the State cannot claim it follows a compelling policy of local control by declining to intervene when financial adversity threatens a district's operations.

Shortly before this lawsuit began, the District faced the prospect of further legislative intervention in its crisis. Assembly Bill No. 128, 1991-1992 Regular Session (A.B. 128), as introduced in December 1990 and thereafter amended, would have appropriated an additional $29 million for emergency loans to the District. Acceptance of the proposed loan would have subjected the District to unprecedented restrictions on self-government. These included a temporary takeover of all District affairs by an SPI-appointed administrator pending approval and implementation of a plan for financial recovery and loan repayment. The administrator would have had broad power, among others, to unilaterally determine wages and benefits for all District employees who, as of April 29, 1991, were not covered by ratified collective bargaining agreements meeting the requirements of an approved recovery plan. (A.B. 128, Sen. Amend. of Jan. 18, 1991, §§ 2, 5.)

A.B. 128 failed passage, but that fact does not suggest a compelling policy against emergency State financial assistance to a local district. On the

contrary, the State has forged into the realm of emergency assistance and control, using the "specific appropriation" requirement (§ 41320) to decide on a case-by-case basis whether, and on what terms, it will intervene.

The State claims that emergency assistance to mismanaged districts contravenes the compelling principle of equalized funding established in our *Serrano* decisions. As we have seen, however, nothing in the *Serrano* cases, which addressed wealth-based disparities in district revenues, prohibits emergency State assistance to a particular district which is experiencing financial difficulties despite its receipt of equalized funding.[17]

Finally, nothing in our analysis is intended to immunize local school officials from accountability for mismanagement, or to suggest that they may indulge in fiscal irresponsibility without penalty. The State is constitutionally free to legislate against any recurrence of the Richmond crisis. It may further tighten budgetary oversight, impose prudent, nondiscriminatory conditions on emergency State aid, and authorize intervention by State education officials to stabilize the management of local districts whose imprudent policies have threatened their fiscal integrity. To the extent such conditions compromise local autonomy and mortgage a district's future, they are not calculated to persuade local officials or their constituents that mismanagement and profligacy will be rewarded.

Indeed, in response to this case, the Legislature and the Governor have already agreed to tighter county and State control of local district budgets and spending.[18] Under certain circumstances, this new legislation *requires* the SPI's complete takeover of an insolvent district as a precondition of an

[17]The *Serrano* decisions themselves, as well as the subsequent adoption of Proposition 13, have exacerbated the need for occasional emergency State intervention by restricting one aspect of local control—the power of local districts to tax themselves out of financial crises. Our *Serrano* opinions condemned the former dependence of school finance on local ad valorem property taxes, because, as a practical matter, however willing a local district might be to increase taxes for education, "districts with small [real property] tax bases simply cannot levy taxes at a rate sufficient to produce the revenue that more affluent districts reap with minimal tax efforts. . . ." (*Serrano I*, *supra*, 5 Cal.3d 584, 598.) In obedience to *Serrano* principles, the current system of public school finance largely eliminates the ability of local districts, rich or poor, to increase local ad valorem property taxes to fund current operations at a level exceeding their State-equalized revenue per average daily attendance. (§ 42238 et seq.) Moreover, Proposition 13 places a general ceiling on the ad valorem property taxes which may be levied on behalf of local governments and school districts. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1.).

[18]Legislation adopted in 1991 provides, among other things, that if a local district's proposed budget fails to win final county and State approval, the county superintendent of schools shall adopt a governing budget for the district which permits the district to meet current and "multiyear" commitments. The county superintendent may rescind any district action or payment which is inconsistent with the county superintendent's budget, except those

emergency State appropriation.[19] Thus, the State has already made vast inroads on the principle that local control is paramount to State intervention in an insolvent district's affairs. The State's plenary power over education includes ample means to discourage future mismanagement in the day-to-day operations of local districts.

In sum, the California Constitution guarantees "basic" equality in public education, regardless of district residence. Because education is a fundamental interest in California, denials of basic educational equality on the basis of district residence are subject to strict scrutiny. The State is the entity with ultimate responsibility for equal operation of the common school system. Accordingly, the State is obliged to intervene when a local district's fiscal problems would otherwise deny its students basic educational equality, unless the State can demonstrate a compelling reason for failing to do so.

The preliminary facts before the trial court support the inference that the District's impending failure to complete the final six weeks of its scheduled school term would cause educational disruption sufficient to deprive District students of basic educational equality. The State has identified no compelling interest which negated its duty to intervene. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs' constitutional claims had potential merit.[20]

3. *Interim harm.*

The trial court also expressly concluded that plaintiffs, District students and their parents, would suffer "substantial and irreparable harm" if a preliminary injunction were denied. This harm, the court further found,

in performance of a previously effective collective bargaining agreement. (§ 42127.3, subd. (b)(1), as amended by Stats. 1991, ch. 1213, § 18.) The county superintendent must also monitor all local budgets continuously to ensure that each district can meet its financial obligations for the current and ensuing fiscal years. A county superintendent's determination that a district will be unable to meet its obligations triggers a process which may culminate in forced revisions to the district's budget and rescission of actions, other than collective bargaining obligations, which are inconsistent with the revisions. (§ 42127.6, added by Stats. 1991, ch. 1213, § 20.)

[19]New sections 41325 through 41327 provide that when a local district accepts an emergency appropriation more than twice the size of its State-recommended reserve, the SPI must take control of the district for at least two fiscal years, assume all duties and powers of the local governing board, fire district officials who took no action to avert insolvency, impose a recovery plan including a ten-year repayment schedule, and remain in control until satisfied that local compliance with recovery requirements is probable.

[20]Our conclusion that the trial court's finding of probable merit is supported by the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution makes it unnecessary to address claims that a State duty of intervention may also have arisen under the "free school" clause or the Fourteenth Amendment.

would be "greater . . . than defendants will suffer if the injunction is granted."

These determinations were based upon the uncontradicted declarations of District teachers, local and regional public school officials, and academic specialists in the field of public education. Besides detailing the severe and immediate academic disruption which would arise from the pending closure (see discussion, *ante*, fn. 16, at p. 687), these declarations set forth at length the "ripple" effect on District parents and students. For example, the declarations recounted, working parents, including the high percentage of needy families in the District, would be faced with expensive child care for the lost school hours; difficult efforts would be required to obtain other placement of the students for the remainder of the year; and special-need students would lose carefully nurtured progress.

The State submitted no evidence that it would suffer comparable or greater harm by offering emergency loan assistance necessary to ensure completion of the District's academic program for 1990-1991. Instead, the State simply argued that court-ordered State aid would damage the State's public school policies of local control and accountability.

(6) The State nonetheless claims plaintiffs' "interim harm" showing was inadequate as a matter of law. In the State's view, plaintiffs' declarations failed to establish that the early closure was unforeseeable, or to explain persuasively why any adverse effects on student progress could not be ameliorated.

We find the trial court's interim-harm findings amply supported. As previously noted, plaintiffs' preliminary showing suggested that the District's inability to complete its school year arose from its ever-worsening fiscal condition and from the deterioration of its negotiations for emergency aid. The declarations of District teachers uniformly indicated that their lesson plans did not provide for the contingency of early closure. Other declarations detailed the difficulties of alternate arrangements to maintain the educational progress of over 31,000 suddenly displaced District students, who included high school seniors poised for graduation. The court could reasonably infer that orderly planning to minimize the resulting educational disruption had not taken place and was not realistically possible.

In any event, the court was not obliged to deny a preliminary injunction simply because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that "irreparable" harm to students was unavoidable by other means. The preliminary record properly convinced the court *both* that plaintiffs had a reasonable probability of

success on the merits, *and* that they would suffer more harm in the meantime if an injunction were denied than the State would suffer if it were granted. This "mix" of the "interrelated" relevant factors fully justified the court's decision to grant the injunction. (See *Common Cause* v. *Board of Supervisors*, *supra*, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442; *King* v. *Meese*, *supra*, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1227.) No error appears.

4. *Scope of remedial order.*

In orders dated April 29, 1991, and May 2, 1991, the trial court directed the State, the SPI, and the Controller to ensure "by whatever means they deem appropriate" that District students would receive their educational rights; both orders made clear that "[h]ow these defendants accomplish this is up to the discretion of defendants. . . ." When no other State official proposed a solution, the SPI and the Controller, on May 2, 1991, offered a conditional loan plan for approval by the court.

After a hearing on that day, the court found that $19 million in aid funds proposed by the SPI and the Controller were presently available, and the court authorized the Controller to apportion such funds as an emergency loan to the District. The court further determined that, given the State's obligation to provide an equal education, the SPI's statutory authority to "[s]uperintend the schools of this state" (§ 33112, subd. (a)), and the "unique" emergency circumstances, "the [SPI] . . . has authority to relieve the [Board] of its legal duties and powers, appoint a trustee, develop a recovery plan and, subject to the approval of the Controller, [develop] a repayment plan on the [D]istrict's behalf as necessary to ensure the operation of the schools through June 14, 1991, the financial recovery of the [D]istrict, and the protection of State funds loaned to the [D]istrict."

(7a) The State and several amici curiae contend that even if the trial court could require State intervention to prevent violation of the District students' constitutional rights, there was no legal or equitable basis for the court's order authorizing the SPI to displace the Board, operate the District through his own administrator, and impose a plan for the District's permanent financial recovery. Under the circumstances presented by this case, however, we conclude that this portion of the court's order did not exceed its powers.

We agree that the statutes themselves provided no direct authority for the approach taken by the trial court. In general, though they act as regulated State agents, local governing boards are vested by statute with immediate jurisdiction over day-to-day district affairs. (§§ 14000, 35000 et seq.) The

SPI has important statutory responsibilities for allocating school funds (§§ 33118, 14000 et seq.), monitoring local budgets (§§ 42120 et seq., 41450), and administering the conditions of emergency loans *appropriated by the Legislature* (§§ 41310, 41320 et seq.; see also § 41325 et seq.), but no statute grants him emergency powers to operate a local district under other circumstances.[21]

The court relied in part on section 33112, subdivision (a), which provides that the SPI shall "[s]uperintend the schools of this state." But no case has interpreted this statute to vest the SPI with nonexpress powers, and an older decision construed similar language narrowly against a county superintendent. (*McKenzie* v. *Board of Education* (1905) 1 Cal.App. 406, 409 [82 P. 392].) Indeed, counsel for the SPI conceded in the trial court that the SPI had no statutory authority to take over the District's government.

The trial court also believed its takeover order was within its inherent equitable power to enforce the State's constitutional obligations in light of the "unique emergency financial conditions" presented by the case. In the court's view, ratification of all loan conditions proposed by the SPI was necessary to ensure the District's continued operation through June 14, 1991, promote its permanent financial recovery, and protect the loan itself. We agree.

(8) In general, courts have equitable authority to enforce their constitutional judgments. (E.g., *Crawford* v. *Board of Education*, *supra*, 17 Cal.3d 280, 308.) Of course, principles of comity and separation of powers place significant restraints on courts' authority to order or ratify acts normally committed to the discretion of other branches or officials. (*Common Cause* v. *Board of Supervisors*, *supra*, 49 Cal.3d 432, 445-446; *Mandel* v. *Myers* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 540 [174 Cal.Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935]; *Serrano II*, *supra*, 18 Cal.3d 728, 751; *Crawford* v. *Board of Education*, *supra*, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 305-306; cf. *Missouri* v. *Jenkins* (1990) 495 U.S. 33, 50-58 [109 L.Ed.2d 31, 53-59, 110 S.Ct. 1651].) In particular, the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3) obliges the judiciary to respect the separate constitutional roles of the Executive and the Legislature.

Moreover, a judicial remedy must be tailored to the harm at issue. (E.g., *Sheet Metal Workers* v. *EEOC* (1986) 478 U.S. 421, 476 [92 L.Ed.2d 344, 388, 106 S.Ct. 3019]; *Dayton Board of Education* v. *Brinkman* (1977) 433

[21]A.B. 128 would have granted the SPI powers of this magnitude over the District, but the bill failed passage. (See discussion, *ante*, at p. 690.) 1991 statutory amendments call for the SPI's takeover of districts that accept large emergency insolvency *appropriations* (§ 41325 et seq.; see discussion, *ante*, fn. 18 at p. 691), but even after 1991, the SPI has no such statutory authority *independent* of a specific insolvency appropriation by the Legislature.

U.S. 406, 420 [53 L.Ed.2d 851, 863-864, 97 S.Ct. 2766].) A court should always strive for the least disruptive remedy adequate to its legitimate task.

(7b) The trial court's remedial order in this case fell within proper boundaries. Having correctly held the State constitutionally responsible for the students' rights, the court could not deny the State and its officials effective means of fulfilling its obligation. Under the circumstances, the court was warranted in authorizing temporary transfer to the SPI of the Board's statutory powers over District affairs.

The emergency the court confronted on May 2, 1991, demanded a prompt State-assisted solution to prevent immediate closure of the District's schools. The State was justified in satisfying its constitutional duty of aid by extending a loan that would impose the ultimate consequences of the District's self-created predicament upon the District, rather than upon the State, its taxpayers, and the students of other districts. The State was also entitled to conditions on the loan that would ensure its appropriate use for the intended constitutional purpose, and would minimize the risk of the District's default in repayment.

The District's ability to administer the new loan under its existing systems and managers was uniquely suspect. As a matter of public record, the District's worsening financial situation had recently led the Legislature to provide a loan in excess of $9 million. A limited-powers State trustee appointed to monitor the District's fiscal affairs in connection with that loan had not been able to stem a growing District deficit estimated by one declarant, a member of the Board, to exceed $23 million for the 1990-1991 school year alone. In response to these difficulties, the Board had caused the District to seek bankruptcy protection against its existing creditors.

As counsel for the SPI explained on April 29, 1991, the District's unprecedented financial collapse indicated systemic management problems. Hence, counsel reported, the SPI considered it foolhardy to extend further substantial State credit to the District unless its management was placed in competent hands, its administrative practices were reformed and restructured from the outside, and a long-term plan for its financial recovery was imposed.[22] On behalf of the State, the Attorney General contested the legality of vesting such extraordinary powers in the SPI, but no party disputed the logic of the SPI's position.

[22]The following colloquy occurred between the court and counsel for the SPI: "[¶] MR. HERSHER [SPI's counsel]: . . . [The SPI] does not want to make . . . 20 to 30 million dollars in state funds available to a district that has already demonstrated substantial financial irresponsibility. It's pouring state money into a hole and it's never going to come back out. [¶] THE COURT: Would he want to do that if the State was given the responsibility for running the district as you suggested? [¶] MR. HERSHER: I believe so. I think what Bill Honig sees is that

Nor can we. Given the emergency circumstances, and under the extreme and aggravated conditions disclosed by the evidence, the court below could properly conclude that orderly completion of the District's 1990-1991 school term, and the sound financing essential to achieve that end, required temporary displacement of the sitting Board and the operation of the District by the SPI's designee for the purpose of stabilizing its financial affairs.[23] We conclude that the order approving temporary takeover of the District by the SPI was within the court's inherent equitable power to remedy the constitutional crisis.[24]

5. *Source of loan funds.*

In order to obtain the necessary $19 million in emergency loan funds, the trial court authorized the Controller to disburse (1) $9 million of unspent funds from a special contingency appropriation to the Department of Education for the GAIN program, and (2) the unused $10 million appropriated as an emergency loan to the OUSD. (9) The State and amicus curiae Pacific argue that because the Legislature had not earmarked either of these sums

the District has to be reorganized. The financial management of the District needs to be completely restructured, and there needs to be a long-term recovery plan . . . . [I]t has always been [the SPI's] position that somebody needs to . . . take over the District, come up with a long-term plan in which all the creditors of the District suffer equally or equitably."

[23]Amici curiae Diaz and Bezemek ask us to receive additional evidence and make findings about the SPI's record as administrator of the District after May 2, 1991. Among other things, Diaz and Bezemek allege that the SPI's administrator has withdrawn the District's bankruptcy petition, dismantled essential programs, failed to reappoint a citizens' advisory committee, restructured the District's administration, dismissed faculty and counselors, obstructed reorganization of the District's existing debt, imposed an unconscionable interest rate on the court-approved loan, and diverted educational funds to debt repayment. Diaz and Bezemek claim this evidence supports their contention that the SPI's governance of the District presents an inherent conflict between his role as protector of State-loaned funds and his duty to restore the District to financial and educational health.

Appellate courts have limited powers to take evidence and find facts in nonjury civil cases. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; Code Civ. Proc., § 909; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 23(b).) However, the matters Diaz and Bezemek seek to present are beyond the scope of this lawsuit and unnecessary to our analysis. Moreover, Diaz and Bezemek concede the proffered evidence is disputed; appellate courts will not resolve such factual conflicts. (E.g., *In re Marriage of Davis* (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 71, 75-76 [190 Cal.Rptr. 104]; see *McCracken* v. *Teets* (1953) 41 Cal.2d 648, 653 [262 P.2d 561].) We therefore deny the motion.

[24]The State argues that even if extraordinary judicial interference in the District's affairs was necessary to guarantee the constitutional rights of District students, the court erred by granting the SPI extralegal "discretion" to act rather than assuming control over the District itself, with the SPI as the court's appointed agent. The State cites no authority for its proposition that the court's remedial options were so narrowly confined. The remedial order of May 2, 1991, makes clear that the authority therein accorded the SPI flows from a direct and critical exercise of the court's equitable power and jurisdiction over the constitutional dispute. The order laudably minimizes direct judicial involvement in matters best left to officials with specific responsibilities and expertise in education, but its effect is no different than if it had expressly made the SPI a court functionary. We find no error.

for purposes "reasonably related" to resolving the District's financial crisis, the court improperly invaded the nonjudicial power of appropriation.

We agree. In a valid exercise of its constitutional powers, the Legislature had directed each of these sums to specific agencies and narrow purposes which did not include the District and its financial emergency. Hence, the Legislature had not made these funds reasonably available for disbursement to the District. By diverting the funds from their earmarked destinations and purposes, the court invaded the Legislature's constitutional authority.

Article III, section 3 of the Califonia Constitution provides that "[t]he powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution." Article XVI, section 7 provides that "[m]oney may be drawn from the Treasury only through an appropriation made by law and upon a Controller's duly drawn warrant." Article IV, sections 10 and 12 set forth the respective powers of the Legislature and Governor over the enactment of appropriations. It has long been clear that these separation-of-powers principles limit judicial authority over appropriations. (*Myers* v. *English* (1858) 9 Cal. 341, 349; see *Westinghouse Electric Co.* v. *Chambers* (1915) 169 Cal. 131, 135 [145 P. 1025]; *California State Employees' Assn.* v. *Flournoy* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 219, 234 [108 Cal.Rptr. 251]; see also *Payne* v. *Superior Court* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 920, fn. 6 [132 Cal.Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565].)

In certain narrow circumstances, California courts have concluded that judicial orders for the disbursement of appropriated funds do not invade valid legislative functions. *Mandel* v. *Myers*, *supra*, 29 Cal.3d 531, is the only decision by this court which found judicial power to "commandeer" appropriated funds. The facts and analysis of that case demonstrate the strict limits on the judicial authority it recognized.

The plaintiff in *Mandel*, a Department of Health Services (DHS) worker, had prevailed in litigation challenging DHS's practice of allowing paid employee leave on Good Friday. The judgment against the State included an award of attorney fees. However, the Legislature removed appropriations for payment from successive claims and budget bills, including the 1978-1979 Budget Act (Act). The Act included the usual appropriation to DHS for "general operating expenses and equipment," which expressly included expenses for "services" and "all other proper purposes." Such "catchall" budget categories for State agencies had traditionally been used to pay agency legal expenses. However, the Act expressly precluded use of any appropriation therein "to achieve any purpose which has been denied by any formal action of the Legislature."

We upheld the trial court's order that the Controller pay the fee award from the general operating budget of DHS. We noted first that the "catchall" appropriation was "reasonably" or "generally" available for payment of legal expenses incurred by DHS, because the broad terms of the appropriation, as well as its historical uses, indicated such a legislative intent. In effect, we concluded that the Legislature had voluntarily made an appropriation for payments of this general kind. (*Mandel* v. *Myers*, *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 539-545.)

We further explained that, once having made an appropriation generally available, the Legislature may not impose specific restrictions which are unconstitutionally discriminatory, or which constitute an impermissible legislative attempt to readjudicate the merits of a final court judgment. Hence, we reasoned, the Legislature's attempt to avoid payment of the *Mandel* award in particular must be struck down. The DHS "catchall" appropriation thus remained "available" under its general terms for payment of the judgment. (*Mandel* v. *Myers*, *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 545-551.)

Subsequent Court of Appeal decisions adhered to these principles of *Mandel*. In *Serrano* v. *Priest* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 188 [182 Cal.Rptr. 387], attorneys who had won the school-finance class action sought judicial help after the State rebuffed their informal efforts to collect a court-ordered fee award. After *Mandel* was decided, the State conceded that the trial court had properly ordered payment from a "catchall" appropriation to the Department of Education, the SPI, and the State Board of Education for "operating expenses and equipment." (Pp. 197-198.) In *Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights* v. *Cory* (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 852 [183 Cal.Rptr. 475], the court concluded, after disregarding an unconstitutional budget act provision against use of Medi-Cal funds for abortions (see *Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights* v. *Myers* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252 [172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779, 20 A.L.R.4th 1118]), that abortion funding could be ordered from monies appropriated for other Medi-Cal pregnancy services. (132 Cal.App.3d at pp. 857-858.)

Plaintiffs and the SPI suggest that two more recent Court of Appeal decisions, *Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist.* v. *State of California* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155 [275 Cal.Rptr. 449] and *Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist.* v. *State of California* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521 [234 Cal.Rptr. 795], have expanded *Mandel*'s concept of "reasonable [or] general availability." The trial court in the instant case apparently relied on these decisions to conclude that it could divert the GAIN and OUSD appropriations to the District because they were "generally related" to education.

Long Beach and *Carmel Valley* do make occasional use of the term "generally related" to describe *Mandel*'s principle of reasonable or general

"availability." (See *Long Beach*, *supra*, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 181; *Carmel Valley*, *supra*, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 541.) But nothing in those cases supports the trial court's apparent view that funds appropriated for one specific educational purpose may be judicially diverted to another. So far as the face of the opinions discloses, the stated intent of the target appropriation in each case, or its historical uses, indicated that the court's application of the funds was plausibly within purposes the Legislature might have contemplated.[25] No court has suggested that *Mandel* principles permit court-ordered diversion of an appropriation away from a clear, narrow, and valid purpose specified by the Legislature. We affirm that the words "generally related," as used in *Long Beach* and *Carmel Valley*, do not countenance such judicial incursions into the legislative power over appropriations.[26]

The instant trial court misapplied *Mandel* when it authorized the diversion of appropriated funds from the specific purposes and programs for which the Legislature had validly earmarked them. Nine million dollars was taken from an appropriation in the 1989-1990 Budget Act for the GAIN program. (Stats. 1989, ch. 93, § 22.00.) GAIN's purpose is to provide employment, adult

[25]In *Carmel Valley*, the Court of Appeal struck down budgetary language which had been inserted to foreclose the constitutionally required reimbursement of local agencies for expenses incurred in upgrading firefighter protective clothing as mandated by the State. (See Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6.) After disregarding these unconstitutional restrictions, the Court of Appeal quite logically determined that funds appropriated to the Department of Industrial Relations for Program 40, the Prevention of Industrial Injuries and Deaths of California Workers, were available for this expense. (*Carmel Valley*, *supra*, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 541.) In *Long Beach*, a local school district sought reimbursement for the State-mandated expenses of developing desegregation programs. After the Legislature deleted an appropriation for this purpose from the 1985-1986 budget bill, the district obtained a trial court order for reimbursement from specified line-item accounts related to education, and from the general operating budget of the Department of Education, which had mandated the programs. The Court of Appeal affirmed on grounds that the record substantially supported the trial court's order. As the Court of Appeal explained, these and similar accounts had historically been used to support programs such as the one for which reimbursement was sought, and were logical sources of funding for this specific purpose. (*Long Beach*, *supra*, 225 Cal.App.3d at pp. 181-182; see also p. 185.)

[26]We are aware that in *Missouri* v. *Jenkins*, *supra*, 495 U.S. 33, the United States Supreme Court upheld the power of federal courts to order local tax levies to enforce judicial remedies for unconstitutional school segregation. However, even if the federal Constitution permits federal courts to impose far-reaching remedies for State government violations of federal constitutional rights, it does not follow that California courts are exempt from the constraints imposed by the California Constitution upon their power to invade the functions of a coequal branch of State government.

Indeed, the California Constitution's separation of powers clause precludes any branch from usurping or improperly interfering with the essential operations of either of the other two branches. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1 [legislative power]; Cal. Const., art. V, § 1 [executive power]; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1 [judicial power].) Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as sanctioning or immunizing such unconstitutional interference, or as addressing the question of the appropriate remedies that may be invoked in the event one branch improperly impinges on the essential operations of a coequal branch.

education, and job training to recipients of public assistance. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11320 et seq.) Local school districts can receive GAIN funds for adult education and training classes (*id.*, §§ 11320.8, 11322, 11323), and the Legislature intended that the 1989-1990 GAIN appropriation might include such funding subject to strict conditions (see Stats. 1989, ch. 93, § 22.00, subd. (b)). However, this appropriation was expressly designated for that program alone and was not intended to fund the needs of non-GAIN students. Nothing in the trial court's order restricted use of the GAIN-derived funds to uses contemplated by the appropriation.

Similar considerations govern the remaining $10 million of the emergency loan, which was derived from the 1989 Legislature's special appropriation for the OUSD. This appropriation, by its express terms, was "for the purpose of an emergency loan *to* [*that*] [*d*]*istrict* in compliance with Article 2 (commencing with Section 41320) of Chapter 3 of Part 24 of the Education Code." (Stats. 1989, ch. 1438, § 1, italics added.)

Section 41310 expresses the intent that emergency loans to distressed districts under section 41320 et seq. not occur "unless funds have been *specifically* appropriated *therefor* by the Legislature." (Italics added.) The statutory scheme imposes detailed conditions on emergency loans granted under its auspices (§§ 41320.1-41323), and the Legislature further refined the conditions on the OUSD appropriation to address the particular circumstances of that case (Stats. 1989, ch. 1438, §§ 2-9).

When it makes an appropriation to a specific district, under specific conditions addressed to the problems of that district, the Legislature clearly intends and contemplates that the appropriation will only be used for that purpose, and under those conditions. Hence, the appropriation is not reasonably available for court-ordered diversion to another district under different conditions.

The trial court, understandably anxious to resolve the crisis, concluded that it could fund its order from any monies previously appropriated "for a purpose that is reasonably related to educational purposes." The court found that the GAIN and OUSD appropriations were "reasonably related to the State's obligation to keep the Richmond schools open through June 14, 1991 . . . ."

As we have seen, however, the test of reasonable availability under *Mandel* does not extend to uses clearly outside the particular purpose for which an appropriation was reserved. The GAIN and OUSD appropriations were earmarked for purposes entirely distinct from the subject matter of this

lawsuit.[27] They were not reasonably available for court diversion to finance the remainder of the District's school term.

In her concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard claims that by flatly disclaiming judicial power to divert appropriations from the purposes specified by the Legislature, we adopt a "formalistic" and outmoded view of the separation of powers. Citing language from two United States Supreme Court decisions (*Mistretta* v. *United States* (1989) 488 U.S. 361 [102 L.Ed.2d 714, 109 S.Ct. 647]; *Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services* (1977) 433 U.S. 425 [53 L.Ed.2d 867, 97 S.Ct. 2777]), she proposes that interbranch conflicts of this kind be resolved under a "pragmatic" and "flexible" case-by-case balancing test, in which the derogation of one branch's powers by another may be warranted to promote overriding objectives within the "constitutional authority" of the latter. Because both the OUSD and GAIN appropriations were "generally related" to elementary and secondary education, she reasons, diversion of these funds to the District was not a "great" or "extreme" intrusion upon the appropriations power, and the court's action was justified by its constitutional responsibility to District students.

We cannot accept these contentions. Our adherence to *Mandel* can hardly be deemed rigid or formalistic; our decision in that case strained to find a practical, sensitive, and principled balance between legislative and judicial power over appropriations. In effect, Justice Kennard urges abandonment of *Mandel*'s careful analysis in favor of a rule giving the judiciary unchecked power to override the valid budgetary acts of coequal branches.

However, nothing in the California or federal cases on which Justice Kennard relies even hints that a court may *nullify* a *specific and valid exercise* by the Legislature and the Executive of fundamental budgetary powers explicitly entrusted to those branches, simply for the purpose of

[27]No party or amicus curiae suggests that the purposes specified by the Legislature for these two appropriations were "improper or invalid . . . restriction[s]" on their use which may be disregarded by the courts. (*Mandel* v. *Myers*, *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at p. 542.) This is not a case where the Legislature, in defiance of the Constitution or the judicial branch, had prohibited use of appropriations for particular purposes to which they would otherwise logically extend.

We recognize that, at the May 2 hearing, counsel for the OUSD indicated his client had "no objection" to diversion of its loan appropriation for the court's purposes. The OUSD's position may not have been entirely altruistic; on April 29, counsel had committed the OUSD to accepting an influx of displaced District students but expressed concern about the disruption such a solution would cause. Even if the OUSD believed that diversion of its appropriation was in its own best interests, however, the OUSD could not unilaterally alter the terms and conditions the Legislature had imposed on the appropriation. Moreover, the OUSD's waiver was conditional; counsel made clear that the OUSD reserved its right to demand refunding of the OUSD appropriation "if and when [the OUSD] chooses to exercise its rights to request a loan from the state of [$]10 million at any time up until June 30, 1993."

satisfying a judgment or order that is *unrelated* to the appropriation. (Compare, e.g., *Mistretta* v. *United States*, *supra*, 488 U.S. 361, 380-384 [102 L.Ed.2d 714, 735-738] [Congress's creation of United States Sentencing Commission, a judicial-branch agency charged with establishing mandatory federal sentencing guidelines, did not usurp authority of individual judicial officers or grant forbidden legislative power to judicial branch]; *Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services*, *supra*, 433 U.S. 425, 441-446 [53 L.Ed.2d 867, 889-893] [legislation vesting Administrator of General Services with limited control over presidential papers of resigned chief executive did not undermine authority of executive branch]; *Wilson* v. *Eu* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 471, 473 [286 Cal.Rptr. 280, 816 P.2d 1306] [Legislature's failure to reapportion justifies judicial adoption of reapportionment plan]; *Davis* v. *Municipal Court* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 72-87 [249 Cal.Rptr. 300, 757 P.2d 11] [District attorney's statutory power to disapprove local misdemeanor-diversion program was not improper delegation of legislative authority; prosecutor's absolute discretion to prevent diversion by charging "wobbler" as felony did not constitute forbidden judicial power]; *Younger* v. *Superior Court* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 115-118 [145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014] [statute requiring Department of Justice to destroy individual's marijuana arrest and conviction records upon application after sentence is complete did not create impermissible conflict with executive clemency powers].)

The balance proposed by Justice Kennard in this case would elevate the judiciary above its coequal brethren, upset the delicate system of checks and balances, and stand the separation of powers clause on its head. Applying *Mandel*'s well-settled principles, we remain satisfied that the trial court acted in excess of its authority when it funded the District's loan with appropriations specifically earmarked by the Legislature for other purposes.[28]

CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION

The District's financial inability to complete the final six weeks of its 1990-1991 school term threatened to deprive District students of their

[28]Although the instant record is silent on the point, Justice Kennard worries that there *may* have been no unearmarked educational appropriations available to enforce this trial court's order. She suggests further that such funds *may* also not be available under current laws and budgetary constraints to permit judicial enforcement of students' constitutional rights in similar future cases. These concerns have no practical effect in the instant lawsuit, because the State does not seek rescission of the District's loan, and the educational rights of the District's students are secure. In any event, we cannot overlook the fact that the urgency of the District's crisis denied the Legislature any opportunity to respond to the trial court's injunctive order. Once alerted by the trial court's constitutional ruling, however, the Legislature and the Governor have taken significant steps to prevent or remedy recurrences of the District's crisis. We may not assume they will fail or refuse to respond as necessary to our final determination of the State's constitutional responsibilities.

California constitutional right to basic educational equality with other public school students in this State. As the court further concluded, discrimination of this nature against education, a fundamental interest, could only be justified as necessary to serve a compelling interest. The State itself, as the entity with plenary constitutional responsibility for operation of the common school system, had a duty to protect District students against loss of their right to basic educational equality. Local control of public schools was not a compelling interest which would justify the State's failure to intervene.

The trial court thus properly ordered the State and its officials to protect the students' rights. The court also acted within its remedial powers by authorizing the SPI to assume control of the District's affairs, relieve the Board of its duties, and supervise the District's financial recovery. However, the court invaded the exclusive legislative power of appropriation by approving the diversion of appropriations for GAIN and the OUSD to an emergency loan for the District.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's remedial order of May 2, 1991, insofar as it approves funding of an emergency loan to the District from appropriations for the Oakland Unified School District and the Greater Avenues for Independence program. In all other respects, the court's orders of April 29 and May 2, 1991, are affirmed. The Court of Appeal is directed to remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate under the views expressed in this opinion.

Panelli, J., Arabian, J., and George, J., concurred.

LUCAS, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur with the majority's conclusions regarding the constitutional obligations of the State of California (State) to assure educational equality. I would not, however, address the propriety of the sources approved by the trial court to provide an emergency loan.

In my view, we need not consider questions regarding the use of the Oakland Unified School District (OUSD) emergency appropriation or the unused appropriation for the Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program because the issues are moot and their resolution will have no impact on the status quo in this case. As the majority notes, at the May 2, 1991, proceeding, the State continued to object to the trial court's order arising out of the April 29, 1991, hearing. That order required the State, Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) and Controller, at their discretion and "by whatever means they deem appropriate," to ensure Richmond students were not deprived of six weeks of education provided to other students within California. In addition to renewing its basic position on the merits of the

constitutional arguments, the State also objected to use of the specific funds proposed by the SPI and Controller. It offered no alternative sources of funding and appealed from both orders.

Before us, however, the State does not demand rescission of the court-approved loan or any change in the status of that funding. The funding was granted as a loan and a loan repayment agreement has been worked out by the parties. The State, acknowledging those facts, expressly asserts "We do not argue that the Controller must be compelled immediately to recover the money." In other words, it seeks no relief from the trial court's order granting payment from the challenged sources and compelling repayment of the funds under a prescribed repayment schedule.

Accordingly, as the SPI observes, the matter is moot. The State's response, found in its reply brief, is only that "the trial court in the next case will still be guided by, unless this court disapproves the test, the 'generally related' test set forth in *Carmel Valley [Fire Protection Dist.* v. *State of California* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 540-541 (234 Cal.Rptr. 795)] and *Long Beach [Unified Sch. Dist.* v. *State of California* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 181-182 (275 Cal.Rptr. 449)]." It does not assert that this issue is capable of evading review because of timing or that a present controversy over the use of these particular funds still exists. Instead, it seeks guidance only for the future. I would decline to render what would essentially be an advisory opinion here. (See *People* ex rel. *Lynch* v. *Superior Court* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 910, 912 [83 Cal.Rptr. 670, 464 P.2d 126] ["The rendering of advisory opinions falls within neither the functions nor the jurisdiction of this court"].)

MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.—I am in general agreement with the views expressed in Justice Kennard's concurring and dissenting opinion.

However, I cannot embrace the ill-advised concession that the trial court's order "did pose a potential for disruption of a function of the legislative branch" although the degree of potential disruption "is not great" and the purported infringement on the legislative function is "not substantial." (Kennard, J., *post*, conc. and dis. opn. at pp. 710, 711.)

The theory of potential interference with legislative functions to any extent is inconsistent with the ultimate conclusion that the funds used for the emergency loan were "reasonably related" to the educational purposes of the legislation, and, indeed, "the trial court's order furthered, rather than defeated, that valid legislative purpose." As persuasively observed in footnote 2, the "funds were appropriated for purposes reasonably and closely related

to the purpose for which the trial court ordered them to be used." (Kennard, J., *post*, conc. and dis. opn. at p. 711.)

Under the foregoing circumstances—with which I agree—there cannot be some conceptual interference, even though "not great," with the functions of the legislative branch.

With that caveat, I join the concurring and dissenting opinion.

KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.—I agree with the majority that the threatened closure of the schools of the Richmond Unified School District (District) was such an extreme departure from prevailing educational standards as to infringe on the students' state constitutional rights to basic educational equality, requiring the State of California (State) to intervene to protect those rights.

I do not agree, however, that the trial court violated the separation of powers doctrine by ordering that emergency loan funds be made available from an unused special appropriation to the Department of Education and an unused emergency appropriation to the Oakland Unified School District (OUSD). The majority has, in effect, declared that although the students' right to education is fundamental, no means may exist by which our judicial system can enforce that right. In my view, the trial court's order was an appropriate and pragmatic resolution of a difficult case under extreme pressure. Because the Legislature had already appropriated the funds in question for educational purposes reasonably related to the District's needs, I discern no constitutional violation, and would affirm the trial court's orders in their entirety.

I

On April 17, 1991, the District, facing a $23 million budgetary shortfall, announced its schools would close on May 1, 1991, rather than as scheduled on June 14, 1991. Parents of students in the District's schools then filed a class action against the State and the District's board of education, alleging the closure would deprive children of their fundamental right to education and would violate equal protection guarantees. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that "education is a fundamental right in California [and] unless injunctive relief is granted children in the District will be denied six weeks of instruction that will be provided to every other child in the State." The trial court ordered the State, the Superintendent of Public Instruction (Superintendent), and the State Controller "to ensure that the students in the District are not deprived of six

weeks of public education while others within the state are not so deprived." The trial court added that "how these defendants accomplish this is up to the discretion of the defendants."

Thereafter, the Superintendent and the Controller proposed a plan to keep the schools open. They proposed that $19 million in unspent funds from two educational programs—from the Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program and from an appropriation to the OUSD—be loaned to the District. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ordered the State Controller to disburse an emergency loan to the District from these funds. This court denied the State's motion to stay the order pending appeal, but transferred the case here.

II

The majority holds that the trial court's remedial order violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Essentially, the majority reasons that by ordering that the unused funds be loaned to the District, the trial court impermissibly engaged in the appropriation of funds, an area of exclusive legislative concern.

The majority's conclusion originates from a fundamental misunderstanding of the separation of powers doctrine. Implicit in the majority's discussion is the assumption that under our tripartite scheme of government, particular powers can be definitively categorized as belonging to one of the three branches, and that these powers can never be exercised by a branch other than the designated branch. Thus, under the majority's approach, appropriation is exclusively a legislative function, and unless the Legislature has either appropriated funds for a specific purpose, or made a "catchall" appropriation under which a specific use of funds may fall, funds are simply not available for any purpose, no matter what rights are at stake.

This formalistic interpretation of the separation of powers concept is, however, contrary to modern understanding. The opinions of the United States Supreme Court, although not binding on this court in interpreting the separation of powers principles of the California Constitution, supply a persuasive body of case authority. Just as our state Constitution provides for the separation of the powers of government into three branches (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3), so does the federal Constitution segregate the branches of government (U.S. Const., art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, & art. III, § 1).

The United States Supreme Court has "squarely rejected the argument that the Constitution contemplates a complete division of authority between the

three branches." (*Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services* (1977) 433 U.S. 425, 443 [53 L.Ed.2d 867, 891, 97 S.Ct. 2777].) Rather than reading the federal Constitution as " 'requiring three airtight departments of government,' " the high court has adopted a "pragmatic, flexible approach." (*Id.* at pp. 443, 442 [53 L.Ed.2d at pp. 891, 890-891.) This approach, the court has explained, is supported by historical understanding. James Madison, one of the principal architects of the United States Constitution, wrote that the concept of separation of powers " 'd[oes] not mean that these departments ought to have no *partial agency* in, or no *control* over the acts of each other,' " but instead that " 'where the *whole* power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the *whole* power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.' " (J. Madison, The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (original italics), quoted in *Mistretta* v. *United States* (1989) 488 U.S. 361, 380-381 [102 L.Ed.2d 714, 735-736, 109 S.Ct. 647].) Thus, the basic purpose of the separation of powers is to guard against the concentration of power in the hands of one branch, but it is important to distinguish "partial agency" from those aggrandizements of power that pose genuine threats to the constitutional scheme.

The pragmatic and flexible approach favored by the nation's highest court is also appropriate because, in a society growing ever more complex, the practical requirements of efficient government action by each of the three branches must be considered. " 'While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.' " (*Mistretta* v. *United States*, *supra*, 488 U.S. at p. 381 [102 L.Ed.2d at p. 736], quoting *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.* v. *Sawyer* (1952) 343 U.S. 579, 635 [96 L.Ed. 1153, 1199, 72 S.Ct. 863, 26 A.L.R.2d 1378] (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.).) In contemporary society, concerns about the workability of government are especially weighty.

Thus, the high court has not evolved a rigid classification of governmental powers as belonging exclusively to one branch or another. Instead, the court has stated that "the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which [the act complained of] prevents [one of the three branches] from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." (*Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services*, *supra*, 433 U.S. at p. 443 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 891]; *Mistretta* v. *United States*, *supra*, 488 U.S. at p. 383 [102 L.Ed.2d at pp. 737-738].) If the "potential for disruption is present," the court must then "determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority" of the branch whose action is challenged. (*Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services*, *supra*, 433 U.S. at p. 443 [53

L.Ed.2d at p. 891]; *Mistretta* v. *United States*, *supra*, 488 U.S. at p. 383, fn. 13 [102 L.Ed.2d at p. 737].)

This court has expressed a similar understanding. We have recognized that the purpose of the doctrine of separation of powers "is to prevent one branch of government from exercising the *complete* power constitutionally vested in another [citation]; it is not intended to prohibit one branch from taking action properly within its sphere that has the *incidental* effect of duplicating a function or procedure delegated to another branch. [Citation.]" (*Younger* v. *Superior Court* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 117 [145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014] [original italics].)

More recently, this court reiterated that the separation of powers doctrine " 'has not been interpreted as requiring the rigid classification of all the incidental activities of government, with the result that once a technique or method of procedure is associated with a particular branch of the government, it can never be used thereafter by another.' . . . 'From the beginning, each branch has exercised all three kinds of powers.' " (*Davis* v. *Municipal Court* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 76 [249 Cal.Rptr. 300, 757 P.2d 11] [citations and italics omitted].)

III

A line of cases from California courts has established the principle that a court does not violate the separation of powers doctrine when it orders appropriate expenditures from already existing funds, if such funds are reasonably available for the expenditures in question. (*Mandel* v. *Myers* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 540 [174 Cal.Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935]; *Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist.* v. *State of California* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 180-181 [275 Cal.Rptr. 449]; *Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist.* v. *State of California* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 538-539 [234 Cal.Rptr. 795]; *Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights* v. *Cory* (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 852, 856 [183 Cal.Rptr. 475].) The precise question in this case is whether funds can be considered "reasonably available" when they are not made part of a "catchall" appropriation under which the specific use of the funds may fall. The majority concludes that unless the funds are part of a "catchall" appropriation, they are not reasonably available.[1]

I would announce no such categorical rule. In my view, the proper inquiry is that set forth by the United States Supreme Court in *Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services*, *supra*, 433 U.S. 425 and *Mistretta* v. *United States*,

[1]The majority purports to reaffirm the rule of these cases, but in fact undermines it. The "catchall" appropriation exception to the majority's rule could easily be eliminated if the Legislature took the time to label more specifically the purpose of each appropriation in a particular area. If the Legislature did so, there would be no possible remedy for the failure to fund any program, no matter how essential.

supra, 488 U.S. 361: To what extent does the challenged act of one branch interfere with another branch's performance of its constitutionally assigned functions? If there is some potential disruption, the court must then determine whether the challenged act is "justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority" of the branch whose action is challenged. (*Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services*, *supra*, at p. 443 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 891]; *Mistretta* v. *United States*, *supra*, at p. 383, fn. 13 [102 L.Ed.2d at p. 737].)

Applying the principles followed by the high court in *Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services*, *supra*, 433 U.S. 425 and *Mistretta* v. *United States*, *supra*, 488 U.S. 361, and by this court in cases such as *Younger* v. *Superior Court*, *supra*, 21 Cal.3d 102 and *Davis* v. *Municipal Court*, *supra*, 46 Cal.3d 64, I conclude that the trial court's order authorizing the Controller to disburse funds from the GAIN and OUSD accounts as an emergency loan to the District to assure the District's schools remained open did pose a potential for disruption of a function of the legislative branch.

The degree of potential disruption, however, is not great. As the trial court concluded, the funds that were the source of the emergency loan were appropriated for purposes reasonably related to the educational purposes served by the District.

The OUSD loan funds were appropriated by the Legislature for the precise purpose for which they were employed here—to alleviate a fiscal crisis in a local school district and prevent disruption of an ongoing educational program. (See Stats. 1989, ch. 1438, § 1.) Moreover, the trial court had before it an application for leave to intervene from the OUSD itself, in which the OUSD stated that the threatened closure of the nearby District "would place substantial and difficult burdens on OUSD as displaced Richmond students seek admission to Oakland Schools," that would be "extremely costly and disruptive" to the operation of the Oakland schools. The emergency loan fund for the OUSD was intended by the Legislature to avoid disruption of the educational program at the Oakland schools, and the trial court's order furthered, rather than defeated, that valid legislative purpose.

The GAIN program was enacted to address the problem of teenage parenting, basic educational deficiencies, and long-term welfare dependency. Specifically, GAIN was intended to "[p]rovide the education and training services needed by teenage parents to help them earn a high school diploma or its equivalent," and to "[l]ink teenagers to other needed health and social services." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11330, subd. (c).) The purpose of the particular appropriation to the Department of Education at issue in this case

was solely to meet educational needs, and not to provide health and social services. (Stats. 1989, ch. 93, § 22.00.) This goal is served by keeping the District's schools open. The trial court had before it uncontradicted evidence that a large number of the students in the District came from low-income families, many of whom were welfare-dependent. The court could rationally conclude that the otherwise unused GAIN funds were reasonably available to meet the basic educational needs of the District's students, a significant portion of whom were in the welfare-dependent population the GAIN program was targeted to assist. Under the circumstances, the funds were ordered to be used for a purpose reasonably congruent with the statutory purpose.[2]

Thus, because the trial court authorized the OUSD and GAIN funds to be used for a purpose that was reasonably related to the purposes for which the funds were appropriated, any infringement on the legislative function is not substantial. By contrast, we are not faced with a situation in which a trial court has ordered that funds appropriated for one purpose be used for some entirely unrelated purpose; nor are we confronted with a trial court order that funds actually in use for one program be diverted to another. It is vital that

[2]The majority asserts that this opinion "urges abandonment" of the rule of *Mandel* v. *Myers*, *supra*, 29 Cal.3d 531 (*Mandel*). This is incorrect.

In *Mandel*, *supra*, 29 Cal.3d 531, this court held that the separation of powers doctrine does not prevent the courts from ordering appropriate expenditures from already existing funds when such funds are "reasonably available for the expenditures in question . . . ." (*Id.* at p. 542.) There, the court found that certain "catchall" funds were reasonably available for the expenditures in question, the payment of attorney fees in a case enforcing constitutional rights. But nothing in *Mandel* indicated that the only funds that might ever be reasonably available in any case were "catchall" funds. And, as later cases made clear, *Mandel*'s test of "reasonable availability" encompasses unused funds that have been appropriated for purposes closely related to the purposes for which they are sought to be expended. (*Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist.* v. *State of California*, *supra*, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 181; *Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist.* v. *State of California*, *supra*, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 541.)

In this case, as my analysis has demonstrated, the OUSD and GAIN funds were appropriated for purposes reasonably and closely related to the purpose for which the trial court ordered them to be used. Thus, *Mandel* and its progeny were not violated. The analysis in this opinion is entirely consistent with both the *Mandel* line of cases, and the cases from the United States Supreme Court and this court that more fully and generally articulate the doctrine of separation of powers. *Mandel* and its progeny represent an area of specific application of general separation of powers principles; properly understood, there is no disjunction between the *Mandel* line of cases and cases such as *Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services*, *supra*, 433 U.S. 425, and *Mistretta* v. *United States*, *supra*, 488 U.S. 361, that set forth a principled and coherent view of the separation of powers doctrine.

Thus, the majority's accusation that the approach to separation of powers questions set forth in this opinion, which is the same approach employed by our nation's highest court, would "stand the separation of powers clause on its head," is meritless.

trial courts take care to minimize any impingement on legislative prerogatives. But the trial court in this case did use the least intrusive means available to it to ensure the students' rights.[3]

As discussed earlier, if there is some cognizable interference with the functions of another branch, the reviewing court must then determine whether the act is "justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority" of the branch whose action is challenged. (*Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services*, *supra*, 433 U.S. at p. 443 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 891]; *Mistretta* v. *United States*, *supra*, 488 U.S. at p. 383, fn. 13 [102 L.Ed.2d at p. 737].) In my view, here the trial court's order was so justified.

The objective that the trial court sought to achieve by its orders in this case—to assure the protection of the fundamental rights of the District's students—was unquestionably within its constitutional authority. As this court has made clear on previous occasions, and as the majority reaffirms today, education is a fundamental right under the California Constitution. (*Serrano* v. *Priest* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 608-609 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 41 A.L.R.3d 1187]; *Serrano* v. *Priest* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 766 [135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929].)

Moreover, the court, in acting to protect the students' rights to education, had no practical alternative to the remedial order it issued. It was the court's

[3]At the hearing on the preliminary injunction, an official of the Department of Education testified without contradiction that there were two sources from which department funds were available that could be employed to assist the District—the OUSD fund and the GAIN fund. No other funds were identified as available.

The funds appropriated to the Department of Education for the general support of elementary and secondary schools are not placed in a "catchall" fund subject to the discretion of Department of Education officials. Instead, under the Education Code, virtually all sums transferred from the state's general fund to the Department of Education for the general support of elementary and secondary education are transferred subject to a strict formula under which each local district is entitled to an amount computed on the basis of average daily student attendance. (Ed. Code, § 14000 et seq., § 46000 et seq.) No state official appears to have any discretion to vary the legislatively mandated allocation of funds.

My research reveals that the only funds that might have been considered reasonably available to aid the District under the majority's criteria at the time of the trial court's decision in this case were certain emergency funds under control of the Director of Finance. (Stats. 1990, ch. 467, § 2.00.) But there is nothing in the record to show that these funds had not been used for some other emergency purpose. Even assuming that none of these funds had been committed to some other use, however, the funds would have been grossly inadequate to meet the District's needs in any event. The total amount of funds available to the Director of Finance to meet all the emergency needs of the State under the then-current budget was $7 million. (*Ibid.*) As we have seen, the District faced a $23 million budget shortfall.

duty to act. As the United States Supreme Court has held, "a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us." (*Reynolds* v. *Sims* (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 566 [12 L.Ed.2d 506, 530, 84 S.Ct. 1362].)

When the other branches of government have failed to act, the courts have not flinched from their duty to fashion appropriate remedies when necessary to guarantee constitutional rights to the people of this state. Thus, in *Wilson* v. *Eu* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 471, 473 [286 Cal.Rptr. 280, 816 P.2d 1306], we held that, although reapportionment is primarily a matter for the legislative branch, when that branch has failed to act and electoral rights will be irretrievably lost if no action is taken, "we must proceed forthwith to draft such [reapportionment] plans." And in *Crawford* v. *Board of Education* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 280, 307 [130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28], we held that when a recalcitrant school board failed to act to cure the harmful consequences of school segregation, the trial court could exercise "broad equitable powers" to frame a remedy that would assure the students' basic rights. (Accord, e.g., *Swann* v. *Board of Education* (1971) 402 U.S. 1, 15 [28 L.Ed.2d 554, 566, 91 S.Ct. 1267]; see *Assembly* v. *Deukmejian* (1982) 30 Cal.3d 638, 659 [180 Cal.Rptr. 297, 639 P.2d 939]; *Midway Orchards* v. *County of Butte* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 765, 779 [269 Cal.Rptr. 796].)

No sound reason exists to hold that although some fundamental rights demand judicial protection when they are endangered because the other branches of government have failed to act, other rights, equally fundamental, do not. Yet that is the consequence of the majority's holding in this case that the trial court erred in ordering that an emergency loan be made to the District.

The practical consequences of the majority's holding should not be overlooked. In an era of fiscal constraint and uncertainty for local governments, including school districts, we cannot assume that the District's problems will prove to be unique. If another school district experiences financial difficulties and the other branches of government fail to act, parents may indeed bring a lawsuit to protect their children's right to education. Under today's decision, the trial court will declare that the children have a constitutional right to basic educational equality, and that the State bears responsibility for assuring this right is not denied. The court may then announce that no means

exist by which it can enforce that right. And the doors to the schoolhouse will close.

I would affirm the orders of the trial court in their entirety.

EXHIBIT 'F'

OPINION OF THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL

OPINION 99-1214 - MAY 2, 2000

Opinion No. 99-1214—May 2, 2000

Requested by: THE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS

Opinion by: BILL LOCKYER, Attorney General
Gregory L. Gonot, Deputy

THE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS has requested an opinion on the following questions:

1. Is the Board of Corrections authorized to institute a legal action or impose sanctions against a local agency for a failure to bring a particular juvenile facility into compliance with the minimum standards established by the board?

2. When a local agency brings a particular juvenile facility into compliance with the minimum standards established by the Board of Corrections, is the state required to reimburse the local agency for the costs incurred in meeting the standards?

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Board of Corrections is not authorized to institute a legal action or impose sanctions against a local agency for a failure to bring a particular juvenile facility into compliance with the minimum standards established by the board.

2. When a local agency brings a particular juvenile facility into compliance with the minimum standards established by the Board of Corrections, the state is not required to reimburse the local agency for the costs incurred in meeting the standards.

ANALYSIS

The Board of Corrections ("Board") is established within the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (Pen. Code, § 6024) and serves as "the means whereby the Department of Corrections and the Department of Youth Authority may correlate their individual programs for the adults and youths under the jurisdiction of each" (Pen. Code, § 6026). Among the Board's specific duties is the adoption of minimum standards for the operation and maintenance of juvenile facilities in which minors are confined. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 210.)[1] We are asked to determine whether the Board has any enforcement powers with respect to the minimum standards which it sets for juvenile facilities and whether compliance with the standards by a local agency requires the state to reimburse the local agency for the costs incurred.

[1] All references hereafter to the Welfare and Institutions Code are by section number only.

We conclude that the Board has not been authorized to institute legal actions or impose sanctions to enforce its minimum standards and that the state is not required to reimburse local agencies for the costs associated with complying with the standards.

1. Authority to Enforce Minimum Standards

Section 210 states: "The Board of Corrections shall adopt minimum standards for the operation and maintenance of juvenile halls for the confinement of minors." Section 210.2 additionally requires the Board to establish standards for adult facilities used temporarily to house minors. The key statute requiring our interpretation is section 209, which provides:

> "(a) The judge of the juvenile court of a county, or, if there is more than one judge, any of the judges of the juvenile court shall, at least annually inspect any jail, juvenile hall, or special purpose juvenile hall that, in the preceding calendar year, was used for confinement, for more than 24 hours, of any minor.
>
> "The judge shall promptly notify the operator of the jail, juvenile hall, or special purpose juvenile hall of any observed noncompliance with minimum standards for juvenile facilities adopted by the Board of Corrections under Section 210. Based on the facility's subsequent compliance with the provisions of subdivisions (d) and (e), the judge shall thereafter make a finding whether the facility is a suitable place for the confinement of minors and shall note the finding in the minutes of the court.
>
> "The Board of Corrections shall conduct a biennial inspection of each jail, juvenile hall, lockup, or special purpose juvenile hall situated in this state that, during the preceding calendar year, was used for confinement, for more than 24 hours, of any minor. The board shall promptly notify the operator of any jail, juvenile hall, lockup, or special purpose juvenile hall of any noncompliance found, upon inspection, with any of the minimum standards for juvenile facilities adopted by the Board of Corrections under Section 210 or 210.2.
>
> "If either a judge of the juvenile court or the board, after inspection of a jail, juvenile hall, special purpose juvenile hall, or lockup, finds that it is not being operated and maintained as a suitable place for the confinement of minors, the juvenile court or the board shall give notice of its finding to all persons having authority to confine minors pursuant to this chapter and

commencing 60 days thereafter the facility shall not be used for confinement of minors until the time the judge or board, as the case may be, finds, after reinspection of the facility that the conditions that rendered the facility unsuitable have been remedied, and the facility is a suitable place for confinement of minors.

"The custodian of each jail, juvenile hall, special purpose juvenile hall, and lockup shall make any reports as may be requested by the board or the juvenile court to effectuate the purposes of this section.

"(b) The Board of Corrections may inspect any law enforcement facility that contains a lockup for adults and that it has reason to believe may not be in compliance with the requirements of subdivision (d) of Section 207.1 or with the certification requirements or standards adopted under Section 210.2. A judge of the juvenile court shall conduct an annual inspection, either in person or through a delegated member of the appropriate county or regional juvenile justice commission, of any law enforcement facility that contains a lockup for adults which, in the preceding year, was used for the secure detention of any minor. If the law enforcement facility is observed, upon inspection, to be out of compliance with the requirements of subdivision (d) of Section 207.1, or with any standard adopted under Section 210.2, the board or the judge shall promptly notify the operator of the law enforcement facility of the specific points of noncompliance.

"If either the judge or the board finds after inspection that the facility is not being operated and maintained in conformity with the requirements of subdivision (d) of Section 207.1 or with the certification requirements or standards adopted under Section 210.2, the juvenile court or the board shall give notice of its finding to all persons having authority to securely detain minors in the facility, and, commencing 60 days thereafter, the facility shall not be used for the secure detention of a minor until the time the judge or the board, as the case may be, finds, after reinspection, that the conditions that rendered the facility unsuitable have been remedied, and the facility is a suitable place for the confinement of minors in conformity with all requirements of law.

"The custodian of each law enforcement facility that contains a lockup for adults shall make any report as may be requested

by the board or by the juvenile court to effectuate the purposes of this subdivision.

"(c) The board shall collect biennial data on the number, place, and duration of confinements of minors in jails and lockups, as defined in subdivision (i) of Section 207.1, and shall publish biennially this information in the form as it deems appropriate for the purpose of providing public information on continuing compliance with the requirements of Section 207.1.

"(d) Except as provided in subdivision (e), a juvenile hall, special purpose juvenile hall, law enforcement facility, or jail shall be unsuitable for the confinement of minors if it is not in compliance with one or more of the minimum standards for juvenile facilities adopted by the Board of Corrections under Section 210 or 210.2, and if, within 60 days of having received notice of noncompliance from the board or the judge of the juvenile court, the juvenile hall, special purpose juvenile hall, law enforcement facility, or jail has failed to file an approved corrective action plan with the Board of Corrections to correct the condition or conditions of noncompliance of which it has been notified. The corrective action plan shall outline how the juvenile hall, special purpose juvenile hall, law enforcement facility, or jail plans to correct the issue of noncompliance and give a reasonable timeframe, not to exceed 90 days, for resolution, that the board shall either approve or deny. In the event the juvenile hall, special purpose juvenile hall, law enforcement facility, or jail fails to meet its commitment to resolve noncompliance issues outlined in its corrective action plan, the board shall make a determination of suitability at its next scheduled meeting.

"(e) Where a juvenile hall is not in compliance with one or more of the minimum standards for juvenile facilities adopted by the Board of Corrections under Section 210, and where the noncompliance arises from sustained occupancy levels that are above the population capacity permitted by applicable minimum standards, the juvenile hall shall be unsuitable for the confinement of minors if the board or the judge of the juvenile court determines that conditions in the facility pose a serious risk to the health, safety, or welfare of minors confined in the facility. In making its determination of suitability, the board or the judge of the juvenile court shall consider, in addition to the noncompliance with minimum standards, the totality of conditions in the juvenile

hall, including the extent and duration of overpopulation as well as staffing, program, physical plant, and medical and mental health care conditions in the facility. The Board of Corrections may develop guidelines and procedures for its determination of suitability in accordance with this subdivision and to assist counties in bringing their juvenile halls into full compliance with applicable minimum standards. This subdivision shall not be interpreted to exempt a juvenile hall from having to correct, in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (d), any minimum standard violations that are not directly related to overpopulation of the facility."[2]

In analyzing the terms of section 209 and related provisions of the statutory scheme, we rely upon well established principles of statutory interpretation. "When construing a statute, we must 'ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' [Citation.]" (*Wilcox v. Birtwhistle* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977.) "Our first step [in determining the Legislature's intent] is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citations.]" (*People v. Valladoli* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 597; accord, *California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist.* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 633.) It is a "cardinal rule that a statute '. . . is to be interpreted by the language in which it is written, and courts are no more at liberty to add provisions to what is therein declared in definite language than they are to disregard any of its express provisions.' [Citation.]" (*Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1097.)

Applying these principles to the Board's statutorily prescribed duties, we find that the Legislature has been highly specific in defining the responsibilities of the Board. It is to adopt minimum standards for facilities housing juveniles. (§§ 210, 210.2.) A judge is to inspect these facilities each year. (§ 209, subd. (a).) The judge is to notify the operator of any facility not in compliance with the Board's minimum standards. (*Ibid.*) In addition, the Board is to inspect each facility every two years and must also notify the operator of any facility not in compliance with its minimum standards. (*Ibid.*) If the facility is thereafter found not to be "a suitable place for the confinement of minors," the juvenile court or the Board is required to "give notice of its findings to all persons having authority to confine minors. . . ." (*Ibid.*) Sixty days after such notification, "the facility shall not

[2] Subdivision (d) of section 207.1 authorizes the temporary confinement of certain minors in an adult facility under specified conditions.

be used for confinement of minors" until "the facility is a suitable place. . . ." (*Ibid.*)

Accordingly, after the Board sets the minimum standards (§§ 210, 210.2), section 209 imposes upon the Board the duties of (1) inspecting the facilities every other year, (2) providing notification to the operator of any facility found not to be in compliance with the standards, and (3) providing notification to persons having authority to confine minors of any finding of unsuitability. No other enforcement duties are specified in section 209 or any other statute. We are not at liberty to add, in the guise of statutory interpretation, the additional enforcement remedies of filing a legal action or imposing sanctions against public officials responsible for operating a particular juvenile facility in violation of section 209.

Justifiably, the Legislature may anticipate that local public officials will obey the law by not housing minors in a particular juvenile facility found unsuitable by a judge or the Board. (See *City of Beaumont v. Beaumont Irr. Dist.* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 291, 297 ["There is a statutory presumption that officials will comply with the law"]; *Erven* v. *Board of Supervisors* (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1012 ["It may be presumed that the Board will comply with the law"]; *San Bernardino County Flood Etc. Dist. v. Superior Court* (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 514, 521 ["It must be presumed that the board of supervisors of the Flood Control District will perform its official duties"].)

This is particularly true here since both the Legislature and public officials are aware that the failure to comply with the terms of section 209 may subject the public officials to criminal prosecution. Government Code section 1222 states:

> "Every willful omission to perform any duty enjoined by law upon any public officer, or person holding any public trust or employment, where no special provision is made for the punishment of such delinquency, is punishable as a misdemeanor."

We have examined the application of Government Code section 1222 in a number of situations (see, e.g., 82 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 246, 248 (1999); 82 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 6, 10, fn. 4 (1999); 80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 36, 39–40 (1997); 76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 289, 292–293 (1993), as have the courts (see, e.g., *Centinela Hospital Assn. v. City of Inglewood* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1598; *Griffis v. County of Mono* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 414, 427, fn. 15; *Griswald v. Mt. Diablo Unified Sch. Dist.* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 648, 656–658; *Adler v. City Council* (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 763, 774–774; see also *Boags v. Municipal Court* (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 65). A willful omission to remove minors from a place found unsuitable by a judge or

the Board in violation of section 209 may give rise to an application of Government Code section 1222.

Public officials who refuse to comply with the terms of section 209 may also be subject to removal from office. (See Gov. Code, §§ 1770, subd. (h) [An office becomes vacant upon "[h]is or her conviction . . . of any offense involving a violation of his or her official duties"], 3060–3074 [conviction of "willful or corrupt misconduct in office" removes the person from office]; *Lubin v. Wilson* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1422, 1427; *People v. Hawes* (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 930, 938–939; *People v. Tice* (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 750, 754; 82 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., *supra*, at p. 10, fn. 4; 80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., *supra*, at pp. 40–41; 76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., *supra*, at p. 291; 75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 64, 66–67 (1992).)

Under these circumstances, the Legislature may reasonably believe that giving the Board additional enforcement powers with respect to its minimum standards for juvenile facilities would be unnecessary. Of course, if the Legislature determines that the Board should institute legal proceedings and impose sanctions in appropriate circumstances, it may easily so authorize. (See, e.g., *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082 ["Had the Legislature intended to limit the exception . . . it could have done so in express terms"].)

Finally, we note that in 63 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 227 (1980), we were presented with a similar question regarding the Board's authority to enforce minimum standards for adult local detention facilities. We stated in part:

> ". . . There is nothing in the statutes that gives the board authority to sue to compel compliance with those standards, even if the failing in a particular facility is life-threatening. A public agency, such as the board, which has been created by the Legislature may exercise only such powers which have been expressly granted to it or which may be fairly implied from such granted powers. [Citations.] No such authority has been granted to the board herein, nor may such be implied from its powers. Instead, the Legislature has left compliance with the standards to persuasion through the filing of reports of inspection or through the coercion of withholding reimbursement for detention of alleged parole violators under section 4016.5. . . ." (*Id.*, at p. 231.)

Here, we believe that the public officials charged with housing minors in a juvenile facility will act to avoid violating the terms of section 209. The consequences of refusing to obey the law may be severe.

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We conclude in answer to the first question that the Board is not authorized to institute a legal action or impose sanctions against a local agency for a failure to bring a particular juvenile facility into compliance with the minimum standards established by the Board.

2. State Mandated Local Costs

Section 6 of article XIII B of the Constitution provides:

> "Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any local government, the State shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of such program or increased level of service, except that the Legislature may, but need not, provide such subvention of funds for the following mandates:
>
> "(a) Legislative mandates requested by the local agency affected;
>
> "(b) Legislation defining a new crime or changing an existing definition of a crime; or
>
> "(c) Legislative mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or executive orders or regulations initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January 1, 1975."

Government Code section 17561 implements this constitutional requirement by providing: "The state shall reimburse each local agency and school district for all 'costs mandated by the state,' as defined in section 17514." Government Code section 17514 defines reimbursable costs as "any increased costs which a local agency or school district is required to incur after July 1, 1980, as a result of any statute enacted on or after January 1, 1975, or any executive order implementing any statute enacted on or after January 1, 1975, which mandates a new program or higher level of service of an existing program within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution."

The constitutional subvention requirement applies to state mandated increases in services provided by local agencies in existing programs. (*Los Angeles v. California* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 56.) Covered programs are those that "carry out the governmental function of providing services to the public, or laws which, to implement a state policy, impose unique requirements on local governments and do not apply generally to all residents and entities in the state." (*Ibid.*) As used in section 6 of Article XIII B of the Constitution, the term "mandate" applies to agency regulations as well as

statutory requirements. (*Long Beach Unified School Dist. v. California* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 175.)

Here, we do not have a "new program" being imposed by the Legislature upon local governments. Counties have been required to maintain a "suitable" place for the detention of minors since at least 1915. (See § 850; Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, § 2; Stats. 1945, ch. 967, § 2; Stats. 1915, ch. 631, § 22.) Setting the minimum standards for what is "suitable" does not create a "higher" level of service—it has long been the level of service required of local agencies. (See also *Inmates of the Riverside County Jail v. Clark* (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 850, 860–861 [minimum standards set by Board for local detention facilities reflect constitutional requirements].)

In *County of Los Angeles v. Department of Industrial Relations* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1538, the court rejected an argument that the state was required to reimburse local governments for the costs incurred in meeting new elevator earthquake and fire safety regulations promulgated by the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The court noted in part: "The regulations at issue do not mandate elevator service; they simply establish safety measures." (*Id.*, at p. 1546.)

In 63 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 700 (1980), we concluded that the state was not required to reimburse local agencies for the costs of adding municipal court judges as directed by the Legislature. In finding that the additional judges did not constitute a "new" program or a "higher" level of service, we stated:

> ". . . Providing for an adequate number of judges for the most important court in the state in terms of the numbers of citizens it serves, in order that it may continue effectively to function as a forum for the orderly settlement of civil disputes and the prosecution of the floodtide of petty crime (*cf. Board of Supervisors v. Krumm* (1976) 62 Cal. App. 3d 935, 946), in accordance with the standard of justice prescribed by the constitution and laws of this state and of the United States, is a preexisting constitutional imperative. It is that standard, as distinguished from the number of personnel, to which the 'level of service' relates. Thus, a 'standard' has been defined in part as 'a definite level or degree of quality that is proper and adequate for a specific purpose.' (Webster's Third New Internat. Dict. (1961) p. 2233.) Hence, in our view, an increase in the number of judges does not portend the imposition by the Legislature of any new or increased obligation, but the maintenance of preordained constitutional standards." (*Id.* at pp. 702–703, fn. omitted.)

The minimum standards set by the Board for juvenile facilities constitute objective criteria which are needed to ensure that the facilities remain suitable places for the confinement of minors. The standards do not create a new program or impose a higher level of service for local agencies. What has long been required of local agencies is the maintenance of "suitable" facilities to house detained minors.

In answer to the second question presented, we conclude that when a local agency brings a particular juvenile facility into compliance with the minimum standards established by the Board, the state is not required to reimburse the local agency for the costs incurred in meeting the standards.

(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)

EXHIBIT 'G'

People Ex.Rel. Foundation etc v. Duque

105 Cal.App.4th 259; 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 298

[No. A098863. First Dist., Div. Five. Jan. 10, 2003.]

THE PEOPLE ex rel. FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HENRY DUQUE, Defendant and Appellant.

SUMMARY

The trial court entered a judgment that a Public Utilities Commission (PUC) commissioner forfeited his office pursuant to Pub. Util. Code, § 303, subd. (a), for having owned stock in a corporation that was regulated by the PUC. (Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, No. 318146, Alfred G. Chiantelli, Judge.)

The Court of Appeal reversed. The court held that because the trial court correctly ruled that defendant held his interest in the stock voluntarily, and since the forfeiture language set forth in the statute applies only when a commissioner acquires an interest in a regulated company "other than voluntarily," the statute, by its terms, did not apply under the facts of the case. The court could not supply an implied remedy to fill the statutory gap. It is particularly appropriate to honor forfeiture limitations where the issue is whether a state constitutional officer has forfeited his or her office. A court must limit itself to interpreting the law as written and leave for the people and the Legislature the task of revising it as they deem wise. Moreover, a commissioner who voluntarily owns stock in a regulated company arguably has neglected his statutory duty under Pub. Util. Code, § 303, subd. (a), and thus would be subject to removal under Cal. Const., art. XII, § 1. (Opinion by Jones, P. J., with Stevens and Simons, JJ., concurring.)

HEADNOTES

Classified to California Digest of Official Reports

(1a-1d) Public Officers and Employees § 29—Duration and Termination of Tenure—Forfeiture—Public Utilities Commissioner—Voluntary Ownership of Stock in Regulated Company.—The trial court erred in ruling that a Public Utilities Commission (PUC) commissioner forfeited his office pursuant to Pub. Util. Code, § 303, subd. (a), for

having owned stock in a corporation that was regulated by the PUC. Because the trial court correctly ruled that defendant held his interest in the stock voluntarily, and since the forfeiture language set forth in the statute applies only when a commissioner acquires an interest in a regulated company "other than voluntarily," the statute, by its terms, did not apply under the facts of the case. The court could not supply an implied remedy to fill the statutory gap. It is particularly appropriate to honor forfeiture limitations where the issue is whether a state constitutional officer has forfeited his or her office. A court must limit itself to interpreting the law as written and leave for the People and the Legislature the task of revising it as they deem wise. Moreover, a commissioner who voluntarily owns stock in a regulated company arguably has neglected his statutory duty under Pub. Util. Code, § 303, subd. (a), and thus would be subject to removal under Cal. Const., art. XII, § 1.

[See 8 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1989) Constitutional Law, § 889; West's Key Number Digest, Public Utilities ⚷ 142.]

(2) **Statutes § 30—Construction—Language—Plain Meaning.**—In construing a statute a court ascertains the Legislature's intent in order to effectuate the law's purpose. The court must look to the statute's words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. The statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.

(3) **Public Officers and Employees § 29—Duration and Termination of Tenure—Forfeiture.**—Public office forfeiture provisions are disfavored because they encroach on the fundamental right to hold office. The right to hold public office, either by election or appointment, is one of the valuable rights of citizenship. The exercise of this right should not be declared prohibited or curtailed except by plain provisions of law. Furthermore, the law traditionally disfavors forfeitures, and statutes imposing them are to be strictly construed.

(4) **Statutes § 30—Construction—Language—Plain Meaning.**—Courts are obligated to interpret the language in a statute in accordance with its plain meaning, and may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite a law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.

(5) **Statutes § 39—Construction—Conformation of Parts.**—While a court must, if possible, avoid interpreting a statute in an absurd manner, when deciding what is absurd the court is required to read the statute

with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized.

(6) **State of California § 10—Attorney General—Opinions—Weight.** —An opinion of the Attorney General authorizing a quo warranto action against a Public Utilities Commission commissioner was not controlling on the commissioner's appeal from an adverse judgment. Given that the Attorney General aligned himself with plaintiff, citing the Attorney General's opinion as controlling is analogous to one party arguing that an amicus curiae brief submitted in support of his or her position mandates how an appeal must be resolved. In any event, while opinions of the Attorney General are entitled to considerable weight, they are not binding.

COUNSEL

Remcho, Johansen & Purcell, Joseph Remcho and Thomas A. Willis for Defendant and Appellant.

Harvey Rosenfield, Pamela M. Pressley; Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, and Anthony Davigo, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

JONES, P. J.—The People of the State of California, through relator the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights (FTCR) filed a quo warranto action against Commissioner Henry Duque of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), contending Duque must be removed from office pursuant to Public Utilities Code section 303,[1] subdivision (a), because he formerly held stock in a corporation that was regulated by the PUC. The trial court agreed and ruled Duque had forfeited his office. Duque now appeals claiming the judgment must be reversed because (1) section 303, subdivision (a), is unconstitutional, and (2) the statute, by its terms, did not apply to his conduct. We agree with the second of these arguments and reverse the judgment.

[1]Unless otherwise indicated, all further section references will be to the Public Utilities Code.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 3, 1995, former Governor Pete Wilson appointed Duque a commissioner on the PUC. The position is a constitutionally mandated office.[2] In December 1996, Governor Wilson reappointed Duque to a full six-year term. His appointment was confirmed by the state senate. Duque's term of office ended on January 1, 2003.

While Duque was a commissioner, his personal investment account was managed by his long-term stockbroker, Michael Golub. Golub made investment decisions for Duque pursuant to a power of attorney without seeking input from Duque. When Duque became a commissioner, he told Golub he could not own stock in companies that were regulated by the PUC.

On May 12, 1999, Golub purchased stock in Nextel Communications, Inc., a wireless communication carrier, and allocated 700 shares to Duque's account. At the time of the purchase, Duque believed that wireless carriers such as Nextel were regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and not by the PUC. Golub had a similar understanding. Duque disclosed his ownership of the Nextel stock in his 1999 and 2000 statements of economic interests.

In fact, while states are precluded from regulating the rates charged by wireless carriers (see 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)), other aspects of Nextel's business were and are regulated by the PUC. Three months after Duque acquired his stock, Nextel and all other phone companies in California filed a joint petition seeking an allocation of phone numbers in the 310 area code. The PUC, with Duque voting in dissent, adopted an allocation plan. Duque voted against the interests of Nextel and the other petitioning parties.

In February 2000, the PUC noticed rulemaking proceedings to establish consumer protection rules applicable to telecommunication companies. The rules would apply to all communication companies, including Nextel.

In March 2000, the PUC approved an interconnection agreement between Pacific Bell and Nextel. The agreement was part of a larger consent item agenda that included several similar agreements. All the agreements were approved en masse.

[2]California Constitution, article XII, section 1, states: "The Public Utilities Commission consists of 5 members appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, a majority of the membership concurring, for staggered 6-year terms. . . . The Legislature may remove a member for incompetence, neglect of duty, or corruption, two thirds of the membership of each house concurring."

On August 16, 2000, Duque received a phone call from Todd Wallack, a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle, who had reviewed Duque's statements of economic interests. Wallack questioned Duque's ownership of Nextel stock, asserting it was a regulated company whose stock Duque was not permitted to own. Duque contacted the general counsel of the PUC to ask him whether Nextel was regulated by the PUC. The general counsel did not call back.

Duque believed that Wallack sounded knowledgeable. He decided to sell his stock because there was, at a minimum, a perception of conflict. On August 18, 2000, Duque directed his stockbroker to sell his remaining Nextel stock. Duque earned almost $70,000 as the result of his ownership of the stock.

On October 4, 2000, respondent FTCR sought permission from the California Attorney General to file an action against Duque. The Attorney General granted permission in an opinion dated November 29, 2000. (See 83 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 263 (2000).)

In January 2001, FTCR, acting in the name of the People of the State of California, filed a quo warranto action against Duque under Code of Civil Procedure section 803 et seq. FTCR contended that Duque had forfeited his office as a commissioner under section 303, subdivision (a), because he formerly owned a prohibited financial interest in Nextel.

In July 2001, FTCR filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it was entitled to prevail as a matter of law. The judge hearing the motion denied it, ruling that section 303, subdivision (a), "does not provide for the removal from office of a [c]ommissioner . . . for a voluntary acquisition of stock." However, the judge ruled Nextel was in fact subject to regulation by the PUC.

The case then proceeded to a one-day court trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued a statement of decision ruling Duque had forfeited his office under section 303, subdivision (a), because he had voluntarily owned stock in a company that was regulated by the PUC. The court ruled specifically that Duque had *not* been dishonest and that he had *not* acted in bad faith. Instead, the court ruled that Duque had shown poor judgment because he had "not [done] everything, which can reasonably be expected of a public utility commissioner to do in order to avoid a conflict of interest." The court ordered Duque to pay a $5,000 fine, and ruled he must pay FTCR's attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

This appeal followed. While the matter was being briefed, we granted Duque's petition for writ of supersedeas and stayed the court's judgment pending our resolution of the appeal.

II. DISCUSSION[3]

(1a) Duque contends the judgment must be reversed because (1) section 303, subdivision (a) is unconstitutional, and (2) the section, by its terms, did not apply under the facts of this case. Since we do not reach constitutional issues unless absolutely required to do so (*Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 207, 902 P.2d 225]), we turn to the second, and we believe, dispositive argument.

Section 303, subdivision (a), states: "A public utilities commissioner may not hold an official relation to nor have a financial interest in a person or corporation subject to regulation by the commission. If any commissioner acquires a financial interest in a corporation or person subject to regulation by the commission other than voluntarily, his or her office shall become vacant unless within a reasonable time he or she divests himself or herself of the interest."

Our interpretation of this language is guided by well-settled rules of construction. **(2)** In construing a statute we ascertain the Legislature's intent in order to effectuate the law's purpose. (*Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].) We must look to the statute's words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. (*DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc.* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 828 P.2d 140].) "The statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous." (*Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851, 860-861 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 803, 968 P.2d 514].)

(1b) The language used in section 303, subdivision (a), is reasonably clear. The first sentence states that commissioners are precluded from owning an interest in any company that is subject to regulation by the PUC. Here, the trial court ruled, and the evidence fully supports the conclusion, that Duque held an interest in a corporation that was regulated by the PUC.

[3]While this appeal was being briefed, FTCR filed a request asking this court to take judicial notice of the legislative history of the statutes and constitutional sections that are at issue in this case. We deferred ruling on the request until the merits of the appeal. (See *People v. Preslie* (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 486, 493-494 [138 Cal.Rptr. 828].) Having now considered FTCR's request, we grant it.

It is undisputed that Duque held Nextel stock. Nextel, as a wireless carrier, was and is subject to regulation by the PUC. Indeed, Duque himself participated in a decision in which the PUC asserted its right to regulate certain aspects of the wireless communication business. (See *In re Mobile Telephone Service and Wireless Communications* (Cal.P.U.C., 1996) 174 Pub.Utl.Rep.4th (West) 543.)

The second sentence of section 303, subdivision (a), then states that if a commissioner comes to possess an interest in a regulated company "*other than voluntarily*" (or in other words involuntarily) he or she must divest himself or herself of that interest "within a reasonable time." If the commissioner fails to do so, his or her office "shall become vacant." Here the trial court held, and the parties both agree, that Duque held his interest in Nextel *voluntarily*. Since the forfeiture language set forth in section 303, subdivision (a), applies only when a commissioner acquires an interest in a regulated company "other than voluntarily," the statute, by its terms, did not apply under the facts of this case.

This application of section 303, subdivision (a), highlights a critical gap in the language of the statute. While section 303, subdivision (a), states that commissioners may not possess an interest in a regulated company, and provides a remedy for the *involuntary* acquisition of such an interest, the statute does not describe what occurs when a commissioner *voluntarily* acquires an interest in a regulated company.[4] The pivotal issue presented here is whether we must fill that gap with an implied remedy: i.e., that a commissioner who voluntarily acquires an interest in a regulated company must forfeit his or her office. We decline to do so.

(3) First, forfeiture provisions are disfavored because they encroach on the fundamental right to hold office. " '[T]he right to hold public office, either by election or appointment, is one of the valuable rights of citizenship . . . *The exercise of this right should not be declared prohibited or curtailed except by plain provisions of law*. . . .' " (*Helena Rubenstein Internat. v.*

[4]The statute's silence as to penalty for a voluntary acquisition is mirrored in a related constitutional provision. Article XII, section 7, of the California Constitution states: "A Public Utilities Commissioner may not hold an official relation to nor have a financial interest in a person or corporation subject to regulation by the commission." This language provides a standard of conduct applicable to public utilities commissioners, but does not provide a remedy for a violation of that standard. Article XII, section 7, also states: "A transportation company may not grant free passes or discounts to anyone holding an office in this state; and the acceptance of a pass or discount by a public officer, other than a Public Utilities Commissioner, shall work a forfeiture of that office." This portion of the section mandates forfeiture of office for certain types of conduct, but states clearly that the remedy does not apply to public utilities commissioners.

Younger (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 406, 418 [139 Cal.Rptr. 473], italics added in *Helena Rubenstein*, quoting *People v. Washington* (1869) 36 Cal. 658, 662; see also *Carter v. Commission Qualifications, etc.* (1939) 14 Cal.2d 179, 182 [93 P.2d 140].) Furthermore, the "law traditionally disfavors forfeitures and statutes imposing them are to be strictly construed." (*People v. United Bonding Ins. Co.* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 906 [98 Cal.Rptr. 57, 489 P.2d 1385]; see also 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 459, 461 (1984).) **(1c)** We believe it is particularly appropriate to honor these limitations where, as here, the issue is whether a state constitutional officer has forfeited his office.

(4) Second, we are obligated to interpret the language in a statute in accordance with its plain meaning. (*Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc.* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 30 P.3d 57].) "We may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite [a] law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used." (*California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 902 P.2d 297].) **(1d)** Here, section 303, subdivision (a), describes what occurs when a commissioner involuntarily owns stock in a regulated company. The statute, by its terms, does not describe what occurs when a commissioner voluntarily owns stock in a company that is regulated. "[W]e must limit ourselves to interpreting the law as written and leave for the People and the Legislature the task of revising it as they deem wise." (*People v. Garcia* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 15 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 980 P.2d 829].)

Our holding does not mean that commissioners may violate section 303, subdivision (a), with impunity. Article XII, section 1, of the California Constitution states that the Legislature may remove a commissioner from office "for incompetence, neglect of duty, or corruption . . . ." A commissioner who voluntarily owns stock in a regulated company arguably has neglected his statutory duty under section 303, subdivision (a), and thus would be subject to removal under article XII, section 1. Furthermore, Duque concedes that commissioners who violate the public trust remain subject to civil and criminal penalties under the Political Reform Act of 1974. (See Gov. Code, § 81000 et seq.) We hold only that a commissioner who violates section 303, subdivision (a), by voluntarily owning stock, does not, under the terms of that statute, forfeit his office.[5]

FTCR contends the interpretation of section 303, subdivision (a), we have adopted is absurd because it would permit forfeiture of office for the

[5]Having reached this conclusion, we need not decide the potentially more troubling issue of whether section 303, subdivision (a), is constitutional in light of article XII, section 1, of the California Constitution, which states: "The Legislature may remove a member [of the Public Utilities Commission] for incompetence, neglect of duty, or corruption, two thirds of the membership of each house concurring." Specifically, we need not decide whether the

involuntary acquisition of an interest in a regulated company, while providing no remedy for the more serious violation that occurs when a commissioner voluntarily acquires an interest in a regulated company. FTCR concedes this argument is premised on the assumption that a voluntary acquisition of an interest in a regulated company is, by its nature, a more serious offense. In our view, FTCR's premise is flawed. A commissioner can voluntarily but inadvertently acquire an interest in a regulated company by, for example, purchasing shares in an unregulated corporation which, unbeknownst to the commissioner, has recently acquired a regulated corporation. There is nothing particularly blameworthy about such an act and it should not necessarily trigger a more severe sanction.

(5) Furthermore, while we must, if possible, avoid interpreting a statute in an absurd manner (*Horwich v. Superior Court* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927]), when deciding what is "absurd" we are required to read the statute " ' "with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized . . . ." ' " (*Ibid.*, quoting *People v. Pieters* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898-899 [276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420].) Section 303, subdivision (a), certainly has a limited scope. It mandates forfeiture of office for an involuntary acquisition of an interest in a regulated company, while stating no remedy for the conflict of interest that arises when a commissioner voluntarily obtains an interest in a regulated company. However, the omissions inherent in section 303, subdivision (a), are largely filled by the power to remove found in article XII, section 1, of the California Constitution, and by the civil and criminal penalties contained in the Political Reform Act of 1974. (See Gov. Code, § 81000 et seq.) When all the related provisions of law are considered together, our interpretation of section 303, subdivision (a), is not absurd.

FTCR also contends the trial court's interpretation of section 303, subdivision (a), is supported by two opinions issued by the California Attorney General. However, the issue in the first opinion, 80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 27 (1997) was whether the PUC is obligated to discharge an employee who marries an employee of a regulated company. That Attorney General concluded that "on its face, section 303 would prohibit continued employment by an employee of the Commission who marries an employee of a regulated utility." (*Id.* at p. 29.) The opinion does not involve a constitutional officer, does not involve stock ownership, and does not discuss the forfeiture clause

section's grant of the power to remove to the Legislature, bars the judiciary from determining whether removal is necessary or appropriate. (Cf. *In re McGee* (1951) 36 Cal.2d 592 [226 P.2d 1]; *California War Veterans for Justice v. Hayden* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 982 [222 Cal.Rptr. 512].)

that is pivotal here. Given these significant differences, we conclude the opinion is not persuasive. (Cf. *Andres v. Young Men's Christian Assn.* (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 85, 90 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 788].)

(6) The second opinion, 83 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 263 (2000), is the one in which the Attorney General authorized FTCR to file the present litigation. Given that the Attorney General has aligned himself with FTCR, citing the Attorney General's opinion as controlling is analogous to one party arguing that an amicus brief submitted in support of his position mandates how an appeal must be resolved. In any event, while opinions of the Attorney General are entitled to considerable weight, they are not binding. (*State of Cal. ex rel. State Lands Com. v. Superior Court* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 50, 71 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 399, 900 P.2d 648].) Here, the Attorney General stated in his opinion that "[Duque's] office became vacant immediately upon his acquisition of the 700 shares of stock in Nextel on May 12, 1999." (83 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., *supra*, at p. 265.) In reaching that conclusion, the Attorney General did not discuss the language of the section 303, subdivision (a), in detail and he did not acknowledge that the statute only provides for a forfeiture when a commissioner obtains stock involuntarily. Again, we conclude the Attorney General's opinion is not persuasive.

FTCR next contends the trial court's ruling was correct under the rule that courts must, if possible, give meaning to all the language of a statute. (See, e.g., *Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564].) According to FTCR, interpreting section 303, subdivision (a), to mean that a voluntary acquisition of an interest does not result in a forfeiture would render the second sentence of the subdivision meaningless. This is simply not true. Under our interpretation, the first sentence of section 303, subdivision (a), sets forth the general rule that commissioners may not possess an interest in a company that is regulated by the PUC. The second sentence then provides a limited remedy for a violation of the general rule. If a commissioner obtains an interest involuntarily, he must divest himself of that interest in a reasonable time. If he fails to do so, his office is vacated. Under our interpretation, all language in the statute is given meaning.

Next, FTCR contends the trial court's ruling is supported by the maxim of statutory construction, *expressio unius est exclusio alterius,* meaning the "expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." (See *People v. Anzalone* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1074, 1078 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 969 P.2d 160].) As we understand it, FTCR's theory is that the first sentence of section 303, subdivision (a), states the general rule that a commissioner who owns an

interest in a company that is regulated by the PUC forfeits his office. The second sentence then provides for a single exception to the general rule: a commissioner who obtains his interest involuntarily, need not forfeit his office if he disposes of that interest within a reasonable time. According to FTCR, interpreting the statute to mean that a commissioner who voluntarily obtains an interest in a regulated company faces no risk of automatic forfeiture of office would improperly add an additional exception that is not specified in the statute. We reject this argument because it is based on a false premise. Contrary to FTCR's argument, the first sentence of section 303, subdivision (a), does not state that a commissioner who owns an interest in a regulated company forfeits his office. It merely states that a commissioner may not own an interest in a regulated company. No remedy is provided. FTCR's argument, based on a mistaken interpretation of the statute, must fail.

FTCR also argues that its interpretation of section 303, subdivision (a), is supported by a constitutional consideration. Specifically, FTCR notes that the first sentence of subdivision (a) stating: "A public utilities commissioner may not hold an official relation to nor have a financial interest in a person or corporation subject to regulation by the commission" is identical to language contained in article XII, section 7, of the California Constitution. The language in article XII, section 7, in turn, is based on former article XII, section 22, which stated in part: "no person in the employ of or holding any official relation to any person, firm or corporation, which said person, firm or corporation is subject to regulation by said Public Utilities Commission and no person owning stock or bonds of any such corporation or who is in any manner pecuniarily interested therein, shall be appointed to *or hold* the office of Public Utilities Commissioner." (See Deering's Cal. Codes (1974 ed.) Const., art. XII, § 22, p. 199, italics added.) Since current article XII, section 7, was intended to restate former article XII, section 22, without "substantive change," (see art. XII, § 9) FTCR contends the language we have italicized in former article XII, section 22, must be interpreted to mean that a person cannot simultaneously hold the position of commissioner and possess stock in a regulated company. If a commissioner does so, his office becomes vacant. We reject this argument because it fails to distinguish between a duty and a remedy. Article XII, section 7, and former article XII, section 22, both describe a duty that is imposed on those who serve as commissioners on the PUC. A commissioner cannot hold an interest in a company that is regulated by the PUC. However, neither of those sections provides a remedy for a violation of that duty. It is simply beyond our purview, as an intermediate appellate court, to create or imply such a remedy where it is not statutorily or constitutionally compelled.

Finally, FTCR relies on language from *Lubin v. Wilson* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1422, 1429-1430 [284 Cal.Rptr. 70], where the court said: "A person holds office subject to conditions imposed by the state and, where cause for removal is provided by law, the person is deemed to have accepted the office on condition he or she could be removed for that cause and in the manner provided. [Citation.]" FTCR contends that when Duque violated section 303, subdivision (a), by voluntarily owning stock, he failed to satisfy a "condition" of his position and thus forfeited his office.

We have no quarrel with the court's holding in *Lubin*; however, the case is distinguishable. The issue in *Lubin* was whether a member of the State Board of Equalization had forfeited his office when he was convicted of several felonies in federal court. The *Lubin* court ruled the member had forfeited his office, relying in part on Government Code section 1770, subdivision (h), which states that when person is "convict[ed] of a felony" his office becomes vacant. Since the statute at issue expressly mandated forfeiture under the circumstances presented, we agree the *Lubin* court reached the correct conclusion. Here, by contrast, the statute at issue contains a forfeiture provision, however, it clearly does not apply under the facts of this case. *Lubin* is not controlling.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed.

Stevens, J., and Simons, J., concurred.

Respondent's petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 9, 2003.